


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Vol: 4 (Part 1 & 2)

THE YOGA DARŚANA OF PĀTANJALI

WITH

THE SĀṆKHYA PRAVACHANA COMMENTARY OF VYĀSA

AND

THE GLOSS OF VĪTHĪPATI MIŚRA.

DISCARDED

CHAPTER THE FIRST, ON TRANCE (SAMĀDHI)

Sūtra 1.

अथ योगानुशासनम् ॥ १ ॥

1. Now¹ a revised text² of Yoga.³

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ।

यस्य क्त्वा रूपमाद्यं प्रभवति जगतोऽनेकधाऽनुग्रहाय

प्रक्षीणक्लेशराशिर्विषमविषधरोऽनेकचक्रः सुभोगी ।

सर्वज्ञानप्रसूतिर्भुजगपरिकरः प्रीतये यस्य नित्यम्

देवोऽहीशः स वोऽव्याप्तिस्तविमलतनुर्योगदे योगयुक्तः ॥१॥

अथ योगानुशासनम् । अथेत्ययमधिकारार्थः । योगानुशासनं शास्त्रमधिकृतं वेदितव्यम् । योगः समाधिः । स च सार्वभौमश्चित्तस्य धर्मः । क्षिप्तं मूढं विक्षिप्तमेकाग्रं निरुद्धमिति चित्तभूमयः । तत्र विक्षिप्ते चेतसि विक्षेपोपसर्जनीभूतः समाधिर्न योगपक्षे वर्तते । यस्त्वेकाग्रे चेतसि सद्भूतमर्थं प्रद्योतयति क्षिणोति च क्लेशान्कर्मबन्धनानि श्लथयति निरोधमभिमुखं करोति स संप्रज्ञातो योग इत्याख्यायते । स च वितर्कानुगतो विचारानुगत आनन्दानुगतोऽस्मितानुगत इत्युपरिष्ठाभिवेदयिष्यामः । सर्ववृत्तिनिरोधे त्वसंप्रज्ञातः समाधिः ॥ १ ॥

VYĀSA'S COMMENTARY.

"Now." This word here denotes undertaking. A text giving a revised critical teaching of Yoga is to be understood as having been undertaken.

Yoga is contemplation (Samādhi, trance), and it is a characteristic of the mind pervading all its planes. The planes of the mind are :— Wandering (Kṣipta); Forgetful (Mūḍha); Occasionally steady or distracted (Vikṣipta); One-pointed (Ēkāgra); and Restrained (Niruddha).

Of these the contemplation in the occasionally steady mind does not fall under the heading of Yoga, because of unsteadiness appearing in close sequence. That however, which in the one-pointed mind, fully shows forth an object existing as such in its most perfect form, removes the afflictions, loosens the bonds of karma and thus inclines it towards restraint, is said to be the Cognitive Trance (Samprajñāta Samādhi). And we shall explain further that this is accompanied by philosophical curiosity (vitarka), meditation (vichāra), bliss (ānanda), and egoism (asmitā).

When however all the modifications come under restraint, the trance is ultra-cognitive (Asamprajñāta Samādhi).

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Bhagavān Patanjali here composed the aphorism, "Now a revised text of Yoga," with the object of stating briefly the subject of the treatise he desired to write, so that it may attract the intelligent student and also that the reader may be able to understand with ease.

The word 'Now' (atha, the first of the sentence is explained :—" 'Now':— This word here denotes undertaking."

The word 'now' does not here denote sequence, as it does in, "Now there is light."

The word 'anūsāsana' means here a text-book, the derivative meaning being that by which something is taught; and this can not be begun in sequence of the performance of mental and physical restraint. On the contrary however the desire to know and the knowledge of realities appear in sequence of the desire to explain the knowledge of realities. As says the Veda :—"Therefore let him see the self, in the self" after having controlled the mind and the senses and become desireless, enduring and contemplative, (Br. U. IV. 4.23).

Although it is possible that the questioning of a student the performance of purificatory actions (tapas), and employment of alchemy may serve as antecedents, they are not to be taken as such here, because the recognition and taking up of the study by a student are of no use in making a treatise on Yoga authoritative. Even if there should be no student for the time being, the work should be undertaken if authoritative. If however not authoritative, it should be given up, even though there be a student asking for it. The existence of an immediate sequence between the knowledge of truth and the desire to explain it is hereby refuted.

If, however, the meaning is to be taken to be undertaking, then by speaking of the Yoga to be discussed by undertaking the work, the whole meaning and object of the work is set forth; and the student is easily informed and set to work in the belief that trance is the means of the highest good, as set forth in the Vedas, the Smṛitis, the Itihasas, and the Purāṇas.

The question arises, Is the word 'Now' to be taken to mean undertaking in all works? Because in that case it would mean the same in the Vedānta Sūtra.

Athāto Brahma jijñāsā.

"Now then a desire to know Brahma." I. 1. 1.

To meet this objection the Commentator specifies :—"This word here, &c."

Another doubt arises. How is Patanjali the author of the Yoga Teaching, when we have it in the Smṛiti of the Yogi Yājñavalkya, that Hiraṇyagarbha and no other ancient was the original teacher of Yoga. For this reason the author of the aphorisms has used the word 'Anūsāsana' (revised text) which means teaching after it has already been taught, not only teaching.

Because the word 'Now' means here an undertaking, the Commentator says that the meaning is that, 'a text giving a revised critical teaching of Yoga is to be understood as having been undertaken.'

But why should it be said that a work teaching Yoga is undertaken here? It is Yoga itself that is intended to be discussed here.

For this reason is it said :— 'Is to be understood, &c.' It is true that Yoga is spoken of as the subject of discussion here. It can, however, be discussed only by means of a work treating of the subject. The action of the teacher works through the instrument and does not directly operate upon the object. With the object of specifically mentioning the action of the teacher, his work treating of the subject of Yoga is to be understood as having been undertaken. Yoga, however, is to be undertaken as the subject of the work.

It should also be known that the hearing of the sound of the word 'atha' (now) when used to denote undertaking, is considered auspicious, like the sight of a jar full of water, which some one may be carrying.

The Commentator now removes the doubt as to the meaning of the word 'Yoga,' which arises from its ordinary connotation. Thus says he, "Yoga is contemplation." The word 'Yoga' is derived from the root Yuj to contemplate, and not from the root Yujir to join, in which latter case it would mean conjunction.

Another question arises again. Trance (samādhi) is to be described later on as being only a branch of Yoga. How can it then be that a part only may be the whole?

The Commentator adds for this reason :— 'and it pervades all its planes.' It is the word 'and' (cha) which distinguishes the whole from the part.

The planes are the states to be mentioned later on, the Madhyamā, the Madhupratikā, and the Viśokā. They are the states of the mind in which the potencies only are left in residue in the mind. Yoga, defined as the restraint of mental modifications, is present in all these planes, i. e., in all these states of the mind. Not so the trance which is only a branch of it.

Yoga is given here only its root meaning of contemplation, because the statement is made here only as an incentive to study, without intending to emphasize the distinction between the whole and the part. The real meaning of the word 'Yoga' is only the restraint of mental modifications.

For the refutation of those who say that the restraint of mental modifications is dependent upon the self, by reason of the modifications themselves being cognitions and therefore dependent upon the self, it is said : 'and it is a characteristic of the mind.'

By the word 'mind' (chitta) the internal organ, the will-to-know is hinted at. The power of consciousness, which is constant in its eternity and thus unchangeable, cannot have the faculty of knowledge for its characteristic. The will-to-be, which is the same as the will-to-know, however may. This is the meaning.

Grant that, but if the Yoga pervades all the mental planes, then, the wandering, the forgetful and the distracted planes of the mind too, should be understood by the word 'Yoga,' showing as they do the restraint of certain mental modifications relatively to the others. To remove this doubt, the planes to be taken and rejected as falling within 'Yoga' are mentioned, beginning with the word, 'wandering, &c.'

The wandering plane or condition of the mind is that in which it is always thrown by disturbing Energy (Rajas) towards these and those objects, and is thus extremely unsteady.

In the forgetful condition, the mind is possessed of the modification of deep sleep on account of the excess of inertia (the quality of Tamas).

The occasionally steady or distracted is differentiated from the wandering. The difference consists in the occasional steadiness of that which is for the most part unsteady.

This excess of its unsteadiness is either acquired, or brought about by the obstacles of disease, disinclination, &c., to be mentioned later.

The *one-pointed* is that which moves along one line only.

The *restrained* mind is that in which all the mental modifications have been restrained, and exist only as potencies.

Of these, the *wandering* and the *forgetful* modifications are not denied here *expressly* the status of Yoga, being far removed as they are from that state, inasmuch as notwithstanding the existence of relative restraint in them, they do not even form links in the chain of causes which lead to the highest good, and because they are in conflict with the nature thereof. To the *occasionally steady*, however, the status of Yoga is expressly denied, because in this case it is possible to mistake it as such on account of its occasional manifestation of steadiness over existing objects of knowledge. In the occasionally steady mind the contemplation does not fall under the heading of Yoga consisting as it does only of an occasional steadiness of the mind over an existing object. Why? Because it is followed in close sequence by its contrary state of unsteadiness and inapplication. Having fallen as it does in the midst of the manifestations of a contrary class, its very nature becomes difficult to distinguish from the very first as cause or effect. A seed which has remained in fire even for three or four seconds, will most certainly not sprout into leaves, even though sown.

Which contemplative mental state is then Yoga, if not the one which follows or is followed closely by unsteadiness?

‘That however which in the one-pointed mind, &c.’

The words ‘existing as such’ keep out an object whose existence is only fastened upon the reality. The words, ‘in its most perfect form’ are used to signify the best, i. e., that which manifests its essence to its utmost capacity. This is mentioned because the phenomenon of deep sleep also has a mind directed towards the one point which is its then object; that is to say, the quality of inertia (*damas*) which though characterized by the absence of all other mental phenomena, does still exist as such; and the excess of inertia is bad because it is the cause of the afflictions.

The word, ‘fully’ is used to qualify the words, ‘shows forth,’ because the showing forth, i. e., the knowledge of the realities may be accomplished by verbal and inferential cognitions also. Knowledge so obtained however, is not competent to remove nescience (*avidyā*) which is directly present in the mind; whereas inferential and verbal knowledge are after all indirect, the object being absent. The word ‘fully’ (*pra*) signifies intensity, and therefore indicates direct perceptual knowledge. The present sight of two moons and the doubt as to any particular direction of space go on existing, even though inference and authority point the other way.

Egoism and the other afflictions have their root in nescience. The appearance of knowledge means the removal of nescience. Egoism and other afflictions are also removed on the appearance of knowledge, because they are contrary thereto, and because the cause of their existence is destroyed. For this reason the words, ‘removes the afflictions’ have been added to the description.

For the same reason does it loosen the bonds in the shape of actions (*karma*). It is non-antecedent action that is desired to be understood here, by using the word denoting the cause to mean the effect.

‘Loosens’ means renders unfit for the production of effects. It will be said further,

‘It ripens into life-time, life-state and life-experience, if the root exists.’ II. 13.

‘And inclines it towards restraint’ means that it was not so inclined before.

This cognitive trance is four-fold. Hence is it said,

‘This is accompanied, &c.’

The ultra-cognitive trance is described by the words,

‘When however all the modifications, &c.’

In the *cognitive* trance are restrained those mental modifications of real cognition, &c., which are of the nature of disturbing energy and inertia (rajas and tamas); and this is done by resort to the class of mental modifications which are of the nature of the essence (sattva). In the *ultra-cognitive*, however, all modifications are restrained. This is the meaning.

The mental planes of Madhvatī &c., which find their end in these two states, are all the planes. That which pervades all these planes is called Sārvabhauma, all-pervading.

Sūtra 2.

योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ॥ २ ॥

2. Yoga¹ is the restraint¹ of mental² modifications.³

तस्य लक्षणाभिधित्सयेदं सूत्रं प्रवृत्ते । योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः । सर्वशब्दाग्रहणात्संप्रज्ञातोऽपि योग इत्याख्यायते । चित्तं हि प्रख्याप्रवृत्तिस्थितिशीलत्वात्त्रिगुणम् । प्रख्यारूपं हि चित्तसत्त्वं रजस्तमोभ्यां संसृष्टमैश्वर्यविषयप्रियं भवति । तदेव तमसाऽनुविद्धमधर्माज्ञानावैराग्यानैश्वर्योपगं भवति । तदेव प्रक्षोणमोहावरणं सर्वतः प्रघोतमानमनुविद्धं रजोमात्रया धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्योपगं भवति । तदेव रजोलेशमलापेतं स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठं सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिमात्रं धर्ममेघध्यानोपगं भवति । तत्परं प्रसंख्यानमित्याचक्षते ध्यायिनः । चितिशक्तिरपरिणामिन्यप्रतिसंक्रमा दर्शितविषया शुद्धाचानन्ता च सत्त्वगुणात्मिका चेयमतो विपरीता विवेकख्यातिरिति । अतस्तस्यां विरक्तं चित्तं तामपि ख्यातिं निरुणद्धि । तदवस्थं संस्कारोपगं भवति सनिर्बीजः समाधिः । न तत्र किञ्चित्संप्रज्ञायत इत्यसंप्रज्ञातः । द्विविधः स योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध इति ॥ २ ॥

YYĀSA.

The following aphorism was composed with the object of formulating its definition :-

‘Yoga is the restraint of mental modifications.’

Because the word, ‘all’ is not put in before (mental modifications) the Cognitive also is termed Yoga.

The mind is possessed of the ‘three qualities,’ showing as it does the nature of illumination, activity and inertia. Mental Essence manifesting as illumination loves power and objects of sense, when mixed up with disturbing energy (rajas) and inertia (tamas). The same pierced through by inertia (tamas) approaches vice, ignorance, and absence of desirelessness and supineness. The same shining all round with the veil of forgetfulness removed, but affected by a touch of disturbing energy, approaches virtue, knowledge, desirelessness, and masterfulness. The same becomes itself when the least impurity of disturbing energy (rajas) is removed. It then shows forth only the distinction of nature between the Essence of objective being and the conscious principle.

(puruṣa), and approaches the state of trance called the Cloud of Virtue (dharma-megha). This the thinkers call the Highest Intellection. (Param prasaṅkhyânam).

^ The power of consciousness changes not. It goes not from object to object. The objects are shown to it. It is pure and infinite. This phenomenon (of the knowledge of the distinct natures of the two) is, however, of the nature of the Objective Essence, and is the opposite thereof. On this account the mind freed from attachment to that too, restrains even this form of manifestation. In that state it is possessed of residual potencies alone. That is the seedless trance. It is called the ultra-cognitive because nothing is cognized in that state.

This is the two-fold Yoga, the restraint of mental modifications.

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

The second aphorism is introduced by the words.

'This aphorism was composed, &c.'

The word 'its' refers to the two descriptions of Yoga, mentioned in the previous aphorism.

"Yoga is the restraint of mental modifications."

That particular state of the mind in which the manifestations of real cognition, &c., have been restrained, is the state of Yoga.

The question arises, is not this definition bad, inasmuch as it does not cover the Cognitive Trance, in which that class of mental modifications which are of the very nature of its essence (sattva) are not restrained?

For this reason the Commentator says: - "Because the word 'all' is not put in, &c." If the restraint of *all* the mental modifications were mentioned, the definition would not cover the Cognitive Trance. The restraint of mental modifications, however, which checks the operation of the vehicles of affliction, action and fruition, comprehends that too. In the Cognitive Trance also, the mental modifications caused by disturbing Energy (rajas) and inertia (tamas) are restrained. In fact, the Cognitive Trance is the restraint of these modifications.

Why then does the *one* mind come into relationship with the wandering and other (more than one) planes? Further, what is the object of restraining the modifications of the mind so conditioned? To meet this apprehended questioning, the Commentator first takes up the cause of the mind thus coming into relationship with different conditions (planes).

'The mind is possessed of the three qualities.'

The Essence (sattva) is there, because it has the nature of illumination. Disturbing Energy is there, because of its possessing the nature of activity. The quality of darkness (tamas) is there, because of its possessing the nature of inertia.

The mention of the nature of illumination is suggestive. All the other qualities, therefore, of the Essence of things (sattva), such as brightness, lightness, joy and others are indicated.

By activity other qualities of disturbing Energy, such as remorse and sorrow, etc., are indicated.

Inertia is the characteristic modification of the quality of Tamas, the opposite of the quality of activity. By the mention of inactivity are indicated heaviness, interception, helplessness, etc.

The meaning is that the mind although *one*, passes into more conditions than one, because it is made-up of the three qualities (*gunas*) and its modifications are various, because the 'qualities' being unequal, fall into a variety of combinations.

Now the Commentator illustrates so far as may be, these very planes of the mind, 'the wandering and others, possessing as they do differences of sub-states :—"Mental Essence, &c."

Mental Essence means the Objective Essence (*sattva*) which has evolved as mind. By saying that the mental essence has the nature of illumination, it is shown that the mind has the quality of Essence (*sattva*) for its chief factor.

When in the mind, the disturbing Energy and Inertia (*rajas* and *tamas*) are a little less predominant than its own Essence, but equal to each other, then to it are dear power and the objects of sense, such as sound, &c. The mind, on account of the Essence being its ruling factor, desires to dwell upon reality. But because the reality is veiled by Inertia (*tamas*) it mistakes the attainments of Attenuation (*Apinā*), &c., for the reality; and desires to dwell and dwells upon them for a moment. Being pushed away, however, by Energy (*rajas*), even from this resting place, it finds not the rest sought after even there, but gets only a liking for them. As to sound, &c., why its love of them is well established as a matter of course, ever inclining as it does towards them by its own nature. It is the occasionally steady mind that is thus described.

While explaining the wandering mind, the author indicates the Forgetful mind also by words beginning with, 'The same pierced through thereafter by Inertia, &c.'

When Inertia flows into the mind and conquers Energy, then the Energy, having become incapable of driving the veil of the darkness of Inertia away from the Essence of the mind, it is rendered lazy by the Inertia, and approaches vice, &c. Ignorance is Untrue knowledge. Further, the knowledge in deep sleep is described as depending upon the notion of the absence of all other modifications. Therefore the state of forgetfulness (the *Muḥhā Bhūmī*) is also indicated. The absence of masterfulness or supineness is the non-fulfilment of one's wishes everywhere. The meaning is that the mind becomes pervaded by vice, &c.

By the words, 'The same when the veil of forgetfulness, &c.,' the author means that, when the same mental Essence shines out in its own nature, then the mind approaches virtue, knowledge, desirelessness and masterfulness. Forgetfulness is inertia (*tamas*) and the same is the veil. When the veil is removed, it becomes as above described. It is for this reason that it illuminates all the specialized, the unspecialized, the undifferentiated phenomenal and the noumenal states and the *Puruṣa*.

Inasmuch as notwithstanding this, it may not be capable of manifesting virtue and masterfulness on account of the absence of activity, the Commentator says :— 'When it is affected by a touch of *rajas*, &c.' The meaning is that because Energy is the cause of activity, virtue, &c., exist in that state.

This gives a comprehensive description of the mental Essence of the two classes of Yogis who have reached the stage of Cognitive Trance, the *Madhuhbhūmikas* and the *Prajñājyotiṣas* of the middle path. Now the author describes the state of mind of the fourth class of Yogis, the *Dhyāni* : or thinkers who have passed the domain of things to be known :—

'The same mind becomes itself, when the least impurity of disturbing Energy is removed.' It is for this very reason that it becomes fixed in its own nature. Purified of the dross of disturbing Energy and Inertia (*rajas* and *tamas*) by the device of heating it with the re-agents of practice and desirelessness, the gold of the Essence of the will-to-know becomes established in its own nature, and becomes the master of the senses and their objects. It has thus fulfilled much of its work, but goes on working : as its great

work is the achievement of the knowledge of the distinction between the Objective Essence and consciousness. The author says :

"The same becomes itself when the least impurity of disturbing Energy is removed. It then shows forth only the distinction of nature between the Essence of Objective Nature and the conscious principle, and approaches the state of contemplation called the Cloud of Virtue." The Cloud of Virtue will be described later. He describes here a term better known among the Yogis : - "This the thinkers, &c." The thinkers call the mind showing forth the distinction of the natures of the Objective Essence and the Conscious Principle, and having the Cloud of Virtue as the other end, by the name of the Highest Intellection. The mind is here spoken of as an abstraction, because the characteristic and the characterized are intended to be spoken of as one.

The Commentator now shows that the power of consciousness is the good and the faculty of discriminative knowledge is not the good. This is with the object of introducing the Inhibitive Trance (Nirodha Samādhi), which restrains the mental modification of discriminative knowledge, and brings about the perfect freedom of the conscious principle :-

"The power of consciousness changes not, &c."

Impurity consists in identifying the self with pleasure and pain and forgetfulness. Pleasure and pain both cause pain to him who discriminates. Hence they too are to be given up like pain. Even the very beautiful gives pain having an end. Therefore that also has to be given up by him who discriminates. This impurity and end do not exist in the power of consciousness or the Puruṣa. Hence is it said to be pure and infinite.

But how is this power of consciousness pure when it takes the forms of pleasurable, painful and forgetful objects, sounds, &c., while cognizing them? And how again is it infinite, when it takes up that form and also gives it up? To meet this the author says :-

"The objects are shown to it."

It is so described because the objective sounds, &c., are shown to it. It might be impure and finite if it took the forms of the objects in the same way as does the will-to-be. It is in fact the will-to-be that takes the forms of the objects, and presents them to the consciousness, which follows its forms. Thence is it said that the Puruṣa cognizes.

The doubt again arises, how can an object be known if the power of consciousness do not take possession of the will-to-be appearing as an object? If it does take possession, how can it be said that it has not taken the form of the object? For this reason says the author :-

"It goes not from object to object."

Going from object to object means motion, and the teaching is that consciousness does not move. But then how does it take possession of that form? For this reason says :-

"The power of consciousness changes not."

The three-fold change, indicated by characteristic, differentia and condition, does not exist in consciousness, that it may put on the form of action and thereby change in conjunction with the will-to-be. It will be described further on how it cognizes, even though it moves not.

Thus it is established that the power of consciousness is the good. It has been said that the manifestation of discriminative knowledge is not the good, being as it is of the nature of the will-to-be. For this reason it is the opposite of the power of consciousness.

When even the manifestation of discrimination also is to be given up, what is to be said of the other modifications which are full of shortcomings? This is the meaning. Hence for this reason, the discussion of the Inhibitive Trance is properly introduced. Therefore the author says :-

"On this account the mind tends to turn from it, &c." The meaning is that it checks the indulgence of discriminative knowledge too, by the Higher desirelessness, which is the illumination of knowledge itself,

Now he describes what the aspect of the mind is when all its modifications have been restrained :—

“In that state, &c.” That state means the state of Restraint (nirodha). The nature of restraint or inhibition is described :—“It is the seedless.”

The vehicle of actions with that of afflictions is the seed of life-state, life-period and life-experience. The seedless is that which has gone beyond that.

Now the author gives another name of the same which is better known to the Yogis and which is descriptive of the mental state, the ultra-cognitive.

“Nothing is cognized in that, &c.”

Summarizes :—“This is the two-fold Yoga, the restraint of the modifications of the mind.”

Sūtra 3.

तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम् ॥३॥

3. Then¹ the seer² stands¹ in his own nature.³

तदवस्थे चेतसि विषयाभावाद् बुद्धिबोधात्मा पुरुषः किंस्वभाव इति । तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम् । स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा तदानीं चित्तिशक्तिर्यथा कैवल्ये । व्युत्थानचित्ते तु सति तथापि भवन्ती न तथा ॥ ३ ॥

VYĀSA.

There being no object of cognition in that state of the mind, what is the state of the conscious principle (puruṣa) who has identified himself with the cognitions of the Will-to-be? “Then the seer stands in his own nature.” At that time the power of consciousness is established in its own nature, as in the state of perfect freedom. In the outgoing mind it appears to be not so centred in its own nature, though in reality it is the same.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now says he, in order to introduce the next aphorism :

“There being no object of cognition in that state of the mind, &c.” The word ‘what’ is inquisitive. The meaning is this. The conscious principle is always perceived as the very self of the cognitions of the Will-to-know taking on the forms of various objects. He is never perceived as separate from the cognitions of the Will-to-know. For this reason the knowledge of the will-to-be is of the very nature of the conscious principle, as light of the sun. And it does not exist when the mind is in a state of residual potency (saṃskāra). And no existence can last as such when it has given up its nature.

Let it be so. But then why does not the Puruṣa know the Will-to-be in its state of residual potency? To meet this he says : “There being no object of cognition, &c.”

It is not the Will-to-know alone, but the Will-to-know which has the objects of the puruṣa to achieve that is the sphere of consciousness. The objects of the puruṣa are discriminative knowledge and the experience of the objective world. These two no longer exist in the state of inhibition (nirodha). Therefore the non-existence of objects in that state is established. The author gives the answer by the aphorism : “Then the seer stands in his own nature.”

By the word ‘svarūpa’ (his own nature), the author excludes the appearances of the calm, the ruffled and the forgetful (the Śānta, the Ghora and the Māḍha) which have

been fastened upon it. The nature of the Puruṣa is consciousness alone, unaffected by the contacts (of objects placed alongside), not the cognitive action of the Will-to-know appearing as calm, &c. This is of the nature of contacts. It is like the redness which appears in a crystal pure white by nature, when a Japa flower is placed in contact therewith. And it is not necessary that when the things placed in contact are removed, the thing with which they have been placed in contact, should also disappear. That would mean encroachment of the one into the sphere of the other. The locative case is used, because the thing and the nature of the thing are conceived as being separate, although in reality the same, and not distinct.

The same meaning is rendered clear by the Commentator :—

“At that time the power of consciousness, &c.” At that time, in the state of restraint and not in the state of outgoing.

Let that be so. But then the power of consciousness, not standing in its own nature when the Will-to-be is in the state of outgoing activity, and becoming established in that state when in the state of inhibition, becomes changeful. If it be said that it remains established in its own nature even in the state of outgoing activity, then there would be no difference between the states of outgoing activity and inhibition. For this reason says the author :—

‘In the outwardly inclined mind, &c.’

The power of consciousness, constant because standing alone, is never disturbed in its own nature; and for this reason is the same in activity as in the state of restraint. The mother-of-pearl does not for certain, put on and give up its true nature, while becoming the object of true or false knowledge. The knower, however, fancies it to be something different from what it really is.

In relation to the Inhibitive Trance, the Cognitive Trance also is a state of outgoing activity.

Sūtra 4.

वृत्तिसारूप्यमितरत्र ॥ ४ ॥

4. Identification² with modifications¹ elsewhere.³

कथं तर्हि ? दर्शितविषयत्वात् वृत्तिसारूप्यमितरत्र । व्युत्थाने यादृचित्तवृत्तयस्तद-
विशष्टवृत्तिः पुरुषः । तथा च सूत्रम् । एकमेव दर्शनं ख्यातिरेव दर्शनमिति ।
चित्तमयस्कान्तमणिकल्पं संनिधिमात्रोपकारि दृश्यत्वेन स्वं भवति पुरुषस्य स्वामिनः ।
तस्माच्चित्तवृत्तिबोधे पुरुषस्यानादिः संबन्धो हेतुः ॥ ४ ॥

VYĀSA.

How then? On account of objects being presented to it, identification with modifications takes place elsewhere. The conscious principle (puruṣa) is not unaffected by whatever may be the modifications of the mind in the state of outgoing activity. And so is the aphorism :—

“Knowledge is but one; discrimination alone is knowledge.”

The mind is like a magnet energized by nearness alone. Being seen it becomes the possession of its lord, the puruṣa. Therefore the reason for knowing the modifications of the mind is the eternal relation of the puruṣa.

VĀCHASPATTI'S GLOSS.

For the purpose of introducing another aphorism, the author puts the question, 'How then?' The meaning is this. In what manner does it shine then, if it is not perceived to be what it really is. Adding the word which explains the cause, he reads the aphorism :—

"On account of objects being presented to it, identification with modifications takes place elsewhere."

'Elsewhere :—In the state of outward activity, whatever may be the modifications of the mind, the calm, the ruffled, and the forgetful, the same are the manifestations of the conscious principle as he exists in that state.

The word *Sa* in *Sârûpya* (identification) means oneness. This is the meaning. The notions, 'I am calm', 'I am ruffled', 'I am forgetful' appear by fastening the modifications of the will-to-be upon the conscious principle, by taking the will-to-know and the conscious principle to be one on account of proximity, as in the case of the white crystal and the Japa flower. This happens in the same way as one looking his face reflected in a dirty mirror, becomes anxious and thinks, 'I am dim.' Although the fastening of the conscious principle upon the will-to-know, is like the knowledge of sound, &c., only a manifestation of the will-to-know, and although this manifestation must be considered to be unintelligent, having as it does its origin in the *Prakriti*, showing forth as it does the will-to-know as the knower, the manifestation shines forth as a manifestation of consciousness. And similarly does this *âtman* (self) appear to possess false knowledge, although in reality he has no false knowledge. He appears as the enjoyer, although he is not the enjoyer. He appears as possessed of discriminative knowledge, and illuminated thereby although devoid of it in reality.

This will be shown further under the aphorisms :

"Consciousness not moving, takes its form and thus the will-to-know knows itself as such."—22. 4.

"Enjoyment (*Bhoga*) consists in the identification of the notions of the Objective Essence and the Conscious principle (*purusha*), which are quite distinct from each other."—34. 3.

The Commentator now says that this is recognized by another school also.

"So is the aphorism, &c."

The aphorism, "knowledge is but one : discrimination alone is knowledge," is an aphorism of the *Achârya Pāñchashikā*.

But how is knowledge but one? The modifications of the will-to-be in the shape of the objects, sound, &c., and in the shape of discrimination, are to be considered Unintelligent. This is one knowledge. The intelligence of the *Puruṣa* is distinct from it. Its recognition also is knowledge. For this reason says, "Discrimination alone is knowledge."

It is in view of the discrimination of the world possessing the characteristics of appearance and disappearance, that it is said,

"Knowledge is but one."

As to consciousness, it is the nature of the *Puruṣa*, not of the discriminative faculty. This, however, is not within the range of the perceptive cognition of the world. It falls within the sphere of the inferential and verbal cognitions. This is the meaning.

While showing thus that nescience is the radical cause of mental phenomena, in the state of outgoing activity, it is also indicated that conjunction, the cause of nescience, is the cause of enjoyment, and also that there exists between the two the relation of the owner and the owned. For the purpose of establishing this the Commentator says,

"It becomes the possession of its lord." •

This shows the relationship.

But the cognizer, puruṣa, can only be the lord of the mind, when it enjoys the benefit of the service rendered by the mind. And it is not possible that he should so enjoy the service without coming into relationship with the benefit rendered; but it can not be beneficially acted upon, and therefore it can not come into relationship. If, on the other hand, the enjoyment of the benefit is to be considered to be due to the conjunction thereof, then the puruṣa must be considered to be changeful.

For this reason he says, "acts by mere nearness."

The mind is not conjoined to the puruṣa; it is merely placed near him. The nearness of the puruṣa is not in space, nor yet in time, on account of the absence of juxtaposition. It is defined by fitness. The puruṣa possesses the power of enjoying as subject, while the mind possesses the power of being enjoyed. This is meant by saying "Being seen, the mind becomes the possession of the lord."

The meaning is that it becomes the object of enjoyment by being transformed into the form of sound, &c. As to enjoyment, although it is a characteristic of the mind, being as it is a modification in the form of sound, &c., still it is spoken of as being a characteristic of the Puruṣa, because of his identification with the modifications, on account of the absence of the conception of distinctness between the mind and consciousness.

Thus is established the enjoyment by the Puruṣa of the service rendered by the mind, although he is not conjoined to it; as is also established the unchanging nature of the Puruṣa.

Well then, the relation of owner and owned which is the cause of enjoyment, has its cause in nescience. But what is the cause of nescience? There must be some cause for it, because no effect can come into existence without some cause. As they say,

"What to him doth make,
"Nescience manifest,
"Like dream and so forth."

This doubt is removed by putting the answer in the form of a summary: For this reason, &c."

The meaning is this. The cause of the experience of the calm, the ruffled and the forgetful forms of mental modifications is the eternal conjunction cause by eternal nescience; and the relation of nescience and potentialization (vāsanā, in each being born from the other in eternal succession is without a beginning like the mutual relation of seed and sprout.)

Sūtra 5.

वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः ॥ ५ ॥

5. The modifications¹ are five-fold,² painful³ and not-painful.⁴

ताः पुनर्निरोद्धव्या बहुत्वे सति चित्तस्य, वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः । क्लेशहेतुकाः कर्माशयप्रचये क्षेत्रोभूताः क्लिष्टाः । ख्यातिविषया गुणाधिकारविरोधिन्योऽक्लिष्टाः । क्लिष्टप्रवाहपतिता अप्यक्लिष्टाः । क्लिष्टच्छिद्रेष्वप्यक्लिष्टा भवन्ति । अक्लिष्टच्छिद्रेषु क्लिष्टा इति । तथा जातीयकाः संस्कारा वृत्तिमिरेव क्रियन्ते । संस्कारैश्च वृत्तय इति । एवं वृत्तिसंस्कारचक्रमनिशमावर्तते । तदेवंभूतं चित्तमवसिताधिकारमात्मकत्वेन व्यवतिष्ठते प्रलयं वा गच्छतीति ॥ ५ ॥

VYÂSA.

These then, the five-fold modifications of the mind, painful and not-painful, are to be restrained, being many. The painful are those that cause the afflictions and become the field for the growth of the vehicle of actions (karmâśaya). The not-painful are those that have discrimination for their object and which oppose the functioning of the "qualities." They remain not-painful even though fallen into the stream of the painful. They are not-painful even in the intervals of the painful. The painful also remain in the intervals of the not-painful. Potencies (Faculties) of the same class are generated by the modifications themselves; and the modifications are caused by the potencies. Thus the wheel of mental modifications and potencies turns round and round. Such is the mind which when its objects have been attained, rests unmoving like the self, or disappears.

VÂCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

Let that be. A man is taught to do what is only possible. And it is not possible to restrain the mental modifications without knowing them. Further, no one can count them even by a thousand lives of men. Being not counted, how can they be restrained? Having this doubt he introduces the aphorism laying down the number of these modifications. "These, the five-fold modifications of the mind, the painful and not-painful, are to be restrained, being many." Mental modifications as a class are one: real cognition and others are their five forms. For this reason, modifications having these sub-classes are five-fold, have five sub-divisions. The plural number is properly used, because these modifications are many, on account of the distinctions due to different personalities, such as those of Chaitra and Maitra and others. The meaning is that whoever it may be, whether Chaitra, Maitra or any other, the mental modifications of them all are five-fold and no more. The use of the singular number of the word 'mind' is for the purpose of denoting the class only. It should be understood to mean the minds.

Now the author mentions a minor classification of the same, as that is useful for the purpose of practice. "Painful and not-painful." The object is that the painful are to be restrained by the help of the not-painful, and these too by the higher desirelessness. The painful are those, &c." This explains them.

The afflictions of egoism, &c., are the causes of certain mental modifications. The modifications of which the afflictions are the moving causes are spoken of as such, *i. e.*, painful. Or to put it another way. Of the prakṛiti, which works for the achievement of (the objects of) the Puruṣa, the manifestations of the rajas and the tamas are only the causes of the afflictions, and they alone therefore tend towards misery. Affliction being painful, the painful are those in which this affliction, the rajas and tamas manifestation, exists. Inasmuch as they come into manifestation for the purpose of supplying the afflictions only, they are for this very reason, the field for the growth of the vehicle of actions. The meaning is that the puruṣa having become conscious of the object which is at hand by means of the manifestation of real cognition, &c., becomes attached to them, or is repelled from them, and thus makes the vehicle of actions grow. Those become the painful manifestations which are fertile grounds for the growth of virtue and vice.

He describes the not-painful:—"The not-painful are those, &c." Discrimination is the illumination of the cognition of the Objective Essence of the Will-to-be, when it flows

undisturbed. By speaking of it as an object, he suggests the knowledge of the distinction between the Objective Essence and the Puruṣa, which is the object thereof.

"And because they have for their object the knowledge of the distinction between the Objective Essence and the Puruṣa, they are for this very reason the opposers of the functionings of the qualities. The function of the qualities is the initiation of the effects. This ceases with discriminative knowledge. Thus the object of the functioning of the qualities having been fulfilled, they are said to oppose their functioning. For this reason these mental modifications of Real Cognition, &c., are not-painful.

Let that be. No one is born who has no desires. The mental modifications of all living beings are therefore painful. And it is not proper that not-painful modifications should exist in the midst of the stream of the painful modifications. Nor having fallen in the midst of opposing forces, can they be fit to perform any work, even though they do exist. Hence to say that the painful are restrained by the non-painful and the non-painful by the higher desirelessness, is only a wish. Hence the author says.

"Fallen into the stream of the painful too they are the non-painful."

Practice and desirelessness born by the study of the Veda, induction and precept remain themselves the non-painful even though fallen into the stream of the painful. A Brāhmaṇa living in the village of Shāla which is full of the Kirātas, does not become a Kirāta.

The words "in the intervals of the not-painful" propound an analogy. Because they take their place in the intervals of the painful modifications, the non-painful ones, not suppressed by the painful, gathering strength in due course by habituation suppress the painful ones themselves. This is what the author says :—"Similar potencies are created by modifications, &c." The meaning is that by the non-painful modifications the non-painful potencies are generated. This is the wheel of mental modifications and potencies which always turns round and round, up to the ultra-cognitive Trance.

Such then is the mind, which in the state of suppression remains only in the state of residual potency and thus stands like the self; and it is said by way of an optional mode of expression that it disappears. The final meaning of the aphorism is summarized :—

"These painful and non-painful manifestations are of five descriptions." The words, "Five descriptions" give only the sense; they do not give the connotation of the word because the suffix 'tāp' has never been used to connote description.

Sūtras 6 and 7.

प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतयः ॥ ६ ॥

प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानि ॥ ७ ॥

6. Real Cognition,¹ Unreal cognition,² Imagination,³ Deep Sleep¹ and Memory.⁵

7. Perception,¹ Verbal Cognition³ and Inference² are real cognitions.¹

ताः क्लृष्टाश्चक्लिष्टाश्च पञ्चधा वृत्तयः प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतयः । प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानि । इन्द्रियप्रणालिकया चित्तस्य बाह्यवस्तूपरागात्तद्विषया सामान्यविशेषात्मनोऽर्थस्य विशेषावधारणप्रधाना वृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम् । फलमविशिष्टः पौढवेगप्रदिष्टतद्भूतिबोधः । प्रतिलंघेदी पुहष इत्युपरिष्ठादुपपादयिष्यामः । अत्रुमेयस्य

तुल्यजातीयेष्वनुवृत्तो भिन्नजातीयेभ्यो व्यावृत्तः संबन्धो यस्तद्विषया सामान्यावधारणप्रधाना वृत्तिरनुमानम् । यथा देशान्तरप्राप्तेर्गतिमच्चन्द्रतारकं चैव वृत् । विन्ध्यश्चाप्राप्तेरगतिः । आसेन हृष्टोऽनुमितो वार्थः परत्र स्वशोधसङ्क्रान्तये शब्देनोपदिश्यते शब्दात्तदर्थविषया वृत्तिः श्रोतुरागमः । यस्याश्रद्धेयार्थो वक्ता न हृष्टानुमितार्थः स आगमः प्लवते । मूलवक्तरि तु हृष्टानुमितार्थे निर्विप्लवः स्यात् ॥ ६ ॥ ७ ॥

YYĀSA.

These painful and non-painful modifications are of five descriptions:—Real Cognition, Unreal Cognition, Imagination, Sleep and Memory. The Real Cognitions are Perception or sense-cognition; Inference or Sequential Cognition and Verbal Cognition.

Perception is the mental modification which cognizes chiefly the specific appearance of an object, being of the nature of both the generic and the specific qualities, and which has it for its object, by means of the impression caused therein by the external object through the passage of the senses. The result is the knowledge of the modifications of the mind by the Puruṣa, as if they were not all distinguishable from himself. We shall establish further on that the Puruṣa knows by reflex conjunction with the will-to-be.

Inference or Sequential Cognition is the mental modification which cognizes the generic nature chiefly and has for its sphere the relation which exists in objects of the same class with that which is inferred, but does not exist as such in objects of different classes. For example, the moon and the stars are moving objects, because they go from one place to another like Chaitra. And the Vindhyā mountain does not move, because it is not seen going from one place to another.

An object perceived or inferred by a competent man is described by him in words with the intention of transferring his knowledge to another. The mental modification which has for its sphere the meaning of words is the Verbal Cognition to the hearer. When the speaker has neither perceived nor inferred the object, and speaks of things which cannot be believed, the authority of Verbal Cognition fails. But it does not fail in the original speaker with reference to either the object of perception or of inference.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author mentions them by their names, "Real Cognition, Unreal Cognition, Imagination, Sleep and Memory." In enumeration the different parts are understood separately as they are spoken of; and this is a copulative composition in which each word is joined to the other in the sense of the word 'Cha' (and) which means the joining of the one to the other.

As in the aphorism.

"Nescience is the taking of the non-eternal, the impure, the painful and the not-self to be the eternal, the pure, the pleasurable and the self."--5. 2.

The definition does not comprehend such confused manifestations of consciousness, as the forgetfulness of directions and the unbroken circle formed by a fast-moving point of light ; so even here notwithstanding that the modifications of Real Cognition, &c., are mentioned, the doubt may arise, that there are other modifications, besides those named, in existence. For the removal of this doubt, it was necessary to say Five-fold ? It is thereby shown that there are so many modifications and no more.....6.

Going to divide the modification of Real Cognition, he gives the general description of the sub-heads. "The Real Cognitions are Perception, Inference and Verbal Cognitions."

Right Knowledge consists in the unknown truth, which becomes the cause of the soul's setting about to act. The means of obtaining that knowledge is the Real Cognition (the cognizing of the real). The mention of the division is for the purpose of refuting a larger or smaller number of sub-heads.

Out of these the definition of Perception is first given, because that is at the root of all other means of knowledge.

"Perception is, &c."

By using the words, 'of an object' the quality of being merely fastened upon (that is, existing as an idea alone) is denied.

By using the words, 'which has it for its object' it is denied that the externality of the object is the sphere of the mental idea thereof. By using the words, 'by means of the impression therein caused by the external object,' the relation of the idea in the mind to the external object of knowledge is shown.

He gives the cause of the impression thereof, even though there be distance between (the knower and the thing known).

"Through the passage of the senses."

Some say an object is the generic quality alone. Others say, an object is the specific quality alone. Other thinkers again say that an object is possessed of both descriptions of qualities, the generic and the specific. For their refutation, he says:-

"Being of the nature of both the generic and the specific qualities." An object is not possessed of the generic and the specific qualities ; it is of the very nature thereof. This will be shown when the question of simultaneous non-cognition is discussed.

Now he distinguishes the domain of sequential and verbal cognitions from that of perception: 'Which cognizes chiefly the specific appearance of an object.' The meaning is that although in perception, the generic quality also shines out, still it is subordinate to the specific quality. This is only suggestive of direct knowledge. Discriminative knowledge also is suggested, therefore.

He refutes the contradiction of the result of perceptive cognition.

'The result is the knowledge by the Purusha of the modifications of the mind.'

The question is, How can knowledge by the Purusha be the result of a modification of the mind ? If an axe operates upon a Khadira tree, it is not a Plaksha tree that is cut thereby.

For this reason he says, 'as if they were not at all distinguishable from himself.' It is not the cognitive modification of the mind that takes its place in the Purusha ; it is on the contrary consciousness reflected in the mirror of the will-to-know, that appears in the form of the modification of the object, because the modification of the will-to-know takes the form of the object. This is the result of the act of perception. This consciousness thus reflected in the will-to-know is not separate from the will-to-know (Buddhi). It is of its very nature, and the modification thereof in the shape of an object is also of

the nature of the will-to-know. They co-exist in the same place. It is, therefore, proper that this should be the result of the perceptive cognition. This we shall show.

For this reason the author says :—‘The purusha knows by reflex conjunction with the will-to-know.’

Because Verbal Cognition has its origin in the recognition of the relations established by the inferences of the intellect of the hearer, on account of the appearance therein of the signs of co-existence, etc., in sequence of perceptive knowledge, it is by inference that verbal knowledge becomes possible. For this reason and also because inferred knowledge is imparted thereafter by means of verbal cognition, the commentator gives the definition of inference before that of verbal cognition.

‘Inference or Sequential Cognition, &c.’

The inferred object is the object possessed of the characteristic desired to be known. Objects of the same class therewith are those similar objects which are placed into the same species on account of the possession of the same generic quality, which is the characteristic to be proved. By saying that it exists in objects of the same class with that which is inferred, the author does away with the presence of contrary and uncommon qualities in the antecedent. Objects of different classes are those which fall not within the same species. These are others than those which fall into the same class, are their contraries and mean their non-existence. By saying that they do not exist as such in objects of different classes, the author emphasizes the necessity of the possession of the generic qualities. Relation is that which furnishes the common bond. This is called the *linga*, the sign which is the common bond, the generic quality. By this he shows the characteristic nature of the thing to be proved (*paksha*, *śādhya*) and thus does away with non-provability.

‘Has for its object,’ (*tadvishaya*) means that to which it is bound, as the word *vishaya* (object) is derived from the root *Shi* to bind.

The author speaks of cognizing the generic nature, with the object of distinguishing it from the perceptive cognition. The sphere of inference is limited to the generic quality, because it is dependent for its birth upon the cognition of relation, and in specific objects there can be no cognition of relationship; and for this reason the common quality alone admits of the recognition of relationship. He gives an example :—“For example.” The word ‘and’ (*cha*) denotes a cause. Because the *Vindhya* is not a moving object, it does not change its location. Therefore when motion is removed, change of place disappears. Hence there being change of place, the moon and the stars are moving bodies; as is *Chaitra*. This is proved.

Gives the definition of the mental modification of Verbal Cognition :—“An object perceived or inferred by a competent person, &c.”

A competent person is an *Âpta*. Competence (*Âpti*) which radically means “reach,” means an all-round comprehension, or the constant presence along with each other of the knowledge of the realities, mercifulness and the skillfulness in their acts of the instruments of knowledge. An *Âpta* or a competent or an authoritative person is one who is possessed of this. An object seen or inferred by him is the object of verbal cognition. The knowledge obtained by an authoritative person such as above described, by hearing is not mentioned here, because knowledge obtained through words has inferential and perceptive knowledge for its root, and therefore must be considered as having been mentioned by the mention of the two only.

‘Transferring of his knowledge’ consist in the production of knowledge in the mind of the hearer, similar to the knowledge which exists in the mind of the authoritative person. For that object it is uttered in words, i.e., is made known for causing gain to, and removing the disadvantages of the hearer. The rest is easy.

When the speaker speaks of things which cannot be believed :—such as, 'it is the ten pomegranates themselves which will become the six cakes.'

'Has neither perceived nor inferred' :—Such as one who says, 'Let him who desires heaven, worship the village tree (Chaitya might mean the Buddha, the temple, &c., besides). Such an authority fails.

The question arises that if it be so, the teaching of Manu, &c., also fails, because they too speak of things not seen or inferred.

Inasmuch as they say, 'whatever of the dharma of whomsoever is disclosed by Manu, all that is laid down in the Veda,' he was certainly possessed of all knowledge.

For this reason says :—“When it has been perceived by the original speaker, &c.” The original speaker is in such teachings, of course, Ishwara.

Sūtra 8.

विपर्ययो मिथ्याज्ञानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम् ॥ ८ ॥

8. Unreal Cognition¹ is the knowing of the unreal,² possessing¹ a form not its own.³

विपर्ययो मिथ्याज्ञानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम् । स कस्मान्न प्रमाणं यतः प्रमाणेन बाध्यते । भूतार्थविषयत्वात्प्रमाणस्य । तत्र प्रमाणेन बाधनमप्रमाणस्य दृष्टम् । तद्यथा द्विचन्द्रदर्शनं सद्भिषयेणैकचन्द्रदर्शनेन बाध्यत इति । सेयं पञ्चपर्वी भवत्यविद्या । अविद्याऽस्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशः क्लेशा इति । एत एव स्वसंज्ञाभिस्तमो मोहा महामोहस्तामिस्रोऽन्यतामिस्र इति । एते चित्तमलप्रसङ्गेनाभिधास्यन्ते ॥ ८ ॥

VYĀSA.

Unreal Cognition is the knowing of the unreal, possessed of a form not its own. Why is it not the knowing of the real? Because the knowledge of the real removes it, inasmuch as Real Cognition has for its object a thing as it exists. Therein is seen the removal of the wrong knowledge by the right one; as for example, the visual knowledge of two moons is removed by the perception which has for its object the thing as it really exists, the one moon.

This it is that is the five-fold Nescience. As it is said :—Nescience, Egoism, Attachment, Aversion, and Love of life are the five afflictions. 3.2. The same are technically called respectively, darkness (tamas), forgetfulness (moha), Extreme forgetfulness (mahāmoha), Excessive darkness (tāmisra) and blind darkness (andhatāmisra).

These will be described in the context of the impurities of the mind.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Unreal cognition is the knowing of the unreal, possessed of a form not its own.

Unreal cognition :—This is a statement of the thing to be defined. The knowing of the unreal, &c., is the definition. It means that it has a form which shines out as if it were real knowledge.

The words, 'possessed of a form not its own,' are equivalent to 'not possessed of the form which is its own.' As for example, the words, 'eating what is not dedicated to the Pitris,' mean "not eating what is dedicated to the Pitris."

Doubt also is included in this. There is, however, this much difference. In this, the unstability of the form of the notion exists in the notion itself, whereas in the case of the perception of two moons, &c., the unstability is brought home by the notion of the removal thereof.

The question arises that if it be so, then on consideration, unreal cognition shows itself in imagination also, because there also, the real object is not perceived as such. For this reason says, it is "the knowing of the unreal." This means that this cognition is contradicted by the common knowledge of all mankind. This contradiction exists in the case of unreal cognition, but not in the case of Imagination. Forms of cognition due to Imagination are in common use with mankind, and it is only to those who show the capacities of a learned man and think thereupon that the knowledge of contradiction appeals in this case.

Thus the question is raised, 'why is not that real cognition?' The meaning is that the former knowledge is not the one that is removed by the opposite knowledge acquired thereafter; but that it is the knowledge acquired thereafter that is removed by the former, which has been acquired before and nothing contrary to which has appeared.

Refutes:—'Because it is removed by right knowledge.'

It might be real cognition if the birth of the latter depended upon the former. Here, however, either cognition is given birth to by its own cause, and is not dependent upon the other knowledge. The latter knowledge thus does not take its rise by the destruction of the former and its appearance, and therefore, does not consist in the removal of the former. Nor does the appearance of the former knowledge mean the removal of the latter, because this does not exist at that time. For this reason, the cause of the existence of removability is the absence of the close appearance of contrariety; and the cause of the power to remove is the close appearance of contrariety. Therefore, that which is not right knowledge, is removed by right knowledge, inasmuch as the latter has for its object, something which exists as such.

Gives an example:—'Therein is seen the removal of the wrong knowledge by the right one.'

Shows the evil nature of this unreal cognition for the purpose of removal:—'This it is that is the five-fold Nescience.' The meaning is that Nescience is the generic quality of all the five, Nescience, Egoism, &c.' The mistaking of the Unmanifested (Avyakta), the Manifested objective existence (Mahat), the Principle of Individuality (Ahankâra), and the five atom-builders (Tanmâtras)—the eight forms of the not-self, for the self, is nescience, darkness (tamas). Similarly, the mistaking by the Yogis of the eight attainments of Ānimā, &c., which are inauspicious, for the auspicious, is the eight-fold forgetfulness (moha) which comes after the former. And this is called Egoism (asmitā).

Similarly the idea, 'I shall enjoy sound, &c., the ten enjoyments both as seen and heard, when I have acquired by Yoga the eight attainments of Ānimā, &c., and have thereby become a powerful man (siddha)', is the greater forgetfulness, attachment (Rāga).

Similarly, when led by such a judgment, one sets about to obtain these enjoyments, but finds that the attainments of Ānimā, &c., are not born on account of obstacles caused by some one and that the enjoyment of the pleasures of both kinds, seen or heard about traditionally, which depend upon the attainments, is not thus obtained. anger against the cause of obstacles appears. This is aversion (dvesha), called utter darkness.

Similarly, when the powers of Ānimā, &c., have been attained, and the visible and heard-of objects of enjoyment have been obtained, then the fear that in the end of the

Kalpa all this will be destroyed, is the love of sentient life, blind darkness (andhatamisa or abhiniveśa).

This has been said :—

“Eight-fold is the division of darkness and so of forgetfulness; ten-fold of the greater forgetfulness. Utter darkness is eighteen-fold and so also is blind darkness.”

MANTRA 2.

शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः ॥ ६ ॥

9. Imagination⁶ is followed in sequence³ by verbal expression¹ and knowledge,² and is devoid⁵ of objective substratum.⁴

शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः । स न प्रमाणोपारोही । न विपर्ययोपारोही । वस्तुशून्यत्वेऽपि शब्दज्ञानमाहात्म्यनिबन्धनो व्यवहारो दृश्यते । तद्यथा चैतन्यं पुरुषस्य स्वरूपमिति । यदा चित्तिरेव पुरुषस्तदा किमत्र केन व्यपदिश्यते । भवति च व्यपदेशो वृत्तिः । यथा चैत्रस्य गौरिति । तथा प्रतिषिद्धवस्तुधर्मो निष्क्रियः पुरुषस्तिष्ठति बाणः स्यास्यति स्थित इति । गतिनिवृत्तौ धात्वर्थमात्रं गम्यते । तथाऽनुपत्तिधर्मो पुरुष इति । उत्पत्तिधर्मस्याभावात्त्रयमवगम्यते न पुरुषान्वयी धर्मः । तस्माद्विकल्पितः स धर्मस्तेन चास्ति व्यवहार इति ॥ ९ ॥

VYĀSA.

Imagination is followed in sequence by verbal knowledge and expression, and is devoid of objective substratum. This does not reach up to real cognition. Nor does it reach up to unreal cognition. Even in the absence of an objective substratum, its action is found to be dependent upon the power of verbal expression and knowledge.

As for example :—‘Purusha is of the nature of consciousness.’ Now what is here predicated of what? seeing that Purusha is consciousness itself, and that there must always be a statement of the relationship of one to another in predication; as in the phrase Chaitra’s cow.

• Similarly, “the purusha is inactive and the characteristics of an object are denied to it.”

“Bâna stands, will stand, has stood.” The meaning of the root alone is understood by (the act of) the cessation of motion.

Similarly in the sentence, “The purusha has the characteristics of not being born,” the mere absence of the characteristic of not being born is to be understood, and not any positive characteristic possessed by the purusha. That characteristic has, therefore, been imagined and has come into practical usage.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

"Imagination is followed in sequence by verbal expression and knowledge, and is devoid of an objective substratum." If it is followed in sequence by verbal knowledge and expression, why should not Imagination (vikalpa) fall under the heading of Real Cognition? If, on the other hand, it is devoid of objective substratum, it must be the same as unreal cognition. For this reason, says:—"This does not reach up to Real Cognition." Why does it not reach up to real cognition? "Because, in the absence of an objective substratum, &c." This shows why it does not fall under the head of real cognition. 'Its action is found to be dependent upon the power of verbal expression and knowledge.' This shows that it does not fall under the head of Unreal Cognition.

This is the meaning. There being no differences in some particulars, it differs in others, while showing some points of similarity. There being no objective substratum for either the distinction or the absence thereof, imagination shows an unreal image of the substratum; and it is not, therefore, an act of real cognition. Nor is it Unreal Cognition, because it differs from it, in being recognised as such in practice.

Now gives illustrations taken from the sacred writings. 'As for example,' &c., Which is the subject to be qualified? What is it predicated by? The quality and the thing qualified can not come into relationship if they are not distinct from each other. The cow can not be predicated of a cow; it can only be predicated of something different from itself, say Chaitra.

This is what he says:—"There must always be the statement of relationship of one to another in predication." Predication is the relation between the predicate and the predicated.' In other words, it is the relation between the quality and the thing qualified. It is of this that the statement of a sentence consists; as in the sentence, 'This is Chaitra's cow.'

Adds another illustration from the sacred writings too:—"Similarly."

He to whom the characteristics of an object (i. e., the essential force which informs earth, &c.) are denied is spoken of as such. Who is he? The inactive Purusha. There is of course no such characteristic of an object in the Sāṅkhya teaching as non-existence, by which the Purusha may be qualified.

The reading in some places is, "The characteristics of an objective substratum are denied." This means as follows:—"Are denied," means 'are pervaded by denial.' i. e., they are possessed of the quality of being denied. Or in other words, it means that the characteristics of an object are possessed of the quality of being denied. But the characteristics of an object are not possessed of the quality of the non-existence of something, because there can be no relation between existence and non-existence. They are, however, taken as such (i. e., existing).

Gives illustrations from the idiom of the world:—"Bana stands." As in the sentences, 'He cooks,' 'He breaks,' the whole series of the moments of action in which some are antecedent and others subsequent, is recognized as being qualified by one effect, so also in the sentence 'He stands,' the commentator mentions the same state of antecedence and postcedence:—"Will stand, has stood."

Well, suppose that the action of cessation of motion consists in antecedent and postcedent moments just like the action of cooking, and that being different from Bana it may be predicated of him. For this reason, says:—"The meaning of the root itself is understood by the act of cessation of motion." The cessation of motion itself is imagined to be the characteristic of an object. Then this fancied characteristic is imagined to be a form of positive existence and even there is fancied an order of the precedence and postcedence. Such is the series of astonishing fanciful conceptions. Non-existence

is imagined to be existence, and then it is imagined that it comes after something in succession. This fanciful conception is found in all men. It is not, however, a characteristic different from the Purusha, so that it might be predicated of him.

Gives another illustration:—‘The Purusha has the characteristic of not being born.’

Many a thinker has held that the modification of imagination is not different from real and unreal cognitions. The detail of these illustrations is meant to explain the matter to them.

Sūtra 10.

अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रा ॥ १० ॥

10. Sleep⁵ is the mental modification⁴ which has for its objective substratum,³ the cause² of non-existence.¹

अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रा । सा च संप्रबोधे प्रत्यवमर्शात्प्रत्ययावशेषः । कथं सुखमहमस्वाप्सम् । प्रसन्नं मे मनः प्रज्ञां मे विशारदीकरोति । दुःखमहमस्वाप्सं सत्यानं मे मनो भ्रमत्यनवस्थितम् । गाढं मूढोऽहमस्वाप्सम् । गुरुणि मे गात्राणि । क्लान्तं मे चित्तम् । अलसं मुषितमिव तिष्ठतीति । स खल्वयं प्रबुद्धस्य प्रत्यवमर्शो न स्यादसति प्रत्ययानुभवे । तदश्रिताः स्मृतयश्च तद्विषया न स्युः तस्मात्प्रत्ययविशेषो निद्रा । सा च समांशवितरप्रत्ययवर्त्तनोद्भवेति ॥ १० ॥

VYĀSA.

“Sleep is the mental modification which has for its objective substratum the cause of non-existence.” And this is a particular kind of notion, because it is called back on awakening. How? ‘I have slept well. My mind is clear; it renders my intellect bright,’ ‘I have slept badly; my mind is listless; it wanders and is unsteady.’ ‘I have slept with great stupidity; my limbs are heavy; my mind is tired; it stands as it were lazy and absent.’ This calling back would certainly not exist on awakening, if there were no recognition of the cause: and there would not be memories dependent thereupon and having that for their object. Therefore sleep is a particular kind of notion, and further it is to be checked in trance like any other modification.—10.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The word ‘vritti’ is the subject of discussion and is, therefore, understood by context. As there is no difference of opinion among rival thinkers as to Real Cognition, Unreal Cognition, Imagination and Memory being mental modifications, the word is not used in those places separately for emphasizing the distinction. In the case of sleep, however, there is difference of opinion. It has, therefore, to be specially stated that it is a modification of the mind. The understanding by context would not serve to emphasize the teaching. Therefore the word modification is repeated a second time.

The non-existence spoken of is of the modifications of the waking and dreaming states. The cause (pratyaya) thereof is the darkness (the quality of inertia) which covers the light of the intellect (the buddhi, the will-to-know). The mental modification,

of which this becomes the substratum (that is the object), is spoken of as sleep. The substance of the will-to-be being possessed of the three qualities, whenever inertia appears and overpowers the qualities of essence and disturbing Energy and thus throws a veil over all the means of knowledge, then the will-to-know does not put on the shape of the object of knowledge, and the purusha, being conscious for the time of the overpowering darkness of inertia alone, is said to be sleeping well with consciousness turned inwards.

Why then this non-existence of the modifications should not be the modification of sleep? Why should it not be similar to the states of restraint and perfect freedom (kaivalya)? For this reason, says :—

‘And that is a particular notion, because it is called back on awakening.’

‘Calling back’ is the remembrance thereof with all its adjuncts. How? When the Tamas appears along with the Sattva, the reflection of one who has awakened after sleep, is like this:—‘I have slept well; my mind is clear and makes my intellect bright.’ Bright means pure.

When the Tamas appears along with the Rajas, the reflection is similar to what is expressed by—

‘I have slept painfully; my mind is unfit for work.’ Why? Because it wanders, is unsteady.

Then speaks of the reflection of one who awakes after a sleep, in which the Tamas appears, having to its utmost overpowered the Sattva and the Rajas :—

‘I have slept very stupidly; my limbs are heavy; my mind is tired, lazy and as it were absent.’

The fact to be proved having been established by the canon of difference, now applies the same canon of difference to the cause thereof.

‘Dependent thereupon’ means caused by the recognition.’

‘Having that for their object,’ means ‘having the cause of the non-existence of the modifications for their object.’

The cause is recognized in this way, ‘This is it.’

And it is recognized by him who awakens, i.e., just on awakening. The meaning is that at the time of awakening, the knowledge of the notion exists along with the knowledge of the cause of the non-existence of the modifications.

The question arises: The modifications of Real Cognition, &c., show themselves in an outwardly inclined mind; they are, therefore, to be checked, being contrary to trance. Sleep, however, is similar to the modification of one-pointedness; why then should it be contrary to trance?

For this reason, says :—

‘And further it is to be checked in trance like any other modification.’ The meaning is that although it is similar to the modification of one-pointedness, yet it is caused by Tamas, and is, therefore, contrary to both the Cognitive and the ultra-cognitive trances.

The meaning is that that too is to be checked.

Sūtra 11.

अनुभूतविषयासंप्रमोषः स्मृतिः ॥ ११ ॥

11. Memory¹ is the not stealing away³ along with objective mental¹ impressions² (retained) (i.e., the reproducing of not more than what has been impressed upon the mind).

अनुभूतविषयासंप्रमोषः स्मृतिः । किं प्रत्ययस्य चित्तं स्मरति । आहोस्विद्विषयस्येति । ग्राह्योपरक्तः प्रत्ययो ग्राह्यग्रहणोभयाकारनिर्भासस्तज्जातीयकं संस्कारमारभते । स संस्कारः स्वव्यञ्जकाञ्जनस्तदाकारमेव ग्राह्यग्रहणोभयात्मिकां स्मृतिं जनयति । तत्र ग्रहणाकारपूर्वा बुद्धिः । ग्राह्याकारपूर्वा स्मृतिः सा च द्वयी । भावितस्मर्तव्या चाभावितस्मर्तव्या च । स्वप्ने भावितस्मर्तव्या । जाग्रत्समये त्वभावितस्मर्तव्येति । सर्वाश्चैताः स्मृतयः प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतीनामनुभवात्प्रभवन्ति । सर्वाश्चैता वृत्तयः सुखदुःखमोहात्मिकाः । सुखदुःखमोहाश्च क्लेशेषु व्याख्येयाः । सुखानुशयी रागः । दुःखानुशयी द्वेषः । मोहः पुनरविद्येति । एताः सर्वा वृत्तयो निरोद्धव्याः । आसां निरोधे संप्रज्ञातो वा समाधिर्भवत्यसंप्रज्ञातो वेति ॥ ११ ॥

VYĀSA.

Does the mind remember the act of knowing or the object? The notion coloured by the object of knowledge shows out both the object and the act of knowledge, and thus begins the formation of the habit of the same kind. The habit manifests its own cause, and thus generates a memory, having the same form and consisting of both the object and the act of knowledge. When the manifestation of the act of knowledge is the first of the two, the modification is the intellect (buddhi). When the appearance of the object of knowledge is the first, it is Memory.

This memory is two-fold : When the phenomenon to be remembered has become the very nature of the mind, and when it has not so become. In dream it is the former ; at the time of waking the latter.

All these memories are born in sequence of the impressions of Real Cognition, Unreal Cognition, Imagination, Sleep and Memory. Further, all these modifications are of the nature of pleasure, pain and illusion. Pleasure, pain and illusion will be described among the afflictions. Attachment is the sticking to pleasure as such in sequence.' 7. 2. Aversion is the sticking to pain as such in sequence.' 8. 2. Illusion, however, is Nescience. All these modifications are to be checked. It is when these have been checked that there comes either the Cognitive or the ultra-cognitive trance.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

"Memory is the not stealing away along with mental impressions." Memory is the not stealing away along with an object which has come into the mind by real cognition, &c. It is only the object of knowledge which comes into consciousness by mental habit alone and which shines forth into the mind in consequence of the cognition of the cause of the habit, that is one's own. The taking of an object, however, over and above that is theft, on account of its similarity with the act. The word 'pramoshā' is derived from the root 'mush' to steal.

This is the meaning : Right cognition and others all cause the knowledge of an object unknown, either in the ordinary or in some particular way. Memory, however,

does not pass over the limitation of the former knowledge. It is that former knowledge or something less than that which is its object, never something more. This is the distinction of memory from other modifications. The question, 'Does it remember the notion or the object?' starts this discussion.

It would appear that the habit generated by an act of knowledge puts into the mind the object of knowledge only, because the impression in the mind is caused by the coming in of the object of knowledge: and no mental impression can come into existence of itself. If the mental impression itself were reproduced, it would be the mental impression alone (and not the object of knowledge).

For this reason the author comes to the final conclusion that it is a remembrance of both. Because the mental impression (the act of knowledge) takes its origin from the object of knowledge, the former is coloured by the latter. In reality, however, it manifests, *i.e.*, illuminates the form, that is the appearance of both the object and the act of knowledge.

That which brings anything into manifestation, is its cause (*vyañjaka*, manifestor). Its manifestation is the form thereof. Hence the meaning of the original is, 'possessing the form of its cause.'

The question arises, what is the difference between the memory and the intellect (*buddhi*), if they have the same form as far as their genesis is concerned?

For this reason, the author says:—"When the form of the act of knowledge is the first of the two, &c."

An act of knowledge consists in the taking in of an object; and it is not possible that there should be the taking in of an object which has already been taken in, *i.e.*, known. Hence by this is described the knowing of the yet unknown, which is intellection. It is described to be such as the form or appearance of knowledge is the first, *i.e.*, the most important factor therein. And although there is no difference in nature, the preponderance of the quality is established.

Memory is described to be that in which the form of the object of knowledge is the first or foremost appearance. By the form of the object of knowledge being the first in appearance, it is meant that the object of knowledge has already been subjected to the operation of the other mental modifications. It is said that the field of memory comprises the mental impressions which have already been subjected to the operation of other mental modifications. And this is what is 'not stealing along with mental impressions.'

But this stealing exists in memory too. It shows in dream past phenomena impressed upon the mind at different times and places, such as the names, &c., as connected with other times and places which have not passed into the mind as such. For this reason, he says, 'It is two-fold.'

'That which has become of the very nature of mind,' means raised into being by mental potency, imagined. This is that in which the object of memory has already been made part of the mind.

The other is that which has not become of the nature of the mind, which is not raised out of mental potencies, is not imagined and is therefore real.

This is not memory, it is on the contrary unreal cognition, fitting in as it does with the definition thereof. It is called memory because it only looks like it, just as what looks like real cognition is called real cognition.

But then why is memory mentioned last of all?

The reason is given:—"All these memories, &c." 'Impression in sequence' means taking in. Memory is a modification preceded by this taking in. That is to say, the genesis of memory is therefrom.

The question arises that an intelligent man will only check the modifications which cause misery to the Puruṣa, and such are the afflictions, not the modifications as such. What then is the object of their suppression? For this reason, he says :—All these, &c. This is easy.

Sūtra 12.

अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः ॥ १२ ॥

12. They³ are restrained¹ by practice¹ and desireless-
ness.²

अथासां निरोधे क उपाय इति । अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः । चित्तनदीनामो-
भयतोवाहिनी या वहति कल्याणाय वहति पापाय च । या तु कैवल्यप्राग्भारा विवेक-
विषयनिम्ना सा कल्याणवहा । संसारप्राग्भारा अविवेकविषयनिम्ना पापवहा । तत्र
वैराग्येण विषयस्रोतः खिलीक्रियते । विवेकदर्शनाभ्यासेन विवेकस्रोत उद्घाट्यते इत्युभ-
याधीनश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ॥ १२ ॥

VYĀSA.

Well then, what is the means for restraining them? "They are restrained by practice and desirelessness."

The stream of mind flows both ways ; it flows towards the good and it flows towards the evil. That which flows on to perfect independence (kaivalya) down the plane of discriminative knowledge, is named the stream of happiness. That which leads to re-birth and flows down the plane of undiscriminative ignorance, is the stream of sin.

Among these the flow of the desirables is thinned by desirelessness ; the flow of discrimination is rendered visible by habituating the mind to the experience of knowledge.

Hence suppression of the mental modification is dependent upon both.

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

The Commentator asks the means of restraint. "Well then, what, &c." He answers by the aphorism :—"They are restrained by practice and desirelessness." The operation of practice and desirelessness on the manifestation of restraint is collective, on account of each operating as a branch of the other. They are not optional. For this reason he says :—
'The stream of mind flows both ways, &c.'

'Flows towards' : The word *prāgbhāra* in the original means bank, limitation ; and the idea is that the stream is so banked, i. e., limited in its flow as to reach the state of perfect independence (kaivalya).

'Down the plane' : The word 'nimna' in the original means down, an inclination of the ground, such as makes it possible for water to flow in a particular direction. It also means depth, into which water would always flow.

Sūtra 13.

तत्र स्थितौ यत्नोऽभ्यासः ॥ १३ ॥

13. Of these,¹ practice¹ is the effort³ to secure
steadiness.²

तत्र स्थितौ यत्नोऽभ्यासः । चित्तस्यावृत्तिकस्य प्रशान्तवाहितास्थितिस्तदर्थः प्रयत्नो
वीर्यमुत्साहस्तत्संपिपादयिषया तत्साधनानुष्ठानमभ्यासः ॥ १३ ॥

VYĀSA.

Steadiness is the undisturbed calmness of the flow of the mind, when it has become free from the modifications.

Effort to secure that end is the putting out of energy to secure, and aspiration towards that.

Practice is the resort to the means thereof with the object of attaining it.

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

Of these, the author describes practice by stating its nature and object: 'Of these, practice is the effort to secure steadiness.'

The commentator explains the same:—'When the mind has become free from the modifications: 'is separated from the modifications due to *Rajas* and *Tamas*, the flow of the modifications of the quality of *Essence* is established in the shape of calm one-pointedness and purity. This is steadiness.

"Effort to secure that end," is the meaning of the locative case of the word 'sthiti' used to signify that object. As is the case in the sentence, 'Charmanī dvīpinam hanti,' of which the meaning is, 'Kills the tiger for the sake of the skin.'

He clears the meaning of effort by giving synonyms: energy, aspiration. He explains:—'With the object of attaining that.' "That" here means steadiness.

He speaks of the field for the action of that energy:—"Resort to the means thereof." The means for the attainment of steadiness are the internal and external *Yogas*, the restraints and observances, &c. The action of the actor is directed towards the means, not towards the fruit.

Sūtra 14

स तु दीर्घकालनैरन्तर्यसत्कारासेवितो दृढभूमिः ॥ १४

14. And² this¹ is firmly³ rooted,⁴ being well-attended to⁷ for a long³ time¹ without interruption⁵ and with devotion.⁶

स तु दीर्घकालनैरन्तर्यसत्कारासेवितो दृढभूमिः । दीर्घकालासेवितो निरन्तरासेवितः सत्कारासेवितः । तपसा ब्रह्मचर्येण विद्यया श्रद्धया च संपादितः सत्कारवान्दृढभूमिर्भवति । व्युत्थानसंस्कारेण द्रागित्येवानभिभूतविषय इत्यर्थः ॥ १४ ॥

VYĀSA.

"Well attended to for a long time," "well attended to without interruption," "well attended to with devotion," i. e., brought about by purificatory action (*tapas*), by continence, by knowledge and by faith, it becomes firmly rooted with welcome devotion. The meaning is that its operation is not then conquered all at once by the outgoing habits of the mind.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

But how can practice secure steadiness, when its operations are opposed by the highway robber of outgoing habits, which are in existence from eternity? Explains :—
“ And this is firmly rooted, being well attended to for a long time, without interruption and with devotion.”

This practice then reaches the state of firmness, but not at once, inasmuch as being possessed of the three qualities, its domain, the appearance of calmness, is often overpowered by the habits of outgoing.

If again, having even had resort to practice of this description, one gives it up, it will be overpowered by lapse of time. Hence it should not be given up. This is the meaning.

Sūtra 15.

दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम् ॥ १५ ॥

15. Desirelessness⁷ is the consciousness⁶ of supremacy⁵ in him who is free from thirst¹ for perceptible¹ and scriptural² enjoyments.³

दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम् । स्त्रियोऽन्नपानमैश्वर्यमिति दृष्टविषये विरक्तस्य स्वगवैदेहप्रकृतिलयत्वप्राप्तावानुश्रविकविषये वितृष्णस्य दिव्यादिव्य-विषयसंप्रयोगेऽपि चित्तस्य विषयदोषदर्शिनः प्रसंख्यानबलादनाभोगात्मिकाहेयोपादेय-शून्यावशीकारसंज्ञावैराग्यम् ॥ १५ ॥

VYĀSA.

A mind free from attachment to perceptible enjoyments, such as women, foods, drinks, and power, and having no thirst for scriptural enjoyables, such as heaven and the attainment of the states of the Videha and the Prakritilaya, has, when it comes into contact with such divine and worldly objects, a consciousness of its supremacy, due to an understanding of the defects of the objects, brought about by virtue of intellectual illumination. This consciousness of power is the same as the consciousness of indifference to their enjoyment, and is devoid of all desirable and undesirable objects as such. This mental state is desirelessness (Vairāgya).

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author describes desirelessness :—“ Desirelessness is the consciousness of supremacy in him who is freed from thirst for perceptible and scriptural enjoyments.”

He describes the freedom from thirst for intelligent and non-intelligent perceptible objects :—‘ women, &c.’

Power is lordship. Scripture is the Veda. Those that are known from the Veda are scriptural enjoyments, such as heaven, &c. He speaks of desire for them too : such as heaven, &c.”

The Videhas are the disembodied, who live only in the vehicles which serve as instruments (of knowledge and action.) The state of the disembodied (vaidehya) is their state of existence.

Others believe the Prakṛiti only to be the self. They meditate upon the Prakṛiti. They are merged in the functional Prakṛiti alone. (The functional Prakṛiti is that in which the state of the equipoise has been disturbed, i. e., not the Mūlaprakṛiti). The state of the Prakṛitilaya is their state of existence.

Scriptural enjoyments consist of the attainment of these states. He who is free from thirst for scriptural objects, is the same who is free from the desire of attaining heaven, &c.

The question arises that inasmuch as there is absence of desire even for objects that have never been possessed, such absence too would be desirelessness if desirelessness signified only absence of desire. Therefore commentator says : 'when it comes into contact with such divine and worldly objects. Desirelessness is not the mere absence of desire. On the contrary, it is the consciousness of indifference to enjoyment, even though divine and worldly objects be in contact. He renders the same plainer :--Is devoid of all desirable and undesirable objects as such.'

Consciousness of supremacy is the consciousness of indifference, freedom from attachment or aversion.

But then whence does it come? He explains : 'By virtue of intellectual illumination.'

The defect of objects is contained in their being surrounded by three-fold pain. Intellectual illumination is the full recognition of this fact with the object of removing them. By virtue thereof is the understanding of the defects brought about.

The authorities speak of four stages in the unfoldment of consciousness : The consciousness of endeavour, the consciousness of difference, the consciousness of one faculty and the consciousness of supremacy.

Attachment, &c., are the impurities of the mind. The powers of sensation, action, and thought are led by these to work up their several objects. Endeavour is the putting in of effort for burning them, so that the powers may not incline to work upon their several objects. This is the consciousness of endeavour.

When the endeavour has begun, some of the impurities are found to be ripe ; others are being ripened ; and others again are going to be ripened. The consciousness of difference consists in differentiating the ripe and the ripening.

When the powers become incapable of action, the wish alone remains in the mind, so far as the ripe ones are concerned. The consciousness of this state is called 'the consciousness of the one faculty.'

When physical and ultra-physical objects of enjoyment take up the position of receding, the position of indifference even to the wish, is beyond the three stages of consciousness, and is called the consciousness of supremacy. The object of the first three having been fulfilled by this alone, they have not been mentioned separately. Thus all is plain.

Sûtra 16.

तत्परं^१ पुरुषख्यातेर्गुणवैतृष्यम्^२ ॥ १६ ॥

16. The same¹ is Higher,² when there is indifference³ to the "qualities,"⁴ due to the knowledge¹ of the Puruṣa.³

तत्परं पुरुषख्यातेर्गुणवैतृष्यम् । दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयदोषदर्शी विरक्तः पुरुषदर्शनाभ्यासात्तच्छुद्धिप्रविवेकाप्यायित बुद्धिर्गुणैर्भ्योव्यक्ताव्यक्तधर्मकेभ्यो विरक्त इति । तद्व्ययं वैराग्यम् तत्र यदुत्तरं तज्ज्ञानप्रसादमात्रं यस्योदये सति योगी प्रत्युदितख्यातिरेवं

मन्यते । प्राप्तं प्रापणीयम् । क्षीणाः क्षेतव्याः क्लेशाः । छिन्नः क्षिप्तः पर्वभ्रवसंक्रमो यस्या विच्छेदाज्जनित्वाभ्रियते मृत्वा च जायत इति । ज्ञानस्यैव पराकाष्ठा वैराग्यम् । एतस्यैव हि नान्तरीयकं कैवल्यमिति ॥ १६ ॥

VYĀSA.

He who sees the defects of the perceptible and scriptural objects of enjoyment, is indifferent (to them.)

He whose Will-to-know is saturated with the notion of the distinctive nature of the puruṣa, brought about by the purity of the effort to know him, becomes indifferent to the 'qualities,' both in their manifested and unmanifested state.

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There are two forms of desirelessness. Of these the latter is but the light of spiritual knowledge. When this light shines, discrimination arises. Then the Yogi thinks thus : Whatever was to be obtained has been obtained. The afflictions that were to be destroyed have been destroyed. The fast-jointed chain of life which, when it is not broken, there is or occurs birth after death and death after birth, has been broken. Desirelessness is but the highest perfection of spiritual knowledge ; and absolute independence (kaivalya) is nothing else.

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

Having described the Lower desirelessness, the author now describes the Higher : "The same is Higher when there is indifference to the 'qualities,' due to knowledge of the Puruṣa."

He shows that Lower desirelessness is the antecedent to the Higher, and that it is the entrance to that. Lower Desirelessness is shown by the words, "he who sees the defects of perceptible and scriptural objects of enjoyment, is indifferent to them."

"Brought about by the effort to know the puruṣa;" the knowledge of the Puruṣa is his recognition by means of the Veda, by inference and by the teaching of the masters. The 'effort to know' consists in the repeated resort to the means. The purity of the knowledge consists in the steady flow of the quality of essence (sattva), due to the removal of active disturbance (rajas) and inertia (tamas). This brings about the recognition of the distinct natures of the puruṣa and the "qualities." The puruṣa is pure and infinite. The 'qualities' are contrary thereto. The yogi whose intellect is saturated by the recognition, is spoken of as such. The trance known as the Cloud of Virtue is spoken of here.

Such a Yogi is entirely free from attachment to the 'qualities,' whether possessing the characteristic of the manifested or the unmanifested ; so much so that he is free from attachment even to the mental phenomenon of the recognition of the distinct nature of the Objective Essence and the Puruṣa, which itself is a manifestation of the qualities.

Thus there are two forms of desirelessness. The former desirelessness exists when the mental essence (sattva) has been rendered free from inertia (tamas), by the manifestation of its essential nature (the sattva), but there still remains a trace of the dirt of disturbing energy (rajas).

This view is common to the Tāustikas, those who are addicted to enjoyment in the states. It is by that of course that they become Prakṛitīlayas. So it has been said :—"One becomes a Prakṛitīlaya by desirelessness."

The last of the two is but the light of knowledge. By the use of the word 'but' it is indicated that in that state no objects of knowledge exist. The mental essence as it exists in that state is similar to the same, but is besides untainted by the least impurity of 'Disturbing Energy (rajas). It is therefore said to be the light of knowledge. Mental Essence is by nature purity : but it puts on impurity by the taint of disturbing energy (rajas) and inertia (tamas). When the impurities of *rajas* and *tamas* have been washed away by the pure showers of desirelessness and practice, it becomes highly illuminated, and the light of spiritual knowledge is left there alone.

He shows that in that state the 'qualities' become unworthy of acceptance :—'When this light shines, discrimination arises in the Yogî.' The meaning is that the Yogî becomes possessed of the present discriminative knowledge, when other forms of knowledge have disappeared.

What was to be obtained, *i. e.*, perfect independence (kaivalya) has been obtained. As will be said, 'the wise man becomes free while living.' The meaning is that this takes place because residual potencies only remain with their root cut off. How is it that all that had to be attained, has been attained? Because the afflictions of Nescience, &c. which had to be removed, have been removed together with their residual aroma.

But then there is the store of virtue and vice which is used as a chain to bind living beings to birth and death in the universe. How then can there be absolute freedom? For this reason, the commentator says :—'The fast-jointed chain, &c., is broken.' The 'fast-jointed chain' means that whose joints are so firmly and closely fastened together that they appear to be one whole and do not appear to have been fastened together. It is the pieces of virtue and vice stored, which, as individual pieces in the collection, are put together to make the fast joints of a chain. 'The chain of existence' implies that the living being is not freed from the bonds of birth and death. This chain is broken when the afflictions have been done away with. And so it has been said :—

'The vehicle of actions has its root in nescience,' 2-12.

'It bears fruit if there is a root,' 2-13.

It may be questioned, that inasmuch as restraint is the intermediate stage between the fruition of intellection and the Cloud of Virtue, what is this that is called the mere light of knowledge?

For this reason, he says :—'Desirelessness is the highest perfection of spiritual knowledge?' The Higher desirelessness is but a form of the Cloud of Virtue, nothing else. As will be said further on,

'To him who desires nothing even from intellection (prasaṅkhyāna) comes the trance known as the Cloud of Virtue, by constant manifestation of discrimination (IV. 29.) and

'Then the knowable is but little, because knowledge is infinite, free as it is from all veils and impurities' (IV. 31).

For this reason it is that absolute independence is this and nothing else. 16.

Sûtra 17.

वितर्कविचारानन्दस्मितारूपानुगमात्संप्रज्ञातः ॥ १७ ॥

17. The Cognitive Trance⁷ is accompanied⁶ by the appearances⁵ of philosophical¹ curiosity, meditation,² elation³ and egoism.⁴

अथोपायद्वयेन निरुद्धचित्तवृत्तेः कथमुच्यते संप्रज्ञातः समाधिरिति । वितर्कविचारानन्दस्मितारूपानुगमात्संप्रज्ञातः । वितर्कचित्तस्यालम्बने स्थूल आमोगः । सूक्ष्मो

विचारः । आनन्दोल्लासः । एकात्मिकासंविदस्मिता । तत्र प्रथमश्चतुष्टयानुगतः समाधिः सवितर्कः द्वितीयो वितर्कविकलः सविचारस्तृतीयो विचारविकलः सानन्दः चतुर्थस्तद्विकलोऽस्मितामात्र इति । सर्व एते सालम्बनाः समाधयः ॥ १७ ॥

VYÂSA.

Now then, how is the Cognitive Trance said to appear in those whose minds have been restrained by the two means ? 'The Cognitive Trance is accompanied by the appearances of philosophical curiosity, meditation, elation and egoism.'

Philosophical curiosity (vitarka) is a superficial attempt of the mind to grasp any object.

Meditation is a subtle attempt. Elation is bliss. Egoism is the consciousness of being one with the self.

Of these, the first is the Savitarka Trance accompanied by all the four. The second is the Meditative (savichâra) where indistinctness ends. The third is Elative (sânanda) where meditation ends. The fourth is the purely egoistical (sâsmîtâ) where elation ends. All these trances have something to grasp (âlambana).

VÂCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

Having described the means, the commentator now puts a question with the object of introducing the description of the acquisition they lead to, together with that of its various classes :—'Now then how is the Cognitive Trance, &c.' The Cognitive Trance is accompanied by the appearances of philosophical curiosity, meditation, elation and egoism.

The Cognitive Trance is first described because it precedes the ultra-cognitive. The general nature of the Cognitive Trance is to be understood in the accompaniment of the natures, i. e., the forms, of philosophical curiosity, meditation, elation and egoism.

He defines philosophical curiosity :—'A superficial attempt of the mind, &c.' Grasp (âbhoga) is the manifestation of consciousness consisting of the illumination of the nature of objects. It is called 'Superficial' because it has the gross phenomena for its sphere of action. As the new archer first aims at large objects only, and then at smaller and smaller ones by and by, so the neophyte in Yoga first learns the nature of gross objects of thought only, such as those made of the five Mahâbhûtas (physical states of matter), the four armed god, &c.; and then the subtle ones.

In this way the grasp of the objects by the mind becomes subtle. Meditation has for its sphere of action, the causes of the gross phenomena, the subtle elements, the five tanmâtras, the manifested and the unmanifested essence of matter (the lînga and the alînga).

Having thus shown the range of the objective phenomena, he now shows the range of the instrumental phenomena :—'Elation is &c.' Elation is that blissful modification of consciousness, which consists in the illumination of the mind, as regards the acts of sensation, with gross phenomena for their objects. The nature of the powers of sensation is to enlighten, because they are born out of the principle of individuality, with the quality of essentiality (Sattva) predominating. Pleasure is a manifestation of the quality of Essentiality (Sattva). Acts of sensation too are therefore of the nature of pleasure. The manifestation of consciousness consisting of the illumination of this aspect is bliss.

He describes the Cognitive Trance having the subject (grihitri) for its sphere of action :—'Egoism is the consciousness of being one with the self.' Egoism is the subtle cause of the instrumental powers inasmuch as they are born out of it; and this egoism appearing as the self, the subject is the consciousness of being one with the self. This Cognitive Trance has the subject for its sphere of action, because the subject is always hidden behind egoism.

He mentions other minor differences of all the four :—'The first, &c.' The cause is always present in the effect, as its antecedent state; not so the effect in the cause. Therefore, this superficial range of consciousness is accompanied by all the four—the gross and its causes, the subtle, the instrumental and the subjective. The others have three, two and one cause, respectively as their spheres of action, and they have therefore three, two and one appearance, respectively.

He distinguishes the ultra-cognitive :—'All these, &c.'

Sūtra 18.

विरामप्रत्याभ्यासपूर्वः संस्कारशेषोऽन्यः ॥ १८ ॥

18. Preceded¹ by the constant repetition³ of the notion² of cessation¹ is the other;⁷ in which the residual potencies⁵ only remain.⁶

अथासंप्रज्ञातः समाधिः किमुपायः किंस्वभावो वेति । विरामप्रत्याभ्यासपूर्वः संस्कारशेषोऽन्यः । सर्ववृत्तिप्रत्यस्तमये संस्कारशेषो निरोधश्चित्रस्य समाधिरसंप्रज्ञातः । तस्य परं वैराग्यमुपायः । सालम्बनो ह्यभ्यासः तत्साधनाय न कल्पत इति विरामप्रत्ययो निर्वस्तुक आलम्बनी क्रियते । स चार्थशून्यः । तदभ्यासपूर्वकं हि चित्तं निरालम्बनमभावप्राप्तमिव भवतीत्येष निर्बीजः समाधिरसंप्रज्ञातः ॥ १८ ॥

VYĀSA.

What now are the means and the nature of the ultra-cognitive trance? "Preceded by constant repetition of the notion of cessation is the other in which the residual potencies only remain."

The ultra-cognitive trance is that state of mental restraint, in which all its modifications cease from action and remain only *in posse*. Its means is the Higher desirelessness.

Inasmuch as any form of practice having an objective phenomenon for its basis, cannot become the means of achieving it, the notion of cessation which is nothing substantial, is here made the basis; and that is devoid of any objective phenomenon. By the constant repetition of this notion, the mind having no object to grasp, becomes as it were non-existent. The trance being thus seedless, is the ultra-cognitive.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The commentator asks a question to introduce the ultra-cognitive, whose discussion is now in order :—'What now, &c.'

"Preceded by the constant repetition of the notion of cessation is the other, in which the residual potencies only remain."

'The words, 'preceded by the constant repetition of the notion of cessation,' show the means; the remaining words describe the nature. The words, 'in which the residual potencies only remain,' are explained as, 'in which all its modifications cease, &c.'

The words, 'preceded by the constant repetition of the notion of cessation,' are explained by the words, 'Its means is the Higher desirelessness.'

Cessation is the absence of mental modifications. Its notion is the cause. Its practice consists in its repetition over and over again. That which this repetition precedes is described as such.

Now he says why the lower desirelessness does not become the cause of restraint (nirodha):—'Inasmuch as any form of practice having an objective phenomenon as its basis, &c.'

The cause must be of the same class as the effect, not of a contrary class. The desirelessness which has an objective phenomenon for its basis is contrary to the effect; the trance, that is to say, which has no object for its basis. It is therefore proper that it should be born only from a cause which has no objective phenomenon for its basis, the mere light, that is to say, of spiritual knowledge. It is only the trance known as the Cloud of Virtue, born as it is from the pure essence of the Will-to-know with the impurities of the *rajas* and the *tamas* entirely removed, and the objects thereof left behind, that is infinite, sees the defects of objects and having given them all up, stands in its own nature, that can properly become the cause, as having no object for its basis, of the seedless trance, in which the residual potencies only remain; because they are similar in nature.

'Is made the basis':—is made dependent upon that.

Becomes as it were non-existent:—because it does not produce any effect in the shape of mental modifications.

The seedless is that which has no object for its basis. Or, it may be said that the seed consists of the vehicles of afflictions and actions. This is said to be the seedless, because the afflictions and actions have gone out of it.

Sūtra 19.

भवप्रत्ययो विदेहप्रकृतिलयानाम् ॥ १९ ॥

19. Is caused² by Objective Existence¹ for the Videhas³ and Prakritilayas.⁴

स खल्वयं द्विविधः । उपायप्रत्ययो भवप्रत्ययश्च । तत्रोपायप्रत्ययो योगिनां भवति । भवप्रत्ययो विदेहप्रकृतिलयानाम् । विदेहानां देवानां भवप्रत्ययः । ते हि स्वसंस्कारमात्रोपयोगेन चित्तेन कैवल्यपदमिवानुभवन्तः स्वसंस्कारविपाकं तथाजातीयकमतिवाहयन्ति । तथा प्रकृतिलयाः साधिकारे चेतसि प्रकृतिलीने कैवल्यपदमिवानुभवन्ति । यावन्न पुनरावर्ततेऽधिकारवशाच्चित्तमिति ॥ १९ ॥

VYĀSA.

This is of two descriptions:—brought about by Objective Existence and brought about by the practice of the means. In the case of Yogis it is brought about by the practice of the means. In the case of the Videhas and the Prakritilayas it is caused by Objective Existence.

In the case of the Videhas, the gods, it is caused by Objective Existence, because they enjoy a state of something like absolute freedom (kaivalya) with a mind functioning only so far as its own residual potencies are capable of, and who while thus enjoying, live out the state of life, which is the fruition of their residual potencies.

Similarly do the Prakṛitilayas enjoy a state of quasi-isolation with a mind which has its work still before it, but which remains merged in the Prakṛitis, as long as it does not come back by virtue of the work still before it.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now the author describes a sub-head of the Inhibitive Trance, being necessary as it is for deciding which is to be adopted and which to be rejected :—‘This,’ the inhibitive trance, ‘is of two descriptions,’—caused by the practice of the means of achievement and brought about by Objective Existence.

The means are faith, &c., to be described later. That which is brought about by these means, is the inhibitive trance so spoken of.

That in which living beings are born is Objective Existence. It is Nescience. The modification of consciousness which consists in the identification of the not-self,—the forms consisting of the elements and the powers of sensation and action and the Prakṛitis, known as the Mûlaprakṛiti, the Mahat, the Ahankâra and the five tanmâtras,—with self, appears in the Taustikas who have attained the states of the lower desirelessness. This notion about the Objective Existence, becomes the antecedent of one description of the Inhibitive Trance. This is spoken of as having been brought about by Objective Existence.

Out of these two the one brought about by effort, is for the Yogis, who work for freedom from Objective Existence. By the mention of this distinction the other is denied to those who follow the path of absolute freedom (mokṣa).

Well then, in whom is it caused by Objective Existence? The reply is given by the aphorism :—‘Is caused by Objective Existence in the case of the Videhas and the Prakṛitilayas.’

The Videhas and the Prakṛitilayas are distinct from each other. The meaning is that this trance is so caused for both of them.

The author explains this :—‘For the Videhas it is caused by, &c.’

Those who recognize either of the elements or the powers of sensation, action and thought as the self, and so constantly devote themselves to them, that their internal organ is fully saturated with that idea, remain, after separation from the body, immersed in the same elemental, sensuous and functional forms; and all that remains of their mind, is the habit of their particular devotion. They are called the Videhas (the disembodied) because they are free from the physical bodies. It is they who, with a mind capable of moving only along the line marked by habit, enjoy a state of something like absolute freedom, but are without the physical body. This state resembles the state of absolute independence, because the modifications of the mind are suspended for the time being. It however differs from absolute freedom, in the possession of the power of having to perform work still to be done.

The reading in some places is “upabhoga” instead of “upayoga” in the text. Upabhoga means enjoyment. The meaning of this alternative reading would be that the residua alone are the objects of enjoyment and not the modifications.

When the limit has been reached they live out the state of life which is the fruition of their residual potencies. They come back to be born again. So says the Vāyu Purāṇa :—

“Those who devote themselves to meditation upon the powers of sensation, action and thought, live in this state for ten Manvantaras. Those who devote themselves to the elements live in that state for full one hundred Manvantaras.”

Similar are Prakṛtilayas. They believe one of the Prakṛtis, the unmanifested (Mūla-prakṛiti), the undifferentiated Phenomenal (Mahat), and the principle of Individuality, to be the self. Their internal organs are saturated with the idea of devotion to either of the Prakṛitis. They are immersed after their separation from the physical body, in the one of these Prakṛitis, which they have made the object of their devotion. But their minds have not yet fulfilled the object of their existence ; they have still work before them.

The mind would fulfil the object of its existence, if while following this very course of thought, it would also manifest the discrimination of the distinct natures of the Puruṣa and objective existence. If on the other hand this consciousness be not generated in the mind, it has not fulfilled its object, and is therefore said to have its work still before it. The Prakṛtilayas having their minds merged in the Prakṛitis, with its work still undone, enjoy a state of something like absolute freedom as long as they do not come back by virtue of the work yet to be done. Although the mind has become similar to the Prakṛiti, yet they come back when the limit has been reached. Then they acquire the consciousness of the distinct natures of the Puruṣa and the objective existence. As on the cessation of the rainy season, the body of the frog is assimilated to the earth, and comes back to life again on coming into contact with rain-water, (so does the mind of the Prakṛtilaya). So says Vāyu :—

“For a thousand Manvantaras, the Abhimānikas, those who identify themselves with the Prakṛitis ; and for ten thousand Manvantaras the Buddhas remain without pain. Those who devote themselves to the Unmanifested remain in that state for a hundred thousand Manvantaras. The computation of time does not exist on reaching the Nirguṇa Puruṣa.”

Thus this state also is given up, being subject to re-births.

Sūtra 20.

श्रद्धावीर्यस्मृतिसमाधिप्रज्ञापूर्वकं इतरेषाम् ॥ २० ॥

20. For others⁷ it is preceded⁶ by faith,¹ energy,² memory,³ trance⁴ and discernment.⁵

श्रद्धावीर्यस्मृतिसमाधिप्रज्ञापूर्वकं इतरेषाम् । उपायप्रत्ययो योगिनां भवति । श्रद्धा चेतसः संप्रसादः । साहि जननीव कल्याणी योगिनं पाति तस्य हि श्रद्धाधानस्य विवेकार्थिनो वीर्यमुपजायते । समुपजातवीर्यस्य स्मृतिरुपतिष्ठते स्मृत्युपस्थाने च चित्तमनाकुलं समाधीयते । समाहितचित्तस्य प्रज्ञाविवेक उपावर्तते । येन यथार्थं वस्तु जानाति । तदभ्यासात्तत्तद्विषयाच्च वैराग्यादसंप्रज्ञातः समाधिर्भवति ॥ २० ॥

VYĀSA.

It is brought about by the means of achievement for the Yogis. Faith is the pleasing wishful contact of mind with the object of

pursuit. It sustains the Yogî, like a mother. Energy is born in him who pursues knowledge with faith. Memory comes to help when he is possessed of energy. On the appearance of memory, the mind ceases to be disturbed and passes into trance. When the mind is entranced, discrimination appears, by which it knows an object as it is. By constant practice thereof and by desirelessness with reference to the object thereof, comes the ultra-cognitive trance.

VĀCHASPATTI'S GLOSS.

The author describes the sequence of the means of the achievement of this trance by a Yogî :—"For others it is preceded by faith, energy, memory, trance and discernment."

But the devotees of the powers of sensation, action and thought are also possessed of faith. For this reason he says : 'Faith is the pleasing wishful contact of the mind with the object of pursuit,' and the object of the pleasing wishful pursuit of the mind here is the ultra-cognitive trance, as it comes into existence with reference thereto, after the nature of the objective world has been known by the Veda, by inference and by the teaching of the masters. There can be no wishful contact in the case of those who confound the powers of sensation, &c., with the self. In their case it is the opposite of the pleasing wishful contact, because their confusion has its origin in all-round forgetfulness. The powers of sensation, &c., can not thus be objects of faith.

He explains why that alone is faith :- 'It sustains the Yogî like a kind mother.' The meaning is that it does not let him fall down into the wrong path, leading to the destruction of its object.

It is this particular wishfulness which gives birth to energetic effort guided towards the object wished for. Therefore he says :- 'Energy is born in him when he pursues knowledge with faith.'

Memory means keeping it present in the mind, thinking thereupon. 'Undisturbed' means 'not only occasionally steady, not distracted.'

"Passes into trance" :—Trance is here the trance which is described as a branch of Yoga. The restraints and observances also are indicated, inasmuch as trance is mentioned there as coming after them. Thus he who has made all the branches of Yoga his own, reaches the stage of cognitive trance. This is what he says :—"When the mind is entranced." That is to say, when the highest limit of intellection is reached.

He explains that the ultra-cognitive is born when the cognitive precedes it :—"By the constant practice thereof and by desirelessness with reference to the objects thereof at each stage comes the ultra-cognitive trance." It is that which is the means of achieving absolute freedom. Because the suppression which comes after the manifestation of the knowledge of the distinct natures of the Puruṣa and the Will-to-know, is the final suppression which renders it unnecessary for the mind to go on working; inasmuch as it has now done the whole of its work and fulfilled the purpose of its existence.

Sûtra 21.

तीव्रसंवेगानामासन्नः ॥ २१ ॥

21. Proximate³ for those whose consciousness of supremacy² is keen.¹

ते क्षुब्धनवयोगिनो भवन्ति । मृदुमध्याधिमत्त्रोपाया भवन्ति । तद्यथा मृदुपायो मध्योपायोऽधिमत्त्रोपाय इति । तत्र मृदुपायस्त्रिविधः । मृदुसंवेगो मध्यसंवेगस्तीव्रसंवेग

इति । तथा मध्योपायस्तथाऽधिमात्रोपाय इति । तत्राधिमात्रोपायानां तीव्रसंवेगानामासन्नः समाधिभ्रमः समाधिफलं च भवतीति ॥ २१ ॥

VYĀSA.

There are nine descriptions of such Yogis. Their application to the means of achievement is mild, middling or intense. Thus some are of mild energy, others of medium energy, and others again of intense energy. Of these, the mildly energetic are three-fold, those having mild consciousness of supremacy, those having middling consciousness of supremacy, and those having keen consciousness of supremacy. Similarly, those of medium energy, and those of intense energy. Of these, the attainment of trance and the fruit of trance are near to those who are intensely energetic in their application to the means of achievement and possess a keen consciousness of supremacy.

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

If faith, &c., are the means for the attainment of trance, then trance and its fruit would accrue to all without distinction. Attainment however is noticed in some only, non-attainment in others. In some cases attainment is distant; in others it is very distant; in other cases however it is accomplished very soon. To meet this the Commentator says :—'There are nine descriptions of such Yogis, &c.'

The means of achievement are faith, &c. They are of mild, middling and intense energy in their application, by virtue of the habits of previous lives. The Yogis possessed of them are spoken of as such.

Consciousness of supremacy is desirelessness. That also is mild, middling or keen by virtue of the habits of previous lives.

Among these Yogis, the speedy attainment is shown such as it is by the Aphorism :— It is near to those who are possessed of keen consciousness of supremacy. This much is the aphorism; the rest is the commentary. The fruit of the cognitive trance is the ultra-cognitive, and of that absolute freedom.

Sūtra 22.

मृदुमध्याधिमात्रत्वात्ततोऽपि विशेषः ॥ २२ ॥

22. A further¹ also⁵ differentiation⁶ by mild,¹ middling² and intense.³

मृदुमध्याधिमात्रत्वात्ततोऽपि विशेषः । मृदुतीव्रो मध्यतीव्रोऽधिमात्रतीव्र इति । ततोऽपि विशेषः । तद्विशेषादप्यासन्नतरस्तीव्राधिमात्रसंवेगस्याधिमात्रोपायस्य समाधि-भ्रमः समाधिफलं चेति ॥ २२ ॥

VYĀSA.

Mild-intense, middling-intense and intense-intense. There is differentiation by that too. By that differentiation too the attainment of trance and its fruit becomes the speediest in the case of one whose application is intense and whose consciousness of supremacy is keenly intense.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

This has been explained by explanations already given of the commentary.

Sūtra 23.

ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद् वा ॥ २३ ॥

23. Or,³ by feeling the omnipresence² of God (Īśwara).¹

किमेतस्मादेवासन्नतरः समाधिर्भवति । अथास्यलाभे भवत्यन्योऽपि कश्चिदुपायो न वेति । ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद्वा । प्रणिधानाद्भक्तिविशेषादावाजित ईश्वरस्तमनुगृह्णात्यभिध्यानमात्रेण । तदभिध्यानमात्रादपि योगिन आसन्नतरः समाधिर्लाभः समाधिफलं च भवतीति ॥ २३ ॥

VYĀSA.

Does trance become speedier of attainment in this way only? Or, is there any other means too? 'Or, by feeling the omnipresence of God.' Īśwara drawn towards him by the kind of devotion which consists in the feeling of His omnipresence, becomes gracious to him by merely wishing attainment. By His merely wishing the attainment, trance and its fruit become speedier of attainment for a Yogī.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The Commentator puts a question for the purpose of introducing the next aphorism :- 'Does trance become speedier, &c.' The aphorism is the answer. 'Or, by feeling the omnipresence of God.'

'Feeling the omni-presence' means a particular kind of devotion of the mind, speech and body. "Drawn towards" means brought face to face. "Wish for attainment" means that any one may get something which he has not got, but which is desirable. 'Merely' signifies not by any other effort. The rest is easy. 23.

Sūtra 24.

क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः ॥ २४ ॥

24. Īśwara⁶ is a distinct⁷ Purusa,⁸ untouched⁵ by the vehicles³ of affliction, action² and fruition.³

अथ प्रधानपुरुषव्यतिरिक्तः कोऽयमीश्वरो नामेति । क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः । अविद्यादयः क्लेशाः । कुशलाऽकुशलानि कर्माणि । तत्फलं विपाकः । तदनुगुणा वासना आशयास्ते च मनसि वर्तमानाः पुरुषे व्यपदिश्यन्ते । स हि तत्फलस्य भोकेति । यथा जयः पराजयो वा योद्धुः वर्तमानः स्वामिनि व्यपदिश्यते यो ह्यनेन भोगेन परामृष्टः स पुरुष विशेष ईश्वरः । कैवल्यं प्राप्तास्तर्हि सन्ति च बहवः कैवलिनः । ते हि त्रीणि बन्धनानि छित्वा कैवल्यं प्राप्ता ईश्वरस्य च तत्त्वबन्धो न भूतो न भावि । यथा मुक्तस्य पूर्वबन्धकोटिः प्रजायते नवमीश्वरस्य । यथा वा प्रकृतिलीनस्योत्तरा बन्धकोटिः

संभाव्यते नैवमीश्वरस्य । स तु सदैव मुक्तः सदैवेश्वर इति । योऽसौ प्रकृष्टसत्त्वोपादानादीश्वरस्य शाश्वतिक उत्कर्षः स किं सनिमित्त आदोस्विन्ननिमित्त इति । तस्य शास्त्रं निमित्तम् । शास्त्रं पुनः किं निमित्तं प्रकृष्टसत्त्वनिमित्तम् । एतयोः शास्त्रोत्कर्षयोरीश्वरसत्त्वे वर्तमानयोरनादिः संबन्धः । एतस्मादेतद्भवति सदैवेश्वरः सदैव मुक्त इति । तच्च तस्यैश्वर्यं साम्यातिशयविनिर्मुक्तम् । न तावदैश्वर्यान्तरेण तदतिशय्यते । यदेवातिशयि स्यात्तदेव तत्स्यात् । तस्माद्यत्र काष्ठा प्राप्तिरैश्वर्यस्य स ईश्वर इति । न च तत्समानमैश्वर्यमस्ति कस्माद् द्वयोस्तुल्ययोरेकस्मिन्पुण्यगपत्कामितेऽर्थे नवमिदमस्तुपुराणमिदमस्त्वित्येकस्य सिद्धावितरस्य प्राकाम्यविघातादूनत्वं प्रसक्तम् । द्वयोश्च तुल्ययोर्युगपत्कामितार्थप्राप्तिर्नास्ति । अर्थस्य विरुद्धत्वात् । तस्माद्यस्य साम्यातिशयैर्विनिर्मुक्तमैश्वर्यं स एवेश्वरः । स च पुरुष विशेष इति ॥ २४ ॥

VYĀSA.

Now who is this called Īśvara (God) that is neither the Mūla-prakṛiti (the root of matter) nor the puruṣa (the conscious principle of the human constitution)? 'Īśvara is a distinct Puruṣa, untouched by the vehicles of affliction, action and fruition.'

The afflictions are Nescience and others. The actions are good or bad. Their fruition is the effect they bring about. Habits following them in their qualifications are the vehicles. These while really existing in the mind, are attributed to the Puruṣa, as he is the enjoyer of their fruit, just as victory or defeat of the soldiers is attributed to their master. He who is not touched by this experience, is the distinct Puruṣa, Īśvara.

Are all those then who have reached the state of absolute freedom Īśvaras and there are many such for they have reached the state of absolute freedom after cutting the three bonds? No, Īśvara never had, nor will have, any relation to these bonds. As former bondage is known in the case of the emancipated, not so in the case of Īśvara. Or, as future bondage is possible in the case of the Prakṛitilayas, not so in the case of Īśvara. He is ever free, ever the Lord.

Is there any, or, is there no reason for this supremacy of the Lord, unlimited by time, and due to His taking up the Universal Supreme Essence? The reason for that is the sacred teaching. What then is the authority of the teaching? The authority is the supremacy of His Universal Essence. These two, the supremacy and the sacred teaching, exist in the Universal Essence of Īśvara eternally related to each other. For this reason does it become possible that He is ever free, and ever the Lord.

And this divinity of His is free from excess or equality. It is not exceeded by another divinity. Whichever is the Highest, must be the divinity of Īśvara. For this reason wherever there is the culmination of this divinity that is Īśvara

Nor is there any divinity equal to that. Because, in the case of equality, if one of the two equals says with reference to a common object of their attention, 'let this be new,' and the other says, 'let this be old,' then one thing only necessarily happening, unrestrained fulfilment of the wish is interfered with, and one becomes less than the other. Further it cannot be that two equals should at once possess an object desired by both. Because the wishes are contradictory. Hence he alone is Īśvara whose divinity is free from equality or excess, and He is a distinct Puruṣa.—24.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The world is made of the conscious and the unconscious principles only. There is none else that goes to make it. If Īśvara is unconscious, He must be the *Mulaprakṛiti*, comprehending as it does all the non-intelligent modifications. If this be so, then there can be no such thing, by reason of his being non-intelligent, that he should be brought face to face with the devotee. If, on the other hand, he is intelligent, then too it is impossible that he should be brought face to face with the devotee, because the power of consciousness is by nature indifferent, and because *Iśvara* is not like other *Puruṣas* in evolution, on account of the absence of any connection with the principles of egoism, &c. Furthermore how is it possible that he should possess a wish for the attainment (of Trance by the devotee)?

This is the meaning of the question, now who is this Īśvara, &c.? The answer to the question is given by the aphorism:—'Īśvara is a distinct *Puruṣa* untouched by the vehicles of affliction, action and fruition.'

Nescience (*avidyā*) and others are the afflictions (*kleśas*), so called, because they afflict the *Puruṣa* in evolution with various painful blows. Good and bad actions are virtue and vice. They are called actions metaphorically because they are born from actions. Their fruition consists in life-state, life-period and life-experience. The vehicles are so called, because by their means the residua which show themselves as fruitions, are embedded as potencies in the substance of the mind.

As long as the karma which brings about the manifestation of the life-state of a camel does not bring into play the potencies of the experience which having been generated by previous existence, are suited to the life-state of a camel, the experience suited to the life-state of a camel cannot be caused. Therefore there must be a potency causing the subsequent experience of the life-state of a camel, and it must be possessed of qualities similar to the experience of the life-state of a camel.

Another question arises. What is the use of adding the words, 'untouched by the vehicles of affliction, action and fruition' in the aphorism, seeing that afflictions, &c., are the characteristics of the Will-to-be, and that they never touch the *Puruṣa* and that therefore the mere use of the word *Puruṣa* would have implied that he was untouched by them? For this reason, he says:—'These while really existing in the mind are attributed to the *Puruṣa*' in evolution. Why? Because he is the enjoyer, the intelligent agent of their fruit. Hence it is possible that Īśvara being a *Puruṣa* might come to be considered as having some relation to these. For this reason their special denial of Him is proper. Therefore he says that the distinct *Puruṣa* who is not touched by the experience present in the Will-to-be even, is Īśvara.

'Distinct' is that which is distinguishable. He is differentiated from the other *Puruṣas*. With the object of showing those who are taken out of the conception of the word Īśvara by the use of the word 'distinct,' he first states an objection and then replies:—

'All those then who have reached the state of absolute freedom.' There are three kinds of bondages,—the bondage of the Prakritic modifications in the case of the Videhas, the bondage of the Prakritis in the case of the Prakritilayas, and the bondage of honour, &c., in the case of those who experience the divine and worldly enjoyments. Those whose minds are saturated with devoted thought of the Prakritis, reach the state of submersion into the Prakritis immediately after separation from the physical body. For this reason the others are spoken of as being bound at the previous end (of the chain of life) and the Prakritilayas are spoken of as being bound only at the next, the future end only; the previous and the second bondages being denied to them. Thus he shows the distinction in brief:—'He is always free, always the Lord.'

Divinity consists in the possession of knowledge and the power of action (Kriyā Śakti). In this connection he puts the question:—'Has this supremacy of the Lord, unlimited by time, &c.' The reason for the question is that knowledge and power of action are not possible to the unchanging constant power of consciousness. It has been said that they live in the purified mental essence, when the rajas and the tamas have been removed. Further, it is not proper that Īśvara who is ever free, should become related even to the Highest Mental Essence, which after all has its origin in Nescience, as an owner to the thing owned.

For this reason it is said that it is due 'to his taking the Universal Supreme Essence in hand.' The relation of Īśvara to the Essence of the mind is not due to Nescience like that of ordinary Puruṣas; and there is therefore no sense of ownership in it. On the other hand he takes the Universal Mental Essence in hand, thinking that he will thus give freedom to men surrounded by the three sorts of pain, and rescue them, being drowned as they are in the great ocean of birth after death, by teaching them virtue and giving them knowledge; and that this teaching is not possible without the possession of the highest power of action and knowledge; and that this cannot be possible without taking in hand the mental Essence, pure and freed from the dirt of the disturbing energy (rajas) and inertia (tamas). The Lord even though untouched by Nescience, and conscious of knowledge, assumes the nature of Nescience, and becomes the possessor thereof. He does not devote Himself to Nescience as Nescience. A mimic personating Rāma shows all his actions but all the while does not forget himself. This form of his is assumed, not real.

Let it be so. Inasmuch, however, as Īśvara has to take up the Mental Essence (sattva), on account of the wish of helping the afflicted, and the wish to help is caused by the taking up of Mental Essence, because the wish itself is a modification of the Mulāprakṛiti, the relation of mutual support is evident. To remove this misconception he says that he is unlimited by time. It might be so if creation came first and the wish to help manifested afterwards. But the arrangement of successive creation and dissolution being eternal, Īśvara draws the world inwards, having first made up his mind that he will take up the Highest Universal Essence, when the time comes for the wish, arising out of an interior manifestation, to reach the limit of its operation. This divine Mental Essence potent with the residuum of this determination, even though it passes into a state similar to that of noumenal matter (Mulāprakṛiti) comes to manifestation again in the same state as Mental Essence, by virtue of the potency of that determination, when the ulterior limit of the Mahāpralaya, the Great Latency, is reached. This happens in the same way as in the case of Chaitra who goes to sleep, having made a determination that he must rise early next morning, and awakes at the same time by virtue of the potency of the determination. Hence, because the determination of the Lord and the taking in hand of the Universal Essence are eternal and thus ever present, their relation to each other can not be that of interdependence.

Further, it should not be said that the divine Mental Essence does not pass into the state of the noumenal root-matter, the equipoise of the *Mulāprakṛiti*, even at the time of the Great Latency. That which never passes into the state of the *Mulāprakṛiti*, can never be the effect thereof. Nor can this Universal Mental Essence be the power of consciousness, because it is non-intelligent by its own nature. If it be not both these, then, it would come to this that it must be another class of substance, for which there is no authority. This is not proper. There is no substance existing independently of the noumenon of matter (*Prakṛiti*) and consciousness (*Puruṣa*).

Such is the greatness of the Lord unlimited by time. Is there any reason, any authority for it? Or, is it without reason, without authority? The answer is 'Its authority lies in the sacred teaching,' the Vedas, the *Smṛiti*, the *Itihāsas* and the *Purāṇas*.

The author introduces the consideration of the Sacred Teaching:—"What then is the reason of the Teaching? The Sacred Teaching is based upon observation and inference. The Universal Mental Essence of the Lord can not depend upon any body's observation and inference. Nor is the Sacred Teaching based upon the observation of the Lord. Some one may, therefore, think that the proper reason for the existence of the Sacred Teaching is that *Īśvara* desires to manifest his own divinity.

He refutes this by saying that the Sacred Teaching has its reason in the Divine Universal Essence. The meaning is this. Evidently the *mantras* and the science of life are proved to be the works of the Lord by the virtue they show in action and by the certainty of the things mentioned therein, being never found to be otherwise. Further, it is not possible that any one possessed only of the ordinary means of knowledge of the world, should be able, even in a thousand human lives, to note the agreements and differences of various medicinal agents, their various compositions, and those of the *mantras*, by throwing them into and taking them out of the various classes. It can not evidently be said, on the ground of the existence of the relation of eternal interdependence, that the agreements and differences are known from authority, and that authority is again based upon the canons of agreement and difference. Because during the Great Latency, the *Mahāpralaya*, both these manifestations cease to exist.

Further, it is not the case that there is no authority for their existence. It will be shown that the universe is a modification of noumenal matter, the *Mulāprakṛiti*, not different from it. It has been observed that things of the same class change into different forms, as in the case of the modifications of curds and sugar, &c., from milk and cane-juice. It has also been observed that different modifications have the same form in their antecedent state. Similarly the noumenal root-matter having different modifications in the forms of the Great Will-to-be, the principle of individuality and others, must have a form common to all in the antecedent state. This common antecedent state of the noumenal matter is the state of equipoise, and that is the state of the Great Latency, the *Mahāpralaya*. Hence the Universal Essence of the will-to-be of the Lord, shining all round by reason of the absence of the veil of the impurities of disturbing energy (*rajas*) and inertia (*tamas*), must be considered as established by at least the promulgation by Him of the *Mantras* and the science of life. And similarly, that collection of the Vedic knowledge too, which has for its object the teaching of how to attain worldly progress and divine freedom, can be a divine production only by virtue of the Universal supremacy of His Spiritual and Mental Essence. It is not possible to have confusion and falsehood, the products of disturbing energy and inertia (*rajas* and *tamas*), in the face of the culmination of Universal Essence. Hence it is established that the authority of the sacred teaching lies in the divinity of the Universal Essence.

Let it be so. The teaching has its origin in the supreme manifestation of the divine Mental Essence, and therefore it shows the highest knowledge. This is an instance

of inference by the canon of residuo, not of the authority of verbal cognition. To meet this objection, he says :—‘The relation of these two, the Teaching and the Highest manifestation of divine Mental Essence, &c.’ The meaning is that the Teaching does not give the highest knowledge, because it is the product of the Highest Universal Essence, but that it teaches because of the existence of an eternal relation of the explainer and the explained. Supremacy exists in the Universal Essence of the divine mind, and the Teaching which promulgates it, is also present there as such.

The author states the final conclusion :—Hence by it, i.e., the teaching which promulgates the Highest Universal Divine Mental Essence, is it known, in the same way that the differentiating qualities of the signified are known by the sign, that He is ever free, ever the Lord.

Having thus distinguished Him from other Puruṣas, he now distinguishes Him from other lords also :—‘This divinity of His is free, &c.’ and explains freedom from excess :—‘There is no other divinity, &c.’ Why ? ‘Wherever there is the highest, &c.’ For what reason is His divinity free from the defect of being exceeded by any other divinities ? He gives the reason :—‘Wherever there is the highest perfection of this divinity, &c.’ The meaning is that the divinity of those in whom it has not reached the highest perfection, is unreal.

Now he explains freedom from equality :—‘Nor is there divinity equal, &c.’ Unrestrained fulfilment of wishes means the removal of obstacles from the path thereof. When wishes are checked in their fulfilment, it means weakness. Even if it do not mean weakness, it means equality. For that reason he says that in both cases the unrestrained fulfilment of desires is interfered with. The desired effect is not produced, or if it is produced then the same thing is found to possess contradictory qualities (which is absurd). With this object, he says : ‘In the case of two equals, &c.’ If the wishes of more divinities than one be considered as never being contradictory, then each must be an Īśvara. But then what is the use of having more Īśvaras than one ? The purpose of divine rule is fulfilled by One only. Or, if it be supposed that they perform the work of divine government by common consent, then there would be no supreme Lord, just as in a republic. Further in the case of those who believe in the eternal possession of divinity, the succession of divinity is improper. Furthermore there is the defect of cumbersome-ness (positing more agents than is necessary for the purpose of bringing about an effect). Thus everything is plain.—24.

Sūtra 25

तत्र निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञबीजम् ॥ २५ ॥

25. In Him¹ the seed¹ of the omniscient³ is not exceeded.²

किं च तत्र निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञबीजम् । यदिदमतीतानागतप्रत्युत्पन्नप्रत्येकसमुच्चया-
तोन्द्रियग्रहणमल्पं बह्विति सर्वज्ञबीजमेतद्विवर्द्धमानं यत्र निरतिशयं स सर्वज्ञः । अस्ति
काष्ठाप्राप्तिः सर्वज्ञबीजस्य सातिशयत्वात्परिणामवदिति । यत्र काष्ठाप्राप्तिर्ज्ञानस्य स सर्वज्ञः
स च पुरुषविशेष इति । सामान्यमात्रोपसंहारे च कृतोपक्षयमनुमानं न विशेषप्रतिपत्तौ
समर्थमिति । तस्य संज्ञादिविशेषप्रतिपत्तिरागमतः पर्यन्वेष्ट्या । तस्यात्मानुग्रहाभावेऽपि भूता-
नुग्रहः प्रयोजनम् । ज्ञानधर्मोपदेशेन कल्पप्रलयमहाप्रलयेषु संसारिणः पुरुषानुद्धरिष्यामीति

तथा चोक्तम् । अदिविद्वान्निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्याद्भगवान्परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञास-
मानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाचेति ॥ २५ ॥

VYĀSA.

The seed of the omniscient is the larger or smaller knowledge of the individual, the collective or the ultra-sensuous arising out of the past or the future. Whenever this reaches a point in expansion, beyond which there is nothing, it is the omniscient. There must be the highest limit of the expansion of the seed of omniscience, inasmuch as there is larger or smaller manifestation of intelligence, just as it is in the case of dimension. Wherever knowledge reaches the highest limit that is the omniscient and that is a distinct Puruṣa. Inference is of service only in establishing the general idea. It has not the power of giving the special qualities. The knowledge of His distinctive names, &c., is to be sought out of the Veda.

Although Īśvara has no purpose of His own to fulfil by His (creation) His (creation) is purposed by compassion for other beings. 'I shall lift the Puruṣas in evolution out of the world by teaching them knowledge and virtue, throughout the manifestations (kalpas), the Latencies (pralayas) and the Great Latencies (Mahāpralayas).' This is what he proposes to Himself. And so it has been said :—'The first Wise Being, the revered Great Sage, informed a self-made mental vehicle out of compassion, and gave the teaching to Āsuri who wished to know.—25.

VĀCHASPATY'S GLOSS.

Having thus established the authority of the Sacred Teaching for His powers of action and knowledge, he now puts forward the authority of inference for His power of knowledge :—'In Him the seed of the Omniscient is not exceeded.' Explains :—'The seed of the Omniscient, &c.'

The knowledge of things beyond the range of the senses, existing either individually or collectively, and caused by the appearance of the past and future forms, is qualified by the attributes of largeness and smallness, on account of the veil of darkness covering more or less of the essence of the will-to-be. The meaning is that this knowledge is the seed, the cause of the omniscient. One takes in a little of the past, &c., another more than that, another the most of all. Knowledge is spoken of as being more or less with reference to the thing known. Wherever this knowledge expands so much that it passes beyond the limit of being further exceeded, that is the omniscient.

This describes only the thing to be known. Now he speaks of the means of knowledge :—'The seed of the omniscient must reach the highest limit, &c.' This is the statement of the proposition to be proved. The 'highest limit' means the state of intensity which can not be exceeded. It is not, therefore, by fixing a limit only that the proposition can be established.

'Inasmuch as there is larger or smaller manifestation of intelligence': This is the statement of the reason. Every thing which possesses the quality of being more or less, has a limit beyond which there is no manifestation of the kind ; as is the case with the

lotus, the emblic fruit and the Bel tree. The quality of largeness exists in these more or less. In the self (ātmā), however, the largeness is such that there is no largeness more than that. He shows the pervasion (vyāpti). 'As in dimension.' This means that the conclusion does not fail by the qualities of largeness, &c., being exceptions to the rule. Thus the proposition is established.

It is not necessary that the largeness of the parts only should be contributed to the largeness of the whole. The fact is that dimension is known to expand by the putting together of as many largenesses of individual factors as there may be, consisting of infinitesimal wholes reaching down to the atoms themselves. In the case of knowledge too this rule is not violated : and knowledge can, therefore, be more or less by having one, two or more objects of knowledge. Thus there is no exception to the rule. (or technically speaking, there is no exclusion of the middle term, which is marked by the pervasion).

He summarizes :—' Wherever knowledge reaches, &c.'

The question arises that there are many Tirthankāras, such as the Buddha, the Ārjats and the seer Kapila ; why should not they be considered to be omniscient by this inference ? For this reason, he says :—' Inference is of service only.'

How then is the knowledge of his specific qualities to be acquired ? Says :—' The knowledge of his special names, &c.'

Further, the teaching of the Buddha, &c., is not properly speaking authority ; it only looks like authority. The reason is that it teaches things against all reasoning, such as the momentary nature of all objects and the non-existence of the self, &c. It is, therefore, all misleading. Hence that which comes into the mind from the Veda, the Śruti, the Itihāsa and the Purāṇa is the only true verbal cognition, the real authority ; and is for this reason the only true means of worldly progress and the Highest Good. With this object the knowledge of special names, &c., should be obtained. Special names, such as Śiva, Īśvara, &c., are well known in the Vedas, &c.

By the mention of the word " &c.," it is understood that He is possessed of the six accessories and the ten unchangeables. As says the Vāyu Purāṇa :—

' Omniscience, satisfaction, eternal knowledge, independence, constant presence of power, infinity of power—these six are said to be the accessories (angas) of the Great Lord, by those who know the law. Similarly, knowledge, desirelessness, power of control, purificatory action, truth, forgiveness, endurance, creation, the knowledge of the self, and being the substratum of all activities—these ten unchangeable qualities (avyayas) always live in the Great source of all Good.'

Well let that be. But the Lord is ever satisfied and possessed of the Highest desirelessness. It is not possible that He should have any wish for the fulfilment of any objects of His own. Further, being compassionate He should be given to the creation of men possessed of undisturbed pleasure. It can not, therefore, be that He should create a world, full of pain of all sorts. Further, a wise being can not be considered as undertaking a useless task. He, therefore, has not created the world, although He is possessed of Kriyā Śakti, the power of creation.

For this reason, he says :—' Although Īśvara has no purpose of His own, &c.' compassionate help of living objects is His object. The individual mind fulfils its object, when it has caused the experience of sound, &c., and the manifestation of the consciousness of the distinct nature of the self and the not-self. Its activity ceases when it has done so, and the Puruṣa then becomes absolutely independent of objective existence (kvali). With that object the compassionate Lord informs men of the means of obtaining knowledge of the distinct nature of the self and the not-self ; because thereby the object of the existence of the mind is fulfilled. Īśvara, therefore, helping man as He

does with reference to the performance of pure and impure works by them, is not cruel, even though He sees their pleasures and pains and feels for them.

Now he speaks of the entrance into the region of compassion, for the sake of explaining the means of obtaining the knowledge of the distinct natures of the self and not-self :— 'By teaching them knowledge and virtue, &c.' Knowledge and virtue are both to be understood together. They manifest the knowledge of the distinct natures of the self and the not-self.

Latency (pralaya) means the end of the day of Brahmâ. In this state, the whole world except the Satyaloka becomes latent. The Mahâpralaya, the Great Latency, is that in which the Satyaloka and Brahmâ himself come to an end. Then the Puruṣas in evolution go back to their causes and hence are subject to the pain of death. The word Kalpa is only suggestive here. The meaning is that the Lord's determination to help the Puruṣas refers to the other Puruṣas also, who by virtue of the fruition of their action have to undergo births and deaths, and who become free from pain on reaching the state of absolute independence. This is the meaning.

This theory that the compassionate Lord teaches knowledge and virtue is also common to the teaching of Kapila :—So has it been said by Pancha Shikha, 'The first wise man, &c.' This is a quotation from Panchashikhâchârya. The first wise man means the teacher who was the first emancipated being of his school. It does not mean the Highest Teacher who is ever free. The reference is to Kapila who was the founder of the school, and who was the first of those emancipated ones who had gone before among the followers of the school. The tradition is that Kapila got the knowledge by the grace of Maheśvara just as he was born, and he is known as such as a particular kind of Vishnu's incarnations. Svayambhû is Hiranyagarbha. It is learnt from the Veda that he too got the knowledge of the Sâṅkhya Yoga. The same Īśvara, the self-existent Vishnu, was the first Wise man, Kapila. The meaning is that he is the Īśvara of those who proceeded from Svayambhû and others. --25.

Sûtra 26.

स एष पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात् ॥ २६ ॥

26. He¹ is the Teacher⁵ of the Ancients¹ too,⁵ being unlimited⁷ by time.⁶

स एष पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात् । पूर्वे हि गुरुवः कालेनावच्छिद्यन्ते यत्रावच्छेदार्थेन कालो नोपावर्तते स एष पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः यथास्य सर्गस्यादौ प्रकर्षगत्या सिद्धस्तथातिक्रान्तसर्गादिष्वपि प्रत्येतच्चः ॥ २६ ॥

VYÂSA.

The ancient teachers were conditioned by time. Wherever time does not exist as condition, that is Īśvara, the teacher of the ancient teachers too. As the knowledge of His supreme power as existing in the beginning of the creation is obtained, so also is it obtained about His existence as such in other creations and other times.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now he shows the distinction of the Lord from Brahmâ &c. 'He,' i. e., the one described formerly 'is (the real aphorism begins here) the teacher of the ancients too.'

He explains :—'The ancients, &c.' Time means a century, &c.

'Does not exist as a condition' means time does not approach as a condition.

The supremacy of power means the manifestation thereof. Its knowledge is to be obtained from the Veda. By this arrangement the Lord Īśvara is described. —26.

Sūtra 27.

तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः २७ ॥

27. The Sacred word³ connotes² Him¹.

तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः । वाच्य ईश्वरः प्रणवस्य । किमस्य संकेतकृतं वाच्यवाचक-
त्वमथ प्रदीपप्रकाशवद्व्यतिथिमिति । स्थितोऽस्य वाच्यस्य वाचकेन सह संबन्धः । संकेत-
स्त्वीश्वरस्य स्थितमेवार्थमभिनयति । यथावस्थितः पितापुत्रयोः संबन्धः संकेतेनावद्योत्यते
अयमस्य पिता । अयमस्य पुत्र इति । सर्गान्तरेष्वपि वाच्यवाचकशतयपेक्षस्तथैव सङ्केतः
क्रियते ॥ २७ ॥

VYĀSA.

The sacred word connotes 'Him.' He is denominated by the sacred word, the Pranava (A U M). Is the relation of the sign and the thing signified between these conventional, or inherent as between flame and light? His relation with the sign is inherent and thus ever present. Further, the convention of God shows only an object which exists (that which is inherent). As the relation already existing between father and son, is only expressed by convention, this is the father, this the son. In other creations too the same convention is adopted on account of the dependence upon the connotative powers of the sign and the thing signified.

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

Now he speaks of His sign (indicator, vāchaka) in order to explain the meaning of his devotion. 'The sacred word connotes Him.' Explains: He is denoted by Pranava, &c. Introduces the opposite theory by putting a question. Is the relation, &c. Signifying is laying down, expressing.

Others, of course, hold that if the relation of word and meaning is inherent, and that it is manifested by a convention that such and such a meaning is to be denoted by such and such a word, then in the absence of any relation between word and meaning, the meaning would not be conveyed even by a hundred conventions. If no jar exists which may be shown by a lamp, even a hundred lamps would not reveal one. It is, however, observed that the word 'elephant' will signify a camel if a convention is made that this word will be used to signify an animal of that class. Hence the power to signify is conventional.

Having thus stated their position, he explains his own teaching:—'Its relation is inherent.' This is the meaning. All words have the capability of meaning objects of all forms. Their relation with objects of all forms must, therefore, be inherent. And the convention of Īśvara is the determining factor and the shower thereof. The division of the sign signifying and non-signifying something is also made by Īśvara's convention or non-convention. This is what he says: 'Further the convention of God, &c.' He gives an illustration:—"already existing between, &c."

The question arises. Sound is a manifestation of the prakṛiti. At the time of the Great Latency it passes back into the state of the Prakṛiti. Its power also thereby disappears. 'Then a particular verbal sign is born again through the successive states of Mahat, &c. But then the power of signification having disappeared, its manifestation does not remain possible. For this reason, he says :—'In other creations also, &c.'

Although a word does become one with the prakṛiti along with the power, it comes back into manifestation along with the power. As earth-born creatures becoming one with the earth on the cessation of the rains, come back to life on being wetted by showers of rain water. Thus God makes a convention similar to the convention which indicated the former relation. Hence on account of the eternity of the succession of similar usage, due to simultaneous knowledge, the relation of word and meaning is eternal. Independent eternity is not meant. So say the Āgamis. Without the authority of the Āgama (the Veda) it is not possible to ascertain that in other creations also the convention is the same. This is the meaning.—27.

Sūtra 28.

१ २ ३ ४ ५
तज्जपस्तदर्थभावनम् ॥ २८ ॥

28. Its¹ repetition² and the understanding³ of its³ meaning.⁴

संप्रतिपत्तिनित्यतया नित्यः शब्दार्थसंबन्ध इत्यागमिनः प्रतिजानते विज्ञातवाच्य-
वाचकत्वस्य योगिनः । तज्जपस्तदर्थभावनम् । प्रणवस्य जपः प्रणवामिधेयस्य चेश्वरस्य
भावनम् । तदस्य योगिनः प्रणवं जपतः प्रणवार्थं च भावयतश्चित्तमेकाग्रं संपद्यते ।
तथा चोक्तम् । स्वाध्यायाद्योगमासीत योगात्स्वाध्यायमासते । स्वाध्याययोगसंपत्त्या
परमात्मा प्रकाशत इति ॥ २८ ॥

VYĀSA.

The Vedic teachers hold that the relation of word and meaning is eternal, inasmuch as one co-exists with the other. The Yogī who has come to know well the relation between word and meaning must constantly repeat it, and habituate the mind to the manifestation therein of its meaning. The constant repetition is to be of the Praṇava (A U M) and the habitual mental manifestation is to be of what it signifies, Īśvara. The mind of the Yogī who constantly repeats the Praṇava and habituates the mind to the constant manifestation of the idea it carries, becomes one-pointed. And so it has been said :—

'Let the Yoga be practised through study, and let study be effected through Yoga. By Yoga and study together the Highest Self shines'—28.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having described the sign, he now describes the devotion, praṇidhāna, the means of feeling the presence of the Lord everywhere, in all circumstances and phenomena :—'Its constant repetition and the repeated understanding of its meaning.' Explains :—'The constant repetition of the Praṇava, &c.'

Repeated understanding (Bhāvanā) means making it enter the mind over and over again until it becomes the very substance of the mental existence.

What attainment does he acquire thereby? Says :—'The mind of the Yogî who constantly repeats the Praṇava, &c.' The mind feels bliss in the One Lord alone. Quotes a verse of Vyāsa in this connection :—And so it has been said The Lord then becomes gracious to him up to his attaining the faculty of trance (Samādhi) and its fruit.—28.

Sûtra 29.

ततः प्रत्यक्चेतनाधिगमोऽप्यन्तरायाभावश्च ॥ २९ ॥

29. Thence¹ the understanding¹ of the individual² self³ and⁸ the absence⁷ of obstacles⁶ too.⁸

किं चास्य भवति । ततः प्रत्यक्चेतनाधिगमोऽप्यन्तरायाभावश्च । ये तावदन्तराया व्याधिप्रभृतयस्ते तावदीश्वरप्रणिधानान्न भवन्ति स्वरूप दर्शनमप्यस्य भवति यथैवेश्वरः पुरुषः शुद्धः प्रसन्नः केवलोऽनुपसर्गस्तथायमपि बुद्धेः प्रतिसंवेदी यः पुरुषस्तमधिगच्छति ॥ २९ ॥

VYĀSA.

And what else comes to him? "The understanding of the individual self and the absence of obstacles." Whatever obstacles there may be—diseases, &c.—cease to be by feeling the omnipresence of the Lord; and the true nature of himself is also seen. It is known that just as Īśvara is a Puruṣa, pure, calm, free and without appendants, such is this Puruṣa also, the self underlying the individual manifestation of the Will-to be.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

What more than this? 'Thence the understanding of the individual self, and the absence of obstacles.' The individual self is the Pratyakchetana, the conscious principle whose cognitions are contradictory of the real, that is to say, the ignorant Puruṣa. In the case of the Wise this turns back on account of the possession of the eternal divine essence. He gets the understanding of the individual self as it really is.

The obstacles will be described and their absence too.

'Whatever obstacles there may be.' These words contemplate their description. The nature of a thing is its own self. By speaking of the nature of the self, the characteristics fastened on to the self by Nescience (avidyā) are denied.

The question arises. Since Īśvara is the object of devotion, how is it that the Individual unit of consciousness will be known by feeling His omnipresence? It is evidently going beyond the mark. In reply to this, he says :—'As is Īśvara, &c.'

Pure :—free from rise and fall on account of constant eternity.

Calm :—undisturbed by afflictions.

Free :—he from whom virtue and vice keep aloof. For this very reason He is without appendants. The 'appendants' are life-state, life-period, and life experience.

A similarity must necessarily mean some distinction. Therefore now he distinguishes the Individual self from Īśvara. 'The self underlying the individual manifestation of the Will-to-be.' This explains why the word 'Individual' has been added.

When there are two contradictory objects, the understanding of the one does not conduce to the understanding of the other. The understanding of similars, however, conduces to the understanding of the other objects possessed of similar qualities. This

happens in the same way as the understanding of one science contributes to the better understanding of an allied science. The effect of the analogy is in the understanding of one's own self, not of the Highest self. Thus all is plain.—29.

Sūtra 30.

व्याधिस्त्यानसंशयप्रमादालस्याविरतिभ्रान्तिदर्शमालब्धभू-
मिकत्वानवस्थितत्वानिचित्तविक्षेपास्तेऽन्तरायाः ॥ ३० ॥

30. Disease,¹ langour,² indecision,³ carelessness,⁴ sloth,⁵ sensuality,⁶ mistaken notion,⁷ missing the point,⁸ instability,⁹—these causing distractions are the obstacles.

अथ केऽन्तराया ये चित्तस्य विक्षेपाः । पुनस्ते कियन्तो वेति । व्याधिस्त्यानसंशय-
प्रमादालस्याविरतिभ्रान्तिदर्शमालब्धभूमिकत्वानवस्थितत्वानि चित्तविक्षेपास्तेऽन्तरायाः ।
नवान्तरायाश्चित्तस्य विक्षेपाः । सहैते चित्तवृत्तिभिर्भवन्ति । एतेषामभावे न भवन्ति
पूर्वोक्ताश्चित्तवृत्तयः । तत्र व्याधिर्धौतुरसकरणवैषम्यम् । स्त्यानमकर्मण्यता चित्तस्य ।
संशय उभयकोटिस्पृग्विज्ञानं स्यादिदमेवं नैवं स्यादिति प्रमादः समाधिसाधनानामभा-
वनम् । आलस्यं कायस्य चित्तस्य च गुरुत्वादप्रवृत्तिः । अविरतिश्चित्तस्य विषयसंप्रयोगा-
त्मगर्हः । भ्रान्तिदर्शनं विपर्ययज्ञानम् । अलब्धभूमिकत्वं समाधिभूमेरलाभः । अनवस्थितत्वं
यल्लब्धायां भूमौ चित्तस्याप्रतिष्ठा समाधिप्रतिलम्भे हि सति तदवस्थितं स्यादिति । एते
चित्तविक्षेपा नवयोगमला योगप्रतिपक्षयोगान्तराया इत्यभिधीयन्ते ॥ ३० ॥

VYĀSA.

Now what are the obstacles that distract the mind? How many are they and what is their nature? 'Disease, &c.' There are nine obstacles causing distraction to the mind. These exist with mental modifications. In their absence they do not exist. The mental modifications have been described before.

Disease is the disturbance of the equilibrium of the humours, chyle and the organs of the body.

Langour is the indisposition of the mind to work.

Indecision is the notion touching both sides of a question: It might be thus or thus.

Carelessness is want of resort to the means of trance.

Sloth is the inertia of mind and body consequent upon heaviness.

Sensuality is the desire consequent upon objects of sense having taken possession of the mind.

Mistaken notion is False knowledge.

Missing the point, is the non-attainment of the state of trance.

Instability is the incapacity of the mind to keep in any state that has been attained, because it becomes stable only when the state of trance has been reached.

These distractions of the mind are designated the enemies and the obstacles of Yoga.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Puts a question :—‘ Now what are the obstacles ? ’ The answer consists of the words, “ the distractions of the mind.” Again asks for the specific enumeration :—‘ How many, &c.’ The answer is ‘ Disease, &c.,’ the whole aphorism. The nine obstacles are mental manifestations which stand in the way of Yoga. They are contrary to Yoga and disturb the mind. They are called obstacles, because they turn the aspirant away from the direct path of Yoga.

Gives the cause of their being the antagonists of Yoga :—‘ They manifest with mental modifications.’ Indecision and False knowledge are antagonistic to the inhibition of the mind, because they are mental modifications. The others, however, which are not mental modifications such as disease, &c., are likewise antagonistic, because mental modifications manifest themselves along with them.

Explains the meanings of the words :—‘ Disease, &c.’

The humours are bile, mucus and gas, called *Dhātus*, because they keep up the body. Chyle (*rasa*) is a particular modification of foods and drinks. The organs of the body are the organs of sensation and action. Disturbance of equilibrium means one of these becoming more and the other less than what is necessary. The indisposition of the mind to work means incapacity to work. Indecision or doubt is knowledge touching both sides of a question. Although the basis of doubt is the knowing of a thing to be what it is not, and therefore doubt and False knowledge do not differ from each other, yet doubt is separately mentioned here, because it is especially intended to bring out here the special characteristic of doubt, the touching and giving up of both sides of a question, which makes a sub-head of False knowledge.

‘ Want of resort, to the means of trance ’ means the absence of these means, the want of effort. The heaviness of the body is caused by phlegm, &c. The heaviness of the mind is caused by inertia, *tamas*. Desire means thirst for an object. The states of trance are *Madhumati*, &c. If one has reached a particular state of progress in trance and is satisfied with it, then he will not reach the higher state and will lose the one already attained. Therefore, when a state of trance has been reached, effort must always be made to retain it.—30.

Sūtra 31.

दुःखदौर्मनस्याङ्गमेजयत्वश्वासप्रश्वासा विक्षेपसहभुवः ॥३१॥

31. Pain,¹ despair,² shakiness,³ inspiration⁴ and expiration⁵ are the companions of these distractions.⁶

दुःखदौर्मनस्याङ्गमेजयत्वश्वासप्रश्वासा विक्षेपसहभुवः । दुःखमाध्यात्मिकमाधिमौत्तिकमाधिदैविकं च येनाभिहताः प्राणिनस्तदपघाताय प्रयतन्ते तद्दुःखम् । दौर्मनस्यमिच्छाविघाताच्चेतसः क्षोभः । यदङ्गान्येजयति कम्पयति तदङ्गमेजयत्वम् । प्राणो यद्वाह्यं वायुमाचामति स श्वासः । यत्कौष्ठ्यं वायुं निःसारयति स प्रश्वासः । एते विक्षेपसहभुवो विक्षिप्तचित्तस्यैते भवन्ति । समाहितचित्तस्यैते न भवन्ति ॥ ३१ ॥

VYÂSA.

Pain is either from one's self, or from external terrestrial objects, or from the powers of nature. Pain is that affected by which people try to do away with it.

Despair is the condition of the mind consequent upon the non-fulfilment of some desire.

Shakiness is that which causes the organs to shake.

Inspiration is the action of the life-force drinking in external air.

Expiration is that which throws out the internal gas.

These are the companions of the distractions of the mind. They appear in him whose mind is distracted. They do not exist in him whose mind is entranced.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now he says that it is not only the nine obstacles, but that pain, &c., too appearing as their companions, act similarly :—' Pain, &c.'

Pain is that which is cognized as being contrary to the mind for the time. It is from one's self, when it is either bodily such as caused by disease, or, mental, such as caused by desire, &c. It is from external causes when it is caused by a tiger, &c. It comes from the powers of nature when it is caused by such things as the planetary influences. All this pain is cognized by every living creature as contrary to one's being. It is, therefore, to be removed. This is what he says :—' Affected by which, &c.' When physical life drinks in, i.e., takes in external air contrary to one's wish, the act of in-breathing becomes contrary to the branch of Yoga known as the Reehaka, the (conscious out-breathing). When physical life expels the internal air against wish, the act of out-breathing is contrary to the branch of Yoga known as Pûraka, the (conscious in-breathing). 3.

Sûtra 32.

तत्प्रतिषेधार्थमेकतत्त्वाभ्यासः ॥३२॥

32. For³ their¹ prevention,² habituation⁶ to one⁴ Truth.⁵

अथैते विक्षेपाः समाधिप्रतिपक्षास्ताभ्यामेवाभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां निरोद्धव्याः । तत्राभ्यासस्य विषयमुपसंहरन्निदमाह । तत्प्रतिषेधार्थमेकतत्त्वाभ्यासः । विक्षेपप्रतिषेधार्थमेकतत्त्वावलम्बनं चित्तमभ्यसेत् । यस्य तु प्रत्यर्थनियतं प्रत्ययमात्रं क्षणिकं च चित्तं तस्य सर्वमेव चित्तमेकाग्रं नास्त्येव विक्षिप्तम् । यदि पुनरिदं सर्वतः प्रत्याहृत्यैकस्मिन्नर्थे समाधीयते तदा भवत्येकाग्रमित्यतो न प्रत्यर्थनियतम् । योऽपि सदृशप्रत्ययप्रवाहेन चित्तमेकाग्रं मन्यते तस्यैकाग्रता यदि प्रवाहचित्तस्य धर्मस्तदैकं नास्ति प्रवाहचित्तं क्षणिकत्वात् । अथ प्रवाहांशस्यैव प्रत्ययस्य धर्मः स सर्वः सदृशप्रत्ययप्रवाही वा विसदृशप्रत्ययप्रवाही वा प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वादेकाग्र एवेति विक्षिप्तचित्तानुपपत्तिः । तस्मादेकमनेकार्थमवस्थितं चित्तमिति । यदि च चित्तनैकेनानन्विताः स्वभावभिन्नाः प्रत्ययाजायेरन्नथ कथमन्यप्रत्ययहृष्टस्यान्यः

स्मर्ता भवेत् । अन्यप्रत्ययोपचित्तस्य च कर्माशयस्यान्यः प्रत्युपभोक्ता भवेत् । कथंचित्स-
माधीयमानमप्येतद्गोमयपायसीयन्यायमाक्षिपति । किं च स्वात्मानुभवापहवद्विचस्रस्या-
न्यत्वे प्राप्नोति । कथं यदहमद्राक्षं तत्स्पृशामि यच्चास्प्राक्षं तत्पश्याम्यहमितिप्रत्ययः
सर्वस्य प्रत्ययस्य भेदे सति प्रत्ययिन्यभेदेनोपस्थितः । एक प्रत्ययिविषयोपमभेदात्मा अह-
मिति प्रत्ययः । कथमत्यन्तभिन्नेषु चित्तेषु वर्तमानं सामान्यमेकं प्रत्ययिनमाश्रयेत् । स्वा-
नुभवप्राणश्चायमभेदात्मा अहमितिप्रत्ययः । न च प्रत्यक्षस्य माहात्म्यं प्रमाणान्तरेणाभि-
भूयते । प्रमाणान्तरं च प्रत्यक्षबलैर्नैव व्यवहारं लभते तस्मादेकमनेकार्थमवस्थितं च चि-
त्तम् ॥ ३२ ॥

VYĀSA.

Now these distractions, the antagonists of trance, are to be checked by the same practice and desirelessness. It is to finish the subject of practice that he says :—‘ For the prevention thereof, habituation to ONE TRUTH.’ For the prevention of distractions, let the mind take to ONE TRUTH and make itself habitually familiar with it.

To him who believes in a mind separate and distinct for every cognized object, in fact a bundle of notions only, and but momentary (in existence) all minds are one-pointed (ekāgra) only. There is no distracted mind.

If, however, the mind is concentrated on one object, only when, having been drawn away from all other objects, it turns away to one object, then it is not separate and distinct for every cognized object.

He who believes the mind to be one-pointed if it flows along similar notions, might opine that one-pointedness is a characteristic of the flowing mind. If so, then the flowing mind would not be one, because it is said to be momentary.

If, however, it is the characteristic of a notion which is only a portion of the entire stream (of flowing mental phenomena), then it is always one-pointed, whether it flows along similar or dissimilar notions; because in this case it is separate and distinct for every object. Thus we would fall upon the non-existence of a distracted mind. Hence the mind is one, has many objects, and is not momentary, but stable.

Further, if it be thought that the notions are born, each separate from the other in nature, and are not linked (by the common basis of) one single mind, then how would any one mind remember a notion cognized by another. And how would any one enjoy the vehicle of action brought into being by the notions of another ?

Howsoever the matter is examined, it illustrates the story of the milk and the cowdung.

Further, if the mind be separate and distinct for every cognized object, then the notion of the identity of the self is destroyed. How can such notions as, 'I touch what I saw,' and 'I see what I touched previously,' point to a common knower, when all the notions are separate and distinct?

The notion of the 'I am' is always identical with itself and points out to but one cogniser. But there can be no single cognizer as a common basis, if it manifest itself in entirely distinct minds every moment. The notion of 'I am' as one undifferentiated continuous self is cognized by internal perception; and the authority of perception is not to be defeated by any other means of knowledge. Other means of knowledge work only by the power of perception. Hence the mind is one and has many objects and it changes not every moment.—32.

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

Introduces the aphorism which finishes the subject under discussion:—'Now these distractions, &c.'

Now it is on account of the context that this aphorism is spoken of as finishing only half the subject under discussion. These distractions are spoken of as antagonists of the trance to explain the object with which they are to be checked.

Although in the aphorism, 'By feeling the omnipresence of the Lord,' the process of mental habituation only is described, yet desirelessness also is to be understood, because it is a help to habituation. With this in mind, he says:—'They are to be checked by the same practice and desirelessness.'

'This is said to finish the subject of practice':—This sentence is spoken because the subject of practice immediately precedes. The ONE TRUTH is God, because that is the context.

To the Vaināshikas all minds are one-pointed only; there is no distracted mind. Hence their teachings and the acts they inculcate, are all useless. With this object he says:—"To him who believes, &c." The theory is that the mind is separate and distinct for every object whether it be a single one in itself, or one out of many. It remains in being only so long as the object shines in consciousness and then disappears at once, not going to another object.

Why does not the mind take in another object after having taken in one before that? Because it is said to be momentary. This means that existence before and after, cannot be posited of a mind, which cannot be spoken of as remaining the same in more than one successive moment of time.

According to our teaching the mind is not momentary in existence, and remains constant, whether the objects of thought be one or manifold. It is not confined to one single object seeing that it takes in and gives up objects every moment and can so far be called distracted, and also that it can cultivate one-pointedness when the modification of distractedness has been removed. This teaching and the acts recommended on its strength are not useless. With this object, he says:—'And if it becomes concentrated, &c.' Concludes:—'Thus it is not distinct and separate for every object.'

Again he introduces the Vaināshika:—'He who believes the mind to be one-pointed if it flows along similar notions, &c.' His meaning is stated to be as follows:—'Let it be

granted that the cultivation of one-pointedness is not possible in a mind confined to one moment only and that therefore it is useless to put forth effort with that object. The continuous succession of minds, however, is unending and not momentary in its nature; it is possible in the succession that distraction may be removed and one-pointedness cultivated.'

He shows the defects of the theory in the case of either of the two statements thereof. If in the philosophy of the Vaināshika one-pointedness is a characteristic of the flowing mind, i. e., of the un-ending succession of minds, then, there being successive mental births for succeeding mental impressions, there does not exist one flowing mind common to all the successive impressions. But why should it not be so? Because in your philosophy, whatever exists for as long a time as it may be, must be momentary; there is nothing that is not momentary.

Takes the other form of the theory;—'If however it is, &c.' If in the successive flow of mental phenomena a notion having the Highest Good appears at a single point, one-pointedness with reference to this particular notion may be secured by effort.

Shows the defects of this theory. The whole of this successive flow of mental phenomena may be a flow of either similar or dissimilar notions. It is, therefore, separate and distinct for every distinct object, and as such takes the form of the Highest Good simply for the expression of it, and therefore it is destroyed on the disappearance of the mind. Such a mind is always one-pointed. There can, therefore, be no distracted mind. It can not, therefore, be that one-pointedness may be cultivated by and after the removal of distractedness. Concludes:—'Hence the mind is, &c.'

Further says, that for another reason too the mind is one having many objects, and is constant, not momentary;—'And if it be so, &c.' As the Teaching studied by Maitra is not remembered by Chaitra, and as the fruit of the vehicle of action grown by Maitra is not enjoyed by Chaitra in the shape of virtue and vice, inasmuch as Chaitra is not related to it, so one notion can not remember the object of another notion; nor can one notion enjoy the fruit of the vehicle of action grown by another notion.

But, says the questioner, this line of reasoning will not be violated, if the relation of cause and effect exists; and it is on account of the existence of that differentia, that in the *shrāddha* and *vaishvānara* sacrifice, &c., the fruit is seen reaching father, mother, and son, who are not the performers thereof; and also because the sweetness of the mango seeds, &c., always appears in due course in the fruits thereof.

For this reason, says:—'However is the matter examined, &c.' This is the meaning. What is the difference between notions falling into one succession and those falling into another, so that a notion falling into one succession may remember and enjoy the notions, experience and the vehicle of action grown by the notions of the same succession but not by the notions of another succession? Succession is not an independently existing substance, so that one succession may be differentiated from another succession. And it is not proper that a fanciful differentia may be fastened upon an action. No one can cook if he only fancies the existence of fire anywhere. Further, the relation of cause and effect also is not real. In the case of simultaneous existence there can be no such relation, as for example, between the right and left horns. In the case of objects which do not exist simultaneously, no relation of cause and effect necessarily exists; because it may be that none of them can be predicated of a phenomenon appearing in the immediate present. The past and the future can not exist together as being related to a phenomenon appearing independently in the present. Therefore, being independent real objects as they are, they do not differ from each other whether they fall in their own or in independent successions. The reason is that they do not come into contact with each

other, not being related to each other by either natural causation or by succession. This logic is like that of the milk and cow-dung cakes.

"All that is produced from the cow is milk.

Cow-dung cakes are produced from the cow.

Therefore cow-dung cakes are milk."

This illustrates the story, which means that it surpasses in fallacy even the logic of the milk and the cow-dung.

Furthermore, the destruction of that which has been done, and the appearance of that which has not been done, should not be mentioned here as an argument. Because the mind alone is the doer of actions, and the mind alone is associated with the pleasures and pains born out of them. It is because the mind enjoys pleasure and pain on account of the presence therein of the reflection of consciousness, and because the consciousness and the mind in which it is present are taken to be one, that they are attributed to the Puruṣa. The notions born in the mind, when the notion of its being the self has already come in there, are of such a nature that they alone remember and enjoy their own fruits, not others. And it is not reasonable to say that the nature of a thing may be separated from it, and then joined to it again. It cannot be said of the nature of a thing that it might or might not be so, or why is it not so?

He speaks to those who are satisfied with the above:—Further, if the mind be separate and distinct for every object, &c., mental impressions and their memories have the characteristics of manifestation and latency. They are many and yet the mind in which they live, i.e., the notion of the 'I am,' is one and not different for each. This one notion of the 'I am' unites all those separate notions into one. How can this one hold all the extremely different notions into itself? Inasmuch as there is difference in the causes of the phenomena of cognition and memory and also on account of the presence in them of the contradictory qualities of manifestation and latency, there can be no single notion of reflex cognition by virtue of which the mind, in which all the different and contradictory notions are generated, may be considered to be a single entity.

For this reason, he says:—'It is cognised by internal perception.'

But it may be said that the difference of causes and the possession of contradictory qualities refute the truth of this perception. In answer to this objection, he says:—'and the authority of perception, &c.'

It is on the basis of perception alone that the unity of material and the contradictory nature of the characteristics of latency and manifestation have been established in the Nyāyakanikā; and the action of objects in a permanent mind is established in the Nyāyakanikā and the Brahmatattva-samīkṣā. Thus all is plain.—32.

Sūtra 33.

मैत्रीकरुणामुदितोपेक्षाणां सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां

भावेनातश्चित्तप्रसादनम् ॥ ३३ ॥

33. By cultivating habits¹⁰ of friendliness,¹ compassion,² complacency³ and indifference⁴ towards⁵ happiness,⁵ misery,⁶ virtue⁷ and vice⁸ (respectively) the mind¹¹ becomes pure.¹²

यस्य चित्तस्यावस्थितस्येदं शास्त्रेण परिकर्म निर्दिश्यते तत्कथम् । मैत्री करुणामुदितोपेक्षाणां सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां भावेनातश्चित्तप्रसादनम् । तत्र सर्वं प्राणिषु

सुखसंभोगापन्नेषु मैत्री भावयेत् । दुःखितेषु करुणाम् । पुण्यात्मकेषु मुदिताम् । अपु-
ण्यशीलेषूपेक्षाम् । एवमस्य भावयतः शुद्धो धर्म उपजायते । ततश्च चित्तं प्रसीदति ।
प्रसन्नमेकाग्रं स्थितिपदं लभते ॥ ३३ ॥

VYĀSA.

How is the embellishment of the permanent mind taught by this science, secured? 'The mind becomes pure by cultivating habits of friendliness, compassion, complacency and indifference towards happiness, misery, virtue and vice.' Let him cultivate in his mind the habit of friendliness towards all those who are found in the enjoyment of pleasure ; compassion towards those who are suffering from pain ; complacency towards those who are virtuous ; indifference towards the vicious. By thus habituating the mind to these notions, the white characteristic makes appearance. Thence the mind becomes pure. Having become pure, it becomes one-pointed and attains the state of steadiness.—33.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now the author begins to lay down the means of purifying the mind, which are contrary to such vices as jealousy, because trance and the means of its achievement cannot appear in a mind, unembellished and full of jealousy, &c. :—'How is the embellishment, &c.'

Whoever shows friendliness, *i.e.*, a heart ready to help, towards the happy, the dirt of envy leaves him. When the mind shows compassion, *i.e.*, the wish to remove the miseries of others as if they were his own, towards those who are suffering, the dirt of the desire to do evil by others is removed. Whoever shows complacency, *i.e.*, pleasure towards virtuously inclined beings, the dirt of envy is removed from his mind. Whoever shows indifference, *i.e.*, the taking of the middle path and not taking sides, towards the viciously inclined, the dirt of impatience is removed from his mind.

By this removal of the characteristics of the qualities of disturbing energy (*rajas*) and inertia (*tamas*), the white characteristic of essential purity (*sattva*) manifests itself. He becomes possessed of a very high manifestation of essential purity. His mind becomes inclined to the side of the restraint of mental modifications, because this enlightenment is natural to that state. When the mind becomes pure, it attains the state of steadiness and becomes one-pointed by the means to be described. If friendliness, &c., are not cultivated, the means cannot lead to steadiness.—33.

Sūtra 34.

प्रच्छेदनविधारणाभ्यां वा प्राणस्य ॥ ३४ ॥

34. Optionally,³ by the expulsion¹ and retention² of breath.⁴

प्रच्छेदनविधारणाभ्यां वा प्राणस्य । कौष्ठ्यस्य वायोर्नासिकापुटाभ्यां प्रयत्नविशेषा-
द्धमनं प्रच्छेदनं विधारणं प्राणायामस्ताभ्यां वा मनसः स्थितिं संपादयेत् ॥ ३४ ॥

VYĀSA.

Expulsion is the throwing out of the air in the lungs through the nostrils by special effort. Retention is the *Prāṇāyama*, the lengthening

of the duration of the stay of the air outside the lungs. Let mental steadiness be optionally cultivated by these.—34.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now then he describes the means of steadiness:—'Optionally by the expulsion and retention of breath.' The word optionally refers to the succeeding means. The option is not given with reference to the cultivation of friendliness, &c., because they must be present along with all (the means).

Now he explains expulsion:—'The throwing out of the air in the lungs, &c.' "By special efforts" means such an effort as is laid down in the science of Yoga, by which the air is thrown out of the lungs slowly.

Now he describes retention:—Retention is Prāṇāyāma. It means the keeping out of the air which has been expired, lengthening the duration of its stay outside, not drawing in all at once. By thus expiring and inspiring air the body becomes light, and the mind thence attains the state of steadiness. The words 'let it be cultivated' have been taken from the sense of the words 'causes mental steadiness, (sthitiṇibandhinī) in the next aphorism.

Sūtra 35.

विषयवती वा प्रवृत्तिरूपन्ना मनसः स्थितिनिबन्धिनी ॥३५॥

35. Or, Higher² sense¹-activity³ appearing,⁴ causes⁷ mental⁵ steadiness.⁶

विषयवती वा प्रवृत्तिरूपन्ना मनसः स्थितिनिबन्धिनी । नासिकाग्रे धारायतोऽस्य या दिव्यगन्धसंविता गन्धप्रवृत्तिः । जिह्वाग्रे रससंविता । तालुनि रूपसंविता । जिह्वामध्ये-
रूपशंसंविता । जिह्वामूले शब्दसंविदित्येता वृत्तय उत्पन्नाश्चित्तं स्थितौ निबन्धन्ति संशयं
विधमन्ति समाधिप्रज्ञायां च द्वारीभवन्तीति । एतेन चन्द्रादित्यग्रहमणिप्रदीपरश्म्यादिषु
प्रवृत्तिरूपन्ना विषयवत्येव वेदितव्या । यद्यपि हि तत्तच्छास्त्रानुमानाचार्योपदेशैरवगत-
मर्थतत्त्वं सद्भूतमेव भवति । एतेषां यथाभूतार्थप्रतिपादनसामर्थ्यात्तथापि यावदेकदेशोऽ-
पि कश्चिन्न स्वकरणसंवेद्यो भवति तावत्सर्वं परोक्षमिवापवर्गादिषु सूक्ष्मेष्वर्थेषु न दृढां
बुद्धिमुत्पादयन्ति । तस्माच्छास्त्रानुमानाचार्योपदेशोपोद्बलनार्थमेवावश्यं कश्चिदर्थ-
विशेषः प्रत्यक्षीकर्तव्यः । तत्र तदुपदिष्टार्थैकदेशप्रत्यक्षत्वे सति सर्वं सूक्ष्मविषयमपि आ-
पवर्गान्छद्ध्यते । एतदर्थमेवेदं चित्तपरिकर्म निर्दिश्यते । अनियतासु वृत्तिषु तद्विषयायां
वशीकारसंज्ञायामुपजातायां समर्थं स्यात्तस्य तस्यार्थस्य प्रत्यक्षीकरणायेति । तथा च
सति श्रद्धावीर्यस्मृतिसमाधयोऽस्याप्रतिबन्धेन भविष्यन्तीति ॥ ३५ ॥

VYĀSA

The power to cognize superphysical (divya) smell, which one gets by concentrating upon the fore-part of the nose (the olfactory organ) is the higher olfactory sense-activity. By concentration upon the fore-part of the tongue, the power to cognize taste; over the palate, cognition of colour; in the middle of the tongue, cognition of touch; in the root of the tongue, cognition of the sound.

The Higher sense-activities appearing cause the steadiness of mind, destroy doubt and become the entrance to that state of cognitive power which is called trance (samâdhi).

By this the Higher sense-activity, which is caused by concentrating upon the moon, the sun, the planets, jewels, the lamp and precious stones, &c., is also to be understood to have that name.

Although whatever of the nature of an object is known by any science, by inference, or by the instruction of a teacher, is of course true, because they are capable of establishing the truth by teaching, yet, as long as even a portion is not known by one's own senses, every thing remains as it were unknown. The knowledge of such subtle matters as the state of absolute freedom does not obtain firm ground in the mind. Therefore even if it were for the purpose of giving fuller light to what has been learnt from any science, by inference, or by the instruction of a teacher, it is necessary that some particular object be perceived by one's self. When one portion of what has been taught is perceived, the subtlest remaining portions are easily believed. It is for this very reason that mental embellishment is taught; so that when consciousness of power over the unrestrained mental modifications shows itself, the Yogî becomes capable of perceiving the objects of all such modifications. And when this happens, he gets faith, energy, memory, and trance without any obstacle.—35.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author now mentions another means of steadiness:—‘Or, Higher sense-activity appearing, causes mental steadiness.’ Explains:—‘By concentration upon the fore-part of the nose, &c.’ The power is acquired by the performance of concentration, contemplation and trance. The cognition of superphysical smell means that the smell lies revealed to his sense. In the other Higher sense-activities also it should be understood in the same way. This is to be believed on authority, not by contact with one's self.

Let it be so. But what is the use of these Higher sense-activities? They do not help in the attainment of the state of absolute freedom. For this reason, he says:—‘These mental modifications appearing, in but a short time, incline the mind to steadiness either with reference to God, or with reference to discriminative knowledge.’

But the question is, how can a mental modification having one object, become steady with reference to other objects also? For this reason, he says:—‘They destroy, i. e., they remove, doubts and for this very reason become the entrance to trance consciousness.’

Teaches that other modifications also which are taught by the Veda consist in Higher sense-activity:—‘By this, &c.’

Then the question arises, wherefore should there be doubt with reference to objects known by authority, &c.? For this reason, he says:—‘Although whatever.....of course, &c.’ The root of Yoga is of course in faith. Arising from that, it reaches up to contemplation, &c., without obstacles. This is the meaning.—35.

Sūtra 36.

विशोका वा ज्योतिष्मती ॥ ३६ ॥

36. Or,² the state³ of painless¹ lucidity.³

विशोका वा ज्योतिष्मती । प्रवृत्तिरूपज्ञा मनसः स्थितिनिबन्धिन्यनुवर्तते । हृदय-
पुण्डरीके धारयतो या बुद्धिसंविद्बुद्धिसत्त्वं हि भास्वरमाकाशकल्पं तत्र स्थितिवैशारद्या-
त्प्रवृत्तिः सूर्यन्दुग्ग्रहमणिप्रभारूपाकारेण विकल्पते । तथास्मितायां समापन्नं चित्तं निस्त-
रङ्गमहोदधिकल्पं शान्तमनन्तमस्मितामात्रं भवति । यत्रेदमुक्तम् । तमणुमात्रमात्मानमनु-
विद्यास्मीति । एवं तावत्संप्रतिजानीत इत्येषा द्वयी विशोकविषयवती अस्मितामात्रा च
प्रवृत्तिर्ज्योतिष्मतीत्युच्यते । यया योगिनश्चित्तं स्थितिपदं लभत इति ॥ ३६ ॥

VYĀSA.

‘Or, the state of painless lucidity’ appearing as a Higher Activity, causes the steadiness of the mind. These words (italicised) are to be taken from the previous aphorism. This is the consciousness of thought-forms, which comes to him who concentrates upon the lotus of the heart. The essence of the Will-to-know is shining in substance. It acts like the Ākāśha (space, giving room to, or transforming easily into any form). By diligent perseverance in that, the Higher Activity appears, taking optionally the shapes of the lights of the sun, moon, planets and precious stones. Similarly the mind concentrating itself upon the notion of the ‘I am’ becomes like a wave-less ocean calm, infinite, pure egoism. The following has been said in this connection :—

“Knowing that self, small as an atom, his consciousness manifests as ‘I am’ only.”

This two-fold Higher Activity, the painless sensuous and the Purely Egoistic, is called the Lucidity. By this the Yogi’s mind reaches the state of steadiness. —36.

VĀCHASPATI’S GLOSS.

‘Or, the state of painless lucidity.’ Painless lucidity means that which is devoid of pain. The state of lucidity is the light shining in the lotus of the heart. Let the mind be concentrated upon the lotus which is located between the chest and the abdomen. It has eight petals and is placed with its face downwards. Its face has first to be turned upwards by the process of the expirative control of breath. In the middle thereof is the sphere of the sun, the place of waking consciousness, and is called A. Above that is the sphere of the moon, the place of dreaming consciousness, the U. Above that is the sphere of the fire, the place of dreamless sleep, the M. Above that is the Higher space, the Sound of Brahma Itself, the fourth state of ultra-consciousness, which the knowers of Brahma call the half-measure (the ardha mātrā). In the stalk thereof is the Artery of Brahma (the Brahmanāḍī), with its face upwards. This passes through the spheres of the sun, &c. Beginning above that, is the channel known as *śuśumnā*. That runs through the external spheres of the sun, &c., too. That is the place of the mind. Performing concentration upon that, the Yogi obtains consciousness of thought-forms.

He now shows the form of the mental essence with the reason thereof :—‘The essence of the Will-to-be, &c.’ By saying that it acts like the Âkāsha, it is intended to be shown that it pervades all forms. The lights of the sun, &c., appear as different forms; and they putting on different forms optionally, appear as such (forms). The text understands here by the word Will-to-be, the mind and not the Mahattattva; and it is intended to state here that the mind is of the shape of light appearing as such from its position in the Sushumnâ channel, inasmuch as it takes its birth from the Vaikârika (the essential sâttvic) form of the principle of Individuality (Ahankâra), and is therefore full of the essence thereof. Its possession of the quality of pervasion too is established by its action upon various objects.

Having spoken of concentration upon the mind, which is evolved out of the principle of Individuality (Asmitâ, the basis of the ‘I am’), now he describes the nature of the concentration upon the principle of Individuality or egoism :—Similarly, &c.

‘Calm’ means that which is free from the waves of disturbing energy (rajas) and inertia (tamas).

Infinite means all-pervading.

‘Pure Egoism’ signifies that which does not show more colours than one.

He supports his theory by another’s authority :—The following has been said in this connection, by Panchashikhâ.

‘Small as an atom,’ because it is difficult to know.

‘That self,’ which is the basis of the principle of Individuality.

‘Knowing’ means having pondered upon it and having come to know only this much, ‘I am.’

Well then the lucidity might appear as various forms of light; but how can it be pure egoism only? In answer to this, he says :—‘This two-fold, &c.’ The meaning is that the principle of Individuality remains essential light itself when the dirt of disturbing energy (rajas) and inertia (tamas) has been washed away.

He describes the result of both forms of lucidity :—‘By this, &c.’—36.

Sûtra 37.

वीतरागविषयं वा चित्तम् ॥ ३७ ॥

37. Or,¹ the mind² having the desireless,^{1,2} for its object³.

वीतरागविषयं वा चित्तम् । वीतरागचित्तालम्बनोपरक्तं वा योगिनश्चित्तं स्थिति-
पदं लभत इति ॥ ३७ ॥

VYÂSA.

The mind of the Yogi tinged by the colour of the mind of the desireless, which it takes up for study, reaches the position of steadiness.—37.

YÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The desireless are such personages as Dvaipâyana and others, their minds become the objects of concentration, and the colour thereof is imparted to the mind of the Yogi.—37.

Sûtra 38.

स्वप्ननिद्राज्ञानालम्बनं वा ॥ ३८ ॥

38. Or,⁵ having⁶ the knowledge³ of dream¹ and sleep² as its object¹ of study.

स्वप्ननिद्राज्ञानालम्बनं वा । स्वप्नज्ञानालम्बनं वा निद्राज्ञानालम्बनं वा तदाकारं
योगिनश्चित्तं स्थितिपदं लभत इति ॥ ३८ ॥

VYÂSA.

By making the knowledge of dreams and the knowledge of sleep an object of study, the mind of the Yogî determines towards the shape and attains the position of steadiness.—38.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

When the time comes that this Yogî, in his dream state, worships the Lord Maheswara's form, enrapturing the mind by its beauty, placed in a secluded spot of some lonely forest, appearing as if arising out of the sphere of the light of the moon, the limbs large and small of the shape appearing as soft as the stalks of the lotus, the form seen as if made of shining moon-stones, encircled with garlands of sweet-smelling Mâlatî and Mallikâ ; then on awakening he is full of elation, and then remembering the same form which was the object of dream consciousness, his mind determines towards the unity of that one form and attains the position of steadiness.

The sleep to be understood here is the one in which the light of the quality of essentiality appears. (This is the sâttvic sleep). It is the same, on awakening from which the remembrance is, 'I have slept pleasantly.' This explains that the mind in that state becomes one-pointed. It is this that the knowers of Brahma define to be of the nature of Brahma (Brahmarûpa).

In the dream state it is not possible to bring mere knowledge without an object, within the range ; therefore, the object also is brought within the range. —38.

Sûtra 39.

यथाभिमतध्यानाद्वा ॥ ३९ ॥

39. Or,¹ by meditating³ according¹ to one's predilection.²

यथाभिमतध्यानाद्वा । यदेवाभिमतं तदेव ध्यायेत् । तत्र लब्धस्थितिकमन्यत्रापि
स्थितिपदं लभत इति ॥ ३९ ॥

VYÂSA.

Let him meditate upon whatever he wishes. Becoming steady in that instance, it reaches the position of steadiness in other matters also.—39.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

What more ? Whatever is desired by one, the same has the form of his deity.— 39.

Sûtra 40.

परमाणुपरममहत्त्वान्तोऽस्य वशीकारः ॥ ४० ॥

40. His⁵ power⁶ reaches¹ down to the minutest,¹ and up to¹ the largest.²⁻³

परमाणुपरममहस्वान्तोऽस्य वशीकारः । सूक्ष्मे निविशमानस्य परात्परमाण्वन्तं स्थितिपदं लभत इति । स्थूले निविशमानस्य परममहस्वान्तं स्थितिपदं चित्तस्य । एवं तामुभयीं कोटिमनुधावतो योऽस्याः प्रतीघातः स परो वशीकारस्तद्वशीकारात्परिपूर्णं योगिनश्चित्तं न पुनरभ्यासकृतं परिकर्मापेक्ष्यत इति ॥ ४० ॥

VYĀSA.

Entering into the subtle it attains the position of steadiness upon the smallest of the small, down to an atom. Entering into the large, the position of mental steadiness reaches upto the largest of the large. His great power consists in not being turned back by any check while running along both these lines. The mind of the Yogī, full of this power, does not again stand in need of the mental embellishment due to habitual practice.—40.

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

He shows how the nature of the self is to be reached as a point of steady concentration :—‘ His power reaches down to the minutest and up to the largest.’ Explains :—‘ Entering into the subtle, &c.’

Summarizing what has already been said, he describes the connotation of the word ‘power.’ ‘ While running along, &c.’ Now describes a subsidiary result of the power. ‘ Full of this power, &c.’

Thus the means of obtaining mental steadiness have been described. The power too obtained by the steady mind has been shown.—40.

Sūtra 41.

क्षीणवृत्तेरभिजातस्येव मणेरग्रहीतृग्रहणग्राह्येषु तत्स्थितदञ्जनता
समापत्तिः ॥ ४१ ॥

41. Becoming like¹ a transparent³ crystal⁵ on the modifications² disappearing,¹ (the mind acquires) the power of thought-transformation¹³ (samapatti), the power of appearing in the shape¹² of whatever object¹² is presented¹⁰ to it,⁹ be it the knower,⁶ the knowable⁷ or the act of knowing.⁸

अथ लब्धस्थितिकस्य चेतसः किंस्वरूपा किंविषया वा समापत्तिरिति तदुच्यते । क्षीणवृत्तेरभिजातस्येव मणेरग्रहीतृग्रहणग्राह्येषु तत्स्थितदञ्जनता समापत्तिः । क्षीणवृत्तेरिति प्रत्यस्तमितप्रत्ययस्येत्यर्थः । अभिजातस्येव मणेरिति दृष्टान्तोपादानम् । यथा स्फटिक उपाश्रयभेदात्तत्तद्रूपोपरक्त उपाश्रयरूपाकारेण निर्भासते तथा ग्राह्यालम्बनोपरक्तं चित्तं ग्राह्यं समापन्नं ग्राह्यस्वरूपाकारेण निर्भासते । तथा भूतसूक्ष्मोपरक्तं भूतसूक्ष्मसमापन्नं भूतसूक्ष्मस्वरूपाभासं भवति । तथा स्थूलालम्बनोपरक्तं स्थूलरूपसमापन्नं स्थूलरूपाभासं भवति । तथा विश्वभेदोपरक्तं विश्वभेदसमापन्नं विश्वरूपाभासं भवति ।

तथा ग्रहणेष्वपीन्द्रियेष्वपि द्रष्टव्यम् । ग्रहणालम्बनोपरक्तं ग्रहणसमापन्नं ग्रहणस्वरूपा-
कारेण निर्भासते । तथा ग्रहीतृपुरुषालम्बनोपरक्तं ग्रहीतृपुरुषसमापन्नं ग्रहीतृपुरुषस्वरू-
पाकारेण निर्भासते । तथा मुक्तपुरुषालम्बनोपरक्तं मुक्तपुरुषसमापन्नं मुक्तपुरुषस्वरूपा-
कारेण निर्भासत इति । तदेवमभिजातमणिकल्पस्य चेतसो ग्रहीतृग्रहणग्राह्येषु पुरुषे-
न्द्रियभूतेषु या तत्स्थितदङ्जनता तेषु स्थितस्य तदाकारापत्तिः सा समापत्तिरित्यु-
च्यते ॥ ४१ ॥

VYÂSA.

Now what is the nature of the power of thought-transformation which the mind acquires, when it has thus obtained rest? This is described:—‘Becoming like a transparent crystal on the modifications disappearing, the mind acquires the power of thought-transformation,—the power of appearing in the shape of whatever is presented to it, be it the knower, the knowable, or the act of knowing.’

‘On the modifications disappearing’:—When the notions are at rest, (not in active work).

‘Like a transparent crystal’:—This is the statement of an analogy. As the crystal becomes coloured by the colour of the object placed beside it, and then shines according to the form of the object, so the mind is coloured by the colour of the object presented to it and then appears in the form of the object.

Coloured by subtle elements placed in contact, it becomes of the nature of the subtle elements and shines out in the shape of the subtle elements.

Similarly, coloured by the distinctions of the world coming into contact with it, it becomes of the nature of those distinctions, and shines out in the form of the world.

Similarly, is this to be understood in the case of the acts of knowing, *i. e.*, the powers of sensation. Coloured by the acts of knowing taken as objects of thought, it becomes of the nature of the acts of knowing, and shines out in forms which show the nature of the acts of knowing.

Similarly, coloured by the enjoying Puruṣa, taken as the object of thought, it puts on the nature of the enjoying Puruṣa, and shines out in the form which shows the nature of the enjoying Puruṣa.

Similarly, coloured by the released Puruṣa taken as object of thought, it becomes of the nature of the released Puruṣa, and shines out in the form which shows the nature of the released Puruṣa.

This then is Samâpatti, thought-transformation,—the mind showing itself like a transparent crystal, in the form of the object it comes in contact with, be it the knower, the knowable, or, the acts of knowledge.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now the question is, what is the nature and what are the objects of the Cognitive trance, when the mind has thus obtained rest ? The Commentator introduces the next aphorism :—"This is described, &c." Reads the aphorism :—"Becoming like a transparent crystal, &c." Explains it :—"The words, 'when the notions are at rest,' describe the mind as existing in the state, in which that class of mental modifications which have their origin in the qualities of disturbing energy and inertia (rajas and tamas) have been destroyed by habitual practice and desirelessness. By this it is meant to be explained that Mental Essence (sattva) being by nature pure, is not overpowered at the time, by disturbing energy (rajas) and inertia (tamas).

He explains the analogy :—"As the crystal, &c."

'The object placed beside it' is the upâdhi, the attributive substance such as the Japâ flower, &c.

'Coloured by proximity,' taking up the light thereof.

The form of the object placed beside, 'is the red, blue or other colour of its own.'

'Shines out,' means, 'shows the qualities of that form.'

He applies the analogy :—"Similarly, coloured by the object, &c."

The object of knowledge (grâhya) is the same to which the mind is at the time turned (âlambana). It is coloured thereby when the object passes into it. Thus is the knowable distinguished from the knower and the act of knowing.

'Becomes of the nature of the object,' means, 'as if it has put on the quality of knowability having thus covered up its own mental form. For this reason shines out in the form of the knowable object itself.'

The subtle and the gross are colours from the objective world only. The Commentator divides them therefore into two :—"Coloured by the subtle, &c." The distinctions of the world consist in its being self-conscious and not self-conscious, and of the differences of objects, such as the animals, cows, etc., and the mineral substances, such as the jar, etc. By this the two trances which are accompanied by philosophical curiosity and meditation are shown.

Similar is the case with the acts, the means of knowledge, the powers of sensation (indriyas). They are so called because knowledge is obtained through their instrumentality.

The Commentator renders the same plainer :—"Coloured by the acts of knowledge, &c." Being an act of knowledge, but taken as an object of knowledge, it is here mentioned as having both these qualities at the same time.

'Coloured by that,' i. e., pierced through and through by that, and having covered up its own mental form it appears as if it were the means, the external instrument of knowledge.

By this has been described the Cognitive trance which is accompanied by elation.

The one which is accompanied by egoism is now alluded to. 'Coloured by the Enjoying Puruṣa, &c.' The Enjoying Puruṣa means, he in whom the notion of the 'I am' resides.

Because the quality of being a Puruṣa is common to the released Puruṣa, such as Śuka and Prahlâda too, they too have to be taken here as objects of trance. For this reason, the Commentator says :—"Similarly, coloured by the released Puruṣa, &c."

Coming to the end, he explains the words 'tatstha tadañjnatât,' appearing in the form of the object it comes into contact with.

The thought-transformation called the Cognitive Trance consists in the assumption by the Mental Essence of the forms of the knower, the knowable and the act of knowledge,

and the consequent showing of itself in the shape of the phenomenon which has entered therein, when the dirt of the *rajas* and the *tamas* has been removed by the increased power of contemplation, and when it is directed towards, i. e., fixed upon, these objects of knowledge.

Here the order of the reading of the words, 'the knower, the act of knowledge and the knowable,' in the aphorism is not to be regarded, because it is contrary to the natural succession of the objects of knowledge. Similarly in the Commentary too the mentioning of the subtle elements first in order, is not to be regarded. All is thus beautiful.—41.

Sûtra 42.

तत्र शब्दार्थज्ञानविकल्पैः सङ्कीर्णं सवितर्कं समापत्तिः ॥४२॥

42. There,¹ the thought-transformation² in which the options⁶ of word,² meaning³ and idea⁴ are mixed up,⁶ is called Indistinct,⁷ (verbal).

तत्र शब्दार्थज्ञानविकल्पैः सङ्कीर्णं सवितर्कं समापत्तिः । तद्यथा गौरितिशब्दो गौरित्यर्थो गौरिति ज्ञानमित्यविभागेन विभक्तानामपि ग्रहणं दृष्टम् । विभज्यमानाश्चान्ये शब्दधर्मा अन्येऽर्थधर्मा अन्ये विज्ञानधर्मा इत्येतेषां विभक्तः पन्थाः । तत्र समापन्नस्य योगिनो यो गवाद्यर्थः समाधिप्रज्ञायां समारूढः स चेच्छब्दार्थज्ञानविकल्पानुविद्ध उपावर्तते सा सङ्कीर्णं समापत्तिः सवितर्कस्त्युच्यते । यदा पुनः शब्दसङ्केतस्मृतिपरिशुद्धौ श्रुतानुमानज्ञानविकल्पशून्यायां समाधिप्रज्ञायां स्वरूपमात्रेणावस्थितोऽर्थस्तत्स्वरूपाकारमात्रतयैवावच्छिद्यते सा च निर्वितर्का समापत्तिस्तत्परं प्रत्यक्षम् । तच्च श्रुतानुमानयोर्बाजम् । ततः श्रुतानुमाने प्रभवतः । न च श्रुतानुमानज्ञानसहभूतं तद्दर्शनम् । तस्मादसङ्कीर्णं प्रमाणास्तरेण योगिनो निर्वितर्कसमाधिजं दर्शनमिति ॥ ४२ ॥

VYÂSA.

And that as follows :—The cow as a word, the cow as an object and the cow as an idea, although different from one another, are cognized as indistinct. Being analyzed, the characteristics of the word are different; and the characteristics of an idea are different; and the characteristics of an object too are different. Thus their lines of existence are distinct. 'There,' among the various descriptions of thought-transformation, if an object such as a cow, is present in the trance-consciousness of the Yogî, who has reached this state of thought-transformation, being pierced through by the indeterminate notions of word, meaning and idea, then the thought-transformation is mixed up and is called Indistinct.

When, however, the mind becomes free from the memories of verbal convention, and the trance-consciousness is devoid of the options of inferential and verbal cognitions, the object makes its appearance in the mind in its own distinct nature (unmixed up with word and meaning), the thought-transformation is called Distinct (nirvitarka). This is Higher

Perception. This further becomes the seed of verbal and inferential knowledge. Verbal and inferential knowledge are born therefrom. It does not go along with verbal and inferential knowledge. Hence the knowledge obtained by a Yogi through the stage of trance, called Distinct thought-transformation, is not confused by any other cognitions.—42.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Thought-transformation in general has been described. By subsidiary classification it is four-fold. Thus: Indistinct or verbal, Distinct or wordless, Meditative and Ultra-meditative. Out of these the description of the Indistinct thought-transformation is given:—‘There, &c.’ Out of these thought-transformations the Indistinct thought-transformation is to be known. How? The notion of word, meaning and idea consists in this. The faculty of imagination (vikalpa) raises distinctions in the same thing and shows sameness in different things. Thus word, meaning and idea are confused together, although in reality they are different from one another. Therefore is this thought-transformation confused, *i. e.*, mixed up with the notions of word, meaning and idea:—‘And that as follows. The word cow, &c.’ The first phrase, ‘the word cow’ shows the unreal cognition of the word being fancied as confused with meaning and idea.

The second phrase, ‘the meaning cow,’ shows the notion of indistinctness from the meaning, when word and idea are taken in.

The third phrase, ‘the cow as an idea’ shows the notion of indistinctness from the idea when word and meaning are taken in. It is in this way that the world is seen taking in these three without making any distinction among them, although in reality they are all distinct from one another.

Well, but if they are taken in as not distinct from one another, whence does the distinction come in? For this reason, the Commentator says:—“Analyzed, &c.” Being examined by philosophers in accordance with the canons of agreement and difference, the characteristics of a word are found to be, that it is a modification of sound only, and that it possesses the qualifications of intensity, &c. The characteristics of the object are different, being absence of intelligence and form, &c. The characteristics of an idea are different, such as illumination and the absence of fixity in form, &c. Therefore their lines of existence are different, the lines, that is to say, along which their natural distinctions show themselves.

When the Yogi is in the state of thought-transformation with reference to ‘this cow, &c., taken in optionally, &c.’ This describes the Yogi’s lower perception (the ordinary perception). The rest is easy. To connect this with the next aphorism he first describes the Distinct Thought-transformation:—‘When however, &c.’

Freedom from memories, &c., means their absence. Verbal and inferential cognitions become possible only when preceded by the memory of verbal conventions. Convention consists in the mutual super-imposition of word, meaning and idea, in the phrase, ‘This is a cow.’ By these become possible the real and imaginative cognitions, traditional teaching and inference. For this reason the trance consciousness preceded by these is Indistinct.

When, however, the mind is full of the object only and favouring the object only, constantly habituates itself to the cognition of the object alone, the memory of the convention does no longer interfere and is therefore given up. Further the options of verbal and inferential cognitions too, in which it has its origin, are also given up. Then in the trance-consciousness, void of these descriptions of knowledge, the object takes its place in its own distinct nature, and the mind is confined to the manifestation of the nature of the object alone. It does not show any of the mixed up percepts of the word and the

idea. This is the Distinct Thought-transformation. That is the Higher Perception of the Yogis, because there is not in this, even a trace of untrue knowledge, the unreal fastening thereupon of other notions.

Well let this be. The Yogis lay down and teach the truths which they have learnt by Higher Perception. And how do they do that, but by promulgating and teaching the truths by means of the processes of verbal and inferential knowledge resorted to for the sake of others. Hence verbal and inferential knowledge have the Higher Perceptive knowledge for their object. And verbal and inferential knowledge are subject to the interference of imagination (vikalpa). For this reason the Higher Perception also is but a modification of imagination.

Therefore he says :—‘ That is the seed of verbal and inferential knowledge.’ If Higher Perception went along with verbal and inferential knowledge in the same way as is the case with Indistinct thought-transformation, i. e., if the perception were confused on account of the percepts being mixed up, then it would be a modification of imagination only. This, however, is their seed. Verbal and inferential knowledge are born therefrom ; and it is not possible that the cause of a thing may also be the sphere of its manifestation and be co-extensive with it. It is not that the fire lives in smoke, because the knowledge of the existence of smoke becomes the cause of the knowledge of the existence of fire. Therefore, the Yogis take in objects by non-fictional (real and distinct) perception, and only teach it and promulgate it by means subject to fiction (mixing up, confusion).

Summarizes :—‘ For this reason, &c.’

Sūtra 43.

स्मृतिपरिशुद्धौ स्वरूपशून्येवार्थमात्रनिर्भासा निर्वितर्का ॥४३॥

43. Distinctive⁹ (wordless) thought-transformation is that in which the mind shines⁸ out as the object⁶ alone⁷ on the cessation² of memory,¹ and is as it were⁵ devoid⁴ of its own nature.³

निर्वितर्कायाः समापत्तेरस्याः सूत्रेण लक्षणं द्योत्यते । स्मृतिपरिशुद्धौ स्वरूपशून्येवार्थ-
मात्रनिर्भासा निर्वितर्का या शब्दसङ्केतधृतानुमानज्ञानविकल्पस्मृतिपरिशुद्धौ ग्राह्यस्व-
रूपोपरक्ता स्वमिव प्रज्ञास्वरूपं ग्रहणात्मकं त्यक्त्वा पदार्थमात्रस्वरूपा ग्राह्यस्वरूपापन्ने-
व भवति सा तदा निर्वितर्का समापत्तिः । तथा च व्याख्यातम् । तस्या एकबुद्ध्युपक्रमो
ह्यर्थात्मा अणुप्रचयविशेषात्मा गवादिर्घटादिर्वा लोकः । स च संस्थानविशेषो भूतसू-
क्ष्माणां साधारणो धर्म आत्मभूतः फलेन व्यक्तेनानुमितः स्वव्यञ्जकाब्जनः
प्रादुर्भूतो भवति । धर्मान्तरस्य कपालादेरुदये च तिरोभवति । स एष धर्मोऽवयवीत्यु-
च्यते । योऽसावेकश्च महाश्चाणीयाश्च स्पर्शाश्च क्रियाधर्मकश्चानित्यश्च
तेनावयविना व्यवहाराः क्रियन्ते । यस्य पुनरवस्तुकः स प्रचयविशेषः सूक्ष्मं
च कारणमनुपलभ्यं तस्यावयव्यभावादतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठं मिथ्याज्ञानमिति । प्रायेण सर्वमेव
प्राप्तं मिथ्याज्ञानमिति । तदा च सम्यग्ज्ञानमपि किं स्याद्विषयाभावात् । यद्यनुपलभ्यते
तत्तदवयवित्वेनाज्ञातम् । तस्मादस्त्ववयवी यो महत्तत्त्वादिव्यवहारापन्नः समापत्तेर्नि-
र्वितर्काया विषयीभवति ॥ ४३ ॥

VYÂSA.

* The description of this Distinctive Thought-transformation is given by the aphorism :—"It is Distinctive, when on the cessation of memory, the mind shines out as the object alone and is, as it were, devoid of its own nature." The thought-transformation becomes Distinctive at the time when the memory of the fictions of verbal convention, verbal and inferential knowledge, ceases; when the mind is coloured by the nature of the object; when it, as it were, gives up its own nature of conscious cognition; and when, therefore, it only shows out the nature of the object, and has, as it were, transformed into the shape of the object itself. And so it has been explained.

The object itself is but a single output of the effort of that (thought transformation of the mind).

The visible world, the cow, &c., or the jar, &c., consists each in its own nature, of different collections of atoms. Each of these collections is a particular arrangement of the subtle elements. It is a generic quality and constitutes the very nature of the object. It is inferred by its visible effect. It has the form of its cause. It shows itself and exists. When other characteristics, such as those of the half-jar, &c., arise, it disappears. This characteristic is called the substratum (the independent Whole, the *avayavî*). It is this substratum which is spoken of as being one, or large, or small, or tangible, or possessing the quality of action or transitory.

To him, however, who does not believe this particular collection to be an independent reality and for whom the subtle cause does not admit of perception, there is of course no substratum; and therefore nearly all knowledge is false, being untrue knowledge and not possessing the form of the real. And then what would Real Cognition too be, when there would be no real object? Hence there is a substratum (independent of the constituent parts) which being spoken of as being large, &c., is the object of Distinctive Thought-transformation.—43.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Connects the aphorism to be explained:—"The description of this Distinctive Thought-transformation, &c."

'It is Distinct, &c.' :—this is the aphorism. Imagination affects the knowledge of word-convention, verbal and inferential cognitions only. Cessation of the memory born therefrom, is spoken of here.

Here, the cessation of the memory of the convention is the cause. The cessation of the memory of the verbal and inferential cognitions is caused thereby. The words 'inferential cognition,' denote here the thing to be inferred by means of the process of

induction. The words 'as it were' used in the text after 'own nature' are to be taken as qualifying the words 'given up.'

He refutes the contrary theories about the object of (this thought-transformation):—
 "The object itself is but a single, &c. 'A single output of the mind,' consists in what puts out the mental act but singly. This means that the atoms which go to make up an object being naturally many are not the objects of the Distinctive Thought-transformation. The reason is that although the atom may otherwise well be the object of this thought-transformation, it cannot be so on account of its extreme subtlety, and because many of them being joined together to make a single whole large object, each cannot singly shine out in the mind and make as such a single notion.

If so, why then it may be supposed that really existing atoms possess the characteristic of shining out in the mind by virtue of existing as derivative qualities of the single whole, i. e., by showing out (what might be called a) derivative grossness. For this reason, he says: 'The object itself (i. e., not the constituent parts).' The meaning is that the grossness of an object being provable by perception, is impossible to conceal in the absence of any defect.

To those who say that the objects cow, &c., and jar, &c., are formed by the successive formations of diatoms, &c., he says that these objects 'consist, each in its own nature, of different collections of atoms.'

A collection of atoms is a modification showing a gross form, and it differs from another such modification. Each particular modification of collectivity is of the very nature of the object, its own form. The description applies equally whether it be an object such as a cow which is capable of enjoying, or, an object such as a jar which is capable of being enjoyed. Both these classes of objects fall within the connotation of the word 'world' (loka, that which is visible).

Now the question arises: Is this collection appearing as a gross form different from the subtle atoms, or, is it the same with them? If different, how could they live in it as such and how could it have that form? A jar is different from a cloth. A jar cannot therefore take the form of a cloth; nor can the qualities which go to make a jar, live in a cloth.

If, on the other hand, the whole in its collective form were the same with the parts (the atoms), it would likewise be subtle and independent (asâdhârâṇa).

For this reason, he says:—'Each of these collections is a particular arrangement, &c.' This is the meaning. A jar and other such objects are not entirely different from atoms; nor are they entirely of the same nature. In the case of their being like the horse and the cow, the existence of the relation of the characteristic and the characterized could not be predicated. If, however, they were not different they would be of the nature of the characterized object itself, and this is not proper. Hence the substratum (the characterized object, the Whole) should be considered to be in some respects different and in others similar to its constituent parts, the subtle atoms. In this way everything becomes proper.

By placing the words 'subtle elements' in the genitive case, he shows partial difference; and the words, 'constitutes the very nature of the object, &c.' show the absence of difference.

'It is inferred by its visible effect':—'Visible effect' means its perception as such and its being dealt with as such.

'It has the form of its cause':—This is intended to show that in so far as it is not different from its cause, it is in the nature of things that it should possess the form of the cause.

Is this characteristic which is of the nature of the characterized object itself, permanent? The Commentator answers in the negative:—"when other characteristics such as those of the half-jar appear, &c."

Now he shows that the form of the characterized object, the whole as such, is different from the atoms :—‘This characteristic is called the substratum, &c.’ The meaning is that its function is the possession of qualities like the sweetness of water, &c., which are quite different from the functions to be performed by atoms.

It is not only by inference that the independent existence of a substratum (the *avayavi*, the Whole as such) is established ; but by the fact as well of the whole world treating it as such, inasmuch as the business of the world depends upon that. For this reason, he says :—‘By this, &c.’

Well, but the mental conception of the percept as an individual existence independent of its parts, may only avail if there is no contradiction. There is, however, contradiction. Thus, whatever exists has no parts, such as consciousness (*vijnāna*) ; and the cow and the jar, &c., do exist. This is a reason taken from the very nature of the things. Existence is qualified by the absence of the touch of such characteristics as are contradictory thereof. It is contradicted by the touch of contradictory qualities.

The touch of contradictory qualities being found in an object possessed of parts, contradicts the pervading quality (excludes the middle term). It, therefore, disproves even the existence of the object.

In the substratum there exists the touch of contradictory characteristics, such as occupying the same space or not occupying the same space, not being covered or uncovered, redness and not-redness, moveability and immoveability, &c.

For this reason, he says :—‘To him however, &c.’ This is the meaning. The proof of the existence by perception is given as the reason. But the pole perceived as a limb of a bedstead may also become the pole of a plough, or something else different from what it has been proved to be by perception. As to its becoming something else, that is no reason, because the something else is not so proved. As to the existence of the jar, &c., being proved by perception, why this existence consists of the capacity of performing certain functions ; and that capacity is not different from grossness (*sthūlatva*). The reasoning which does away with grossness, does away with the nature of the thing itself.

But the objection may still arise that the grossness of a thing is not its existence itself. Existence is the absence of non-existence. Grossness is the absence of non-grossness. The absences differ on account of the difference of the objects whose absences are contemplated. Therefore existence is not destroyed, even though grossness may be absent, because the two are different. Or, it might be said that there is difference in the objects to be determined on account of the difference of their absences. If with a view to determine the nature of the object of perception, which being true cognition and free from the taint of imagination, precedes the determination of the nature of the object as such, you say that it is made up of the visible atoms, being incessantly born without there being any interval between them, and without their having put on the nature of extreme subtlety ; then, it is to be noted that the atoms of odour, taste and touch fall into the intervals of the visual atoms and that they do not exist without them.

Besides, the notion of a grove, as a single whole, comes into the mind, because the intervals among the trees thereof is not perceived, (although it does exist). The theory, therefore, which speaks of the atoms as being visible and gross in themselves and as having no intervals, is false. How can the fancies based upon such a theory have anything to do with the realities of things, even on the strength of the conception of a causal chain (*pāramparya*)? How can it be accepted as establishing the nature of the existence to the effect that they do not exist as parts but are wholes themselves.

Therefore he who believes in the authority of perception free from the taint of fancy, must grant that grossness itself, being as it is the object of such perception, does exist

as such. This is determined for certain without the taint of fancy, and must be admitted even by one who has no desire left for such things. And further, if existence as such were to contradict and thus exclude grossness, why, it would exclude itself too as a necessary consequence.

The very highly subtle atoms have, therefore, their intervals filled up with atoms of another class, and the theory of their being the objects of perception is shorn of admissibility. This is meant by saying, 'To him, however, who does not believe this particular collection to be an independent reality &c.' But the particular collection although independently existing is still the object of certain (nirvikalpa) perception.

Well then the subtle atoms may be the objects of certain perception. For this reason, he says :— 'And the subtle object does not admit of perception.' Perception here means that which is free from the taint of imagination, is certain.

'To him who has such a belief,' there is of course no substratum and for this reason, all knowledge is false, being defined as it is "to be untrue knowledge, not possessing the form thereof." The knowledge, that is to say, which has grossness for its object, and that again on which this rests, the knowledge of existence, is all false to him.

Well, even so, the knowledge of self would not be untrue, inasmuch as the self does not exist as a whole consisting of parts. How then should it be said that all knowledge would become false? For this reason, he says :— "Nearly all knowledge."

The question now arises, 'What even if it were so?' In answer, he says :— 'And then what would Right Cognitions too be, &c.' If the knowledge of existence (sattva) &c., be false then the knowledge of things which have their origin in Sattva, &c., such as the knowledge of there being no substratum, independent of parts, must also be false. For what is the object of this knowledge but the grossness which is the object of certain perception? And inasmuch as this grossness does not exist, its knowledge would certainly be false. But how is it that the object itself does not as such exist? For this reason, he says :— "Whatever is perceived, &c."

As to contradiction (virodha) that is to be explained in accordance with the afore-said method of knowledge, by means of the variety of modification, and by differentiation and non-differentiation. Thus all is beautiful. —43.

Sûtra 44.

एतयैव सविचारा निर्विचारा च सूक्ष्मविषया व्याख्याता ॥४४॥

44. By¹ this² the meditative³ and⁵ the ultra-meditative,⁴ having the subtle⁶ for their objects,⁷ are also described.⁸

एतयैव सविचारा निर्विचारा च सूक्ष्मविषया व्याख्याता । तत्र भूतसूक्ष्मके-
ष्वभिव्यक्तधर्मेकेषु देशकालनिमित्तानुभवावच्छिन्नेषु या समापत्तिः सा सविचारेत्युच्यते ।
तत्राप्येकबुद्धिनिर्ग्राह्यमेवोदिनधर्मविशिष्टं भूतसूक्ष्ममालम्बनीभूतं समाधिप्रज्ञायामुप-
तिष्ठते । या पुनः सर्वथा सर्वतः शान्तोदिताव्यपदेश्यधर्मानवच्छिन्नेषु सर्वधर्मांमुपातिषु
सर्वधर्मात्मकेषु समापत्तिः सा निर्विचारेत्युच्यते । एवंस्वरूपं हि तद्गतसूक्ष्मम् । एतेनैव
स्वरूपेणालम्बनीभूतमेव समाधिप्रज्ञास्वरूपमुपरञ्जयति । प्रज्ञा च स्वरूपशून्येवार्थमात्रा
यदा भवति तदा निर्विचारेत्युच्यते । तत्र महद्वस्तु विषया सवितर्का निवितर्का च सूक्ष्म-
वस्तुविषया सविचारा निर्विचारा च । एवमुभयोरेतयैव निर्वितर्कया विकल्पहानिर्या-
ख्यातेति ॥ ४४ ॥

VYÂSA.

. Of these the thought-transformation into subtle elements is called Meditative, when their characteristics are in manifestation and when the limitations of consciousness in space, time and operative cause are present. In this state too the subtle element comes into the trance-consciousness as qualified only by the present characteristics ; and is taken in only by a single effort of consciousness ; and it is this much alone of an object that comes into contact with the faculty of Meditative Thought-transformation.

That, however, is the ultra-meditative thought-transformation, which operates with reference to subtle objects unlimited in all ways, all round by the past, the present and the unpredicable characteristics, but running after all the characteristics possessing as they do in fact a nature common to all of them. This in fact is the nature of the subtle element. It presents itself to the trance-consciousness as such and colours it similarly by contact. As to the cognition, it is called ultra-meditative, when it becomes the object itself, and thus as it were, becomes void of its own nature.

Of these the Indistinctive and Distinctive thought-transformations have to operate upon things extended in time and space ; the Meditative and the Ultra-meditative operate upon the subtle elements. It is thus that the absence of uncertainty in both these is described by the description of the Indistinctive alone.—44.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Those that have manifested the characteristics of the jar, &c., are said to 'have their characteristics in manifestation.' It means those that have already taken up the characteristics of the jar, &c.

Space is indicated by above, below and the directions, &c. Time here is the present. 'Operative cause': The earthy atom is born from the five classes of ultimate atoms (tanmâtras), with a prevalence of the odoriferous minima. Similarly the liquid atom (âpas tattva) is born from the four classes of ultimate atoms except the odoriferous minima, with the prevalence of the gustiferous minima. Similarly, the fiery atom is made of the three minima besides the odoriferous and the gustiferous minima, with a prevalence of the lumniferous minima. Similarly, the gaseous atom is born from the tangiferous and soniferous minima without an admixture of the other three classes of minima, with a prevalence of the tangiferous minima. Similarly the birth of Âkâsha is from the one class of soniferous minima alone. This is the operative cause of the subtle elements.

The subtle elements in this state are qualified by the limitations of space, time and their causes such as those specified. It means that, being limited by the consciousness of time, space and cause as they are, the cognition of these qualified objects is not independent of the cognition of their qualities.

The question is, what is the similarity of the Indistinctive to the Meditative Thought-transformation? For this reason, he says :—'Further in that state, &c.' The earthy atom receives its individuality from the five classes of ultimate atoms (tanmâtras) grouping together and is taken in by a single effort of consciousness as a single whole. Similarly,

are the liquid atoms, &c., to be understood as coming into consciousness as single substances, receiving as they do their individuality by groupings of three, two and one class of ultimate atoms (tanmātras) respectively.

The present characteristic is that which is at present rising. By saying that 'it is qualified only by the present characteristics,' it is indicated that in this state of consciousness are present along with the object the optional operations of the memory of convention and of verbal and inferential cognitions. Perception, while it cognizes the gross state, does not reveal the atoms. They are revealed by verbal and inferential cognitions. Hence is it proper that it (the Meditative Thought-transformation) should be mixed up with the operations of verbal and inferential cognitions.

Now explains the Ultra-meditative :--'That however, etc.'

'In all ways' means in all modes of manifestation, as blue, yellow, &c. All round means by the consciousness of all the conditions of time, space, and causation. By describing them thus, it is shown that the atoms are not limited by time. Further, he says that they are neither limited by the characteristics which are brought into operation by time :--'Unlimited by the past characteristics, i. e., those which have had their operation; by rising characteristics, i. e., those that are to be found in the present; by the unpredicable characteristics, i. e., the future ones.

The question arises that if the atoms are not conditioned by any of these characteristics, are they then quite fortuitous? For this reason, he says :--'but running after all the characteristics.' By what connection then do the atoms run after the characteristics? For this reason, he says :--'Possessing as they do in fact a nature common to all the characteristics.' The meaning is that characteristics differ in some respects from, and are identical in others to, the atoms.

Now he says why this thought-transformation has this nature of the atoms as its object :--'This in fact is the nature of the subtle element! The power which gives the knowledge of reality, does not operate upon the unreal.

Having described the object of that state of consciousness, now he describes its nature :--'As to the cognition, &c.'

Summarizing makes a statement which shows the differences of their natures :--'Of these, &c.' Finishes :--'It is thus, &c.'

In both these :-- in itself and the ultra-meditative.---44.

Sūtra 45.

सूक्ष्मविषयत्वं चालिङ्गपर्यवसानम् ॥ ४५ ॥

45. And³ the province² of the subtle¹ reaches up⁵ to the noumenal.⁴

सूक्ष्मविषयत्वं चालिङ्गपर्यवसानम् । पार्थिवस्याणोर्गन्ध तन्मात्रं सूक्ष्मो विषयः । आप्यस्यापि रसतन्मात्रम् । तैजसस्य रूपतन्मात्रम् । वायव्यस्य स्पर्शतन्मात्रम् । आकाशस्य शब्दतन्मात्रमिति । तेषामहङ्कारः । अस्यापि लिङ्गतन्मात्रं सूक्ष्मो विषयः । लिङ्गतन्मात्रस्याप्यलिङ्गं सूक्ष्मो विषयः । न चालिङ्गात्परं सूक्ष्ममस्ति । नन्वस्ति पुरुषः सूक्ष्म इति । सत्यम् । यथा लिङ्गात्परमलिङ्गस्य सौक्ष्म्यं न चैवं पुरुषस्य । किंतु लिङ्गस्यान्वयि कारणं पुरुषो न भवति । हेतुस्तु भवतीति । अतः प्रधीने सौक्ष्म्यं निरतिशयं व्याख्यातम् ॥ ४५ ॥

VYÂSA.

The odoriferous ether (gandha tanmâtra) is the subtler object in relation to the atoms of the earthy class (prithvi); the gustiferous (rasa tanmâtra) to the liquid (âpas) atom; the luminiferous ether (rûpa tanmâtra) of the fiery (taijas) atom; the tangiferous ether (sparsâ tanmâtra) of the gaseous (vâyu) atom; the soniferous ether (śabda tanmâtra) of the Âkâśic atom. Of these the principle of individuality (ahaṅkāra) is the subtler cause. Subtler than this too is the purely Phenomenal Objective Existence. The principle subtler than this too is the Noumenal (Alinga). There is nothing subtler than the Noumenal.

But it might be said that there is the Puruṣa who is also subtle. True. As however is the subtlety of the noumenal in comparison with the purely phenomenal, such is not the subtlety of the Puruṣa. On the other hand, the Puruṣa is not the material cause of the Purely Phenomenal. It is only the instrumental cause. For this reason the subtlety of the Mulâprakṛiti is described as not liable to be exceeded.

VÂCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

Does the range of thought-transformation with reference to objective appearances extend up to the subtle elements only? No. 'And the province of the subtle reaches up to the noumenal.'

The characteristic of the odoriferous ultimate atom (gandha tanmâtra) is in relation to the atom of the earthy class (Prithvi) the subtle object of the faculty of thought-transformation. In other places it should be construed in the same way.

The purely Phenomenal is the Great Principle (Mahattattva), because it is that which immediately passes into latency (linga) into the Mulâprakṛiti. The noumenal is the Mulâprakṛiti, because it does not pass into latency (alinga), into any other state.

Describes the reaching up to the noumenal: - 'There is nothing subtler, &c.'

States an objection: - 'But it may be, &c.' Replies: - 'True, &c.' The meaning is that as a material cause subtlety exists in the noumenal only, nowhere else.

But the Mahat and the principle of individuality exist for fulfilling the objects of the Puruṣa. The Puruṣa also is, therefore, a cause of the noumenal. Why should it be said that subtlety exists only in the noumenal? For this reason, he says: - It is certainly a cause but not the material cause. As Mulâprakṛiti evolves into the phenomenon of Mahat and onwards, not so the Puruṣa.

Finishes: - 'For this reason the subtlety of the Mulâprakṛiti is described as not capable of being exceeded.'--45.

Sûtra 46.

ता एव सबीजः समाधिः ॥ ४६ ॥

46. They¹ are the seeded³ trance¹ only.²

ता एव सबीजः समाधिः । तादृचतन्त्रः समापत्तयो बहिर्वस्तुबीजा इति समाधिरपि सबीजः । तत्र स्थूलेऽर्थे सवितर्कः । निर्वितर्कः सूक्ष्मेऽर्थे सविचारो निर्विचार इति । स चतुर्थोपसङ्ख्यातः समाधिरिति ॥ ४६ ॥

VYÂSA.

These four descriptions of thought-transformation have their origin (seed) in external objects. Therefore is the trance too 'seeded.' In the case of the gross objects it is the Indistinctive and the Distinctive. In the subtle objects it is the Meditative and the Ultra-meditative. Thus is trance described to be four-fold.—46.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Says that the four states of thought-transformation have the objective for their sphere of operation, constitute the cognitive trance:—'They are the seeded trance only.' The word 'only' is to be taken as qualifying the word 'seeded.' By this the four descriptions of thought-transformation, having the objective state of existence as their sphere, are limited by being qualified as seeded.

The quality of being seeded, however, is not restricted to these. It applies to the thought-transformations which have the subjective and the instrumental modifications also for their sphere of operation, in both its descriptions of Uncertain (savikalpa) and Certain (nirvikalpa). For this reason there are said to be four descriptions of thought-transformation in the case of the objective and the instrumental phenomena. Thus there are eight descriptions in all. The meaning of the Commentary has been explained.—46.

Sûtra 47.

निर्विचारवैशारद्येऽध्यात्मप्रसादः ॥ ४७ ॥

47. The undisturbed flow² of the ultra-meditative¹ causes Subjective³ Luminosity.⁴

निर्विचारवैशारद्येऽध्यात्मप्रसादः । अशुद्ध्यावरणमलापेतस्य प्रकाशात्मनो बुद्धिसत्त्वस्य रजस्तमोभ्यामनभिभूतः स्वच्छः स्थितिप्रवाहो वैशारद्यम् । यदा निर्विचारस्य-समाधेर्वैशारद्यमिदं जायते तदा योगिनो भवत्यध्यात्मप्रसादः । भूतार्थविषयः क्रमानुरोधी स्फुटः प्रज्ञालोकः । तथा चोक्तम् । प्रज्ञाप्रसादमारुह्य अशोच्यः शोचतो जनान् । भूमिष्ठानिव शैलस्यः सर्वान्प्राज्ञोऽनुपश्यति ॥ ४७ ॥

VYÂSA.

'Undisturbed flow' is the pure and constant flow, not overpowered by disturbing energy (rajas) and inertia (tamas), of the essence (sattva) of the Will-to-know, the very self of light, with the veil of impurity covering it removed. When this undisturbed flow is secured for the Ultra-meditative trance, the Yogi attains Subjective Luminosity. His intellectual vision becomes clear with regard to objects as they exist, irrespective of all sequence. And so it has been said:—'Having reached the stage of intellectual luminosity, the wise man is no longer an object of compassion; he looks upon and compassionates others, as one upon a height looks down upon those in the plains.'

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now he describes the beauty of the ultra-meditative among the four descriptions of thought-transformation, which have the objective as their sphere of operation :--'The undisturbed flow of the ultra-meditative causes Subjective Luminosity.' Describes the meaning of the words, 'undisturbed flow': 'The pure, &c.' 'Impurity' is the adhesion of disturbing energy (rajas) and inertia (tamas). The same is a sort of dirt having the quality of a veil. When the veil is removed from the essence of the Will-to-know, it shines out as the very self of light, and is therefore said to be not overpowered by them.

But then, if the sphere of thought-transformation is the objective modification of existence, how can it secure Subjective Luminosity? For this reason, he says :- 'With regard to objects as they exist.' The subjective is not its object. It is only that in which the subjective self lives, that becomes its object as such.

'Without regard to all sequence' means simultaneously.

Quotes on this subject the Gāthā of the Great Seer :--'And so it has been said.' Finding himself above all, on having reached the highest point of the vision of knowledge, he is sorry to see the men of the world suffering from the three descriptions of pain.—47.

Sūtra 48.

ऋतंभरा तत्र प्रज्ञा ॥४८॥

48. 'Therein² the faculty³ of Essential¹ Cognition.'

ऋतंभरा तत्र प्रज्ञा । तस्मिन्त्समाहितचित्तस्य या प्रज्ञा जायते तस्या ऋतंभरेति संज्ञा भवति । अन्वर्था च सा सत्यमेव विभर्ति । न च तत्र विपर्ययज्ञानगन्धोऽप्यस्तीति । तथा चोक्तम् । आगमेनानुमानेन ध्यानाभ्यासरसेन च । त्रिधा प्रकल्पयन्प्रज्ञां लभते योगमुत्तममिति ॥ ४८ ॥

VYĀSA.

The cognitive faculty which shows itself in that state in the mind of the wise, bears the name of Essential Cognition (Ritambharā). The term itself expresses the definition. It always cognizes the essence, the truth. There is not even a trace of false knowledge.

And so it has been said :--'Cultivating the mind in the three ways of verbal and inferential cognitions and the practice of contemplation with tastefulness, one gets the highest Yoga.'—48.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Expresses the concurrence of the Yogis by mentioning a technical term well-known among them and defining its own meaning :--'Therein, the faculty of essential cognition.' The Commentary is easy. 'Cultivation by verbal cognition' means the hearing of the Vedas.

'Cultivation by inferential cognition' means thinking.

Contemplation means keeping in mind. Practice means over and over again. Contemplation with tastefulness means welcome contemplation.—48.

Sātra 49.

श्रुतानुमानप्रज्ञाभ्यामन्यविषया विशेषार्थत्वात् ॥४९॥

49. It has different¹ objects⁵ from those of verbal¹ and inferential² cognition,³ as it refers⁷ to particulars⁶

सा पुनः । श्रुतानुमानप्रज्ञाभ्यामन्यविषया विशेषार्थत्वात् । श्रुतमागमविज्ञानं तत्स मान्यविषयम् । न ह्यागमेन शब्दोविशेषोऽभिधातुम् । कस्मात् ? न हि विशेषेण कृत-सङ्केतः शब्द इति । तथानुमानं सामान्यविषयमेव । यत्र प्राप्तिस्तत्र गतिर्यत्राप्राप्ति-स्तत्र न भवति गतिरित्युक्तम् । अनुमानेन च सामान्येनोपसंहारः । तस्माच्छ्रुतानुमान-विषयो न विशेषः कश्चिदस्तीति । न चास्य सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टस्य वस्तुनो लोकप्रत्य-क्षेण ग्रहणमस्ति । न सास्य विशेषस्याप्रमाणस्याभावोऽस्तीति । समाधिप्रज्ञानिर्ग्राह्य एव स विशेषो भवति । भूतसूक्ष्मगतो वा पुरुषगतो वा तस्माच्छ्रुतानुमानप्रज्ञाभ्यामन्य-विषया सा प्रज्ञा विशेषार्थत्वादिति ॥ ४९ ॥

VYĀSA.

And that, moreover, 'has different objects from those of verbal and inferential cognitions, as it refers to particulars.'

Verbal cognition refers to knowledge received from another. It has the generals for its objects. It is not possible to describe the particulars by words. Why? Because there is no conventional denotation of the particular in words.

Similarly, has inferential cognition the generals for its objects. Wherever there is approach there is motion ; wherever there is no approach there is no motion in existence. This has been said. Further inference arrives at conclusions by means of the generic qualities. Therefore there is no particular which can be made the object of induction and verbal cognition.

Ordinary perception does not cognize the subtle, the distant and the intercepted. Nor can it be said that this particular does not exist for want of authority. This particular can only be cognized by the trance-cognition, whether it be present in the subtle elements or in the Puruṣa. Hence this cognition has different objects from those of inferential and verbal cognitions, because it has the particulars for its objects.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Very well, the ultra-meditative has for its sphere of action the objects cognizable by verbal and inferential cognition and is the culmination of these faculties. It can therefore operate upon the objects of verbal and inferential cognitions only. Because it is not certainly possible that a mental potency born out of practice with reference

to one object of thought, should be capable of causing the knowledge of another object. This would mean going beyond the proper limits. Therefore if the essential cognition is the same as the ultra-meditative, its objects must be the same as those of verbal and inferential cognitions. For this reason, he says : 'It has different objects.'

Mental Essence is luminous by nature, and has the power of knowing all objects. When veiled by inertia (tamas) it cognizes only upon the veil being removed by energy (rajas). When, however, upon the impurities of inertia and disturbing energy being removed by practice and desirelessness, the pure light shines forth, then, light passes beyond the limits of all measures and all finite objects, and becomes infinite ; what then is there that does not fall within the sphere of its action ?

Explains : -- 'Verbal cognition is the knowledge received from another.' Its sphere of action consists of the 'universal. Why ? Words cannot connote particulars. Why ? Because of their not being limited and because of overlapping (vyabhihâra.)

'There is no conventional denotation of the particular in words,' because the relation of the sign and the thing signified is not found existing between a word and the particular. Nor is such a particular possible of being expressed by the meaning of a sentence.

The same is the case with inference, whose operation depends upon the relation existing between the sign and the thing signified (the *linga* and the *lingi*) : -- 'Similarly, has induction, &c.' The words 'wherever' and 'there' denote the pervader and the pervaded, by a change of places. For this reason the conclusion is arrived at here by virtue of the common property. Concludes : 'therefore there is, &c.'

Well, then, let it be the ordinary perception which does not depend for its operation upon the knowledge of any relationship. For this reason, he says : 'Nor can it be said, &c.' Ordinary perception may not depend for its operation upon the recognition of relationship. It does certainly depend upon the senses, and the senses are not in their sphere here (i. e., in the essential cognition). This is the meaning.

Well, but, if the particulars are not such objects as can be known by verbal, inferential and perceptive cognitions, then, there is no authority for their existence. For this reason, he says : -- 'Nor can it be said that the particular does not exist for want of authority.' The meaning is that a means of knowledge (*pramâna*) is neither co-existent with nor the cause of the thing known. It is not therefore necessary that the reality to be known should cease to exist, because there is no means or power of knowing it. Those who rely upon the ordinary means of knowledge, do not doubt the existence of a deer-like mark in the moon at a time when only certain phases of hers are visible. For this reason is it said that it is capable of being known by the trance cognition alone.

Here the atoms and the Puruṣas which are the subjects of discussion, are each of the nature of independent particularities, because, being substances, they are all separate from each other. All those that are separate from one another, being substances, are of the nature of independent particularities, as say sugar and a hair-shorn mendicant. Thus by this inference and by authority the special province of the essential cognition is defined, because otherwise there would remain a doubt as to its real nature, brought about by ordinary reasoning. Still, the attempt to define it is not complete, and its existence is brought within the sphere of consciousness with difficulty, on account of its being far removed from ordinary objects, by inference and authority. The knowledge although thus brought about with difficulty is not so plain and well-defined as the knowledge of collectivity, &c., obtained by words denoting them along with the proper accessories of enumeration of signs (signifying the particular object). Thus is it that its object is different from the objects of verbal and inferential cognitions, -- 49.

Sūtra 50.

तज्जः संस्कारोऽन्यसंस्कारप्रतिबन्धी ॥५०॥

50. Residual potencies³ born² therefrom¹ impede⁶ other⁴ residual potencies.⁵

समाधिप्रज्ञाप्रतिलम्भे योगिनः प्रज्ञाकृतः संस्कारो नवो नवो जायते । तज्जः संस्कारोऽन्यसंस्कारप्रतिबन्धी । समाधिप्रभवः संस्कारो व्युत्थानसंस्काराशयं बाधते । व्युत्थानसंस्काराभिभवात्तत्प्रभवाः प्रत्यया न भवन्ति । प्रत्ययनिरोधे समाधिरुपतिष्ठते । ततः समाधिजा प्रज्ञा ततः प्रज्ञाकृतः संस्कारा इति नवो नवः संस्काराशयो जायते । ततश्च प्रज्ञा ततश्च संस्कारा इति कथमसौ संस्काराशयश्चित्तं साधिकारं न करिष्यतीति । न ते प्रज्ञाकृताः संस्काराः क्लेशक्षयहेतुत्वाच्चित्तमधिकारविशिष्टं कुर्वन्ति । चित्तं हि ते स्वकार्यादवसादयन्ति । ख्यातिपर्यवसानं हि चित्तचेष्टितमिति ॥ ५० ॥

VYĀSA.

When the trance cognition has been reached, the Yogi acquires by the exercise of that cognition, newer and newer residual potencies. 'The residual potencies born therefrom impede other residual potencies.' The potency born of trance impedes the outgoing vehicle of potencies. By overpowering the outgoing tendencies, notions due to them cease to exist. On the suppression of these notions the trance faculty gains in power. Then again the activity of trance cognition. Then again residua caused by the act of cognition. In this way the vehicle of potencies is being constantly renewed.

Well the act of cognition is caused by the potency and the potency is caused by the act. How is it then possible that the mind may not be given by this vehicle of potencies an object in itself? The potencies born out of the trance cognition do not give the mind a duty to perform with reference to themselves, because they are the cause of the removal of the afflictions. They bring about the finishing of the duty which the mind has to perform. It is only up to the attainment of discriminative knowledge that the activity of the mind has to last.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Let that be. The cognitive trance has the reality of an object for its sphere of operation. Practice and the other means of restraint as described, are however outgoing potencies. The trance cognition is known to be firmly bound up with them. They must therefore be obstacles to the full realization of that state of consciousness, shine as it would like atomic twinkles of light in the midst of a hurricane. To remove this doubt the Commentator introduces the aphorism:—'When the trance cognition has been reached, &c.' Reads the aphorism:—'Residual potencies born therefrom impede other residual potencies.'

The word, 'there' in 'therefrom' signifies the ultra-meditative thought-transformation. 'Other' means the outgoing. Inclination towards the realities of objects is of the very nature of the mind. It is unsteady and wanders only so long as it does not reach the reality. When that is reached it takes up a steady position, and turns round and in the way of the wheel of potency, bent upon purification (i.e., upon acquiring that potency). Doing this it must certainly impede the mutual succession of the power and act of the cognition of unrealities, although the succession has had no beginning. The outsiders also say the same:—'Unreal cognitions do not contradict the nature of the objects as they do exist in reality, free from defects, even though the unrealities have existed from eternity; because the mind is naturally inclined towards the realities.'

Very well, grant that the outgoing potencies are restrained by the operations of the trance cognition. But the first manifestation of the trance cognition has for its final object the ever-increasing unchecked manifestation of the potency of trance cognition. Thus it is plain that the mind even in that state, has the same old quality of having still a function to perform. (The attainment of the trance cognition too does not take it any nearer to the fulfilment of its object). This is the question raised 'How is it then that the mind, &c.' Refutes:—'The potencies born out of, &c.' There are but two objects of the mind, the enjoyment of sound, &c., and the attainment of Discriminative knowledge. Of these the enjoyment of sound, &c., comes into operation with the existence of the vehicles of affliction and action. When, however, the power which springs from the manifestation of trance cognition, entirely roots out the vehicles of action and affliction and the mind for that reason exists in the state of having mostly fulfilled its objects, the only object that then remains for it to achieve, is the attainment of Discriminative knowledge. Therefore the potencies of the mind due to the practice of the trance cognition cannot generate the habits of returning to the duties of enjoyment. They must check their forward march. They bring about the end of its duty of enjoyment, i.e., render it impotent to enjoy them. How? The action of the mind lasts only up to the attainment of discriminative knowledge. The mind only works for enjoyment as long as it does not experience Discriminative knowledge. When, however, discriminative knowledge is born, the afflictions are removed, and the duty of causing enjoyment is over. This is the meaning.--50.

Sūtra 51.

तस्यापि निरोधे सर्वनिरोधान्निर्वीजः समाधिः ॥५१॥

51. All¹ being suppressed,⁵ by the suppression³ of that¹ too² comes the seedless⁶ trance.⁷

किं चास्य भवति । तस्यापि निरोधे सर्वनिरोधान्निर्वीजः समाधिः । स न केवलं समाधिप्रज्ञाविरोधी । प्रज्ञाकृतानामपिसंस्काराणां प्रतिबन्धी भवति । कस्मान्निरोधजः संस्कारः समाधिजान्संस्कारान्बाधत इति । निरोधस्थितिकालक्रमानुभवेन निरोधचित्त-कृतसंस्कारास्तित्वमनुमेयम् । व्युत्थाननिरोधसमाधिप्रभवैः सह कैवल्यभाग्यैः संस्कारै-श्चित्तं स्वस्यां प्रकृताववस्थितयां प्रविलीयते । तस्मात्त संस्काराश्चित्तस्याधिकारविरो-धिनो न स्थितिहेतवो भवन्तीति । यस्मादवसिताधिकारं सहकैवल्यभाग्यैः संस्कारै-

द्विचत्तं निवर्तते । तस्मिन्निवृत्ते पुरुषः स्वरूपमात्रप्रतिष्ठोऽतः शुद्धः केवलो मुक्त इत्युच्यत
इति ॥ ५१ ॥

इति श्रीपातञ्जले सांख्यप्रवचने योगशास्त्रे प्रथमः

समाधिपादः समाप्तः ॥ १ ॥

VYĀSA.

And what more comes to the mind? 'All being suppressed by the suppression of that too comes the seedless trance.' This opposes not only the trance cognition, but checks also the operation of the potencies generated by that cognition. Why? The potency of the habit of suppression that is acquired, removes the potencies of the habit of trance cognition. That there exists the potency of the habit of suppression, generated by the acts of mental control, is to be inferred by the mental experience of the succession in time of the act of suppression and the consequent rest. The mind disappears into its own inactive cause, along with the potencies which operate to lead to absolute freedom, and which are born of the trance cognition operating to suppress the outgoing potencies. These potencies, therefore, being opposed, to the continuance of the duty of the mind, do not become the cause of its further existence as such. And it is for this reason that the mind which has achieved its purpose, and along with it the potencies which operate to lead to absolute freedom, cease to act further. When the mind ceases to act further, the Puruṣa remains in its own true self, and is therefore pure, absolutely free, and released (mukta) as he is called.--51.

This finishes the first chapter, on trance, of the Sāṅkhyapravachana Commentary of the Yogaśāstra of Patañjali, by Vyāsa.

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

It has been said that the cessation of the function of enjoyment is the reason for acquiring the potencies of the trance cognition. Now he puts a question : 'And what more comes to the mind?' The meaning is that inasmuch as the mind possessing the potencies of the trance cognition, generates the flow of these potencies (into activity) the mind has still a duty to perform as before ; because something else is necessary to remove the necessity of the performance of this function too. The answer is given by the aphorism : 'All being suppressed, by the suppression of that too comes the seedless trance.' The meaning of the word 'too' is that not only the trance cognition, but the potencies generated by the cognition are also suppressed by means of generating side by side with these the potency of Higher desirelessness, defused to be the light of knowledge alone. The stream of the potency and the act of cognition which are being constantly generated one from the other, having been checked, the effect is not born without the cause ; and this is the seedless trance. Explains : 'That' seedless trance, being brought about by the Higher desirelessness, which opposes the trance cognition, does by means of its cause, not only become the opposer of the trance cognition, but at the same time obstructs the flow of the potencies generated by that cognition also,

Well, the knowledge born of desirelessness may very well destroy the cognition alone, because it exists as a cause. How can it destroy the potency, which in fact is no knowledge? Memory is seen operating even in a waking man with reference to objects seen in dreams. With this object he puts the question: 'Why?' The answer is: 'The potency of the habit of suppression, &c.' 'Suppression' is that by which the cognition is suppressed, that is the Higher desirelessness. It is from that, that the potency of the habit of suppression is born. The meaning is that it is not by the cognition but by the potency born of Higher desirelessness, long, uninterruptedly and devotedly practised, that the potency of the cognition is destroyed. Well, let that be. But what authority is there for the existence of the potency of the habit of suppression? It can either be known by perception, or inferred by its effect, the memory thereof. But the Yogi can have no perception when all the mental modifications have been suppressed. Nor can he have memory, because the act of suppression operating upon the act of modification as such can leave no memory behind. For this reason, he says:—'The existence of the potency is to be inferred, &c.' The 'rest' in suppression means the state of suppression.

The succession in time of that state means a *muhūrta*, an hour and a half, day and night, &c. The experience is to be of this succession. This is the meaning. The intensity of suppression is in accordance with the intensity of desirelessness and practice; and this intensity is taken note of by its extension over the periods of time known as *muhūrta*, an hour-and-a-half, &c., by the Yogi. And inasmuch as the moments of desirelessness do not exist together on account of a fixed order in the appearance, and on account of their extending over their own special periods of time, they cannot be adequate to bring about the intensity of suppression; it is therefore the store of the potential energy thereof, born of the collective effect of the moments of desirelessness, indulged now and again, that is desired to be understood here.

Well the potencies of cognition may be destroyed. But how can the potencies of suppression be destroyed? For if they be not destroyed, the mind has still a duty left to perform. For this reason, he says:—'The mind disappears, &c.'

The trance cognition which suppresses the outgoing tendencies is the cognitive trance. It is the potencies born from that, that are here spoken of. The potencies which operate to lead to absolute freedom are the potencies born from the acts of suppression. Because the potencies of the outgoing acts of cognition have become embedded in the mind, it is said to be the possessor of the potency of outgoing cognition. The potency of suppression, however, is but newly born in the mind. The mind has therefore no duty to perform, even though the potency of suppression exists. The mind which has the duty of achieving the purposes of the Puruṣa, is said to have the duty of achieving those objects. The purposes it has to achieve are the enjoyments of sound, &c., and the attainment of discriminative knowledge.

When however the potency of suppression only remains, the Puruṣa is no longer the substratum of the reflex consciousness of the Will-to-be (*buddhi*). Hence the potency of suppression can not be an object of the Puruṣa to be fulfilled by the mind. The minds of the *Videhas* and the *Prakṛitilayas* do not consist of a balance of suppressive potencies alone; they have therefore still a duty to perform. Also because they are possessed of the aroma of afflictions.

With this in mind, says the Commentator:—'And it is for this reason, &c.' The rest is easy.—51.

The object and explanation of Yoga, the meaning of the modifications for the purpose of the performance thereof, the means of Yoga and its kinds are described in this chapter.

Here ends the first chapter of Vāchaspati's Gloss, the Vāchaspatya, on the Commentary of Vyāsa on the Aphorisms of Pātanjali.

CHAPTER THE SECOND.
ON THE PRACTICE OF YOGA.

Sūtra 1.

तपः स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः ॥ १ ॥

1. Purificatory action¹, study² and making God³ the motive of action⁴, IS the Yoga⁶ of action⁵.—52.

उद्दिष्टः समाहितचित्तस्य योगः । कथं व्युत्थितचित्तोऽपि योगयुक्तः स्यादित्येतदारभ्यते । तपः स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः । नातपस्विनो योगः सिध्यति । अनादिकर्म क्लेशवासनाचित्रा प्रत्युपस्थितविषयजाला चाशुद्धिर्नान्तरेण तपः संभेदमापद्यत इति तपस उपादानम् । तच्च चित्तप्रसादनमत्राध्यमानमनेनासेव्यमिति मन्यते । स्वाध्यायः प्रणवादिपवित्राणां जपो मोक्षशास्त्राध्ययनं वा । ईश्वरप्रणिधानं सर्वक्रियाणां परमगुरावर्पणम् । तत्फलसंन्यासो वा ॥ १ ॥

VYĀSA.

The Yoga for him whose mind is already inclined towards trance-cognition, has been described. How may one with an out-going mind become also possessed of Yoga, is now considered. 'The Yoga of action is purificatory action, study and the devotion to God and making Him the motive of action.'

Yoga is not attained by one not given to purificatory action. Impurity is variegated by the eternal in-dwelling of the aroma of action and affliction, and is ever in contact with the network of enjoyables. It can not be dispersed without purificatory action (tapas). For this reason

Note.—The word 'tapas' has been translated as purificatory action, because 'tapas' means that which burns up impurities.

The word 'īśvarapraṇidhāna' has been translated as the devotion to God being the motive of action. The same word in the first chapter (I. 23.) has been translated as feeling the omnipresence of the Lord. The root meaning of the word 'praṇidhāna' is the placing of anything under another to the fullest extent (pra=fullness, Ni=under and dhāna=placing). In the chapter on trance the word can only mean the contemplation of Him as the substratum of all phenomena. Hence 'īśvarapraṇidhāna' as a means of achieving trance can only mean the habituating of the mind to feel the omnipresence of the divine principle. In a chapter on the Yoga of action however the word can not be interpreted as carrying the same meaning. As a branch of the Yoga of action 'praṇidhāna' must have special reference to action which would be out of place in contemplation. It has, therefore, been translated here as above. The root meaning, it is easy to see, runs through both these meanings.

purificatory action has been taken up (as a factor of the Yoga of action). This is considered an action worthy of performance, as it purifies the mind when not impeded.

Study is the repeated utterance of purifying words, like the A U M and others ; or, the reading of the teachings about absolute spiritual freedom (Mokṣa).

‘The devotion to God and making Him the motive of all actions’ means the dedicating of all actions to the Highest Teacher, or the renunciation of its fruit.—52.

VÂCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

The question is that the fruit of Yoga and the means thereof, having been described in the first chapter along with their sub-heads, what is the necessity of writing a second chapter ? The answer is given :—‘The Yoga for him, &c.’

It is only practice and desirelessness that have been mentioned in the first chapter to be the means of Yoga. They are, however, not possible for the out-going mind also at once. The means, therefore, to be taught in the second chapter are necessary in order to achieve the required purity of mental essence. It is only thereafter that the essence of the Will-to-know, becoming strong enough to preserve itself in that state, daily shows forth the powers of practice and desirelessness.

‘Already inclined towards the trance cognition’ means not only occasionally steady. The meaning is how may the out-going mind also become possessed of Yoga by the practice of the means to be taught ?

The author of the aphorisms first takes up some of these means as of first rate importance and usefulness, and describes them as the Yoga of action : ‘Purificatory action, &c.’

It is the action itself that is the Yoga in the Yoga of action. It is for this reason that in the Viṣṇupurāṇa in the dialogue between Keśidhwaṇa and Khândikya it is said : -

‘When the Yogī first comes into contact with the Yoga, he is called the Yūñjamāna, the Neophyte, the Beginner.’ And beginning with this are mentioned purificatory action and study, &c.’

Now the comment shows by the canon of difference that purificatory action must be a means of Yoga :—‘Yoga is not attained by one who is not given to purificatory action.’

He shows a subsidiary result of the purificatory action, justifying its nature as a means of Yoga :—‘Impurity, &c.’ The impurity which is variegated by the aroma of eternal action and affliction, and which is for this very reason in contact with, i.e., approached by the network of enjoyables, consists in the intensity of disturbing energy (rajas) and inertia (tamas), and can not come to dispersion without purificatory action. Dispersion means the entire separation of objects in thick cohesion.

But the question is what purificatory action may be inimical to Yoga, inasmuch as being taken up as a means of Yoga, it may become the cause of the disturbance of the physiological equilibrium of the forces of the body. How then can it be a means of Yoga ? For this reason the Commentator says :—‘This is considered an action, &c.’ The meaning is that so much of a purificatory action only is to be performed as does not cause the disturbance of the equilibrium of physiological forces.

The words AUM, &c., include such portions of the Veda as the Puruṣa Sūkta, the Rudra Maṇḍala and the Brāhmaṇas, &c., as also the portions of the Purāṇas such as the

Brahmapâra, &c. The Highest Teacher is *Īśvara*. To him are actions to be dedicated. It is on this subject that the following has been said :—‘ Whatever I am doing, beautiful or ugly, with desire or without desire, I renounce all that on thy account ; I do all things with submission to thee.’

The renunciation of fruit means the doing of an action without thinking in connection with it of the fruit to be obtained thereby. The following has been said in this connection :— It is in the doing of action alone that thy duty lies, never in its fruits. Never make the fruit of action its motive ; never become attached to inaction. —1.

Sūtra 2.

समाधिभावनार्थः क्लेशतनूकरणार्थश्च ॥ २ ॥

2. For the purpose³ of bringing about² trance¹ and for the purpose⁶ of attenuating⁵ afflictions.⁴—53.

सहि क्रियायोगः । समाधिभावनार्थः क्लेशतनूकरणार्थश्च । स ह्यासेव्यमानः समाधिं भावयति । क्लेशांश्च प्रतनूकरोति । प्रतनूकृतान्क्लेशान्प्रसंख्यानाग्निना दग्धबीजकल्पान् प्रसवधर्मिणः करिष्यतीति तेषां तनूकरणात्पुनः क्लेशैरपरामृष्टः सत्त्वपुरुषान्यता मात्र ख्यातिः सूक्ष्मा प्रज्ञा समाप्ताधिकाराप्रतिप्रसवाय कल्पयिष्यत इति ॥ २ ॥

VYĀSA.

The Yoga of action is certainly to be performed, ‘ for the purpose of bringing about trance and for the purpose of attenuating the afflictions.’ It is that which being performed, brings about trance and attenuates the afflictions. The afflictions thus attenuated become characterized by unproductiveness. When their seed power has, as it were, been singed by the fire of High Intellection ; and for this reason the mind after their attenuation, is never again touched by the affliction ; and having by subtle cognition come up to the discrimination of the distinct natures of the Puruṣa and Objective Essence, has the whole of its duty fulfilled and can only resolve into its cause.—53.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The aphorism defining its object is introduced :—‘ The Yoga of action is certainly, &c.’ The aphorism is :—‘ For the purpose of bringing about trance and for the purpose of attenuating the afflictions.’

The question arises that if the Yoga of action alone be competent to attenuate the afflictions, there remains no use at all in High Intellection. For this reason the Commentator says :—“ The afflictions thus attenuated become, etc.” The action of the Yoga of action operates only in attenuating them ; it does not render the afflictions barren. High Intellection, however, operates to render them barren.

Let that be granted. But if High Intellection alone is competent to render the afflictions non-productive, what is the use of attenuating them ? For this reason he says :—‘ On account of their attenuation, &c.’ If the afflictions are not attenuated, the discrimination of the distinct natures of the Puruṣa and the Objective Essence, remaining

overpowered by a powerful enemy, does not even show the energy to rise and render them barren, from the very first. When, however, the afflictions have been dispersed and rendered weak, even then, though inimical to them, it only arises by practice and desirelessness. When it has thus been born, it is not again touched by them, it is not overpowered so long as it is not touched by them. The discrimination of the distinct natures of the Puruṣa and Objective Essence is a subtle faculty, because its object is subtle.

“Can only resolve into its cause” means can only disappear.—2.

Sūtra 3.

अविद्यास्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशाः ॥ ३ ॥

3. The afflictions⁶ are Nescience,¹ Egoism,² Attachment,³ Aversion⁴ and Love of Life.⁵—51.

अथ के क्लेशाः कियन्तो वेति । अविद्यास्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशाः । क्लेशा इति पञ्चविपर्यया इत्यर्थः । ते स्पन्दमाना गुणधिकारं द्रढयन्ति परिणाममवस्थापयन्ति कार्यकारणस्रोत उन्नमयन्ति परस्परानुग्रहणतन्त्रीभूत्वा कर्मविपाकं चाभिनिर्हरन्ति ॥ ३ ॥

VYĀSA.

What then are the afflictions and how many? ‘The afflictions are Nescience, Egoism, Attachment, Aversion and Love of Life.’

‘The afflictions’ are the five forms of Unreal Cognition. When quick with life, they render the rule of the “qualities” firm, establish change, send out the stream of cause and effect, bring about the fructification of action by coming to depend upon one another for mutual support.—3.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

How is its duty fulfilled? It can only be so said to have fulfilled its duty, when it has caused the cessation of the action of the “qualities”; inasmuch as the duty is nothing else but the bringing about of an effect by the “qualities.” For this reason the Commentator puts the question, ‘What are the afflictions, &c.’ And he answers by the aphorism :—“Nescience, &c.” Nescience and the others are the afflictions. He explains :—‘The five forms of Unreal Cognition, &c.’

Nescience is Unreal Cognition itself. Egoism and the others also carry nescience with them and can not exist without it. They too are therefore unreal cognitions. The meaning is that for this reason, they are destroyed with the destruction of Nescience.

He says now that the reason for their destructibility exists in their being the cause of repeated births :—‘When quick with life,’ i.e., when they are in operation, they render the rule of the qualities firm, i.e., strong. For this very reason they establish change. They send out, i.e., show forth the stream of cause and effect in the shape of the Unmanifested, the Mahattattva (the great principle) and the principle of individuality.

Now he shows the object for which all this is done by them : ‘Bring about, &c. . . for mutual support.’ The fructification of action consists in life-state, life-period and life-experience. This is the object of the Puruṣa. It is these that the afflictions bring about. Does each of them do this by itself? No he says :—‘By mutual support!’ The actions are supported by the afflictions and the afflictions by the actions.—3.

Sūtra 4.

अविद्याक्षेत्रमुत्तरेषां प्रसुप्ततनुविच्छिन्नोदाराणाम् ॥ ४ ॥

4. Nescience¹ is the field² for the others,³ whether dormant⁴ tenuous,⁵ alternated⁶ or fully operative⁷.—55.

अविद्याक्षेत्रमुत्तरेषां प्रसुप्ततनुविच्छिन्नोदाराणाम् । अत्राविद्याक्षेत्रं प्रसवभूमिरु-
त्तरेषामस्मितादीनां चतुर्विधविकल्पानां प्रसुप्ततनुविच्छिन्नोदाराणाम् । तत्र का प्रसुप्तिः ।
चेतसि शक्तिमात्रप्रतिष्ठानां बीजभावोपगमः । तस्य प्रबोध आलम्बने सम्मुखी-
भावः प्रसंख्यानवतो दग्धक्लेशबीजस्य सम्मुखीभूतेऽप्यालम्बने नासौ पुनरस्ति । दग्धबीजस्य
कुतः प्ररोह इति अतः क्षीणक्लेशः कुशलश्चरमदेह इत्युच्यते । तत्रैव सा दग्धबीजभावा
पञ्चमी क्लेशावस्था नान्यत्रेति । सतां क्लेशानां तदा बीजसामर्थ्यं दग्धमिति । विषयस्य
सम्मुखीभावेऽपि सति न भवत्येषां प्रबोध इत्युक्ता प्रसुप्तिर्दग्धबीजानां चाप्ररोहश्च
तनुत्वमुच्यते प्रतिपक्षभावनोपहताः क्लेशास्तनवो भवन्ति । तथा विच्छिद्य विच्छिद्य तेन
तेनात्मना पुनः पुनः समुदाचरन्तीति विच्छिन्नाः कथं रागकाले क्रोधस्यादर्शनात् ।
नहि रागकाले क्रोधः समुदाचरति रागश्च कचिद् दृश्यमानो न विषयान्तरे नास्ति ।
नैकस्यां स्त्रियां चैत्रो रक्त इत्यन्यासु स्त्रीषु विरक्तः किंतु तत्र रागो लब्धवृत्तिरन्यत्र तु
भविष्यद्वृत्तिरिति । स हि तदा प्रसुप्ततनुविच्छिन्नो भवति । विषये यो लब्धवृत्तिः स
उदारः । सर्व एवैते क्लेशविषयत्वं नातिक्रामन्ति । कस्तर्हि विच्छिन्नः प्रसुप्तस्तनुरुदारो
वा क्लेश इत्युच्यते सत्यमेवैतत् । किंतु विशिष्टानामेवैतेषां विच्छिन्नादित्वम् । यथैव
प्रतिपक्षभावनातो निवृत्तस्तथैव स्वयञ्जुकाञ्जनेनाभिव्यक्तः सर्व इति सर्व एवामी क्लेशा
अविद्याभेदाः । कस्मात्सर्वेष्वविद्यैवाभिप्लवते यदविद्ययावस्त्वाकार्यते तदेवानुशेते क्लेशा
विपर्यासप्रत्ययकाल उपलभ्यन्ते क्षीयमाणां चाविद्यामनुक्षीयन्त इति ॥ ४ ॥

VYĀSA.

Of these, Nescience is the field, the breeding ground for the others that follow, the Egoism, &c., having a four-fold possible mode of their existence, as the dormant, the tenuous, the alternated and the fully operative.

What is dormancy? It is the existence in the mind as power alone in the germinal state. It is awake when it turns its face towards its objects. In the case of him who possesses discriminative knowledge, the germs of the afflictions are singed, and therefore even on the object coming in front, they do not come into operation. How can the burned up seed sprout? Hence, the wise man whose afflictions are gone, is said to have had his last birth. It is in him alone that the afflictions pass into the fifth state, that of the seed being burnt up; inasmuch as the afflictions do exist in that state, although their seed-power has been burnt up. It is for this reason that they do not awaken even when an

object comes in front of them. This is the dormancy of those whose seed-power has been burnt up.

Tenuity is now described. The afflictions become tenuous on being cut down by habituation to contraries.

And they are alternated, inasmuch as they disappear and appear over and over again in the same condition. Anger is not observed to be in operation at the time of attachment. Anger does not arise when attachment has its play. Nor does it happen that attachment, while manifesting with reference to one object, has ceased to exist altogether with reference to another object. Because Chaitra is attached to one woman, it does not follow that he is averse to others. The fact is that in the one his attachment has manifested itself, while in others it can be active in the future. It is this that becomes either dormant, tenuous or alternated.

The fully operative is that which has found manifestation in the object.

All these do not pass beyond the sphere of affliction. What is it then that is called an affliction, whether it be the dormant, the alternated or the fully operative? This is true. But they become either alternated or any one else, only when they appear as so qualified. As all are removed by habituation to contraries, all are manifested by the operation of competent causes.

All these afflictions are the modifications of Nescience only. How? It is Nescience alone that is the quickness of their life. The afflictions appear only in the form which is put upon an object by Nescience. They are found existing simultaneously with the cognition of the unreal; and they disappear when Nescience disappears.—55.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The Commentator shows that the afflictions which are to be overcome as being painful, have their root in Nescience. "Nescience is the field for the others, whether dormant, tenuous, alternated or fully operative."

What of these is dormancy? The meaning of the questioner is that there is no authority for the existence of the afflictions at a time when they are not in operation with reference to objects. The answer is:—'In the mind, &c.' The afflictions of the Videhas and the Prakṛitilayas do not operate with reference to their proper objects; they have gone to the germinal state, and as such do exist only *in posse*, as curds exist in milk. There is no other means of making them barren besides discriminative knowledge. It is for this reason that the Videhas and the Prakṛitilayas are understood as not possessed of discriminative knowledge. Their afflictions are dormant so long as they do not reach the limit of their time. When they do reach the limit, the afflictions come round again into manifestation and turn towards their various objects. They have existed in the potential state alone. This potency means the power of manifesting. The approach to the germinal state indicates the power of producing the effect.

How is it that the afflictions of him who is possessed of discriminative knowledge are not also dormant? To show this the Commentator says:—‘To him who is possessed of discriminative knowledge.’

‘Last birth’ means that he will not be born in another body. There will be no birth after the present one.

‘No where else’ means in the disembodied (the Videhas), &c. But inasmuch as that which is, can not be entirely destroyed, there is no use in the power of Yoga; the afflictions arise when their objects come in front. For this reason the Commentator says:—‘The afflictions do exist, &c.’ The meaning is that although the afflictions exist, yet their seed-power is burnt up.

The contraries of the afflictions are the practices of the Yoga of action. The afflictions become tenuous when they are put down by the Yoga of action. Or, Right knowledge is the contrary of Nescience; the recognition of the distinction is the contrary of egoism; justice is the contrary of attachment and aversion; the removal of the idea of dependence upon the body, i.e., that the body is the necessary adjunct of the soul, is the opposite of the love of life.

Now he describes alternation:—‘Similarly, &c.’ The afflictions are overpowered by another affliction being in operation for the time; or they arise and manifest themselves after alternate cessations on account of excessive enjoyment. Its difference from the dormant is explained by its being dependent for manifestation upon the seed-power and the organs of enjoyment; or by its repeated manifestation and cessation on account of the weakness of other manifestations which tend to overpower it; or by reiterated manifestations. Further attachment *in esse* may overpower anger, which belongs to a different class of afflictions. Or, an affliction of the same class, such as attachment to one object may overpower attachment to a different object. For this reason he says:—‘Attachment, &c.’

Now he says that the affliction which is to manifest in the future must be understood to possess a three-fold line of action, whichever it may be at any time: It is at that time, &c.’ The word ‘that’ points only to the affliction which is to manifest in the future, not to the attachment of Chaitra, because that is of one of the three classes, i.e., the alternated.

Now he describes the one in full operation:—‘That which is, &c.’ The question is that it is the one in full operation alone that afflicts, and it is therefore proper to call it an affliction; but how is it proper to call the others afflictions? They do not afflict, not being in operation. For this reason he says:—‘All these afflictions, &c.’ The meaning is that they do not pass beyond the sphere of afflictions and may well be called by that name, because they tend to operation, and for this very reason are to be removed.

Well inasmuch as they are all afflictions, they are one only. Why then are they described as being more than one? The answer is:—‘It is true, &c.’

The question now arises that although it may be that the afflictions take their rise in Nescience, yet why should it be that they should cease to exist when Nescience is destroyed? The cloth is not destroyed with the destruction of the weaver. For this reason he says:—‘All these are the forms, &c.’ All these are the modifications.

This means that they are different modifications only in appearance, not in reality; because they do not exist as separate from it. Why? The answer is:—‘In all these nescience, &c.’ He explains the same. ‘Whatever, &c.’ The rest is easy. The following is a brief statement. In those that are merged in some principle, the afflictions are dormant. In the Yogis they are tenuous. In those who are given to enjoyment (the ordinary mortals), they are alternate and operative.

Sûtra 5.

अनित्याशुचिदुःखानात्मसु नित्यशुचिसुखात्मख्यातिरविद्या ॥५॥

5. Nescience¹⁰ is the taking of the non-eternal,¹ the impure,² the painful³ and the not-self⁴ to be the eternal,⁵ the pure,⁶ the pleasurable⁷ and the self.⁸—56.

तत्राविद्यास्वरूपमुच्यते । अनित्याशुचिदुःखानात्मसु नित्यशुचिसुखात्मख्यातिरविद्या । अनित्ये कार्ये नित्यख्यातिस्तद्यथा ध्रुवा पृथिवी ध्रुवा सचन्द्रतारका द्यौः अमृता दिवौकस इति । तथाशुचौ परमबीभत्से कार्ये शुचिख्यातिः । उक्तं च । स्थानाद् बीजादुपष्टम्भान्निःस्पन्दान्निधनादपि । कायमाधेयशौचत्वात्पण्डिता ह्यशुचिं विदुरिति । अशुचौ शुचिख्यातिर्दृश्यते । नवेव शशाङ्क-लेखा कमनीयेयं कन्या मध्वमृतावयवनिर्मितेव चन्द्रं भित्वा निःसृतेव ज्ञायते । नीलोत्पलपत्रायताक्षीहावगर्भाभ्यां लोचनाभ्यां जीवलोकमाश्वासयन्तीवेति कस्य केनाभिसंबन्धः । भवति चेयमशुचौ शुचिविपर्यासप्रत्यय इति । एतेनापुण्ये पुण्यप्रत्ययस्तथैवानर्थे चार्थप्रत्ययो व्याख्यातः । तद्यथा दुःखे सुखख्यातिं वह्यति परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिन इति । तत्र सुखख्यातिरविद्या तथानात्मन्यात्मख्यातिर्बाह्योपकरणेषु चेतनाचेतनेषु भोगाधिष्ठाने वा शरीरे पुरुषोपकरणे वा मनस्यनात्मन्यात्मख्यातिरिति । तथैतदत्रोक्तम् । व्यक्तमव्यक्तं वा सत्त्वमातमत्वेनाभिप्रतीत्य तस्य संपदमनुनन्दत्यात्मसंपदं मन्वानस्तस्य व्यापदमनुशोचत्यात्मव्यापदं मन्वानः स सर्वोऽप्रतिबुद्ध इत्येषा चतुष्पदा भवत्यविद्या मूलमस्य क्लेशसन्तानस्य कर्माशयस्य च सविपाकस्येति तस्याश्चामित्रागोष्पदवद्वस्तुसत्त्वं विज्ञेयम् । यथा नामित्रो मित्राभावो न मित्रमात्रं किंतु तद्विरुद्धः सपत्नः । यथा चागोष्पदं न गोष्पदाभावो न गोष्पदमात्रं किंतु देश एव ताभ्यामन्यद्वस्त्वन्तरम् । एवमविद्या न प्रमाणं न प्रमाणाभावः । किंतु विद्याविपरीतं ज्ञानान्तरमविद्येति ॥ ५ ॥

VYĀSA.

Out of these the nature of Nescience is described :—“Nescience is the taking of the non-eternal, the impure, the painful, and the not self to be the eternal, the pure, the pleasurable and the self.”

The taking of the non-eternal to be eternal is the possession of such notions as that the earth is permanent, the firmament with the moon and the stars is permanent, the gods are immortal, &c.

Similar is the seeing of purity in the body, which is impure and highly disgusting. And it has been said :—“The wise know the body to be impure on account of its position, its origin, its process of up-keep, its perspiration and destruction and also on account of the necessity of keeping it constantly clean.” Thus is purity seen in the impure. “The girl is attractive like the new moon. Her limbs are, as it were, made of honey and nectar. She looks as it were, she has emerged from the moon.

Her eyes are large like the leaves of a blue lotus. With playful flashes of her eyes she imparts life to the world of men.' Now 'what is in' this connected to what? This unreal cognition, however, of the pure in the impure is daily seen. By this is described the cognition of the sacred in the profane, the cognition of purposeless. As here so will the cognition of pleasure in pain be later described.

"All is pain to the discriminating because of the end, the remorse, the residual potency, and the mutual contrariety of the manifestations of the 'qualities.'" II.—15.

The cognition of pleasure under these circumstances is Nescience.

Similar is the cognition of the self in the not self. The external accessories whether sentient or not sentient, the body which is the vehicle for enjoyments, the mind which is only a vehicle for the Puruṣa, are all manifestations of the not-self. The notion that any one of these is the self is Nescience. On this subject the following has been said :—

'Those who believing the sentient or insentient objective essence to be the self, rejoice in their increase believing it to be the prosperity of the self, and are anxious when they decrease, believing it to be the adversity of the self have not awakened.'

This nescience is thus possessed of four locations. It is the root of all this overgrowth of afflictions, the vehicle of action together with the vehicle of fruition. This nescience should be understood as being a real substance, like the word Amitra (a, not and mitra, friend, the compound meaning an enemy) and the word Agospada (a, not and goṣpada, cow's foot, the compound meaning a particular place). As the word Amitra does not mean the absence of a friend nor a particular friend, but something opposite to a friend, an enemy; and as the word Agospada does not mean the absence of a Goṣpada nor a particular Goṣpada, but a particular place distinct from both, another substance; so is nescience neither Real Cognition nor the absence of Real Cognition. On the contrary, Nescience is another form of cognition, which is contrary to real knowledge (the cognition of the real).—56.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Nescience is non-eternal and impure. It is, that is to say, an effect which is ever qualified by the presence of non-eternity. There are some, it is well-known, who believe the elements to be eternal, and meditate upon them devotedly with the object of assimilating their natures. Similarly do others meditate with devotion upon the heavens, the sun, moon, and stars as stages of the path of Saoko (the Pitriyana), with the object of reaching them in the belief of their eternity. Similarly do people drink the Soma juice for attaining the state of the denizens of heaven, the gods, believing them to be eternal and immortal, inasmuch as the Veda says :—'Drink ye the Soma so that we may

become immortal.' This is the Nescience which is described as the cognition of the eternal in the non-eternal.

Similarly with reference to the impure and highly disgusting body. Having said this much, he stops in the middle to quote a verse of Vyāsa, describing the disgusting nature of the body.

'The wise, &c.'

The 'position of the body' is the mother's womb close to urine, &c. The 'origin' is the germ and sperm cells of parents. 'The process of the upkeep of the body' is the transformation of the foods and drinks into chyle, &c. It is by this that the body is supported. Perspiration means sweating. Destruction or death renders the body of even a man learned in the Veda, impure, inasmuch as a bath is ordained after it has been touched.

The question is that if the body is by nature impure, what then is the use of washing it with earths and water? For this reason he says: 'On account of this necessity, &c.' This means that although by nature impure, the body admits of being purified by external applications; as for example, take the bodies of women by means of sweet smelling applications.

He finishes the sentence: 'The body which is impure is cognised to be pure in the way now described. 'Like the new moon, &c.'

'Playful flashes denote the frolicsomeness of love.'

'Now what is here connected with what?' The first 'what' stands for the body of a woman which is by nature so impure and therefore disgusting. By what poor similitude is the body related to the new moon?

By this illustration of the cognition of the pure in the impure body of a woman, is also described the cognition of virtue in the vices of causing pain to others under the impression of their being released from the world.

Similarly are described the notions of usefulness in wealth, &c., which on account of the troubles incident upon collection and preservation, &c., are really things which contradict the real purpose of life. They are all impure on account of their being causes of disgust.

Similar is the case of the cognition of pleasure in pain. This is easy.

'Similar is the cognition of self, &c.' This also is easy.

Similarly has it been said on this subject by Pañchaśikhā.

'The sentient' are the intelligent objects of enjoyment, such as wife, &c., and animals.

'The insentient' are the non-intelligent objects, such as seats and couches, &c.

All such have not awakened, means they are forgetful.

This nescience is said to possess four locations, i. e., places where it manifests.

Upon this the question arises that nescience being really located in an infinity of places, such for example, as the forgetfulness of directions and the appearance of a complete circle in the case of a rapidly rotating point of light, &c., why should it be described as being located in four places only? For this reason he says: 'It is the root, &c.' There may be other forms of nescience; that, however, which is the root of repeated births is only four-fold.

Now another question:-- The word 'nescience' is a compound of 'nē' (न॑=not) and science (विद्या=science). Now is the prohibitive NE a), the effective word of the compound, thus signifying the mere absence of the thing signified by the second word, as in the word Amakṣika, one meaning of which is the absence of bees. Or, is the second word of the compound the effective portion thereof, in which case it would mean a particular form of knowledge, as in the case of the word Arājapuruṣa, Not-public servant. Or, is it that the word denotes something which is neither the meaning of the first word nor of the

second, but something different from both? Such a word would be the word *Amakṣika*, beelless place. This meaning is different from the meaning of both the factors of the compound.

Now the meaning of the word *Nescience* would be the absence of knowledge already existing, if the first word of the compound were the effective one. This, however, can not be the cause of the afflictions. If the second word of the compound be the effective one, then the meaning of the compound would be a science qualified by the absence of something (particular) the science of the negation, (A, of something). Science, however, can only be the opposite of the afflictions, &c., not their seed. It is not proper that the destroyer of a thing should be a quality thereof.

If it be considered that it means something different from both, then it can only mean the Will-to-know (*buddhi*) with the knowledge absent therefrom, *i.e.*, something in which there is no knowledge. Now the Will-to-know can never be the cause of afflictions, &c., even though knowledge be absent therefrom. Whatever thus be the meaning given to *Nescience*, it can never be the root of afflictions, &c.

For this reason he says:—‘It is to be considered, &c.’ It is possessed of substantiality. This means can not be the absence of something existing as such. Neither is *Nescience* a particular form of science; nor is it the Will-to-know devoid of knowledge. It is, as has been said, a cognition contrary to the Real Cognition; it is the cognition of the unreal (or briefly, unreal cognition.)

The relation of word and meaning depends upon how the world begins to understand it. In the world it is often seen that in words compounded with deprivative prefixes, the deprivative prefix, while denying the existence of the last word of the compound, signifies something which is the contrary thereof. Similar is the meaning here. He gives analogies:—‘As the word *Amitra*.’ It does not mean the absence of a friend; nor does it mean a particular friend (a friend called A). On the contrary, it means the opposite of a friend, an enemy.

Similarly, does the word *Agospada* not mean the absence of a cow-shed (*gospada*); nor does it mean a particular cow-shed (styled A). On the other hand, it means a particular country where kine are not found. It is a substance different from both. It applies the analogy to the thing illustrated:—‘In the same way, &c.’

Sūtra 6.

दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योरेकात्मतेवास्मिता ॥६॥

6. Egoism⁶ is the appearance of identity¹ in the natures of the subjective power³ of consciousness¹ and the instrumental power³ of seeing.²—57.

दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योरेकात्मतेवास्मिता । पुरुषो ह शक्तिबुद्धिर्दर्शन-शक्तिरित्येतयोरेकस्वरूपापत्तिरिवास्मिता क्लेश उच्यते । भोक्तभोग्यशक्त्योरत्यन्तविभक्तयोरत्यन्तासङ्गीर्णयोरविभागप्राप्ताविव सत्यां भोगः कल्पते । स्वरूपप्रतिलम्भे तु तयोः कैवल्यमेव भवति कुतो भोग इति । तथाचोक्तम् । बुद्धितः परं पुरुषमाकारशीलविद्यादिभिर्विभक्तमपश्यन्कुर्वात्तत्रात्मबुद्धिं मोहेनेति ॥ ६ ॥

VYĀSA.

The *Puruṣa* is the subjective power of consciousness, and the Will-to-know is the instrumental power of seeing. The appearance of these

two powers as if they were identical, is the affliction known as Egoism. Enjoyment is rendered possible when the power of enjoyment in the enjoyer and the capacity of being enjoyed in the Objective Existence, which are quite distinct and different from each other, are looked upon as, as it were, identical. When however their natures have been understood they become isolated; and how then can there be enjoyment? And so it has been said:—‘Not knowing the Puruṣa beyond the Will-to-know to be different therefrom in nature, character and knowledge, &c., a man has by forgetfulness the notion of self therein.—57.

VACHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having described Nescience, now he describes Egoism, which is quite as dear to the heart of man as attachment and the others:—‘Egoism is the appearance of identity in the natures of the subjective power of consciousness and the objective power of seeing.’

Consciousness and seeing are two distinct powers. They are, respectively, the self and the not-self. The particular Nescience which is responsible for the cognition of this not-self as the self, and which is only a delusion and not a reality is Egoism. Although it was sufficient only to say “consciousness” and “seeing” the word power is added to bring out their mutual relation of fitness as the enjoyer and the enjoyed. He explains the aphorism:—‘The Puruṣa, &c.’

The question arises, why should they not in fact be considered as one when in fact they are taken in as such? How is it that their unity afflicts the Puruṣa? For this reason he says:—‘Enjoyment, &c.’ The capacity of being enjoyed means the Will-to-be. The power of enjoyment in the enjoyer means Puruṣa. They are quite distinct from each other. Why? The reason is given to be that they are seen to be quite distinct from each other. The Puruṣa possesses the characteristics of unchangeability, &c., the Will-to-know has the characteristics of changeability, &c. They are, therefore, quite distinct from each other. It is meant to be said by this that although they appear to be identical they are not in reality the same. ‘Are looked upon, as it were, to be one with each other.’ This explains that this notion is an affliction. This employs the canon of agreement.

The canon of difference is now applied:—‘When, however, their natures are understood, &c.’ Understood means when the consciousness of discrimination has been attained.

Now he shows that this is conceded by others also: ‘And so it has been said’ by Pāṇchāsikhā. ‘Knowing the Puruṣa beyond the Will-to-know, &c.’ Its nature is constant purity, its character is indifference; its knowledge means intelligence. The Will-to-know is impure, not indifferent and non-intelligent. The notion of self therein is Egoism and it is Nescience. Forgetfulness is the potency generated by former nescience. Or it may be the darkness of inertia (tamas), because Nescience is born of the quality of inertia (tamas).—6.

Sūtra 7.

सुखानुशयी रागः ॥७॥

7. Attachment¹ is the sequential attraction² to pleasure.¹—58.

सुखानुशयी रागः । सुखाभिज्ञस्य सुखानुस्मृतिपूर्वः सुखे तत्साधने वा यो गर्हस्त्वृणा लोभः स राग इति ॥ ७ ॥

VYĀSA.

The desire to possess, the thirst for and the hankering after pleasure or the means thereof, preceded by a remembrance of the pleasure in one who has enjoyed it, is attachment.—58.

VACHASPATI'S GLOSS.

On the attainment of discriminative knowledge, attachment, &c., are removed. Egoism, fought about by nescience, is the root of attachment, &c. For this reason describes attachment, &c., after egoism. Attachment is the sequential attraction to pleasure.

Memory is not possible to one who has not cognized. Hence is it said :—'In one who has enjoyed.' When pleasure is remembered, attachment is preceded by the remembrance of the pleasure in consequence of the enjoyment thereof. When pleasure is being enjoyed there is no necessity of the remembrance. The attachment, however, to the means thereof, whether remembered or actually present, is also preceded by the remembrance of the pleasure. As a matter of course when a means of pleasure is perceived, it is remembered as a cause of the pleasure of the same class. Or it is inferred that it will cause a pleasure similar to what has been before caused by an object of the same class. The means of pleasure is, therefore, desired.

Describes the meaning of the word attraction :—'The desire to possess, &c.'—7:

Sūtra 8.

दुःखानुशयी द्वेषः ॥८॥

8. Aversion³ is the sequential repulsion² from pain.¹—59.

दुःखानुशयी द्वेषः । दुःखमिदं दुःखानुस्मृतिपूर्वो दुःखे तत्साधने वा यः प्रतिघो मनुजिघांसा क्रोधः स द्वेषः ॥ ८ ॥

VYĀSA.

The repulsion, the anxiety, the wish for removal and the anger at pain and the means thereof, which stick in the mind in consequence of the feeling of pain, in the case of him who has felt the pain, preceded by a remembrance of the pain, is aversion.—59.

VACHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'Aversion is the sequential repulsion from pain.' "One who has felt pain, &c." This is to be explained as before. 'Describes the meaning of the words sequential repulsion from pain :—'The repulsion, &c.' Repulsion is the force which repels. Amplifies the same by stating synonyms :—'The anxiety, &c.'—8.

Sūtra 9.

स्वरसंवाही विदुषोऽपि तथारूढोऽभिनिवेशः ॥९॥

9. Flowing on² by its own potency,¹ established⁶ all⁵ the same⁴ even in the wise,³ is Love of Life.⁷—60.

स्वरसंवाही विदुषोऽपि तथारूढोऽभिनिवेशः । सर्वस्य प्राणिन इयमात्माशीर्नित्या भवति मानमूर्ध्व भूयासमिति । न चाननुभूतमरणधर्मकस्यैषा भवत्यात्माशीः । एतया

च पूर्वजन्मानुभवः प्रतीयते स चायमभिनिवेशः क्लेशः । स्वरसवाही कुमेरपि जातमात्रस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमैरसंभाषितो मरणत्रास उच्छेददृष्ट्यात्मकः पूर्वजन्मानुभूतं मरणदुःखमनुमापयति । यथाचायमत्यन्तमूढेषु दृश्यते क्लेशस्तथा विदुषोऽपि विज्ञातपूर्वापरान्तस्य क्लेशः कस्मात् । समाना हि तयोः कुशलाकुशलयोर्मरणदुःखानुभवादियं वासना ॥ ९ ॥

VYĀSA.

In all living beings exists the self-benediction, 'would that I were never to cease. May I live on.' And this self-benediction can not exist in him who has not experienced the nature of death. And by this the experience of a former life is inferred. This is the affliction of Love of Life, which flows by its own potency.

That even a worm just born should know the fear of death, which is the same as the knowledge of annihilation, and that this fear can not be explained by perceptive, verbal and inferential knowledge, leads to the inference that the pain of death has been experienced in a former life. And as this affliction is found existing in the extremely ignorant, so also is it established even in the wise, who have come to know both the starting and finishing ends of life. Why? The residual potency having been brought about by an experience of the pain of death, is necessarily common to both of them, the knowing and the ignorant.—(6).

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

Explains the meaning of the words, Love of Life (abhiniveśa). 'In all living beings, &c.' This self-benediction, this desire with reference to one's self is constant. 'Would that I were never to cease to be,' i.e., May I never become extinct. 'May I live on, i.e., May I retain life.' And this self-benediction, this love of life, this fear of death is not possible in a living being who has not experienced his liability to die. The unbeliever denies the fact of a previous life. The author, therefore, takes the opportunity to refute him :—'And by this the experience of a former life, &c.' The experience of a former life is inferred, because the present body is being maintained. Birth means the coming into relationship with the experiences of a body, senses and mind which are new and which are specialized by a new coming together. Its experience means coming into contact therewith. That is inferred. How? Explains :—'This the love of life, &c.' Without completing the sentence says that it is an affliction : 'this affliction.' It is this love of life which through evil deeds, &c., afflicts, i.e., gives pain to living beings. It is, therefore, called an affliction. Finishes the sentence, 'which flows on, &c.'

The meaning is that it flows on by its own potency brought about by habituation and is not external. Gives the reason, why it is not external even in the case of a worm which is just born, is full of pain and is of a very low type of intelligence. 'That even worm just born, &c.' 'Can not be experienced' means cannot be caused. This is the meaning. A child just born begins to shake when he sees a death-dealing object. The knowledge of death is inferred by his peculiar trembling. It is thereby found that he is afraid. Fear is seen as being caused by pain or the cause of pain. He has not experienced death in this life. Neither has inferred or heard about it. The knowledge of the peculiar pain and of the particular cause thereof which is causing pain at any moment,

is therefore a previous possession of his. All other means of the knowledge being excluded, the only one that remains by the canon of residues, is memory. And this memory cannot exist without the residual potency of a former experience. And inasmuch as there is no experience in this birth, the experience of a former birth only remains as the cause proved to exist by the canon of residues. For this reason there was certainly contact with a former birth. The word 'even' necessitates a contact with something. Hence completes the meaning of the sentence by saying, 'And as, &c.'

The extremely ignorant are those whose intelligence is very low. Explains wisdom :—'Who have come to know both the starting and finishing ends of life.' The end means the point. The world of experience is the first of the life of the Puruṣa. The final one is absolute freedom (kaivalya). The wise are so called because they have come to know of this by verbal and inferential knowledge.

This fear of death is then established in the worm on the one side and in the wise man on the other. The question arises that although the fear of death might well exist in an ignorant man, it is not proper that it should exist in the wise, inasmuch as in the latter's case it must have been uprooted by knowledge. And if it be said that it is not uprooted in this case, then the highest manifestation of the quality of essentiality (sattva) must be absent from him. With this object puts the question, 'Why?' Gives the answer. 'This residual potency, &c. is common, &c.'

The meaning is that the wise man is not he who has reached the state of the Cognitive trance, but only he who can discriminate by inference and verbal knowledge.—9.

Sūtra 10.

ते प्रतिप्रसवहेयाः सूक्ष्माः ॥१०॥

10. These¹ when but potential,¹ are destroyed³ along with the passing out of activity².—61.

ते प्रतिप्रसवहेयाः सूक्ष्माः । ते पञ्च क्लेशा दग्धबीजकल्पा योगिनश्चरिताधिकारे चेतसि प्रलीने सह तेनैवास्तं गच्छन्ति ॥ १० ॥

VYĀSA.

These five afflictions, when their seed-power has, as it were, been burnt up, disappear of themselves along with that Yogi's mind, when having fulfilled the purpose of its existence, it becomes latent.—61.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The afflictions have been defined and they have been shown to be possessed of four states—the dormant, the tenuous, the alternated and the fully operative—all of which are to be destroyed. Now is it that the author of the aphorisms has not mentioned the fifth state of the afflictions, the potential, in which the seed power is as it were burnt up? For this reason says :—'They when but potential are destroyed along with the passing out of activity.' That which falls within the sphere of man's effort is of course taught. The destruction of the potential state is not within the sphere of man's effort. It is, on the contrary, to be destroyed by the passing out of activity; that is, by the mind passing back into its cause, the principle of egoism.

Explains :—'These five, &c.' This is easy.—10.

Sūtra 11.

ध्यानहेयास्तद्वृत्तयः ॥११॥

11. Their³ modifications⁴ are destroyed² by meditation¹.—62.

स्थितानां तु बीजभावोपगतानाम् । ध्यानहेयास्तद्वृत्तयः । क्लेशानां या वृत्तयः
स्थूलास्ताः क्रियायोगेन तनूकृताः सत्यः प्रसंख्यानं ध्यानेन हातव्या यावत्सूक्ष्मीकृता
यावद्बुद्धबीजकल्पा इति । यथा च वस्त्राणां स्थूलो मलः पूर्वं निर्धूयते पश्चात्सूक्ष्मो
यत्नेनोपायेन वा अपनीयते तथा स्वल्पप्रतिपक्षाः स्थूलावृत्तयः क्लेशानां सूक्ष्मास्तु
महाप्रतिपक्षा इति ॥ ११ ॥

VYĀSA.

When, however, they exist as retaining their seed-power, their modifications are destroyed by meditation. The modifications of the afflictions which are essential are attenuated by the Yoga of action; and having been so attenuated, are destroyed by the high intellection of meditation, so that they are rendered potential, *i.e.*, their seed-power is as it were burnt up. As the gross dirt of clothes is at first shaken off, and then the fine dirt is washed off by effort and appliance, so the gross essential modifications need but small antagonistic efforts; whereas the potential ones need very powerful antagonists.—62.*

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

Well then, when the afflictions have been attenuated by the Yoga of action, to what sphere should the effort of the Puruṣa be directed, in order that they may be destroyed? For this reason says:—'When, however, they exist as retaining their seed-power, &c.'

Differentiates them from the barren ones and reads the aphorism:—'Their modifications are destroyed by meditation.' Explains:—'The modifications of the afflictions, &c.' They are called essential, because even though attenuated by the Yoga of action, they are further capable of destruction by being rendered incapable of producing effects and losing their very nature by means of the mind resolving back into its cause.

Mentions the limit of the effort of the Puruṣa in the sphere of intellection:—'So that they are rendered potential.'

Explains potentiality:—'Their seed-power has as it were been burnt up.' Gives an illustration of the same:—'As the gross dirt of clothes, &c.'

Effort means washing, &c. Appliance means the use of washing ingredients. The illustration and the illustrated are analogous only so far as they possess grosser and finer dirt, and not in their removability by effort, because it is impossible in the potential afflictions, which disappear along with the mind resolving back into its cause.

Those that require but little effort for their removal are said to need small antagonistic ingredients. Those that require the agency of very powerful causes for removal, are said to need very powerful antagonists. High intellection is described as small, because it is lower in comparison with the resolving of the mind into its own cause.—11.

Sūtra 12.

क्लेशमूलः कर्माशयो दृष्टादृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः ॥१२॥

12. The vehicle⁴ of actions³ has its origin² in afflictions,¹ and is experienced³ in visible⁵ and invisible⁶ births.⁷—63.

क्लेशमूलः कर्माशयो दृष्टादृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः । तत्र पुण्यापुण्यकर्माशयः कामलोभ-
मोहक्रोधप्रभवः । स दृष्टजन्मवेदनीयश्चादृष्टजन्मवेदनीयश्च । तत्र तीव्रसंवेगेन मन्त्रतपः
समाधिभिर्निर्वर्तित ईश्वरदेवतामहर्षिमहानुभावानामाराधनाद्वा यः परिनिस्पृष्टः स
सद्यः परिपच्यते पुण्यकर्माशय इति । यथा तीव्रक्लेशेन भीतव्याधितकृपणेषु विश्वासेप-
गतेषु वा महानुभावेषु वा तपस्विषु कृतः पुनः पुनरपकारः स चापि पापकर्माशयः सद्य
एव परिपच्यते । यथा नन्दीश्वरः कुमारो मनुष्यपरिणामं हित्वा देवत्वेन परिणतः ।
तथा नहुषोऽपि देवानामिन्द्रः स्वकं परिणामं हित्वा तिर्यक्त्वेन परिणत इति । तत्र नारका-
णां नास्ति दृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः कर्माशयः । क्षीणक्लेशानामपि नास्त्यदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः
कर्माशय इति ॥ १२ ॥

VYĀSA.

The vehicle of actions has its origin in afflictions, and is experienced in visible and invisible births.

Here the vehicle of good and bad actions is born of lust, avarice, forgetfulness and anger. Its operation is felt in the visible as well as in the invisible birth. Of these, the vehicle of good actions, which is supplemented by intense energy in the shape of purificatory action, trance and repetition of *mantras*, or, which is accompanied by devotion to the Lord, the devas, the great seers and other possessors of great power, ripens into fruit at once. This happens in the same way in which, in the event of repeated evil done to men who are suffering the extreme misery of fear, disease and helplessness, or to those who place confidence in the evil doer, or to those who are high-minded and perform *tapas*, the vehicle of evil actions also ripens into fruit at once. As for example, the youth Nandīśvara passed out of the human form and was transformed into a god. As also Nahuṣa, the ruler of the gods, passed out of his own form and was transformed into an animal. Of the vehicles of action, that which culminates into the life of hell, is said to be experienced in the invisible birth.

As to those whose afflictions have been destroyed, the vehicle of actions is not experienced in the invisible births.—63.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Very well, what afflicts the Puruṣa by causing life-time, life-state and life-experience may be called an affliction. But it is the vehicle of actions that brings these about, not Nescience and the others. Why then are Nescience, &c., called afflictions? For this reason says :—‘The vehicle of actions has its origin in afflictions, and is experienced in

visible and invisible births.' It is so called because the afflictions are the roots out of which it is born and which bring about its operation. The meaning is that inasmuch as the vehicle of action has its origin in Nescience, &c., and is for that reason the cause of life-state, life-time and life-experience, they are called afflictions. Explains:—'The vehicle of good and bad actions, &c.' That in which something lives is its vehicle. Here the Puruṣas in evolution are to be understood as living in the vehicle of actions (which is for this reason called a vehicle). Virtue and vice are the vehicles of actions. Virtue becomes the cause of the enjoyment of heaven, &c., when desirable actions are performed with desire. Similarly, vice manifests when such actions as the taking away of other people's property are performed through avarice. The vice for which forgetfulness is responsible is such as the taking of the life of others in the belief that it is a virtue.

The question arises that there is such a thing as virtue caused by forgetfulness and virtue caused by anger. An illustration may be taken from the fact of Dhruva having been given the highest position in the starry world on account of the pure vehicle of action, brought about by the desire to conquer his father, due to anger born of his ill-treatment. As to vice caused by anger, why that is well known, as it becomes the cause of people dealing death to Brāhmaṇas and others.

Says that it is of two descriptions:—'It is experienced either in the visible, &c.' Describes that which is experienced in the visible life:—'That which is brought about by, &c.' Gives illustrations respectively:—'As the youth Nandīśwara, &c.'

'Of the vehicle of action which culminates in the life of hell.' The makers of the vehicle of action which takes to the hells known as *Kumbhipāka*, &c., are spoken of as 'leading to the life of hell.' The vehicle of action formed thereby is not experienced in the visible life. It is not possible that by means of the human body which is the consequent form thereof, residua like that should be lived out, even by the constant suffering of thousands of years. The rest is easy.—12.

Sūtra 13.

सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगाः ॥१३॥

13. It³ ripens¹ into life-state⁵, life-experience⁷ and life-time⁶, if the root² exists.⁴—64.

सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगाः । सत्सु क्लेशेषु कर्माशयो विपाकारम्भी भवति नाच्छिन्नक्लेशमूलः । यथा तुषावनाद्धाः शालितण्डुला अदग्धबीजभावाः प्ररोहसमर्था भवन्ति नापनीततुषा दग्धबीजभावा वा तथा क्लेशावनद्धः कर्माशयो विपाकप्ररोही भवति नापनीतक्लेशो न प्रसंख्यानदग्धक्लेशबीजभावो वेति । स च विपाकस्त्रिविधो जातियायुर्भोग इति । तत्रेदं विचार्यते । किमेकं कर्म एकस्य जन्मनः कारणमथैकं कर्मानेकं जन्माक्षिपतीति । द्वितीया विचारणा किमनेकं कर्मानेकं जन्म निर्वर्तयति अथानेकं कर्मैकं जन्म निर्वर्तयतीति । न तावदेकं कर्मैकस्य जन्मनः कारणम् । कस्मादनादिकाल प्रचितस्यासंख्येयस्यावशिष्टस्य कर्मणः सांप्रतिकस्य च फलकमानियमादनाभ्वासा लोकस्य प्रसक्तः । स चानिष्ट इति । न चैकं कर्मानेकस्य जन्मनः कारणम् । कस्मादनेकेषु कर्मसु एकैकमेव कर्मानेकस्य जन्मनः कारणमित्यवशिष्टस्य विपाककालाभावः प्रसक्तः स चाप्यनिष्ट इति । न चानेकं कर्मानेकस्य जन्मनः कारणं कस्मात्तदनेकं जन्म युगपन्न संभवतीति क्रमेणैव वाच्यम् । तथा च पूर्वदोषानुषङ्गः । तस्माज्जन्मप्रायणान्तरे कृतः

पुण्यापुण्यकर्माशयप्रचयो विचित्रः प्रधानोपसर्जनभावेनावस्थितः प्रायेणामिव्यक्त एकप्रघट-
केन मरणं प्रसाध्य संमूर्छित एकमेव जन्म करोति तच्च जन्मतेनैव कर्मणा लब्धायुष्कं
भवति । तस्मिन्नायुषि तेनैव कर्मणा भोगः संपद्यत इति । असौ कर्माशयो जन्मायुर्भोग
हेतुत्वाच्च त्रिविपाकोऽभिधीयत इति । अत एकभविकः कर्माशय उक्त इति । दृष्टजन्मवेद-
नीयस्त्वेकविपाकारम्भी भोगहेतुत्वाद्विविपाकारम्भी वा भोगायुर्हेतुत्वात्रिविपाकारम्भी
वा जन्मभोगायुर्हेतुत्वात्तन्दीश्वरधन्नुषवद्वेति । क्लेशकर्मविपाकानुभवनिवर्तिताभिस्तु
वासनाभिरनादिकालसंमूर्छितमिदं चित्तं विचित्रीकृतमिव सर्वतो मत्स्यजालं ग्रन्थिभिरि-
वाततमित्येता अनेकभवपूर्विका वासनाः । यस्त्वयं कर्माशय एष एवैकभविक उक्त इति ।
ये संस्काराः स्मृतिहेतवो वासनास्ताश्चानादिकालीना इति । यस्त्वसावेकभविककर्माशयः
स नियतविपाकश्चानियतविपाकश्च । तत्र दृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्य नियतविपाकस्यैवायं
नियमो नत्वदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्यानियतविपाकस्यैव । कस्मात् । ये ह्यदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयो
ऽनियतविपाकस्तस्य त्रयी गतिः । कृतस्याविपाकस्य विनाशः प्रधानकर्मण्यावापगमनं
वा नियतविपाकप्रधानकर्मणाभिभूतस्य वा चिरमवस्थानमिति । तत्र कृतस्याविपाकस्य
नाशो यथा शूलकर्मोदयादिहैव नाशः कृष्णस्य । यत्रेदमुक्तम् । द्वे द्वे ह वै कर्मणी वेदित-
व्ये पापकस्यैको राशिः पुण्यकृताऽपहन्ति तदिच्छस्व कर्माणि सुकृतानि कर्तुमिहैव ते
कर्म कवयो वेदयन्ते । प्रधानकर्मण्यावापगमनम् । यत्रेदमुक्तं स्यात्स्वल्पः सङ्करः सपरि-
हारः सप्रत्यवमर्शः कुशलस्य नापकर्षालम् । कस्मात्कुशलं हि मे बह्वन्यदस्ति यत्रायमा-
वापं गतः स्वर्गेऽप्यपकर्षं करिष्यतीति नियतविपाकप्रधानकर्मण्याभिभूतस्य वा चिरमव-
स्थानं कथमित्यदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्यैव नियतविपाकस्य कर्मणः समानं मरणमभिव्यक्तिकार-
णमुक्तम् । नत्वदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्यानियतविपाकस्य वा । यस्त्वदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयं कर्मानियत-
विपाकं तन्नश्येदावापं वा गच्छेदभिभूतं वा चिरमप्युपासीत । यावत्समानं कर्माभिव्यञ्जकं
निमित्तमस्य न विपाकाभिमुखं करोतीति । तद्विपाकस्यैव देशकालनिमित्तानवधारणादियं
कर्मगतिश्चित्रा दुर्विज्ञाना चेति । न चोत्सर्गस्यापवादान्निवृत्तिरित्येकभविकः कर्माशयो
ऽनुज्ञायत इति ॥ १३ ॥

VYĀSA.

The vehicle of actions begins to ripen into fruit when the afflic-
tions exist ; not when the afflictions have been rooted out. As the rice
in the paddy have the power to grow only so long as the chaff remains
attached thereto and their seed-power is not burnt up, not when the chaff
has been removed ; so also does the vehicle of actions grow into ripeness,
when the afflictions are attached to it, and when its seed-power has not
been burnt up by intellection ; not when the afflictions have been removed.

The fruition is of three descriptions, life-state, life-time and life-
experience. The following has to be considered in this connection. Is
one action the cause of one life ? Or, does it bring about more lives than
one ? The second question is this. Do more actions than one bring
about more lives than one ; or do they bring about one life only ?

It is not that one action only is the cause of one life only. Why? Because in that case there would be no regularity of succession in the fruition of present actions and those that are being heaped up eternally and some of which still remain unconsumed; and thus the world would lose all patience. This, however, is not the desired end.

Nor is one action the cause of more lives than one. Why? There being more actions than one, it would necessarily follow that one action requiring more lives than one for fruition, there would remain no time for the fruition of the remainder. That also is not a desirable end.

Nor again are more actions than one, the cause of more lives than one. Why? It is impossible that all of them should exist at once, and it must, therefore, be said that if such a thing be possible it can only be in succession that so many lives can manifest. And in this latter case the defect already stated is apparent.

For this reason, the vehicle of the entire collection of good and bad actions done in the interval between birth and death, stands in all its variety with every action attached to one ruling factor of life. This is brought into manifestation by death, is joined together by one link which at the time brings about death and thus causes but one life.

The period of this life is limited by this very action. During the life-period all experience is also caused by that very action alone. This vehicle of actions is said to possess a three-fold fruition, causing as it does the manifestation of life-state, life-period and life-experience.

For this reason the vehicle of actions is termed *unigenital* (*Ekabhāvika*), causing one birth only.

That, however, which is experienced in the visible life only, may bring about but a single fruition, as causing life-experience; or, double fruition as causing life-experience and life-period; or, a triple fruition as causing life-experience, life-period and life-state. It may be like Nandiswara or like Nahuṣa.

This mind, however, is as it were, variously coloured all through on account of its becoming pervaded from eternity by the residua of the experiences of afflictions, actions and fruitions; and as such looks like a fishing net pervaded all over with knots. These, therefore, must have been brought about by more (previous) lives than one.

It is this vehicle of actions which has been termed *uni-genital* (*Eka-bhāvika*), causing one birth only; and the potencies which as residua cause memory, exist from eternity.

Further the *uni-genital* (*ekabhāvika*) vehicle of actions is either of appointed or of unappointed fruition. The rule applies to that portion

only which has to be experienced in the visible life and whose fruition has been appointed. It does not apply to that which has to be experienced in an invisible life and whose fruition has not been appointed. Why? Because, that which has to be experienced in an invisible life and whose fruition has not been appointed, has a three-fold end. It may be destroyed without fruition. It may become merged in the ruling action. It may live on for a long time overpowered by the ruling action whose fruition has been appointed.

Of these, the destruction of an action done takes place without fruition in this way that the black actions are destroyed by the rise of the white actions. The following has been said on this subject:—

‘Two and two the actions, know,
‘Of him that evil does
One heap of virtue kills;
To do good actions therefore tend;
The wise such actions tell.’

As to mergence in the ruling action, the following has been said on the subject:—‘A little mixture of evil may be easily removed or borne; it can not do away with the good.’ Why? ‘There is much of the good for me, mixed wherewith it may cause some insignificant diminution even in heaven.’

And now how may it live on for a long time, overpowered by the ruling action whose fruition has been appointed? Death is said to be the cause of the simultaneous appearance of the actions whose fruition has been appointed and which are to be experienced in the invisible birth, not that of the actions which although to be experienced in the invisible birth, yet whose fruition has not been appointed. The actions whose fruition has not been determined upon, may either be destroyed or get mixed up, or stand unfructified for a long time, overpowered so long as similar actions competent to bring the cause of manifestation into play, do not incline it towards fruition. It is because the time, the place and the cause of manifestation are not determined that the working of karma is variegated and difficult to know. Inasmuch as the rule is not abolished by the exception, the vehicle actions is recognized as causing one birth only.—64.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Let it be so, seeing that the vehicle of actions has its origin in Nescience. Let it also be granted that on the destruction of Nescience being brought about by the birth of knowledge, there should not come into existence another vehicle of actions. But the old vehicles of action which have been laid by in an eternal succession of innumerable lives, and the times of whose fruition have not been appointed, are impossible to finish

off by experience and thus the chain of repeated births becomes interminable. For this reason says :—‘It ripens into life-state, life-experience and life-period if the root exists.’ The meaning is this. The vehicle of actions fructifies into pleasure and pain only. Life-state and life-period also are meant to fulfil that object and not to put in an obstacle thereto. Pleasure and pain follow in the wake of attachment and aversion, never exist in separation from them and can not exist without them. And it is not possible that if any one is attached or averse to anything, he will not feel pleasure and pain respectively in contact with that thing. For this reason the mental plane becomes a field for the production of the fruit of actions only when it is watered by the stream of the afflictions. Hence the afflictions help the vehicle of actions in the production of their fruits also. It is for this reason that when the afflictions are destroyed, the power which helps to bring about the manifestation also disappears; and on that account, the vehicle of actions, although existing, being innumerable and having no time for its fruition appointed, does not possess the power of producing fruit, because its seed-power has been destroyed by high intellection.

The Commentary makes the same subject clear :—‘The vehicle of actions begins to ripen when the afflictions exist.’ Illustrates the same :—‘As the rice in the paddy, &c.’ Even though covered by the chaff, their seed-power should not have been burnt up by heat, &c., before they can sprout. Applies the illustration to the illustrated :—‘So also, &c.’

The question arises that the afflictions can never be destroyed, because nothing that exists can be destroyed. For this reason says :—‘And not when the seed-power has been burnt up by intellection.’

Mentions three descriptions of fruition :—‘This fruition is, &c.’ Fruit is that into which the actions ripen.

The first discussion relates to the unity or multiplicity of lives as the result of a single action taken as the starting point. The second discussion refers to the unity or multiplicity of lives caused by more actions than one taken as the starting point. Thus there are four options. Refutes the first of these options : ‘One action is not the cause of one life.’ Questions :—‘Why?’ The answer is this. Actions have been laid by from eternity in each life. They are for this very reason innumerable. If a single life exhausts one action only, many a one remains unexhausted. To this are to be added the actions of the present life. There will thus be no rule for the successive fruition of actions. As a necessary result there will be no comfort for the world, and this is not desirable. The meaning is that when the actions that are exhausted are only isolated ones, and those that are being born are many, the vehicles of action will run into each other in confusion. They will keep being constantly born in uninterrupted succession, but there being no law for their fruition, there will be no comfort for men. It will be impossible for intelligent people to determine the order of their fruition, and thus there will be no satisfaction in the performance of virtuous actions.

He refutes the second alternative :—‘Nor is one the cause of more lives than one.’ Question :—‘Why?’ The answer is this :—If one action out of those that have been laid by in many lives, becomes the cause of bringing about many lives, then the actions that remain unexhausted will be many more, and the result will be that there will be no time available for their fruition. That also is useless, because the performance of actions having thus become useless, no one will attend to them. When on account of there being no rule for the succession of fruition, satisfaction disappears in case of one action only being considered exhaustible in one life, what mention is to be made of the option in which one action is considered as exhaustible in more lives than one. In this case there will be no opportunity and no time available for the fruition of any present actions that may be done.

He refutes the third alternative:—‘Nor again are more actions than one the cause of more lives than one.’ He gives the reason thereof. These many lives cannot be lived all at once in the case of one who is not a Yogi. It must, therefore, be said that such a thing is possible only in succession, if at all. It is only if a thousand lives were simultaneously caused by a thousand actions, that the thousand actions becoming thus exhausted, time would become available for the fruition of the remaining ones, and a law for the succession of fruition become possible. But more lives than one cannot be possible all at once. The same defect, therefore, that was found in the first alternative becomes apparent here also.

Three alternatives having thus been refuted, the only one that remains available by the canon of residues, is the last:—‘More actions than one are the cause of one life.’ For this reason he says:—‘The vehicle, &c.’

‘The interval between birth and death’ is the period of life which falls between the two events, birth and death on either side.

‘In all its variety’ means variegated by the presentations of the fruits of actions in the shape of pleasure and pain.

The ruling factor of life is that which is in evidence above all and which fructifies in immediate succession.

‘The action merged into’ is that which fructifies sometime along with it. Death means passing beyond the present life. It is by that, that the vehicle of actions is brought into manifestation. This means that it is inclined towards the bringing about of its effects.

‘Is joined together by one link’:—Is brought into the state of one active force, working towards the bringing about of its effects in the shape of birth, &c. It thus causes one birth only, not more than one. This birth is as man, &c. The period of each such life is determined by that very karma. Each life has its appointed limit, with difference in time. During that life-period the enjoyment of pleasure and pain is brought about by that very karma, being as it is related thereto. For this reason the vehicle of actions is said to cause three fruitions, causing as it does life-state, life-period and life-experience. The author summarizes the general rule:—For this reason the vehicle of actions is termed uni-natal’ or unigental (ekabhāvika). The meaning is that its manifestation is limited to one birth only.

Having thus described the three-fold fruition of the one-birth vehicle as being the general rule, he now differentiates the three-fold fruition of the present karma, the one that is experienced in the visible life:—‘That, however, which is experienced in the visible life only, &c.’ In the case of Nandīśvara, whose human life was broken off at the age of eight, the special virtue which on account of high energy and intense application, became the cause thereof, resulted in the double fruition of life-state and life-experience. In the case of Nahuṣa, however, the period of life being already determined by the karma which determined his attainment of the position of Indra, his antagonistic action of kicking Agastya, resulted only in his experience of the result of the vice.

The question arises, Have the residua of afflictions and the residua brought about by the experiences of the fruitions of actions causing similar enjoyments, their fruition in one life only, just as the one-birth vehicle of actions has? For if be so, a man passing into the animal state of life would not have the experiences which are suited to that state of life alone. For this reason he says:—‘The mind however, is as it were variously coloured, &c.’

‘Pervaded from eternity’ means unified into a single manifestation of energy.

Now he describes the nature of residua in order to differentiate virtue from vice. ‘And the potencies which as residua, &c.’

The author introduces now the discussion of occasional exceptions to the general

rule of the vehicle of actions causing one-birth only. 'The vehicle of actions, however, &c.' The word 'however' differentiates it from the residual potencies. The rule of causing one birth only applies only to the vehicle whose fruition is to be experienced in the visible life only, and whose fruition has been appointed. It does not apply to that which has to be experienced in an invisible life, and whose fruition has not yet been appointed. He asks the reason therefore :—

'Why?' and mentions the reason :—'Because that which has to be experienced, &c.'

The author mentions now one of the three ends :—'It may be destroyed without fruition.' Mentions the second :—'It may be merged in, &c.' Mentions the third :—'It may live on for a very long time, &c.'

Of these, he divides the first :—'Of these the destruction of an action done without fruition, &c.'

There are only three kinds of actions, the white, the black and the white-black, besides the actions of a Sannyāsi, which are neither white nor black. Now here the white vehicle of actions brought about by purificatory action and study, &c., becomes, as soon as it arises, the destroyer of the black one, which has not begun to fructify.

It should also be understood that it destroys the white-black one too, there being similarity on account of the presence of the black one in that. His reverence quotes the Veda on this very subject :—'The following has been said, &c.' 'Two and two the actions, &c.'

The two and two actions are the white and the white-black. This is related to the verb 'kills.' The word 'two' is used twice to indicate manifoldness. Of whom are these two-fold actions? Of the man who does the evil. What is that which kills? The answer is :—'The heap of the good actions of him who does good deeds.' He speaks of a heap because a heap can be managed by a heap only. This makes out the white vehicle of actions to be the third one. The meaning is that the white vehicle of actions which is brought into being by the performance of such actions as avoid causing pain to others, is of such a nature that although one, it destroys the contrary vehicles of black and white-black actions, although they may be many. For this reason they tend, i.e., incline towards good actions, such as the wise men teach. Here it is a very high class virtue, this rise of white actions, that destroys the others.

It is not by the pain consequent upon study, &c., that they are destroyed. It is not pain *qua* pain that is contrary to vice. It is contrary to that pain only which is brought about by vice itself. The pain which accompanies study, &c., is not brought about by vice. If it were so, the ordinances of study, &c., would be useless, because in that case vice would be born out of the very strength of the study, &c., ordained. Further the pain which accompanies study, &c., is not caused by them. If it were caused by them, the recommendation of study, &c., would become useless, because the more intense the application to study, &c., the more would thus be the pain caused thereby. If no pain be caused by the application to study, &c., thus recommended, why then the hellish states of Kumbhīpāka, &c., may also be recommended as desirable, because in that case it would appear to be only on account of their not being recommended as desirable that pain would not be produced. Everything, therefore, runs into all four corners (i.e., nothing is well established in its own right place and is therefore absurd).

The author divides now the second end (of actions) :—In the ruling action such as the sacrifice of Jyotiṣṭoma, &c., its minor actions such as the killing of animals, &c., are merged as parts in the whole.

The killing of animals, &c., has two effects. The first is that being ordained as part of the principal action, it helps in its fulfilment. The second is that the causing of pain to all living beings being forbidden, it results in undesirable consequences. Of

these when it is performed only as subsidiary to the principal action, then, for that very reason, it does not manifest its result all at once independently of the principal action. On the contrary it keeps its position of an accessory only and manifests only when the fruition of the principal ruling action begins. It is said to be tacked on to the ruling action, when, while helping the ruling action, it exists only as the seed of its own proper effect. *Pañchaśikhā* has said the following on the subject : — 'A little mixture.'

When the ruling factor of the present karma born from the sacrifice of *Jyotiṣṭoma*, &c., is mixed up with the present cause of evil, it may be easily removed. It is possible of removal by a small expiatory sacrifice. Even if an expiatory sacrifice be not performed by carelessness, the subsidiary action would ripen at the time of the ripening of the principal only, and in that case the evil generated thereby would be easy to bear. The wise who are taking their baths in the great lake of the nectar of pleasure brought about by a collection of good actions, put up easily with a small piece of the fire of pain produced by a small evil. It is not, therefore, capable of diminishing, i. e., appreciably lessening the effect, of the good, i. e., of his large virtues.

He puts the question : — Why ? The answer is put into the mouth of the virtuous man : — 'There is much other good for me,' which stands apart as a consequence of the fruition of the principal factor of action beginning with the taking of the vow of sacrifice and ending with the distribution of charities. With that there will be a little of the admixture of evil. Even in heaven which is considered as free from all pain, the enjoyment is the result of virtue mixed up with a little of vice and there will, therefore, be a somewhat inappreciable diminution of enjoyment only.

He divides the third alternative : — 'How may it optionally live on, &c.' The ruling action here means the most powerful one, not the whole consisting of many parts. 'The most powerful' is that whose fruition has been appointed with regard to time, because there remains no other opportunity for its fruition. That whose fruition has not been appointed is considered weak, inasmuch as there is opportunity for its fruition at other times. 'Living on for a very long time' is in the seed state only, not as helper of the principal action, that being independent.

The question arises. It has been said that the vehicle of actions manifests at once at the time of death. It is now said that it lives on for a very long time overpowered. How is it that the former is not contrary to the latter ? With this object he puts the question : — 'How may it, &c.' The answer is : — 'Death is said to be the cause of the simultaneous appearance, &c.' The singular denotes the class.

Now he lays down that what has been said applies to the other as well. 'Not that of the action, &c.' The rest is easy. — 13.

Sūtra 14.

ते ह्लादपरितापफलाः पुण्यापुण्यहेतुत्वात् ॥१४॥

14. They¹ have pleasure² or pain³ as the fruit,⁴ by reason of⁵ virtue⁶ or vice.⁶—65.

ते ह्लादपरितापफलाः पुण्यापुण्यहेतुत्वात् । ते जन्मायुर्भोगाः पुण्यहेतुकाः सुखफला अपुण्यहेतुका दुःखफला इति । यथाचेदं दुःखं प्रतिकूलात्मकमेवं विषयसुखकाकौषि दुःखमस्त्येव प्रतिकूलात्मकं योगिनः ॥ १४ ॥

VYĀSA.

They, i. e., life-state, life-period and life-experience have pleasure for their fruit, when caused by virtue, and have pain for their fruit when caused by vice.

As pain consists in what is contrary to the prevalent mental tendencies at a time, there must be pain to the Yogi's mind even at the time of the enjoyment of pleasureable objects.—65

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

It has been said that karma has its origin in afflictions. It has also been said that the fruitions have their origin in actions (karma). Now the question is of what are the fruitions the origin, so that they too have to be given up? For this reason he says :— ' They have pleasure or pain as their fruit, by reason of virtue and vice. Explains :— ' They, i.e., Life-state, &c.'—

Although life-state and life-period only have pleasure and pain as their fruit, inasmuch as those come before these, and not so life-experience, inasmuch as that comes after pleasure and pain have arisen, and inasmuch as it consists in the very experience thereof, yet that too is spoken of as the fruit of enjoyment, because being perceivable and enjoyable, it is an object of the act of enjoyment.

The question arises that although the life-state, life-experience and life-period caused by vice and causing pain may well be regarded as removable, being found to be contrary, why should those be given up which have been caused by virtue and cause pleasure? They are seen to be moving along the proper line. It is impossible that even a thousand inferences and so-called authoritative statements should do away with the fact of their moving along the line of every individual mind. Nor are pleasure and pain possible of existence the one without the other, inasmuch as when pleasure is taken up, pain too is there as not to be given up, as they have different causes and different appearances. For this reason he says :— ' And as this pain, &c.'— 14.

Sūtra 15.

परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः॥१५॥

15. By reason of the pains¹ of change,¹ anxiety² and habituation³ and⁴ by reason of the contrariety⁷ of the functionings⁶ of the ' qualities,⁵ all¹¹ indeed¹⁰ is pain⁹ to the discriminating.¹²—66.

कथं तदुपपद्यते । परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः । सर्वस्यायं रागानुविद्धश्चेतनाचेतनसाधनाधीनः सुखानुभव इति । तत्रास्ति रागजः कर्माशयस्तथा च द्वेष्टि दुःखसाधनानि मुह्यति चेति । द्वेषमोहकृतोऽप्यस्ति कर्माशयः । तथाचोक्तम् । नानुपहत्य भूतान्युपभोगः संभवतीति । हिंसाकृतोऽप्यस्ति शारीरः कर्माशय इति । विषयसुखं चाविद्येत्युक्तम् । या भोगेष्विन्द्रियाणां तृप्तेरुपशान्तिस्तत्सुखम् । या लौल्यादनुपशान्तिस्तद्दुःखम् । न चेन्द्रियाणां भोगाभ्यासेन वैतृष्यं कर्तुं शक्यम् । कस्माद्यतो भोगाभ्यासमनुविषधन्ते रागाः कौशलानि चेन्द्रियाणामिति । तस्मादनुपायः सुखस्य भोगाभ्यास इति । स खल्वयं वृश्चिकविषभीत इवाशीविषेण दष्टो यः सुखार्थी विषयानुवासितो महति दुःखपङ्के निमग्न इति । एषा परिणामदुःखता नाम प्रतिकूल

सुखावस्थायामपि योगिनमेव क्लिश्नाति । अथ का तापदुःखता सर्वस्य द्वेषानुविद्धश्चे-
तनाचेतनसाधनाधीनस्तापानुभव इति । तत्रास्ति द्वेषजः कर्माशयः सुखसाधनानि च
प्रार्थयमानः कायेन वाचा मनसा च परिस्पन्दते ततः परमनुगृह्णात्युपहन्ति चेति परानुप्र-
हपीडाभ्यां धर्माधर्मावुपचिनोति स कर्माशयो लोभान्मोहाश्च भवतीत्येषा परितापदुःखतो-
च्यते । का पुनः संस्कारदुःखता सुखानुभवात्सुखसंस्काराशयो दुःखानुभवादपि दुःख-
संस्काराशय इति । एवं कर्मभ्यो विपाकेऽनुभूयमाने सुखे दुःखे वा पुनः कर्माशयप्रचय
इति । एवमिदमनादिदुःखलोतो विप्रसृतं योगिनमेव प्रतिकूलात्मकत्वादुद्वेजयति ।
कस्मादक्षिपात्रकल्पो हि विद्वानिति । यथोर्णातन्तुरक्षिपात्रे न्यस्तः स्पर्शेन दुःखयति
न चान्येषु गात्राद्यवेषु । एवमेतानि दुःखान्यक्षिपात्रकल्पं योगिनमेव क्लिश्नन्ति नेतरं
प्रतिपत्तारम् । इतरं तु स्वकर्मोपहतं दुःखमुपात्तमुपात्तं त्यजन्तं त्यक्तं त्यक्तमुपादानमना-
दिवासनाविचित्रया चित्तवृत्त्या समन्ततोऽनुविद्धमिवाविद्यया हातव्य एवाहङ्कारममका-
रानुपातिनं जातं जातं बाह्याध्यात्मिकोभयनिमित्तास्त्रिगुणस्तापा अनुप्लवन्ते । तदेवमना-
दिना दुःखलोतसा व्यूहमानमात्मानं भूतग्रामं च दृष्ट्वा योगी सर्वदुःखक्षयकारणं सम्यग्-
दर्शनं शरणं प्रपद्यत इति गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः । प्रख्या प्रवृत्तिस्थि-
तिरूपा बुद्धिगुणाः परस्परानुग्रहतं ग्रीभूत्वा शान्तं धारं मूढं वा प्रत्ययं त्रिगुणमेवारभन्ते ।
चलं च गुणवृत्तिमिति क्षिप्रपरिणामि चित्तमुक्तम् । रूपातिशया वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च परस्परे-
ण विरुध्यन्ते सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते । एवमेते गुणा इतरेतराश्रयेणोपाजि-
तसुखदुःखमोहप्रत्ययाः सर्वे सर्वरूपा भवन्तीति गुणप्रधानभावकृतरत्वेषां विशेष इति ।
तस्माद्दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिन इति तदस्य महतो दुःखसमुदायस्य प्रभवबीजमविद्या ।
तस्याश्च सम्यग्दर्शनमभावहेतुः । यथा चिकित्साशास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहम् । रोगो रोगहेतुरारोग्यं
भैषज्यमिति । एवमिदमपि शास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहमेव । तद्यथा संसारः संसारहेतुर्मोक्षो मोक्षोपा-
य एवेति । तत्र दुःखबहुलः संसारो हेयः । प्रधानपुरुषयोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः । संयोगस्यात्य-
न्तिकी निवृत्तिर्हानम् । हानोपायः सम्यग्दर्शनम् । तत्र हातुः स्वरूपमुपादेयं वा हेयं वा न
भवितुमर्हतीति । हाने तस्योच्छेदवादप्रसङ्गः । उपादाने च हेतुवादः । उभयप्रत्याख्यानै
शाश्वतवाद इत्येतत्सम्यग्दर्शनम् । तदेतच्छास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहमित्यभिधीयते ॥ १५ ॥

VYĀSA.

How is that possible ? 'By reason of the pains, &c' The feeling of pleasure depending upon the enjoyment of intelligent and non-intelligent objects, is in the case of every one followed by attachment. Here the vehicle of actions is born out of attachment. Further inasmuch as there is aversion to the causes of pain and also delusion, there exists also the vehicle of actions brought about by aversion and delusion. And so it has been said :—'Enjoyment is not possible without giving pain to beings.' There is also the physical vehicle of actions caused by giving pain to others.

It has been said that the pleasure of enjoyment is Nescience. The calming down of the powers of action, sensation and thought, which

comes in consequence of the satisfaction derived from enjoyment of their objects, is pleasure. The activity in consequence of want of satisfaction is pain.

Further, it is not possible to make the powers of action, &c., free from desire by the frequent repetition of enjoyments, because attachment increases in consequence of the repetition of enjoyments, and so also does the dexterity of the powers. The repetition of enjoyments is, therefore, no cause of pleasure. Whoever desiring pleasure enjoys certain objects and thus becomes addicted to them, in consequence, and having become addicted thus becomes entangled in the morass of pain, is like one who being afraid of the bite of a scorpion, is bitten by a serpent.

This is the pain of change. In the state of pleasure even, it produces a contrary effect and thus afflicts a Yogî alone.

Well, what is the painfulness of anxiety? The feeling of pain in depending upon intelligent and non-intelligent objects is in the case of every one followed by aversion. Here the vehicle of action is born out of aversion. Whoever desires objects of pleasure, acts with his mind, body and speech and thereby favours some and disfavours others. He thus lays by virtue and vice by favours and disfavours shown to others. This is a vehicle of actions brought about by avarice and delusion. This is termed the painfulness of consequent suffering (*tâpa*).

What again is the painfulness of habituation? By the enjoyment of pleasure comes into being the vehicle of the potency of pleasure. By the feeling of pain comes the vehicle of the potency of pain. By thus experiencing the fruition of actions in the shape of pleasures and pains, the vehicle of actions grows.

This is the eternal stream of painfulness, which thus flowing on frightens the Yogî alone. Why the Yogî alone? Because the wise have in this case a similarity to the eye-ball. As a thread of wool thrown into the eye pains by mere touch, but not so by coming into contact with any other organ, so do these pains afflict the Yogî, tender as the eye-ball, but not any one else whom they reach.

As to others, however, who give up the pain they have again and again taken up as the consequence of their own karma, and who again take it up after having repeatedly given it up; who are all round as it were pierced through by Nescience, possessed as they are of a mind full of afflictions, variegated by eternal residua; who follow in the wake of the 'I' and the 'Mine,' in relation to things that should be left apart,—the three-fold pain caused by both external and internal means, run after

them as they are repeatedly born. The Yogi then seeing himself and the world of living beings thus surrounded by the eternal flow of pain, turns for refuge to right knowledge, the cause of the destruction of all pains.

Further, by reason of the contrariety of the functionings of the qualities, 'all is indeed pain to the discriminating' The qualities of the Will-to-know being of the nature of essentiality, activity and inactivity, become dependent upon mutual help, and set the formation of either a quiescent, a disturbed or a delusive notion possessed of the three qualities themselves. And the functioning of the qualities being changeful, the mind is said to possess the nature of changing quickly. The intensities of their natures and the intensities of their functionings are contradictory to one another. The ordinary, however, function together with the intense. Thus do these qualities bring about the notions of pleasure, pain and delusion by each subserving the others, and all thus enter into the formations of the others. It is by the quality which is the leading factor, that the difference is introduced. It is for this reason that all is pain to the discriminating.

The seed out of which this large heap of pains grows is Nescience, and of that the means of destruction is right knowledge.

As the science of medicine has four departments, Disease, the Cause of Disease, the Absence of Disease, and medicine or the means of removal, so also this science has four departments. It is thus divided. The universe in evolution, the cause of the universe in evolution, liberation, the means of liberation. Of these, the universe in evolution being full of troubles is the pain to be avoided; the conjunction of the Puruṣa (the conscious principle) and the Prakṛiti is the cause of pain; the final cessation of the conjunction is the removal of pain. Right knowledge is the cause of the removal of the pain. Here the individuality of the remover is not to be considered the pain to be avoided; nor is to be considered as an object of desire to be aimed at. In the case of avoidability, the theory of their destructibility would come in. In the case of its being considered an object of desire to be aimed at, the theory of its being the effect of some preceding cause would come in. When both these positions have been given up, the theory of eternal immutability only remains. This is the Right knowledge.

Thus is the science said to possess four departments. — 66.

VÂCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

The author introduces the aphorism by putting a question with the object of explaining in the sequence, that although ordinary people do not at the time of feeling pleasure, have the sense of its contrariety to the mind, and do not, therefore, feel the pain

theroof, the Yogī has the sense of pain therein:—'How is that possible?' 'By means, &c.' This is the aphorism. The consequential change, the suffering (tāpa) and the habituation are themselves pains. It is by means of these, &c.

He describes the painfulness of an object on account of the painfulness of sequential change:—'This feeling of pleasure..... in the case of every one, &c.' It is plain that pleasure is not possible without the consequent bond of attachment. Where there is no co-existence there is no pleasure. It is in that that the feeling of pleasure consists. Attachment causes activity. Activity is responsible for the heaping up of virtues and vices. Of these consists the vehicle of actions born out of attachments, because nothing that does not exist can not be born. He who enjoys pleasure and is at the time even devoted to it, goes on at the same time hating the causes of pain, by means of the mental modifications of aversion which exists distinct and independent. When one becomes incapable of removing the causes of pain, he becomes deluded forgetting as he does the true nature of things. Thus a vehicle of actions is brought into being by aversion also, and like aversion by delusion also. This is but another name of Unreal Cognition. There is, therefore, nothing contradictory in its being the cause of the vehicle of action coming into existence.

The question arises, How can one who is attached, be at the same time averse and deluded? Aversion and delusion are not seen at the time of attachment. For this reason he says:—'And so it has been said:' by us when speaking of the characteristic of alternation in the afflictions. The virtue and vice which have their origin in the activity of speech and mind have both been described by what has been said so far, because the incident of their being born out of attachment, &c., is common to both, inasmuch as there is no difference in this matter between a mental and verbal expression of desire. As they say:—'The mental modification of desire differs not from its verbal expression.'

Now he shows that there is a physical vehicle of actions also: 'Enjoyment is not possible without giving pain to others.' It is for this reason that the writers of the dharma-śāstras speak of the five sins of householders.

It may be so. But it is not proper that the pleasure derived from an object of enjoyment should be denied on account of this contrariety to the feeling of Yogīs. For this reason he says:—'It has been said that the pleasure of enjoyment is Nescience', when describing Nescience as consisting of the four-fold unreality of cognition. The elders do not look with favour upon mere consequential conditions. There is, of course, no feeling of pleasure caused to any one by the enjoyment of honey mixed up with poison, even though he may use it. On the contrary, there is a feeling of pain in the sequence. So also has it been said by the Lord:—'The pleasure which is felt by the contact of the senses with their objects, that which is like nectar in the beginning and like poison in the end, is *rajasic* pleasure.'—(Gītā.)

He introduces this:—'The calming down, &c.' We do not hold that pleasure consists in the enjoyment of an object. On the contrary, the greatest pain of man consists in the desire for objects, of men, who being satisfied by objects are pained by the wish to possess them. This does not calm down without the enjoyment of the object. Further, its calming down does not come about, being followed as it is by attachment, &c. Why then should it not be considered as the pain of consequence? This is the meaning. Satisfaction is caused by the cessation of the thirst for an object. The calming down thus caused consists in the cessation of the powers from their work. The author shows this very meaning by means of the canon of difference:—'The restlessness in consequence of absence of satisfaction is pain.'

He refutes:—'Further it is not possible, &c.' It is true that the cessation of desire is the faultless pleasure. It is not the repetition of enjoyments, however, that brings this about. The repetition of enjoyment, on the contrary, brings about the manifestation of

desire, which is the opposite of the cessation thereof. As they have said :—‘The desire for enjoyments is not calmed down by their enjoyment. It gathers strength like fire by oblations.’—(Manu). The rest is not difficult.

Now he questions about the pain of anxiety :—‘Well what is the painfulness of anxiety?’ He gives the answer :—‘The feeling of pain, &c.’ The full description of its nature has not been undertaken, because it is well known to all men. It is similar to the pain of consequence ‘or sequential change’. The details of this are the same as those of the other.

He now questions about the painfulness of habituation :—‘What again, &c.’ Answers :—‘By the enjoyment of pleasure, &c.’ The feeling of pleasure nourishes its residual potency. That brings about the memory of pleasure. That again causes attachment. From this follow the movements of mind, body and speech. These cause virtue and vice. Thence comes the enjoyment of their fruition. Thence again is the mind habituated to it. This is the meaning of eternity, absence of beginning. And here again memory comes in by the intensity of the potencies of pleasure and pain. Thereby come attachment and aversion. Thence come actions. From actions proceeds fruition. Thus should this be understood. Flowing thus this stream of pain troubles the Yogi alone, not any one else. For this reason he says : ‘This is the eternal stream, &c.’ As to others the three-fold pain runs after them, this is the construction. The pains caused by other beings and the powers of nature are described by one common characteristic, the external. The modifications variegated by the eternal residua are described as the Nescience. It is the Nescience which causes modifications in the mind ; they are, in fact, Nescience itself. It is by this that the feelings of ‘This is myself’ and ‘This is mine’ are generated in the Will-to-be the senses and the body, &c., and in wife and children, &c. These are the lines along which the ordinary Puruṣa moves.

Under these circumstances there is no rescue at all except in right knowledge. For this reason he says :—‘The Yogi then, &c.’

Having thus shown the painfulness of pleasurable enjoyments, on account of the surrounding circumstances of sequential change, habituation and anxiety, he now shows the painfulness due to the very nature of their being : ‘Further by reason of the contrariety of the functionings of the qualities, &c.’ He explains : ‘The qualities of Essence (Sattva), disturbing energy (rajas) and inertia (tamas) evolved as essentiality, activity and inactivity in their transformation as the Will-to-be, being dependent for support upon each other, bring about every notion, even though it be the notion of pleasurable enjoyments, as necessarily possessed of the three qualities, being as it is as such, either quiescent, that is pleasurable, disturbed, *i. e.*, painful or inert, *i. e.*, seedy (a feeling which is neither of active pleasure nor yet of pain). And even such a modification in the form of a notion of this Will-to-be is not permanent. So says he :—‘And the functioning of the qualities being changeful, &c.’ The mind has been said to be of a quickly changing nature.

But how can one notion become possessed of the opposite qualities of quiescence, disturbance and seediness at one time? For this reason he says :—‘The intensities of their nature and the intensities of their functionings are contradictory to one another.’

Natures differ from natures, that is, the eight modes of mental being, characterization, &c. Their functionings are pleasure and pain. Thus characteristic (*i. e.*, virtue) differs when ripening into fruit, from Vice (that which is non-characteristic), when that ripens into fruit. Similarly, knowledge, desirelessness and power as also pleasure, &c., differ from contradictory characteristics of the same classes. The ordinary manifestations, *i. e.*, when their natures are not intensified, do not contradict their intense manifestations, *i. e.*, when they are in the height of their manifestation. They, therefore, do manifest along with them.

Well, we understand this. But how can the enjoyment of pleasurable objects be painful by nature? For this reason he says :—‘Thus do these, &c.’ The meaning is that they are both the same inasmuch as there is no difference in their material causes and the material cause and the effect thereof are the same in nature.

What, is it then a case of absolute identity of nature? If so, there would be no difference among mental conceptions as they do exist. For this reason he says :—‘It is by the quality which is the leading factor, &c.’ The presence of the qualities is in their ordinary nature. The leading factor is that which is intense. For this reason, all is but pain to the discriminating, by nature as well as on account of surrounding circumstances. And pain has to be removed by the wise. And pain can not be removed unless its root is removed. Further, the root can not be removed unless it is known. For this reason shows the root thereof :—‘The seed out of which grows, &c.’ The meaning is that the seed is that out of which the heap of pains grows, i.e., from which it takes its birth.

He mentions the means of its eradication :—‘And of that the means of destruction, &c.’

Now he explains that this science, which is taught for the welfare of all, is similar to another science of the same class :—‘As the science of medicine, &c.’ That science which has four branches of discussion, is said to be a science of four departments. The question now arises that inasmuch as pain was ere now described as the thing which has to be removed and the universe in evolution is now described as the thing to be removed, is there not an evident contradiction in this? For this reason he says :—‘The universe in evolution being full of pain, &c.’

Now he describes the minor operation of Nescience, whereby the evolution of the universe is set in :—‘The conjunction of the Prakṛiti and the Puruṣa, &c.’

He describes the means of liberation :—‘Right knowledge is the means, &c.’

Some are of opinion that liberation consists in the destruction of the very being of him who does away with pain. As they say :—‘The salvation of the mind is like the extinguishment of a lamp.’ Others say that liberation consists in the appearance of pure knowledge by the destruction of the afflictions together with their potencies. He says to them :—‘Here the individuality of the remover is not to be considered the pain, &c.’

He points out the defect in the theory of removal :—‘In the case of avoidability, &c.’ No wise man ever works for self-destruction. It is, however, seen that men who carry a body full of intense pain, do attempt to destroy themselves. True. But it is only a few who do so.

Further, if this were so, there would remain no object of existence for the Puruṣa, inasmuch as there are spirits in evolution who enjoy different kinds of pleasure as gods, &c., and they too reach the state of liberation. Hence, liberation is not to be considered to be the annihilation of the very being of him who removes the pain.

Well then let us suppose that the mind in the state of liberation takes up another nature. For this reason he says :—‘In the case of it being supposed that another nature is put on, the theory of there being another cause for it, &c.’ It means that if it is something which comes into existence, it is an effect and is, therefore, impermanent. Being impermanent it cannot be considered liberation (mokṣa). Mokṣa consists in immortality. The expression of pure knowledge is not immortal. It is not possible that expression (santana) should exist as separate from the thing expressed, and as an independent existence. The things that are expressed are, of course, impermanent. For this reason we should try to find out a theory which would make it possible that Mokṣa should be permanent. Is only thus that it would be possible to make Mokṣa an object for the Puruṣa to achieve. For this reason he says : ‘When both these positions, &c.’ Hence Mokṣa is only the establishment of the self in its own nature. This alone is Right Knowledge. Thus is this science said to possess four departments.—15.

Sūtra 16.

हेयं दुःखमनागतम् ॥१६॥

16. Pain² not-yet-come³ is the avoidable¹.—67.

हेयं दुःखमनागतम् । दुःखमतीतमुपभोगेनातिवाहितं न हेयपक्षे वर्तते । वर्तमानं च स्वक्षणेऽपभोगारूढमिति न तत्क्षणान्तरे हेयतामापद्यते । तस्माद्यदेवानागतं दुःखं तदेवाक्षिपात्रकल्पं योगिनं क्लिश्नाति नेतरं प्रतिपत्तारं तदेव हेयतामापद्यते । तस्माद्यदेवं हेयमित्युच्यते तस्यैव कारणं प्रतिनिर्दिश्यते ॥ १६ ॥

VYĀSA.

The pain which has passed away has been spent up by experience. It can not, therefore, fall within the sphere of the avoidable. And that which is present, is being experienced at the time of its existence ; it can not, therefore, be considered as the avoidable with reference to the future moment of time. Hence that pain alone which has not yet been experienced, troubles the Yogī who is sensitive as the eye-ball ; it does not trouble any other knower. Hence that alone is the avoidable pain. It is the cause of this avoidable pain only that is to be discussed.—67.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

By the use of the words 'not yet come,' the past and the present have been taken out of the purview. He shows the propriety thereof :—'The pain that has passed away, &c.'

But why should pain which is present, i. e., in the process of being suffered, be not considered as falling within the sphere of the avoidable, seeing that it has not been spent up by suffering ? For this reason he says :—'And that which is present, &c.' The rest is easy.—16.

Sūtra 17.

द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः ॥१७॥

17. The conjunction³ of the knower¹ and the knowable² is the cause of the avoidable pain¹.—68.

द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः । द्रष्टा बुद्धेः प्रतिसंवेदी पुरुषः । दृश्या बुद्धिसत्त्वोपाख्याः सर्वे धर्माः । तदेतद्द्रष्टव्यमयस्कान्तमणिकल्पं सन्निधिमाम्नापकारी दृश्यत्वेन स्वं भवति पुरुषस्य दृशिरूपस्य स्वामिनः । अनुभवकर्मविषयतामापन्नं यतोऽन्यस्वरूपेण प्रतिपन्नमन्यस्वरूपप्रतिलब्धात्मकं स्वतन्त्रमपि परार्थत्वात्परतन्त्रम् । तयोर्दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योरनादिरर्थकृतः संयोगो हेयहेतुर्दुःखस्य कारणमित्यर्थः । तथा चोक्तम् । तत्संयोगहेतुर्विष्वज्जनात्स्यादयमात्यन्तिको दुःखप्रतीकारः । कस्माद्दुःखहेतोः परिहार्यस्य प्रतीकारदर्शनात् । तद्यथा पादतलस्य भेद्यता कण्टकस्य भेद्यत्वं परिहारः कण्टकस्य पादानधिष्ठानं पादत्राणव्यवहितेन बाधिष्ठानमेतत्त्रयं यो वेद लोके स तत्र प्रतीकारमारभमाणो भेदजं दुःखं

नाप्नोति । कस्मात्त्रित्वोपलब्धिसामर्थ्यादिति । अत्रापि तापकस्य रजसः सत्त्वमेव तयम् ।
कस्मात्तपि क्रियायाः कर्मण्यत्वासत्त्वे कर्मणि तपिक्रिया नापरिणामिनि निष्क्रिये क्षेत्रज्ञे
दर्शितविषयत्वात् । सत्त्वे तु तयमाने तदाकारानुरोधी पुरुषोऽनुतप्यत इति ॥ १७ ॥

VYĀSA.

The knower is the Puruṣa (the conscious principle) who cognizes the reflection from the Will-to-know by conjunction. The knowable consists of all the characteristics present in the essence of the Will-to-know. This then, the knowable behaves like a magnet. It is useful only when placed here. On account of its capacity of knowability, it becomes the possession of the lord the Puruṣa, who is of the nature of the power of knowing. It becomes the object of the act of enjoyment, inasmuch as although by nature independent, it becomes dependent upon another, existing as it does for fulfilling the object of that other. It is different in nature from the power of knowing (consciousness), but puts on that nature by taking it up from another. The eternal conjunction of the power of knowing and the capacity of being known, brought about by the purpose of existence, is the cause of the avoidable pain. And so it has been said :--'The conjunction therewith is the cause ; by giving that up is secured the complete remedy of pain, inasmuch as that is found to be the cause of the removal of the real thing, the cause of pain. As for example, the soles of the feet possess the capacity of being pierced, and the thorn possesses the power of piercing. The remedy consists in not putting the foot on the thorn, or putting it with a shoe on. Whoever in the world knows these three things, secures the remedy and does not suffer the pain caused by the prick. By what means? By the power of the three-fold knowledge.

And here, too, it is the quality of the disturbing motion (rajas) that brings about the pain ; and it is the quality of the Essence (sattva) which is pained. Why? Because the act of pain must live in an object, and it can, therefore, live in the Objective Essence alone. It can not live in the unchanging actionless knower of the field. Because consciousness (Puruṣa) has the Objective Essence for its field it follows along the lines of the phenomena of the Essence, and when the Objective Essence is pained, the Puruṣa also is pained by reflex action. — 68.

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

The avoidable pain has been described. Its cause is now discussed. 'The conjunction of the knower and the knowable is the cause of the avoidable pain.'

Now he describes the nature of the knower :--'The knower, &c.' The cognition by conjunction of the reflection from the Will-to-know (buddhi) is the same as the reflection of consciousness into the Will-to-know. This is present even in the Puruṣas who are indifferent (udāsīna).

Well, but if this is all, it is the Will-to-know alone that can thus be visible to him, not sound, &c., which are not thus in contact with him (the Puruṣa). For this reason he says:—‘The knowable consists of all the characteristics of the Will-to-be.’ By means of the passage of the senses the Will-to-be transforms as sound, &c. Sound, &c., thus becomes the characteristics of the knowable. This is the meaning. Well, but it is the Will-to-be that transforms as sound, &c., and thereby puts on these appearances. As to the Puruṣa however, the change takes place in him when his relation with the Will-to-be is perceived. If this relation is not recognized, how can sound, &c., be perceived even though they have entered the essence of the Will-to-be? The knowable cannot be cognized without being in contact with the power of consciousness. For this reason he says:—‘This then, the knowable behaves like, &c.’ We have discussed in the first chapter that the essence of the Will-to-be, being touched by consciousness takes in the reflection of consciousness on account of its extreme purity, and being thus as it were transformed into consciousness cognizes sound, &c., in sequence.’ And it is for this reason, that the seer enjoying sound, &c., presented to it by the essence of the Will-to-be having transformed into sound, &c., becomes the master, and the essence of the Will-to-be standing to it in that relation becomes its possession. This is the essence of the Will-to-be, which possessed of forms behaves as a magnet and becomes a possession of the Puruṣa, who is the lord, as the power of consciousness. Why? Because it becomes the object of the act of cognition in sequence. The cognition in sequence is the experience of the Puruṣa. This means the action of the Puruṣa with the object in view. Becoming the object thereof means becoming enjoyable. It is spoken of as his possession, because it becomes enjoyable by him.

The question again arises that the essence of the Will-to-be being self-illuminated, how can it be the object of cognition? For this reason he says:—‘It is different in nature from, &c.’ The essence of the Will-to-be can be self-illuminating only, if it is in reality of the nature of consciousness. Its nature, however, is different from that of consciousness, being as it is of the nature of the non-intelligent. It takes up the nature of consciousness by borrowing it from the other. It is for this reason an object of cognition.

The question now is that inasmuch as anything is said to be dependent upon another when something constituting it rests in that other, the Will-to-be can not be dependent upon the Puruṣa, because nothing that belongs to the Will-to-be rests upon the Puruṣa, who is by nature indifferent. It further follows from this that the Puruṣa can have no action of his own. For this reason the author says:—‘Although independent by nature, it becomes dependent upon another, &c.’ The purpose of its existence being the fulfilment of the object of another, *i.e.*, of the Puruṣa, it becomes dependent upon that other, *i.e.*, the Puruṣa.

Well then this relation of the power of seeing and the capacity of being seen can either be innate or accidental. If it be innate, then both the related objects must always remain as such. The relation can not cease to exist, because both of them are indestructible. The relation being thus impossible of cessation there can never be an end of births and deaths. If it be incidental (*naimittika*), then because the afflictions, the actions and their potencies are the modifications of the internal organ, they can exist only when the internal organ exists. And the internal organ is brought into existence by means of them. Thus each comes to depend for its existence upon the existence of the other. Inasmuch as there can not be this eternity of succession in the beginning of creation, the very setting in of evolution thus becomes impossible, and in fact non-existent. And so it has been said:—‘Action is brought about by the ‘qualities’ even according to those who believe that the Puruṣa is not the actor. But how can that be brought about? Karma does not exist then? Nor is there untrue knowledge, nor

attachment nor aversion, &c. Nor is the mind born then, nor can any mental modifications exist at all in the case of any one." To remove this doubt the author says:—"The eternal conjunction of the power of knowing and the capacity of being known, brought about by the purpose of existence, &c."

True, the relation is not innate; it is incidental. And although it is thus incidental, it has no beginning, because its existence has been caused by an eternal cause. And this succession of afflictions, actions and potencies is eternal. In each creation they become merged into the Prakṛiti together with the internal organ, and manifest again in the beginning of another creation in the same state in which they were before. The illustration has been mentioned more than once before of how certain creatures of the earth are reduced to earth on the cessation of the rains, but come back to life again when the rains return.

Nescience is the cause of the conjunction by antecedence. The fulfilment of the object of the Puruṣa is the cause of keeping it on. It is by virtue of that that the conjunction lasts. For this reason is it said to have been caused by the purpose of the Puruṣa. "And so it has been said" by Pañcha-sikḥā:—"Conjunction with that" means the conjunction with the Will-to-be (Buddhi). It is this conjunction which is the cause of pain. By the cessation of that is secured the absolute remedy of pain. It is implied that pain lives on as long as the conjunction does not cease. The author repeats a well known illustration of the same:—"As the soles of the feet, &c."

Well let that be so. But when it is said that the conjunction with the 'qualities' is the cause of pain, it becomes admitted that the 'qualities' are the pain-givers. Further the action of the verb 'to pain' does not terminate in the actor alone, like that of the verb 'Is' and others of the same class. There must be another object in its case which is pained. The Puruṣa can not be the object in which this pain may reside, because the Puruṣa being immutable it can not possess the nature of being affected by the fruit of action. Therefore, it being necessary for pain that there should be something pained, we infer its non-existence when no object of pain exists, just as we see that no smoke exists where there is no fire. For this reason the author says:—"And here too the quality of essentiality is pained, &c." It is the qualities which are either the pain-givers or the pained. Of these the Sattva being delicate like the soles of the feet, is pained; the Rajas being sharp is the pain-giver.

The author now puts a question:—"Why is it the Sattva alone that is pained? and not the Puruṣa." The answer is:—"On account of the action of pain, &c."

Well then, does not the Puruṣa get pain? And further if it is only the non-intelligent Sattva that is pained, what loss is thereby caused to us. For this reason he says:—"The Puruṣa is pained by reflex action."—17.

Sūtra 18.

प्रकाशक्रियास्थितिशीलं भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं भोगापवर्गार्थं
दृश्यम् ॥१८॥

18. The knowable¹⁰ is of the nature⁴ of illumination,¹ activity² and inertia;³ it consists of the elements⁵ and the powers of sensation,⁶ (action and thought); its objects⁹ are emancipation⁸ and experience⁷.—69.

दृश्यस्वरूपमुच्यते । प्रकाशक्रियास्थितिशीलं भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं भोगापवर्गार्थं दृश्यम् । प्रकाशशीलं सत्त्वम् । क्रियाशीलं रजःस्थितिशीलं तम इति । एते गुणाः परस्परोपरक्तप्रविभागाः परिणामिनः संयोगवियोगधर्माश्च इतरेतरोपाश्रयेणोपाजितमूर्तयः परस्पराङ्गा-
 क्तिव्येऽप्यसंभिन्नशक्तिप्रविभागास्तुल्यजातीयास्तुल्यजातीयशक्तिभेदानुपातिनः प्रधानवेला-
 यामुपदर्शितसन्निधानानुगुणत्वेऽपि व्यापारमात्रेण च प्रधानान्तरणीतानुमिताऽस्तिताः पुरु-
 षार्थकर्तव्यतया प्रयुक्तसामर्थ्याः सन्निधिमात्रोपकारिणोऽयस्यकान्तमणिकल्पाः प्रत्ययमन्त-
 रेणैकतमस्य वृत्तिमनुवर्तमानाः प्रधानशब्दवाच्या भवन्ति । एतद्दृश्यमित्युच्यते । तदेत-
 द्भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं भूतभावेन पृथिव्यादिना सूक्ष्मस्थूलेन परिणमते । तथेन्द्रियभावेन श्रोत्रा-
 दिना सूक्ष्मस्थूलेन परिणमत इति । तच्च नाप्रयोजनं प्रयोजनमुररीकृत्य प्रवर्तत इति ।
 भोगापवर्गार्थं हि तद् दृश्यं पुरुषस्येति । तन्नेष्ट निष्टगुणस्वरूपावधारणमविभागापन्नं भोगो
 भोक्तुः स्वरूपावधारणमपवर्ग इति । द्वयोरतिरिक्तमन्यदर्शनं नास्ति । तथाचोक्तम् । अयं
 तु खलु त्रिषु गुणेषु कर्तृत्वकर्तरि च पुरुषे तुल्यातुल्यजातीये चतुर्थे तत्क्रियासाक्षिण्युपनी-
 यमानान्त्सर्वभावानुपपन्नाननुपश्यन्नदर्शनमन्यच्छङ्कत इति । तावेतौ भोगापवर्गौ बुद्धिकृतौ
 बुद्धावेव वर्तमानौ कथं पुरुषे व्यपदिश्येते इति । यथा च जयः पराजयो वा योद्धृषु वर्त-
 मानः स्वामिनि व्यपदिश्यते स हि तत्फलस्य भोक्तेति । एवं बन्धमोक्षौ बुद्धावेव वर्तमानौ
 पुरुषे व्यपदिश्येते स हि तत्फलस्य भोक्तेति । बुद्धरेव पुरुषार्था परिसमाप्तिर्बन्धस्तदर्थव-
 सायो मोक्ष इति । एतेन ग्रहणधारणोद्घापोद्घातत्त्वज्ञानाभिनिवेशा बुद्धौ वर्तमानाः पुरुषेऽ
 ध्यारोपितसद्भावाः स हि तत्फलस्य भोक्तेति ॥ १८ ॥

VYĀSA.

The nature of the knowable is now described : — 'The knowable is of the nature of, &c.' The quality of essentiality (Sattva) is of the nature of illumination. Energy (rajas) is of the nature of activity. Inertia is of the nature of inactivity. These 'qualities' are capable of being coloured more or less by proximity to one another. They are ever evolving. They have the characteristics of conjunction and separation. They manifest forms by each lending support to the others by proximity. None of these loses its distinct power into those of the others, even though each may exist as the principal factor of a phenomenon, with the others as subsidiary thereto. They take to the lines of different manifestations of power in objects of the same or of different classes. When any one of them is the principal factor of any phenomenon, the others show their presence in close contact. Their existence as subsidiary energies of the principal factor is inferred by their distinct and independent function-
 ing, even though it be as subsidiary qualities. Their powers come into manifestation by virtue of the objects of the Puruṣa having to be fulfilled. They bring about the fulfilment by mere proximity, acting in the same way as lodestone. They follow along the line of the

manifestation of one of them independently of any disposing cause. They are called by the name of Pradhāna (primordial matter). This is styled the knowable. This it is that consists of the elements and the powers of action, sensation and thought. It evolves as the elements, the subtle and the gross *prithvi*, &c. Similarly does it evolve as the powers of sensation, action and thought, the subtle and gross auditory and other powers. And this evolution is not purposeless, beginning as it does with a set purpose before it. The object of the "knowable" is of course the fulfilment of the objects of the Puruṣa, experience and emancipation. Of these, experience consists in obtaining the knowledge of the nature of the desirable and undesirable phenomena of the qualities; which knowledge, however, does not recognize them as only the modifications of the qualities. Emancipation is the ascertainment of the nature of the enjoyer, the Puruṣa. Beyond the knowledge of these two there is no wisdom. And so it has been said: —"And this one, however, having come to know the three 'qualities' to be the actors and the fourth Puruṣa to be the actionless knower of their action, and knowing also the outputs of the qualities, not yet known, that are being presented to the Puruṣa, who is of the same and not yet of the same class with them, no longer suspects the existence of any other wisdom."

Well, but how can either experience or emancipation, which being both of them the works of the Will-to-be live in the Will-to-be alone, be predicated of the Puruṣa? As victory and defeat existing in the soldiers are predicated of their master, because it is he who enjoys the fruit thereof, so are bondage and freedom existing in the Will-to-be alone predicated of the Puruṣa, because he is the enjoyer of their fruit. It is of the Will-to-be alone that the bondage exists until the object of the Puruṣa is fulfilled; and it is the fulfilment of the object that is emancipation (Mokṣa). Similarly have perception, retention, judgment, rejection, knowledge of realities and the distinction of unrealities their existence fastened on to the Puruṣa although they have their existence in the Will-to-be, because he is the enjoyer of their fruit.—69.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The presentation of objectivity is the cause of pain, and that has been described before. The author now describes the knowable:—'The knowable is of the nature of illumination, &c.' It is a quantum of essence (Sattva) as luminosity that is coloured by a quantum of inertia (tamas) as weakness and by a quantum of disturbing energy (rajas) as pain. Similarly may this be illustrated in the case of existences in which rajas, &c., prevail. It is this that is intended to be said by,

'These qualities are capable of being coloured more or less by proximity to one another.'

They have the characteristics of conjunction and separation 'with and from the Puruṣa.' As it is said in the Veda :—'One unborn is there who is red, white and black; she goes on giving birth to many similar children. One unborn Puruṣa follows her enjoying; another unborn (Puruṣa) gives her up, having enjoyed all her enjoyables.' (Śveta-śvatara Up.)

It is said of them that they manifest forms, by lending support to one another, inasmuch as it is thus that the *prithvi* and other *tattvas* are evolved. Grant that. But inasmuch as Disturbing Energy (*rajas*) and Inertia (*taṃas*) subserve the quality of Essentiality (*sattva*), when the latter brings about the production of the quiescent notion (*śānta pratyaya*), they too are the causes of the production and must as such possess the virtues (that bring about the production). Such being the case, the same quiescent notion must be manifest even when the *rajas* and the *taṃas* are the principal factors as is manifested in the case of the quality of Essentiality being the principal factor, and not the disturbed and forgetful notions. For this reason the author says :—'None of these loses its distinct power into those of the others, even though each may exist as the principal factor of a phenomenon, with others as subservient thereto.' It may be that *rajas* and *taṃas* exist as subservient factors when the quiescent notion has to be manifested, but their energies are not merged into that of the other. The fact that the energies are not merged is to be inferred from the fact of the effects thereof not disappearing into each other. Inasmuch as the quiescent, disturbed and forgetful effects are found along with the intensified manifestation of the several 'qualities,' not being merged into the others, it is proved that the separate qualities of their energies are not destroyed by conjunction.

Let that be granted. But if these energies are separate from one another and cannot be merged into the others, then it cannot be said of the 'qualities' that they can come together with the object of bringing about a single effect. Different energies are never found coming together to bring about a single effect. It never happens that thread, earth and straw should come together to produce a jar and such other things. To this he says in answer :—'They take to the lines of different manifestations of power in objects of the same and of different classes.' Although the power of forming the material cause exists with reference to objects of the same class only and not with respect to others, the power of helping the cause to manifest as a particular effect does certainly exist in objects of different classes also. As to a cloth, straw does not possess the power of even helping the material cause in the manifestation thereof. It, therefore, cannot come together with thread to bring about a cloth. They are spoken of as taking to the lines of different energies in objects of the same and different classes, because it is their nature to do so.

'At the time of their being the principal factors':—When a divine body has to be generated, the quality of essentiality becomes the principal factor, and the qualities of disturbing energy (*rajas*) and inertia (*taṃas*) are subservient. It is for this reason that these qualities show their antecedent closeness at the time of their not being the principal factors, i.e., their modifications tend towards the immediate manifestation of the intended effects.

The words 'principal factors' are intended chiefly to signify the state of being. As in the aphorism of Pāṇini, 'The dual and the singular in case of two and one,' the meaning is that in case of duality and unity, the dual and singular are to be used; for were it not so, the words used would be 'twos' and 'ones' (in the plural number).

Well, but the question arises, that in the case of their being the principal factors of any phenomenon it is possible to posit their existence because they are then in manifestation; not so however when they are not in manifestation. What reason is then there to

suppose that they do exist, when they are not in manifestation? For this reason he says :—‘Their existence as subservient energies, &c.’ Even though they are not in manifestation, yet their existence as substances subserving the principal factor by helping it to bring about a particular effect is inferred by their functioning alone, inasmuch as they do not possess the power of discriminating intelligently, the one from the other, and have the capacity of causing effect by coming together. They are, therefore, thus described.

Well but granting that the qualities have the power of bringing about the manifestation of effects by coming together, how is it that they do bring about the effects. It is not necessary that whoever has the power must use it also. To show that this power does not stop in its action of causing the manifestation of effects, he says :—‘Their powers come into manifestation by virtue, &c.’ The meaning is that the ‘qualities’ cease to act only when all the objects of the Puruṣa have been fulfilled. It is only then that they do not produce effects.

The question arises that inasmuch as the qualities do not confer any benefit upon the Puruṣa, how can it be said that the fulfilment of the objects of the Puruṣa sets them into action. For this reason he says :—‘They bring about the fulfilment by mere proximity.’

But the question arises that virtue and vice being the evident disposing causes of the action of the ‘qualities’ why is it said that their powers come into manifestation by virtue of the objects of the Puruṣa having to be fulfilled? In answer to this he says :—‘They follow in the line of the manifestation of one of them, &c.’ Whichever of the three, whether the Sattva, the Rajas or the Tamas functions as the principal factor to manifest its effect, the others follow along its line without the existence of a disposing cause in the shape of virtue and vice. The same will be said : -

“No disposing cause sets the Prakṛitis in motion; it removes the obstacles only, like the husbandman.”—3.28.

“These qualities” are called by the name of Pradhāna—this is the construction. They are called by the name of Pradhāna, derived as the word is from the root √Dhā ‘to maintain,’ meaning those by which the whole world is maintained. This is called ‘the knowable.’

Having thus described the nature of the qualities, now the author describes their effects :—‘This it is that consists, &c.’ When it is proved that the effects exist in reality, it is apparent that everything evolves according to its own nature. Now he explains how it is of the nature of the elements and the powers of sensation, &c. ‘It evolves as the elements, &c.’ Now he introduces the portion of the aphorism, ‘Its objects are experience and emancipation.’ And this evolution is not purposeless, inasmuch as it sets in with a fixed purpose before it.

The author explains experience (bhoga) :—‘Of these, experience, &c.’ Pleasure and pain are the phenomena of the Will-to-be which is of the nature of the three qualities. It is the Will-to-be that modifies as these. Experience, however, does not consist in determining their nature as qualities. For this reason he says :—‘Which knowledge, however does not recognize them as only modifications of the qualities.’ This has often been discussed.

The author explains emancipation. ‘The ascertainment of the nature of the enjoyer.’ The radical meaning is that by which it is separated from something (Apa vṛij, varga).

Now he explains the non-existence of any other purpose :—‘Beyond the knowledge of these two there is no other wisdom.’ And so it has been said by Pañchaśikḥā :—‘And this one however, &c.’

The question now arises that experience and emancipation being both the modifications of the Will-to-be and as such having their being in the Will-to-be, how is it that they are predicated of the Puruṣa, who is not their cause and in whom they do not live? For this reason he says :—" Well but how can either, &c." It has been said that the Puruṣa is the enjoyer, and the subject will be discussed further besides. In reality, however, it is by the Will-to-be alone that the object of the Puruṣa is fulfilled. It is by this description of the nature of the relationship of the Puruṣa to experience and emancipation, that the nature of the relationship of the Puruṣa to perception, &c., should also be known. But of these perception is the knowledge of an object such as it is. The memory thereof is retention. Judgment consists in discovering the particular differentiae of the percepts. Rejection means the removal by reasoning of the untrue facts that have entered the mind. The knowledge of realities consists in coming to a conclusion by judgment and rejection. The knowledge of the things to be rejected and accepted, preceded by the knowledge of the realities, is the distinguishing of the unrealities. 18.

Sūtra 19.

विशेषाविशेषलिङ्गमात्रालिङ्गानि गुणपर्वणि ॥१६॥

19. The Specialized,¹ the Unspecialized,² the Undifferentiated phenomenal³ and the noumenal⁵ are the stages⁷ of "the qualities."⁶—70.

दृश्यानां तु गुणानां स्वरूपभेदावधारणार्थमिदमारभ्यते । विशेषाविशेषलिङ्गमात्रालिङ्गानि गुणपर्वणि । तत्राकाशवाय्वग्न्युदकभूमयो भूतानि शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धतन्मात्राणामविशेषाणां विशेषाः । तथा श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षुर्जिह्वाघ्राणानि बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि । वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थानि कर्मेन्द्रियाणि । एकादशं मनः सर्वार्थमित्येतान्यस्मितालक्ष्यस्याविशेषस्य विशेषाः । गुणानामेष षोडशको विशेषपरिणामः । षडविशेषाः तद्यथा शब्दतन्मात्रं स्पर्शतन्मात्रं रूपतन्मात्रं रसतन्मात्रं गन्धतन्मात्रं चेति । एकद्वित्रिचतुष्पञ्चलक्षणाः शब्दादयः पञ्चाविशेषाः । षष्ठश्चाविशेषोऽस्मितामात्र इति । एते सत्तामात्रस्यात्मनो महतः षडविशेषपरिणामाः । यत्तत्परमविशेषेभ्यो लिङ्गमात्रं महत्त्वं तस्मिन्नेते सत्तामात्रे महत्यात्मन्यवस्थाय विवृद्धिकाष्ठामनुभवन्ति । प्रतिसंसृज्यमानाश्च तस्मिन्नेव सत्तामात्रे महत्यात्मन्यवस्थाय यत्तान्निःसत्तासत्तं निःसदसन्निरसदव्यक्तमलिङ्गं प्रधानं तत्प्रतीयन्ति । एष तेषां लिङ्गमात्रः परिणामो निःसत्तासत्तं चालिङ्गपरिणाम इति । अलिङ्गावस्थायां न पुरुषार्थो हेतुर्नालिङ्गावस्थायामादौ पुरुषार्थता कारणं भवतीति । न तस्याः पुरुषार्थताकारणं भवतीति । नासौ पुरुषार्थकृतेतिनित्याख्यायते । त्रयाणां त्ववस्थाविशेषाणामादौ पुरुषार्थता कारणं भवति । स चार्थहेतुर्निमित्तकारणं भवतोत्यनित्याख्यायते । गुणास्तु सर्वधर्मानुपातिनो न प्रत्यस्तमयं तेनोपजायन्ते । व्यक्तिभिरेवातीतानागतव्ययगमवतोभिर्गुणान्वयिनीभिरुपजननापायधर्मका इव प्रत्यवभासन्ते । यथा देवदत्तो दरिद्राति । कस्मात् । यतोऽस्य ध्रियन्ते गाव इति । गवामेव मरणात्तस्य दरिद्राणं न स्वरूपहानादिति । समः समाधिर्लिङ्गमात्रमलिङ्गस्य प्रत्यासन्नं तत्र तत्संसृष्टं विविच्यते क्रमान्तित्वेः । तथा षडविशेषालिङ्गमात्रे संसृष्टा विविच्यन्ते परिणामक्रमनियमात् । तथा तेष्वविशेषेषु भूतेन्द्रियाणि संसृष्टानि विविच्यन्ते । तथाचोक्तं पुरस्ताद्विशेषेभ्यः परं

तत्त्वान्तरमस्तीति विशेषाणां नास्ति तत्त्वान्तरपरिणामः । तेषां तु धर्मलक्षणावस्था परि-
णामा व्याख्यायिष्यन्ते ॥ १९ ॥

VYÂSA.

This is composed for the purpose of ascertaining the differences of nature shown by 'the qualities' which constitute the 'knowable.' The Specialized, the Unspecialized, the Undifferentiated Phenomenal and the Noumenal are the stages of 'the qualities.'

Here the elements known as Âkâsa (ether), Vâyu (Invisible gas), Tejas (Steam or visible gas), Apas (liquid) and Prithivî (solid) are the specialized modifications of the unspecialized soniferous, tangiferous, lumniferous, gustiferous and odoriferous measures thereof (the tanmâtras, the subtle elements)

Similarly are the powers of sensation (hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell), the powers of action (speech, grasp, position, excretion and generation), the eleventh Manas, which has all these as its sphere, the specialized modifications of the unspecialized modification of the principle of egoism. Thus sixteen-fold is the specialized modification of the qualities. Six are the unspecialized modifications and these are the soniferous, the tangiferous, the lumniferous, the gustiferous and the odoriferous 'ultimates' the tanmâtras. These five unspecialized modifications, the soniferous and the others, possess respectively one, two, three, four, and five of the qualities of sound, &c. The sixth unspecialized modification is the Pure Egoism.

These six are the unspecialized modifications of Pure Be-ness, the Great Principle, the Mahâ Âtmâ. This Great Reality is the Undifferentiated Phenomenal Stage beyond the Unspecialised. In the Great Principle of Pure Be-ness do these live and grow up to their highest capacity. On involution they pass back into that state of Pure Be-ness, the great principle; and thence they pass into the state which neither IS, nor yet IS NOT, that in which it exists and yet does not; that which is Real, the Unmanifested, the noumenon, the background of all. This is their undifferentiated phenomenal modification; and that which neither IS nor yet IS NOT, is the noumenal modification. The objects of the Puruṣa are no cause of the noumenal state. That is to say, the fulfilment of the objects of the Puruṣa does not act as the cause manifestation with reference to the noumenal state, in the beginning. The fulfilment of the objects of the Puruṣa is not, therefore, the reason of the existence of the cause. For the reason that it is not brought into existence by the Puruṣa's objects, it is said to be eternal. As to the three specialised states, the

fulfilment of the objects of the Puruṣa becomes the cause of their manifestation in the beginning. And because the objects of the Puruṣa become the cause of their manifestation, they are said to be non-eternal. The 'qualities,' however, follow up all these characteristics. They are, therefore, neither born nor disappear at each stage. They only appear as if they were possessed of the characteristics of birth and death, because their individual phenomena in which they of course are present, are possessed of the characteristics of dissolution and birth with reference to their past and present, &c. As (when we say) "Devadatta has become poor," Why? Because all his cattle are dead. The death of his cattle has caused his poverty and not the destruction of his own substance. This is an analogous conception.

The Undifferentiated phenomenal (Liṅga) is the next after the Noumenal (Alinga). It exists therein, as the same substance, and is distinguished from that, because the law of the order of appearance is inviolable.

Similarly, the six unspecialised modifications have their being in the undifferentiated phenomenal and are distinguished from that by the order of evolution being inviolable.

Similarly are the elements and the powers of sensation having their being in these unspecialized modifications, distinguished from them. And it has been said before that there is no other tattva appearing in succession after the specialized modifications. Their modifications consist of the characteristic (dharma) the secondary quality (lakṣaṇa) and condition (avasthā, accident). They will be described. --70.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

It is for ascertaining the different modifications of 'the qualities' that go to make up the knowable that this is composed :—

"The specialized, the unspecialized, the undifferentiated phenomenal and the noumenal are the stages of the qualities."

"The specialized":—The unspecialized modifications are those that are free from the specialities which may be described as the quiescent, the disturbed and the forgetful. The specialized modifications are their outcomes only. They do not evolve further tattvas.

He describes them :—"Here the elements found, &c." They are enumerated here in the order of their manifestation.

The powers of sensation and thought are the specialized modifications of the unspecialized principle of egoism, with the quality of essentiality (sattva) as the principal factor. The powers of action are the modifications of the rājasic form of that principle. The Manas is of the nature of both and should be considered as possessing both of these as the principal factors. Here the five tanmātras are the effects of the Will-to-be (budhi) because they are the unspecialized modifications, just like the principle of egoism. Non-specialization consists in being the cause of further modifications.

Having enumerated the tanmātras and the principle of egoism as the unspecialized modifications, now he enumerates the specialized :—"This is the sixteenfold, &c." Then he

enumerates the unspecialized :—"Six, etc." Next he illustrates by putting them together :—"And these are, &c." The latter is in each case qualified by the former. The 'smell vibration' has by nature five secondary qualities. The taste vibration has by nature four ; the luminiferous three, the tangiferous two, and the soniferous has but one secondary quality, namely the sound.

Well of what are these six modifications or effects ? He says : - 'They are the modifications of PURE BE-NESS.' That which is capable of fulfilling the objects of the Puruṣa IS. Its state is signified by BE-NESS. Pure means limited by that alone. This is the Great Principle, the Mahattattva. The meaning is that whatever of work is there for fulfilling the objects of the Puruṣa, whether it appears in the shape of the enjoyables of sound, &c., or in the shape of the discrimination of the distinction between the Puruṣa and Sattva (consciousness and the Essence of Objective matter), all has its end in the Great Principle of the Will-to-be. This is described as the Ātmā, with the object of denying its smallness by showing that it constitutes the very nature, the very being of all modifications. This is the first modification of the Prakṛiti. It is a real modification, not a mere unfoldment thereof.

"Beyond the undifferentiated" means divided off from it in time with reference to the other objects which are nearer to it in time, *i.e.*, the unspecialized. This is the Mahattattva, the Great Principle of the undifferentiated Phenomenal. In that Great Principle of Pure Be-ness lives the determining energy of all further phenomenal modifications, that is the unspecialized phenomena, because it is proved that they possess the capacity of effecting the fulfilment of the objects of the Puruṣa, possessed as they are of real existence. There they grow to their highest capacity of growth, *i.e.*, reach that state. As to the modifications in succession of the specialized modifications of the unspecialized ones, these further modifications are characteristic secondary quality and condition. This is the end of their growth, *i.e.*, of their further modifications.

Having thus described the order of evolution, now he describes the order of involution. Involution means passing into latency into the antecedent modification, the determining cause of its existence, its Ātmā (self). The Unspecialized modifications into which the Specialized ones have already become latent, pass back in their turn into the Pure Be-ness, the Great Mahattattva. Thence the Unspecialized modifications along with their Mahat modification pass back into the Unmanifested. It is called Alīṅga, the Noumenal, because beyond this do the phenomena pass into latency. This is the final state of latency of the phenomenal world. "That which neither IS nor yet IS NOT" is a description of this state. Its existence consists in its possessing the capacity of effecting the fulfilment of the objects of the Puruṣa. Non-existence means want of capacity to be taken into account, to force itself upon attention. It is so described, as being beyond both these states of existence and non-existence. This is the meaning. The state of the equipoise of the three qualities of Essence, Inertia, and Energy is nowhere of use in fulfilling the objects of the Puruṣa. It, therefore, does not exist as such. On the other hand, it does not admit of being rejected as non-existent, like the lotus of the sky. It is, therefore, not non-existent.

Grant that. But the principles of Mahat, &c., exist as such in the state of the unmanifested also, because nothing that exists can be destroyed ; and if it is destroyed it can not be born again, because nothing that does not exist can be born. It follows, therefore, that the principles of Mahat, &c., existing in the state of the unmanifested, that state also can effect the fulfilment of the objects of the Puruṣa. How then can it be said that the unmanifested is not possessed of existence ? For this reason he says : - 'That in which it exists and yet does not exist.' This means that the cause exists in that state but not the effect as such. Although the effect exists in the cause *in posse*, yet it is

incapable of performing its function of fulfilling the object of the Puruṣa. It is, therefore, said to be non-existent as such.

Further he says that this cause is not of the nature of a hare's horn :—"That which is real (not *asat*, non-existent)." It is beyond the state of non-existence, that is of the existence of the effect only as such. If it were like that, then it would be like the lotus of the sky and no effect would follow from that.

Having described what takes place in the case of every manifestation, now he summarizes :—"This is their undifferentiated, &c." 'This' refers to what has gone immediately before. The states of existence from the undifferentiated Phenomenal downwards are impermanent, because they have been brought into manifestation by virtue of the objects of the Puruṣa having to be fulfilled. The noumenon, however, is permanent, because it has not been brought into being by the objects of the Puruṣa. The author describes the cause :—"The objects of the Puruṣa are no cause, &c."

How is it, however, that the objects of the Puruṣa are no cause? He says :—"That is to say, &c." By using the words, 'does not act as the cause,' he indicates the knowledge of the nature of the principle under discussion. This is the meaning. The fulfilment of the objects of the Puruṣa may be understood to be the cause with reference to the noumenal state, if that state bring about the enjoyment of sound, &c., or manifest the discrimination of the distinction between consciousness and Objective Existence. If, however, it did that there would be no equipoise. For this reason the objects of the Puruṣa are not understood to be the cause of the noumenal state. Hence the fulfilment of the objects of the Puruṣa is not the cause of the noumenal state. This he summarizes :—"For the reason that it is not brought into existence, &c." The word *ITI* in the text means "for the reason that." He describes non-eternity : "As the three states, *i. e.*, the undifferentiated phenomenal, the unspecialized and the specialized."

Having described the nature of the stages, now he describes the nature of the 'qualities' :—"The qualities, however, &c." Then he gives an illustration :—"As for example, Devadatta becomes poor."

The meaning is that when the entirely different phenomena of the rise, increase and decrease of his bovine wealth cause the rise and fall of Devadatta to be inferred, what need then be said of the appearance and disappearance of individual phenomena which although different from the "qualified" themselves, are yet of their very nature and not altogether different from them.

The question now is whether the order of manifestation is alterable. The answer is, 'It is not.' 'The undifferentiated phenomenal is the next after, &c.' The seeds of Nyagrodha are not certainly capable of putting forth at once the full-grown, thickly set tree of Nyagrodha capable of protecting from the fierce heat of the sun with the thick setting of its leaves, twigs, branches and body. The tree comes out only gradually in the ordered appearance of shoots, leaves, body and branches, brought about by contact with earth, water and heat. Here too must, therefore, be established an order of appearance proved to exist both by reason and authority.

How have the elements and the powers of sensation and action their origin in the unspecialized modifications? It has been said before in the Commentary to this very aphorism.

Now he says why the further modification of the specialized modifications into other principles has not been spoken of. 'There is no other appearance in succession after, &c.' Are the specialized modifications then quite unchangeable? If so they must be permanent. For this reason he says :—"Their modifications consist of the characteristic, &c."—19.

Sūtra 20.

द्रष्टा दृशिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः ॥२०॥

20. The seer¹ is consciousness² only ;³ even though⁵ pure,⁴ he cognizes ideas⁷ by imitation.⁶—71.

व्याख्यातं दृश्यमथ द्रष्टुः स्वरूपावधारणार्थमिदमारभ्यते । द्रष्टा दृशिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः । दृशिमात्र इति दृक्शक्तिरेव विशेषणापरामृष्टेत्यर्थः । स पुरुषो बुद्धेः प्रतिसंवेदी स बुद्धेर्न सरूपो नात्यन्तं विरूप इति । न तावत्सरूपः । कस्मात् । ज्ञाताज्ञातविषयत्वात्परिणामिनीहि बुद्धिस्तस्याश्च विषयो गवादिर्घटादिश्च ज्ञाताज्ञातश्चेति परिणामित्वं दर्शयति । सदाज्ञातविषयत्वं तु पुरुषस्यापरिणामित्वं परिदीपयति । कस्मान्नहि बुद्धिश्च नाम पुरुषविषयश्च स्यादगृहीता गृहीता चेति सिद्धं पुरुषस्य सदाज्ञातविषयत्वं तदश्चापरिणामित्वमिति । किंच परार्थो बुद्धिः संहत्यकारित्वात्स्वार्थः पुरुष इति । तथा सर्वार्थाध्यवसायकत्वात्त्रिगुणानुबुद्धिस्त्रिगुणत्वादचेतनेति । गुणानां तूपद्रष्टा पुरुष इत्येतो न सरूपः । अस्तु तर्हि विरूप इति नात्यन्तं विरूपः कस्मान्छुद्धोऽप्यसौ प्रत्ययानुपश्यो यतः प्रत्ययं बौद्धमनुपश्यति तमनुपश्यन्न तदात्मापि तदात्मक इव प्रत्यवभासते । तथाचाक्तम् । अपरिणामिनी हि भोक्तशक्तिरप्रतिसङ्क्रमा च परिणामिन्यर्थे प्रतिसङ्क्रान्तेव तद्वृत्तिमनुपतति । तस्याश्च प्राप्तचैतन्योपग्रहरूपाया बुद्धिवृत्तेरनुकारमात्रतया बुद्धिवृत्त्याऽविशिष्टा हि ज्ञानवृत्तिरित्याख्यायते ॥ २० ॥

VYĀSA.

The knowable has been described. Discussion is now begun with the object of describing and ascertaining the nature of the seer (knower). 'The seer is consciousness only : even though pure, he cognizes ideas by imitation.'

'Consciousness only' : This means that he is nothing other than the power of becoming conscious ; that is to say, he is not touched by the qualities. This Puruṣa cognizes the Will-to-be by reflex action. He is neither quite similar nor quite dissimilar to the Will-to-be (Buddhi). 'He is not quite similar.' Why ? The Will-to-be having for its sphere of action objects known, and not yet known, is of course changeful. The changefulness is shown by its objects, such as the cow and the jar &c., being both known and unknown. The fact, however, that the sphere of consciousness is always *the Known*, renders it plain that consciousness is not changeful. How ? It never happens that the Will-to-know becomes the sphere of consciousness both when it takes in some notion and when it does not. Hence it is proved that the Known is always the sphere of the Puruṣa. Thence the unchangeability of the Puruṣa is shown. Further the Will-to-be exists to fulfil another's object,

bringing as it does more than one phenomena together into itself, for the purpose of presenting them to the Puruṣa. The Puruṣa, however, has his own object before it.

Besides the Will-to-be is the underlying determinative energy of all objective phenomena, and is as such of the nature of the qualities. It is, therefore, non-intelligent. The Puruṣa, however, is the seer of the qualities by proximity. For these reasons he is not similar.

Well then let him be dissimilar. To meet this he says:—‘He is not quite dissimilar.’ Why? ‘Even though pure, he sees the ideas after they have come into the mind.’ Inasmuch as the Puruṣa cognizes the ideas as the Will-to-be seized of consciousness is transformed into them, he appears by the act of cognition to be as it were the very self of the Will-to-be, although in reality he is not so. As it has been said:—‘The power of the enjoyer is certainly unchangeable, and it does not run after every object. In connection with a changeful object it looks as if it were being transferred to every object, and imitates its modifications.’

And when that modification of the Will-to-be assumes the form of consciousness by which it is coloured, it imitates it and looks as if it were a manifestation of consciousness unqualified by the modifications of the Will-to-be. It is accordingly so spoken of.-- 71.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The knowable has been described; the discussion for the ascertainment of the nature of the seer is now begun:—‘The seer is consciousness alone; even though pure, he cognizes ideas by imitation.’ He explains it:—‘Consciousness alone, not touched by modifying characteristics.’ By this the object of using the word only or alone is shown.

Well if it be so, if the power of the seer be free from all the attributes of sound, &c., they would not be known. Nothing that is not touched by the act of seeing, can be knowable. For this reason he says: ‘That Puruṣa, &c.’ The passing of the reflection of the Puruṣa into the mirror of the Will-to-be is the knowing of the Will-to-be by the Puruṣa by reflex action. It is thus that sound and touch, &c., are known by the Will-to-be which has received into itself the reflection of the Puruṣa. And it is thus that they become the knowable.

Well if this be so, why should not consciousness and the Will-to-be be considered to be really one in nature? What is the use of this reflection of the Puruṣa into the Will-to-be? For this reason he says:—‘He is not similar to the Will-to-be.’ Inasmuch as in the case of dissimilarity it would be difficult to account for reflection, it is further said:—‘Nor is he quite dissimilar.’ Of these he denies similarity:—‘He is not quite similar, &c.’ Then asks he the question:—‘Why?’ He gives the answer with grounds:—‘The Will-to-be having for the sphere of its action, &c.’ Inasmuch as the Will-to-be is changeful it is dissimilar. When it assumes the shapes of sound, &c., then its sphere becomes instinct with sound, &c., and thus becomes known. If it has not taken up the forms of sound, &c., then they remain unknown. Hence the Will-to-be which takes up the forms of sound &c., then they remain unknown. Hence the Will-to-be which

takes up the forms of sounds, &c., only sometimes, is changeful. And the statement is so made:—‘The Will-to-be is changeful because it is the sphere of both the known and the yet unknown, like the sense of hearing, &c.’

As to the dissimilarity of the Puruṣa with the Will-to-be, it is proved by the opposite reasoning:—‘The fact, however, that the sphere of consciousness is always the known, &c.’

Well but if the known is always the sphere of the puruṣa, then he can never be absolutely free (kevala). With this in view he puts the question: ‘How?’ The answer is:—‘It never happens that the Will-to-be becomes &c.’

Inasmuch as it is possible that in the state of the restraint of mental faculties, the Will-to-be and the absence of actual cognition might co-exist it is said with the object of indicating contrariety:—‘because the sphere of consciousness both when &c.’

The first copulative signifies that the Will-to-be must be the sphere and the other shows the contrary state. The statement of the reasoning will stand thus:—The Puruṣa never changes, because he is the constant factor in the phenomena of knowledge, in the outgoing mental state and the state of the Cognitive trance. That which is changeful can not be the constant factor in the phenomena of knowledge, as the power of hearing, &c. This inference is by the canon of difference.

He mentions another contrary characteristic also:—‘The Will-to-be fulfilling as it does the objects of the Puruṣa by means of the residua of the afflictions and actions and the objects and powers of sensation, &c., coming together into it, exists for the purpose of another.’ The statement of the reasoning is thus:—The Will-to-be exists for the purpose of another, because its work is fulfilled by bringing together into itself various objects such as beds, seats and toilet powders, &c.

He says that the Puruṣa is not like that:—‘The Puruṣa, however, has its own object before it.’ All is made for the Puruṣa. The Puruṣa is not designed for any other. This is the meaning.

He states another contrary characteristic:—‘Because the Will-to-be is the underlying characteristic, &c.’ The Will-to-be determines the nature of all objects, as it is being transformed into their respective forms. Further, all these are the modifications of the three qualities of Essence, Energy and Inertia. For this reason the Will-to-be is proved to possess the three qualities by nature. He says that the Puruṣa is not such. ‘The Puruṣa, however, is the seer, &c.’ The meaning is that he sees by reflection into it, not by being transformed into the forms of the objects (like the Will-to-be). He summarizes:—‘For these reasons, &c.’ The result of the reasoning being that he must be dissimilar, it is added that he is not altogether dissimilar. Why? Because (having been reflected into the mind) he sees the ideas by imitating the modifications of the Will-to-be. The way in which this happens, has been described in the aphorism: “Identification with modifications elsewhere.”—I. 4.

So also has it been said by Pauṇḍarīkha:—‘The power of the knower is certainly unchangeable. The power of the knower means the self (ātmā). And although for this very reason it does not in reality change with the modifications of the Will-to-be, it as it were follows the modifications of the Will-to-be, resting as it does in each object that comes into the changeful mind.

The question arises, How is it that it looks as it were running after every object, although it, as a matter of fact, does not do so? Further how does it follow the modifications of the mind, when it does not modify itself? For this reason he says:—‘Inasmuch as the Puruṣa cognizes, &c.’

“Seized of consciousness”—This means having been coloured by contiguity. Whatever form the Will-to-be is transformed into, is as such coloured by consciousness. The

Will-to-be is said to be 'seized of consciousness' when each transformation of it is as such coloured by consciousness. This is the meaning. Although the moon is not as a matter of fact transferred into pure water, yet inasmuch as its reflection passes into water, it is as it were transferred into it. So also, the power of consciousness, although not actually transferred into the Buddhi, yet it is, as it were, transferred into it, because it is reflected into it. By that fact consciousness becomes, as it were, of the very nature of the Will-to-be. It accordingly follows the modifications of the Will-to-be. This explains the words 'by imitation.' It is said it cognizes by imitation as it cognizes by following the modifications of the Will-to-be.—20.

Sûtra 21.

तदर्थ एव दृश्यस्यात्मा ॥२१॥

21. For his¹ purpose² only³ is the being⁵ of the 'knowable'.⁴—72.

तदर्थ एव दृश्यस्यात्मा । दृशिरूपस्य पुरुषस्य कर्मरूपतामापन्नं दृश्यमिति तदर्थ एव दृश्यस्यात्मा भवति । स्वरूपं भवतीत्यर्थः । तत्स्वरूपं तु पररूपेण प्रतिलब्धात्मकं भोगापवर्गाद्यैतायां कृतायां पुरुषेण न दृश्यत इति । स्वरूपहानादस्य नाशः प्राप्तो न तु विनश्यति ॥ २१ ॥

VYÂSA.

The knowable comes out as the object of the Puruṣa appearing as an act of consciousness. For his purpose only, therefore, is the being of the knowable. The meaning is that it possesses the nature it does, for that purpose. Its nature, however, depending as it does upon another for its existence as such, is not cognized by the Puruṣa when the objects of achieving the purposes of enjoyment and emancipation are over. This would seem to imply that it is destroyed, because what constitutes its very being is thus done away with. But it is not destroyed.—72.

VACHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having described the nature of the knower and the knowable now he says that the knowable exists for the knower, showing as this does in part the relationship existing between the two, the relation that is to say of the lord to his possessions. 'For this purpose only is the being of the knowable.' He explains it: 'The knowable comes out as the object of, i. e., being enjoyable by the enjoyer, the Puruṣa, appearing as an act of consciousness.' For this reason the existence of the knowable is for his purpose only, i. e., for the purpose of the knower alone, and not for the purpose of the knowable.

(The word translated here as the *being* is in the original *Âtmā*, the self. Hence arises the question, How can the self exist for the self?) For this reason he says:—Possesses the nature it does for that purpose. This is the meaning:—The knowable being of the very nature of pleasure and pain, is the enjoyable. Pleasure and pain which consist in being of the same class with the then prevailing mental habit, are in reality put up as such for his purpose only. The objects also such as sound, &c., cause pleasure and pain only because they also are of the nature of the knowable. And it is not themselves that are to be pleased or pained, because in that case these modifications would act as

contrary to themselves. By the canon of residues, therefore, the power of consciousness only can be opposed or favoured. Therefore the being of the knowable is for the purpose of the Puruṣa only and not for the purpose of the knowable itself.

It is because the being of the knowable is for the purpose of the Puruṣa and not for the purpose of the knowable itself, that its nature acts to that purpose until that purpose of the Puruṣa is achieved; and ceases to act when that purpose has been achieved. For this reason he says :—‘Its nature, however, &c.’ In itself the knowable is unintelligent. It is ensouled by another, by consciousness which is the nature of the self. “Ensouled by consciousness” means that its nature as such is informed thereby. When enjoyment and emancipation have been achieved, it is no longer seen by the Puruṣa. Enjoyment is the experience of sound, &c., as pleasure and pain, &c. Emancipation is the direct knowledge of the distinction between the Puruṣa and Objective Existence (Sattva). The Will-to-be is unintelligent and by itself does not know either. It is only by the reflection of the Puruṣa into itself that it does do so. The enjoyment and the direct knowledge of the distinct nature of the Puruṣa and Objective Existence, belong therefore to the Puruṣa Himself. Thus when the enjoyment and emancipation of the Puruṣa have been achieved, the purpose of the existence of the knowable no longer remains. The enjoyment and emancipation have no longer to be achieved. Hence it has been said :—‘When the object of achieving enjoyment and emancipation has been achieved, &c.’

In this connection he raises a doubt :—‘It would follow, &c.’ and refutes it :—“But it is not destroyed.”—72.

Sūtra 22.

कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् ॥२२॥

22. Although⁵ destroyed¹ in relation to³ him whose objects² have been achieved¹, it is not destroyed⁶, being common⁹ to others⁷⁻⁸.—73.

कस्मात् । कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् । कृतार्थमेकं पुरुषं प्रति हृद्यं नष्टमपि नाशं प्राप्तमप्यनष्टं तदन्यपुरुषसाधारणत्वात् । कुशलं पुरुषं प्रति नाशं प्राप्तमप्यकुशलान्पुरुषान्प्रति न कृतार्थमिति तेषां हृद्योः कर्मविषयतामापन्नं लभत एव पररूपेणानात्मरूपमिति । अतश्च हृद्यदर्शनशक्त्योर्नित्यत्वादिनादिः संयोगो व्याख्यात इति । तथा चोक्तम् । धर्मिणामनादिसंयोगाद्धर्ममात्राणामप्यनादिः संयोग इति ॥ २२ ॥

VYĀSA.

Why is it not destroyed? “Although destroyed in relation to him whose objects have been achieved, it is not destroyed, being common to others” than him. Even though destroyed, i.e., passed into annihilation, in relation to one Puruṣa, whose objects have been achieved, it is not destroyed in reality, because it is common to other Puruṣas beside him. Although it is destroyed to the Puruṣa who has attained wisdom, it is not destroyed in relation to the Puruṣas who have not attained wisdom, as it has not done its duty by them yet. It is, therefore, still related to

them, as an object of the act of consciousness, and is as such of course, ensouled by them into form.

This further explains the eternal conjunction of the indestructible energies of the knower and the knowable. As has been said :—The characterised being eternally conjoined, there is eternal conjunction of mere characteristics also.—73.

VACHASPATI'S GLOSS.

But becoming altogether unperceivable as it does, how is it that it is not destroyed ? Forestalling this objection, he asks the question, 'Why is it not destroyed ?' and answers by the aphorism :—'Although destroyed in relation to him whose objects have been achieved, &c.' The Puruṣa whose objects have been achieved, is so spoken of here. Even though destroyed in relation to him, it, the knowable, is not really destroyed, because it is common to all the other Puruṣas, whether they be the wise ones or the unwise ones. He explains :—'Even though destroyed in relation, &c.' Destruction means disappearance. The knowable, however, is not destroyed, being common to all the other Puruṣas. Consciousness is the nature of the self which is beyond the knowable. It is by that, that the knowable is ensouled. That is known in the Śruti, Smṛiti, Purāṇa and Itihāsa as the Unmanifested, One without parts, not dependent upon anything else, pervading, eternal, possessing the energy of all the effects in the world. It does not become the object of knowledge to the wise man the act being contrary to his nature. It is, however, seen by the unwise, and is not therefore non-existent. Colour is not seen by the blind man ; it does not, therefore, cease to exist, being visible to a man with eyes. Further, there is not one Puruṣa only like the Prakṛiti. That there are more Puruṣas than one is proved by differences of life, death, pleasure and pain and evolution and emancipation. As to the Vedic texts which speak of the unity of the Puruṣas, they are contrary to other authoritative knowledge ; they also can somehow be reconciled by the absence of difference of time and place and by devotion. Further, the Vedic texts themselves lay down clearly that the Prakṛiti is one and that the Puruṣas are many. Thus the text :—"One unborn is there, who is red, black and white ; she goes on giving birth to many children. One unborn Puruṣa follows her enjoying ; another unborn Puruṣa gives her up, having enjoyed all her enjoyables." (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad). The aphorism under discussion explains only the meaning of this text.

Inasmuch as the knowable, although destroyed in relation to one, exists in relation to another Puruṣa, the powers of seeing (consciousness) and being seen (the knowable) are permanent, and the eternity of their conjunction is hereby explained. The author states the concurrence of the Âgamas with this position :—"As it has been said." The 'characterized,' i.e., the qualities are in eternal conjunction with the selves (the âtmās). Hence their conjunction with the characteristics, i.e., the phenomenal state of Mahat, &c., is also eternal. Although the conjunction of the Mahat, &c., with each one of the Puruṣas has an end, notwithstanding its having had no beginning, yet the conjunction of all of them with the Mahat, &c., has no end, as these are common to all. It is for this reason that the words used are 'characteristics only.' The author shows the generic qualities pervading all the phenomena of that class by using the word "only." It is for this reason that although the conjunction of one Puruṣa with one manifestation of the principle of Mahat has ceased to exist, the conjunction of another Puruṣa with another manifestation of the Mahat has not become a thing of the past. It has, therefore, been spoken of as ever-present (Nitya).—22.

Sūtra 23.

स्वस्वामिशक्त्योः स्वरूपोपलब्धिहेतुः संयोगः ॥२३॥

23. Conjunction⁷ is that which brings about⁶ the recognition⁵ of the natures⁴ of the power³ of owning² and the capacity³ of being owned.¹—74.

संयोगस्वरूपाभिधित्सयेदं सूत्रं प्रवृत्ते । स्वस्वामिशक्त्योः स्वरूपोपलब्धिहेतुः संयोगः । पुरुषः स्वामी दृश्येन स्वेन दर्शनार्थं संयुक्तस्तस्मात्संयोगाद्दृश्यस्योपलब्धिर्या स भोगः । या तु द्रष्टुः स्वरूपोपलब्धिः सोऽपवर्गो दर्शनकार्यावसानः संयोग इति । दर्शनं वियोगस्य कारणमुक्तम् । दर्शनमदर्शनस्य प्रतिद्वन्द्वीत्यदर्शनं संयोगनिमित्तमुक्तम् । नात्र दर्शनं मोक्षकारणमदर्शनामावादेव बन्धाभावः स मोक्ष इति । दर्शनस्य भावे बन्धकारणस्यादर्शनस्य नाश इत्यतो दर्शनं ज्ञानं कैवल्यकारणमुक्तम् । किंचेदमदर्शनं नाम किं गुणानामधिकार आहोस्विदृशिरूपस्य स्वामिनो दर्शितविषयस्य प्रधानचित्तस्यानुत्पादः स्वस्मिन्दृश्ये विद्यमाने यो दर्शनाभावः किमर्थवत्तागुणानामथाविद्या स्वचित्तेन सह निरुद्धा स्वचित्तस्योत्पत्तिबीजम् । किं स्थितिसंस्कारक्षये गतिसंस्काराभिव्यक्तिः । यत्रेदमुक्तं प्रधानं स्थित्यैव वर्तमानं विकाराकरणादप्रधानं स्यात् । तथा गत्यैव वर्तमानं विकारानित्यत्वादप्रधानं स्यात् । उभयथा चास्य वृत्तिः प्रधानव्यवहारं लभते नान्यथा । कारणान्तरेष्वपि कल्पितेष्वेव समानश्चर्चः । दर्शनशक्तिरेवादर्शनमित्येके प्रधानस्यात्मख्यापनार्था प्रवृत्तिरिति श्रुतेः । सर्वबोध्यबोधसमर्थः प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः पुरुषो न पश्यति सर्वकार्यकरणसमर्थं दृश्यं तदा न दृश्यत इत्युभयस्याप्यदर्शनं धर्म इत्येके । तत्रेदं दृश्यस्य स्वात्मभूतमपि पुरुषप्रत्ययापेक्षं दर्शनं दृश्यधर्मत्वेन भवति । तथा पुरुषस्यानात्मभूतमपि दृश्यप्रत्ययापेक्षं पुरुषधर्मत्वेनेवादर्शनमवभासते । दर्शनं ज्ञानमेवादर्शनमिति केचिदभिदधति । इत्येते शास्त्रगतौ विकल्पाः । तत्र विकल्पबहुत्वमेतत्सर्वपुरुषाणां गुणानां संयोगे साधारणविषयम् ॥२३॥

VYĀSA.

This aphorism was composed for the purpose of explaining the nature of conjunction. 'Conjunction is that which brings about the recognition of the natures of the power of owning and the capacity of being owned.' The Puruṣa is the owner. 'The knowable' is whatever is owned. The former is conjoined to the latter for the purpose of knowing. The cognition of the knowable which follows from that conjunction is enjoyment. The knowledge, however, of the nature of the knower is emancipation. Conjunction, therefore, ends when it has caused knowledge. Knowledge is, therefore, called the cause of separation. Knowledge is the contradictory of ignorance. Therefore, ignorance is said to be the reason for conjunction. Here knowledge is not the cause of freedom (Mokṣa); because the absence of Ignorance itself, meaning as it does the absence of bondage, is freedom (Mokṣa). When knowledge comes into existence,

ignorance which is the cause of bondage disappears, and with it the bondage which is caused thereby. It is for this reason that knowledge, the seeing of the true nature of things, is said to be the cause of Kaivalya (absolute independence, standing alone).

And now what is this Ignorance (*adarsana*), this absence of knowledge? Is it a function of the qualities? Or, is it the non-reproduction of the mind which after having shown all the objects to the *Puruṣa* has become latent? That there should be absence of knowledge notwithstanding the presence of the knowable or the thing owned, is also unreasonable. Is it again the purposefulness of the qualities? Or, is it Nescience which has passed into the state of latency with its own appropriate mental state, and has become the seed which produces the mind appropriate to its own manifestation? Is it again the manifestation of the potency of motion, on the potency of rest having expended itself. It has been said on this subject, that the *Pradhāna*, the material cause of all manifestation would become what it is not, if it tended only to rest, because in that case there would not be any manifestation into phenomena; nor would it be what it is, if it were to remain in constant motion, because in that case, the phenomena would become eternal and never disappear. It is only when it tends to both these states, that it can be called the *Pradhāna* (the cause of manifestation) not otherwise. The same considerations apply to any other causes that might be imagined.

Some say that Ignorance (*adarsana*) is nothing but the power which manifests as knowing (*darśana*). As the text says, 'The activity of the *Pradhāna* is for the sake of showing herself.'

Others say that Ignorance (*adarsana*) is the characteristic of both the knower (*Puruṣa*) and the knowable, because the *Puruṣa* possesses only the power of knowing all that may be known, but does not know, before the setting in of manifestation; and the knowable possesses only the capacity of causing all effects, but is not known at the time. Here this knowledge, though of the very nature of the knowable, stands in need of the incoming of the *Puruṣa*, for its achievement, and is therefore a characteristic of the knowable. Again although it is not of the nature of the *Puruṣa*, yet depending as it does for its completion upon the illumination of the knowable, Ignorance looks as if it were a characteristic of the *Puruṣa*.

Some again say that Ignorance is seeing or knowing (*darśana*) only.

These are alternative conceptions of the teaching only. This manifoldness of alternative conceptions is the common ground for the conjunction of the qualities with all the *Puruṣas*.—74

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Thus then having described the cause of conjunction to be the achievement of the objects of the Puruṣa and having further described the concomitant eternity of the Pradhāna as well as the cause of the conjunction common to all the Puruṣas, this aphorism was composed to explain the nature of the conjunction which is not common to all the Puruṣas but pertains only to the individual:—‘Conjunction is the cause of the recognition of the nature of the power of owning and the capacity of being owned.’ Inasmuch as the knowledge is for his sake, the Puruṣa enjoying the benefits conferred by it, becomes its owner, and the knowable becomes its own (possession). This correlation of theirs being determined as it is by the natures of the powers themselves, becomes the cause of the recognition of their natures. It is this that is illuminated by the Commentary:—“The Puruṣa is the owner.” On account of fitness only as such, he is conjoined with the knowable as its own by virtue of its fitness again. The rest is easy.

Very well. The recognition of the nature of the seer is called emancipation (apavarga) because by the instrumentality thereof one is drawn away from the conjunction. Perfect freedom (Mokṣa), however, is not a thing which can be brought about by means of anything. It would, therefore, certainly fall short of perfect freedom. For this reason he says:—Conjunction, therefore, ends when it has caused knowledge; the conjunction, that is to say, of the individual Puruṣa with the individual Will-to-be. Therefore, knowledge is called the cause of separation.

But then how is it that the conjunction ceases with the attainment of knowledge. He says that:—‘Knowledge is the contradictory of Ignorance, &c.’ What then? For this reason he says:—“Ignorance, i.e., Nescience is said to be the reason for conjunction.” Further he illuminates the same meaning:—“Here knowledge is not the cause of freedom (Mokṣa), &c.

Well but knowledge may remove ignorance being contradictory thereto; how can bondage be removed? For this reason he says:—“When knowledge comes into existence, &c.” The meaning is that perfect freedom (Mokṣa) is the establishment of the self in its own nature, quite independent as he is of the Will-to-be; and that the means whereby it is brought about is not knowledge, but the removal of ignorance.

In order to establish the particular ignorance which is the cause of the conjunction to all the Puruṣas, he now sets out the alternative forms of ignorance as such:—‘And now what is, &c.’ He suggests a theory:—‘Is it a function of the qualities, &c.’ The function of the qualities is their power of bringing about effects. It is by virtue of that that conjunction becomes the cause of creation (saṃsāra).

Taking up the form of denying what seems to be implied, he states the second alternative:—‘Or is it, &c.’ The meaning is that the mind by whom the objects, such as sound, &c., and the mental manifestation of the distinction between the Puruṣa and the objective Existence are shown, is not born along with these states. He explains the same:—“In its own knowability that is sound, &c., and the manifestation in the mind of the distinctive natures of the Puruṣa and the essence of matter, the Pradhāna is active only so long as the two-fold knowledge has not been brought about. When the two-fold knowledge has been brought about it ceases to act.” This is another suggestion thrown out.

Now he mentions the third alternative:—‘Is it again the purposefulness of the qualities.’ The meaning is that inasmuch as the effect always exists, enjoyment and emancipation which have to manifest in the future, exist though not predicable in the present.

He suggests the fourth alternative in the same form of suggestive interrogation:—‘Or is it Nescience, &c.’ The suggestion is that it may be Nescience which at the time

of every creation goes into the state of latency of the *Pradhāna* having been drawn in along with its own mind and then becomes the seed for the production of the same mind by its own potentiality. For this reason it is the residual potency of Nescience which is different from knowledge that is called Ignorance.

He states the fifth alternative in the same form of a suggestive question :—"Is it that the potency of motion of the *Pradhāna*, the potency, that is to say, which is responsible for inclining the *Pradhāna* towards the manifestation of effects, is essentialized on the potentiality of rest which lives in the *Pradhāna* and which consists in the continued successive manifestation of the modification of equipoise, coming to an end? He states the teaching of another school in support of the existence of both these potencies :—"It has been said on this subject," by those who deny the existence of the one only. The *Pradhāna* is that by which the world of modifications is created. If that *Pradhāna* always tend towards rest and never towards motion, then it can not create any modification and must, therefore, become the contradiction of itself. If again it go on always moving and never tend to rest, then he says :—"If it were to remain in constant motion, &c."

In some places the reading of both the words 'sthiti' and 'gati,' is in the dative case. In that case the dative case and the word "eva" are to be read as meaning the same thing. If it did not go into the state of rest, then no modification would disappear; and if a thing which exists does not disappear, it can never also re-appear; and thus there would be no modifications. In this view nothing would ever be created, and thus there would be no *Pradhāna*. It is by motion and rest, both alternating, that this cause becomes *Pradhāna*, not otherwise. If only one of these alternative states were admitted, then not only in the case of *Pradhāna*, but in the case of other First Causes, such as *Parabrahma*, *Mâyā*, atoms, &c., also, the same discussion would be relevant. These causes too would be no causes, if they were to remain in constant rest, because in that case they would not produce effects. They would similarly be no causes, if they were to remain in constant motion, because in that case, the modifications themselves becoming eternal, no necessity would remain for a cause.

He states the sixth alternative again as a suggestive interrogation. "Some say that ignorance is nothing but the power which manifests as knowing (*darśana*). It is said in the case of the *Prajāpati* vow, 'Do not see the rising sun.' This signifies the mental mood which co-exists with and is responsible for the act of seeing not. So also in the case of ignorance too the denial of knowledge means that, co-existent with the absence of knowledge, there is a power which takes its origin therein and which with the object of bringing about the knowledge termed enjoyment, &c., joins the knower to the knowable.

He cites a Vedic text in support of the same subject :—"The activity of the *Pradhāna* is, &c." Grant that the *Pradhāna* becomes active for the purpose of showing herself as the Vedic text says; but it is not the power of knowing the nature of the self that becomes active. For this reason he says :—"The *Puruṣa* possessing the power of knowing all that may be known, &c." It is not the object of showing herself that only sets the *Pradhāna* into activity, because before the setting in of activity, it could not be said whether it possessed the power of being seen. Hence it is the capacity of being seen that sets in activity. This the Vedic text says by implication.

This is the sixth alternative, that the power of seeing (knowing) depends upon the *Pradhāna*. Now he states the seventh alternative, which takes up the position that the power of knowing depends upon both. 'Ignorance depends upon both, &c.' Ignorance, i. e., the power of seeing is the characteristic of both the *Puruṣa* and the knowable. Such is the position of some (thinkers).

This may be allowed with regard to the knowable, because all the powers have it as their substratum. We can not, however, allow it with regard to the *Puruṣa*. The power

of knowing has not the Puruṣa for its substratum, because knowledge does not enter into the Puruṣa to make a part of him. If it did, the Puruṣa would become changeable. (He would not remain the constant factor which he is always found to be in all mental phenomena). For this reason he says :—‘Here this knowledge, &c.’

Let it then be of the nature of the ‘knowable.’ In that case knowledge, being a modification of the constituent energy of the ‘knowable’ must also be un-intelligent by nature. It could not, therefore, perform the function of the knowing as a characteristic of the knowable. The non-intelligent is not self-illuminating. For this reason knowledge becomes a characteristic of the ‘knowable’, only with reference to the incoming of the knower, the self, the reflection of consciousness therein. This is known by the act indicating the actor.

Well but this too makes knowledge to be a characteristic of the knowable, not at the same time a characteristic of the Puruṣa too. For this reason he says :—‘Again although it is not of the nature of the Puruṣa, &c.’ The essence of matter is certainly not of the nature of the Puruṣa. Still the incoming of the Puruṣa, i.e., the reflection of consciousness on which the act of knowing the knowable essence of the Will-to-be depends, makes it possible that the act of knowing be spoken of as it were to be an act of the Puruṣa, although not really so. This is the meaning. The characteristics of the Will-to-be shine forth as the characteristics of consciousness, because consciousness and the Will-to-be appear to be one, on account of the Will-to-be always carrying the reflection of consciousness along with itself.

He now mentions the eighth alternative : ‘Some say that the seeing, i.e., the knowing of sound, &c., is itself ignorance, not that of the distinction between the Puruṣa and the Objective Essence. This is the same as that the power of seeing, although an authority for the perception of colour, is no authority for the perception of taste, &c. This is the meaning. The cognitions of sound, &c., as pleasurable appearances, &c., point to the conjunction of the knower and the knowable, because it is necessary for their achievement.

All the alternative theories have been described. In order to accept the fourth alternative, he rejects all the others, because all the other alternative conceptions of the teaching of the Sāṅkhya, being common to all the Puruṣas lead to the absence of variety of experience :—“These are the alternative conceptions of the teaching, &c.”—23.

Sūtra 24.

तस्य हेतुरविद्या ॥२४॥

24. Nescience³ is its¹ effective cause.²— 75.

यस्तु प्रत्यक्चेतनस्य स्वबुद्धिसंयोगः । तस्य हेतुरविद्या । विपर्ययज्ञानवासनेत्यर्थः । विपर्ययज्ञानवासनावासिता च न कार्यनिष्ठां पुरुषख्यातिं बुद्धिः प्राप्नोति साधिकारा पुनरावर्तते । सा तु पुरुषख्यातिपर्यवसानां कार्यनिष्ठां प्राप्नोति । चरिताधिकारा निवृत्तादर्शना बन्धकारणाभावात् पुनरावर्तते । अत्र कश्चित्पण्डकोपाख्यानेनोद्धाटयति । मुग्धया भार्ययामिधीयते । पण्डक आर्यपुत्र अपत्यवती मे भगिनी किमर्थं नाम नाहमिति स तामाह मृतस्ते ऽहमपत्यमुत्पादयिष्यामिति । तथेदं विद्यमानं ज्ञानं चित्तनिवृत्तिं न करोति । चित्तं करिष्यतीति का प्रत्याशा । तत्राचार्यदेशीयो वक्ति । ननु बुद्धिनिवृत्तिरेव मोक्षोऽदर्शनकारणाभावाद् बुद्धिनिवृत्तिः । तच्चादर्शनं बन्धकारणं दर्शनाभिर्वर्तते । तत्र चित्तनिवृत्तिरेव मोक्षः किमर्थमस्थान एवास्य मतिविभ्रमः ॥ २४ ॥

VYĀSA.

The effective cause, however, of the conjunction of the individual consciousness with its own Will-to-be is Nescience, which means the potency of the habit of unreal cognition. The Will-to-know possessed as it is of the aroma of the habits of unreal cognition, does not culminate into the knowledge of the self, which is the end of its work, and thus having still a duty to perform, comes back. When, however, it reaches the culmination of its work, which is the attainment of the knowledge of the Puruṣa, its work is achieved, ignorance is gone, the cause of bondage no longer remains, and it does no longer come back.

Some one ridicules this position by the story of the impotent husband. A foolish wife thus addressed her husband :—“My dear, my sister has got children. Wherefore have I none?” He said to her :—“I shall beget children unto thee when I am dead.” Similarly, this knowledge while in existence, does not cause the mind to cease from action; what hope is there that it will cause cessation when suppressed? Says on this subject a teacher very nearly perfect :—“Is not Mokṣa (freedom) the cessation of the Will-to-be itself and nothing else? The Will-to-be ceases to act when the cause of ignorance no longer remains. The Ignorance which is the cause of bondage is removed by knowledge. Mokṣa (perfect freedom) then is only the cessation of the mind from its work. Wherefore then this mental confusion out of place?”—75.

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

In order to establish the fourth alternative he introduces the aphorism :—‘The effective cause, however, of the conjunction, &c.’ ‘Individual Consciousness :’—The word *Pratyak-cetana* in the text means consciousness which cognizes by reflex action, and as the conjunction which makes it possible is not common to all the Puruṣas, and is the conjunction of one Puruṣa with his own independent Will-to-be, variety of experience is effected. (Hence the translation Individual Consciousness).

He reads the aphorism :—‘Nescience is its effective cause.’ But Nescience is Unreal Cognition. It is due to the conjunction of consciousness with the individualized Will-to-be just as other experiences and emancipation are due to it. If the Will-to-be is not conjoined to consciousness, there can be no existence for unreal cognition. How is it then that Nescience is the cause of any kind of cognition? For this reason he says :—‘Which means the residual potency of Unreal cognition.’ The Nescience of other creations drawn in with the mind in which it manifested, lives in the Pradhāna in the shape of potential energy. The Pradhāna, possessed as it is of the aroma of this potential energy, evolves out of itself, the Will-to-be of a particular Puruṣa, just as it was before. Similarly in the regular order of each creation preceding another. The order of creation being eternal no defect arises in the theory. It is for this reason that the Puruṣa is not free at the time of each creation. For this reason, he says :—‘The Will-to-be possessed as it is, &c.’

When, however, the knowledge of the Puruṣa reaches its end, then the cause of bondage in the shape of the residua of unreal cognition no longer exists, and it does not come back. For this reason he says :—‘When, however, it reaches its culmination, &c.’

Here some nihilists ridicule this state of absolute independence (kaivalya) by relating the story of the impotent husband. The author tells the story of the impotent husband :—"A foolish wife, &c." "Wherefore" in the translation stands for "with what object" in the original. Object here stands for reason. The object of an act is the reason of the action.

The author shows the similarity with the story of the impotent :—"Similarly, &c." This existing knowledge of the distinction between consciousness and the "qualities" does not cause mental cessation; what reason is there that higher desirelessness, the light of knowledge alone, will make the mind to disappear after having restrained it along with its residual potency? The effect of something exists only so long as the cause itself exists. It does not remain in existence when the cause ceases to exist. He refutes this by quoting the reasoning of a teacher who agrees on this point: "Says on this subject a teacher, &c."

A teacher very nearly perfect though not altogether, is called Āchāryadeśiya. As to a perfect teacher, Vāyṇ has described his qualities thus :—"One is called an Āchārya because he understands the meaning of the teaching (śāstra) well, establishes one in right conduct also, and also himself keeps the right line of action."

Mokṣa (absolute freedom) is only the cessation of the Will-to-be after it has achieved experience and the discrimination of the distinction between the Puruṣa and Objective Existence. It is not that the Will-to-be itself ceases to exist. This ceasing of the Will-to-know from its work of causing experience and emancipation, although the Will-to-know itself lives on, follows immediately upon its establishment in the state of the Cloud of Virtue (Dharma Megha) which is the culmination of discriminative knowledge. He illuminates the same :—"The Will-to-know ceases to act when ignorance, which is the cause of bondage is removed by knowledge. The removal of knowledge (the cessation of the act of knowing) is brought about by higher desirelessness. The meaning is that perfect freedom (Mokṣa) exists even though the Will-to-know itself lives on. Having described the opinion of the teacher, he now gives his own :—"Mokṣa then is only the cessation of the mind from its work."

But it has been said that when the act of knowing ceases the mind itself very soon ceases to exist. How is it then this brought about by knowledge? For this reason he says :—"Wherefore then this mental confusion quite out of place?" The construction is as follows :—"We may be taunted thus if we believe that knowledge is the direct cause of the cessation of the mind. We, however, lay down that discriminative knowledge becomes useful in establishing the Puruṣa in its own nature, when having reached the highest point, by the successive appearances of the higher and higher stages of the inhibitive trance, it comes to co-exist with the state of mental cessation. How then have we laid ourselves out for a taunt? 24.

Sūtra 25

तदभावात्संयोगाभावो हानं तद्दृशेः कैवल्यम् ॥२५॥

25. Removal⁵ is the disappearance¹ of conjunction³ on account of its¹ disappearance²; that⁶ is the absolute freedom⁸ of the knower⁷.—76.

हेयं दुःखं हेयकारणं च संयोगाख्यं सनिमित्तमुक्तमतः परं हानं वक्तव्यम् । तदभावात्संयोगाभावो हानं तद्दृशेः कैवल्यम् । तस्यादर्शनस्याभावाद् बुद्धिः पुरुषसंयोगाभाव आ-

त्यन्तिको बन्धनोपरम इत्यर्थः । पतञ्जानं तद्दशोः कैवल्यं पुरुषस्यामिश्रीभावः पुनरसंयोगो गुणैरित्यर्थः ॥ २५ ॥

VYĀSA.

The pain that has to be removed has been described, as also what is called conjunction, the cause of the pain to be removed, together with the reason of its existence. Removal has to be discussed henceforward. 'Removal is the disappearance of conjunction brought about by its disappearance; that is the absolute freedom of the knower.' The meaning is that on the disappearance of the conjunction of the Puruṣa and the Will-to-be being brought about by the disappearance of ignorance, bondage is for ever removed. This is removal. This is the freedom of the seer (Puruṣa). It means his not getting mixed up again, *i.e.*, not being conjoined again with the 'qualities'.—76.

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

Having thus described two departments of the science, now he introduces the aphorism for describing the third :—'The pain that has been removed is the future pain. Removal is the disappearance, &c.' Explains :—'The meaning is, &c.' Because there is disappearance of conjunction even in the state of the Great Latency (Mahāpralaya), the words 'for ever' have been used. The removal is the cessation of pain. This shows that the object of the removal is the fulfilment of the objects of the Puruṣa. The rest is easy.—25.

Sūtra 26.

विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः ॥२६॥

26. The means⁵ of the removal¹ is discriminative¹ knowledge² undisturbed³.—77.

दुःखकारणनिवृत्तौ दुःखोपरमो हानं तदा स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठः पुरुष इत्युक्तमथ हानस्य कः प्राप्नुयाय इति । विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः । सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययो विवेकख्यातिः । सा त्वनिवृत्तमिथ्याज्ञाना प्लवते । यदा मिथ्याज्ञानं दग्धबीजभावं बन्ध्यप्रसवं संपद्यते तदा विधूतक्लेशरजसः सत्त्वस्य परे वैशारद्ये परस्यां वशीकारसंज्ञायां वर्तमानस्य विवेकप्रत्ययप्रवाहो निर्मलो भवति सा विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः । ततो मिथ्याज्ञानस्य दग्धबीजभावोपगमः पुनश्चाप्रसव इत्येष मोक्षस्य मार्गो हानस्योपाय इति ॥२६॥

VYĀSA.

Pain is removed on the removal of the cause of pain. In the removal of pain consists the establishment of the Puruṣa in its own nature. What then is the means of attaining the state of this removal of pain? 'Discriminative knowledge undisturbed is the means of the removal.'

Discriminative knowledge is the recognition of the distinct natures of the Puruṣa and the Essence of matter (Sattva). This, however, remains

shaky as long as false knowledge has not been removed. When false knowledge has its seed burnt up and thus becomes incapable of fruition, then the dirt of disturbing energy (rajas) being removed, mental essence is in the state of the highest purity and possesses the consciousness of the highest power; and in that state flows on the stream of the notion of discrimination, free from impurity. It is this discriminative knowledge undisturbed, that is the means of the removal. By this it is clear that the means of removal, the path of Mokṣa (absolute freedom), is the burning of the seed of false knowledge, so that it may not sprout again.—77.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author introduces the aphorism, in order to describe the means of removal, the fourth branch of the science: —'What then, &c.' "Discriminative knowledge, undisturbed is the means of removal." Discriminative knowledge comes into existence by verbal and inferential cognitions also. The knowledge so obtained does not remove the actual or potential outgoing energies of the mind. In the case of such discriminative knowledge they always return to action. It is with the object of excluding the discriminative knowledge thus acquired, that the word 'Undisturbed' is used. Undisturbed means 'free from false knowledge. Disturbance is false knowledge. This is the meaning. Discriminative knowledge should be obtained by the teaching which consists of verbal knowledge. It should then be established in the mind by reasoning. It should be carried to its highest limit of illumination by devoted attention for a long time without interruption and with reverence. Then does discriminative knowledge become direct. False knowledge is removed together with its residua. It becomes undisturbed. This is the means of removal. The rest of the Commentary is easy. 26.

Sûtra 27.

तस्य सप्तधा प्रान्तभूमिः प्रज्ञा ॥ २७ ॥

27. His¹ discrimination² becoming final³ at each stage⁴, is sevenfold⁵.—78.

तस्य सप्तधा प्रान्तभूमिः प्रज्ञा । तस्येति प्रत्युदितख्यातेः प्रत्याम्नायः सप्तधेति । अशुद्ध्यावरणमलापगमाच्चित्तस्य प्रत्ययान्तरानुत्पादे सति सप्तधैव सप्तप्रकारैव प्रज्ञा विवेकिना भवति । तद्यथा परिज्ञातं हेयं नास्य पुनः परिज्ञेयमस्ति । क्षीणा हेयहेतवो न पुनरेतेषां क्षेतव्यमस्ति । साक्षात्कृतं निरोधसमाधिना हानम् । भावितो विवेकख्यातिरूपो हानोपाय इत्येषा चतुष्टयी कार्याविमुक्तिः प्रज्ञायाः । चित्तविमुक्तिस्तु त्रयीचरिताधिकारा बुद्धिः । गुणा गिरिशिखरतटच्युता इव प्रावाणो निरवस्थानाः स्वकारणे प्रलयमिमुखाः सह तेनास्तं गच्छन्ति । न चैषां प्रविलीनानां पुनरस्युत्पादः प्रयोजनाभावादिति । एतस्यामवस्थार्या गुणसंबन्धातीतः स्वरूपमात्रज्योतिरमलः केशली पुरुष इत्येतां सप्तविधां प्रान्तभूमिप्रज्ञामनुपश्यन्पुरुषः कुशल इत्याख्यायते । प्रतिप्रसवेऽपि च चित्तस्य मुक्तः कुशल इत्येव भवति गुणातोतत्वादिति ॥ २७ ॥

VYĀSA.

“His” in whom discrimination has come up into consciousness, consideration of attainments is sevenfold. “Sevenfold,” *i.e.*, of seven descriptions only is the conscious discrimination of the thinker when at each stage the mental notion is not further produced, on account of the removal from the mind of the dirt which constitutes the veil of impurity. This is as follows:—(1) The pain to be removed is known. Nothing further remains to be known of it. (2) The causes of pain to be removed have been done away with. (3) Removal has become a fact of direct cognition by means of inhibitive trance. (4) The means of knowledge in the shape of discriminative knowledge has been understood.

This is the four-fold freedom of conscious discrimination from external phenomena. The freedom from the mind itself is three-fold. The Will-to-be has done its duty. The ‘qualities’ tending to become latent into their cause, disappear along with it, finding no support as they do, like stones rolled down from the edge of a hill-top. Nor once passed into latency, do they come back to life again, there being no object for it. In this state the *Puruṣa*, having passed beyond the limits of the relation with the ‘qualities’ remains only the light of his own pure nature and is free.

The *Puruṣa* who has seen successively these seven stages of discrimination is called ‘adept’ (*kuśala*). He remains free and wise even when the mind is resolved into its cause, because he has passed beyond the sphere of the ‘qualities’.—78.

VACHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author describes by the aphorism the nature of the finality of the perfection of discriminative knowledge: ‘His discrimination becoming final at each stage is seven-fold.’ Explains:—‘His, &c.’

He in whom the discrimination has just up into consciousness, is the *Yogi*, in whom the mental phenomenon is present at the time.

His ‘consideration of attainments,’ means the sending back of his thought over the whole ground that has already been passed over.

The veil of impurity of the mental essence is the same as dirt. When that is removed, and when consequently, ‘the mental notion is not further produced,’ *i.e.*, the outgoing energy of the notions due to the qualities of disturbance (*rajas*) and inertia (*taṇas*) is no longer active, he reaches the final point in a stage of undisturbed discriminative knowledge. This consciousness of discrimination of his is seven-fold, *i.e.*, of seven descriptions only. The difference of descriptions of consciousness is due to the difference of its objects.

The stages, *i.e.*, the states are spoken of as each becoming final, because each as such reaches its ultimate and highest point. The ultimate and highest point is that beyond which there is no point of its culmination. The stages of consciousness, *i.e.*, of discriminative knowledge, each of which reaches its culmination, are spoken of as becoming final at each stage.

Now he describes these seven stages, each reaching its own culmination :—‘ That as follows, &c.’

Out of the four stages which are brought about by the effort of man, he illustrates the first :—‘ The pain to be removed has been known.’ Whatever has its origin in the Pradhāna is certainly pain, by reason of the pains of consequence, anxiety and habituation, and by reason of the contrariety of the modifications of the qualities.’ It has, therefore, to be removed. It is that which has been known. He shows its finality :—‘ nothing further remains to be known of it.’

He mentions the second stage :—‘ The causes.....have been done away with.’ He speaks of the finality :—‘ Nothing more of them, &c.’

He mentions the third :—‘ The removal which is brought about by inhibitive trance, has been made by me a fact of direct cognition, ascertained by internal perception, while I am in the state of Cognitive trance only. It is to be understood that nothing further of it remains to be ascertained.’

He mentions the fourth :—‘ The means of removal in the shape of discriminative knowledge has been understood, i. e., has been brought into existence. It is to be understood that there is nothing more of it to be brought into being. This is the four-fold freedom of consciousness from external phenomena. Freedom means their ending. The fact of their being the objects of human effort has been shown by their being external phenomena.

Now he speaks of the freedom from the mind, which is brought about after the states brought about by human effort and which does not depend upon effort :—‘ The freedom from the mind is, however, three-fold.’ He mentions the first :—‘ The Will-to-be has done its duty.’ The meaning is that it has achieved experience and emancipation. He mentions the second :—‘ The qualities, &c.’ He shows their finality :—‘ Nor once passed into latency, &c.’

He mentions the third :—‘ In this state, &c.’ In this state the Puruṣa, even while in life, is called free and wise ; because this is his last birth. He says this :—‘ The Puruṣa who has seen in succession these, &c.’ He says that this state is not dependent upon the mind :—‘ He remains free and wise even when the mind is resolved into its cause, because he has passed beyond the sphere of the qualities.’—27.

Sūtra 28.

योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिराविवेकख्यातेः ॥ २८ ॥

On the destruction⁵ of impurity⁴ by the sustained practice³ of the accessories² of Yoga¹, the light⁷ of wisdom⁶ reaches up to discriminative⁸ knowledge⁹.—79.

सिद्धा भवति विवेकख्यातिर्हानोपाय इति न च सिद्धिरन्तरेण साधनमित्येतदा-
रभ्यते । योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिराविवेकख्यातेः । योगाङ्गान्यष्टावभिधायिष्य-
माणानि तेषामनुष्ठानात्पञ्चपर्वणो विपर्ययस्याशुद्धिरूपस्य क्षयो नाशस्तत्क्षये सम्यग्ज्ञान-
स्याभिव्यक्तिः । यथा यथा च साधनान्यनुष्ठेयन्ते तथा तथा तनुत्वमशुद्धिरापद्यते । यथा
यथा च क्षीयते तथा तथा च क्षयकमानुरोधिनी ज्ञानस्यापि दीप्तिर्विवर्धते । सा खल्वेषा
विवृद्धिः प्रकर्षमनुभवत्याविवेकख्यातेः । आशुण्णपुरुषस्वरूपावज्ञानादित्यर्थः । योगाङ्गानु-
ष्ठानमशुद्धेर्वियोगकारणम् । यथा परशुश्छेद्यस्य । विवेकख्यातेस्तु प्राप्तिकारणं यथा

धर्मः सुखस्य नान्यथा कारणम् । कति चैतानि कारणानि शास्त्रे भवन्ति । नवैवेत्याह । तद्यथा उत्पत्तिस्थित्यभिव्यक्तिकारणप्रत्ययाप्तयः । वियोगान्यत्वधृतयः कारणं नवधांस्मृतमिति । तत्रोत्पत्तिकारणं मनो भवति ज्ञानस्य स्थितिकारणं मनसः पुरुषार्थता शरीरस्येवाहार इति अभिव्यक्तिकारणं यथा रूपस्यालोकस्तथा रूपज्ञानं विकारकारणं मनसो विषयान्तरम् । यथाग्निः पाक्यस्य । प्रत्ययकारणं धूमज्ञानमग्निज्ञानस्य । प्राप्तिकारणं योगाङ्गानुष्ठानं विवेकख्यातेः । वियोगकारणं तदेवाशुद्धेः । अन्यत्वकारणं यथा सुवर्णस्य सुवर्णकारः । एवमेकस्य स्त्रीप्रत्ययस्याविद्या मूढत्वे द्वेषो दुःखत्वरागः सुखत्वे तत्त्वज्ञानं माध्यस्थ्ये धृतिकारणं शरीरमिन्द्रियाणाम् । तानि च तस्य महाभूतानि शरीराणां तानि च परस्परं सर्वेषां तैर्यग्योनमानुषदैवतानि च परस्परार्थत्वादित्येवं नव कारणानि । तानि च यथासम्भवं पदार्थान्तरेष्वपि योज्यानि योगाङ्गानुष्ठानं तु द्विधैव कारणत्वं लभत इति ॥ २८ ॥

VYĀSA.

Discriminative knowledge becomes the means of removal, when achieved. There can be no achievement without the adoption of the means thereof. 'This, therefore, is taken up. 'By the sustained practice of the accessories of Yoga is impurity destroyed and then the light of wisdom shines up to discriminative knowledge.'

The accessories of Yoga are eight, to be further named. By their sustained practice is destroyed the five-fold unreal cognition, which is of the nature of impurity. Destruction means disappearance. When that is destroyed, real knowledge is manifested. As the means of achievement are being practised more and more, so is the impurity being attenuated more and more. And as more and more of it is being destroyed, so also goes on increasing more and more the light of wisdom following in the wake of destruction. This increase reaches its culmination in discriminative knowledge. This means that its highest culmination is in the knowledge of the nature of consciousness and the 'qualities.'

The practice of the accessories of Yoga is the cause of the separation of impurity, as the axe is the cause of the separation of the piece of wood cut off thereby. It is, however, the cause of the attainment of discriminative knowledge, as virtue is the cause of happiness. It is not a cause otherwise.

Well how many of these causes are there in the Teaching? They have been said to be nine only as follows :—'A cause is said to operate in nine ways :—As the cause of birth, of preservation, of manifestation, of modification, of sequential cognition, of attainment, of separation, of differentiation, of upholding.'

Of these the cause of birth : the mind is of knowledge.

The sustaining cause : the achievement of the objects of the Puruṣa is of the mind, as food is of the body.

The cause of manifestation is as light is the cause of the manifestation of colour ; as also the knowledge of colour.

The cause of change or modification is as for example, a different object of the mind. Or fire of the food that is cooked.

The cause of sequential cognition is as the knowledge of smoke is of the knowledge of fire.

The cause of attainment is as the practice of the accessories of Yoga of the attainment of discriminative knowledge.

The cause of separation is as the same of impurities.

The cause of differentiation is as the goldsmith is of gold. Similarly, as in the case of the one notion of the same woman, Nescience causes for getfulness ; anger makes it painful ; desire makes it pleasurable ; the knowledge of realities makes it indifferent, neither pleasurable nor painful.

The cause of upholding is as the body is of the organs of sensation and action and *vice versa* ; the elements of the bodies and each of these mutually of all the others. So also the animals, men and gods each of the others. Thus there are nine descriptions of causal operations. These are to be applied to other objects also as may be. As to the practice of the accessories of Yoga they operate as causes in two ways only.--79.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now then having described the four departments of the science, and seeing that the discriminative knowledge which as the means of removal falls within these departments, has not been achieved like cow's milk, &c. (which although existing in the udders, is not obtained until it is drawn out), and further seeing that this can not be achieved without employing some means, he goes on to describe the means : --' Discriminative knowledge becomes the means, &c.'

Here shows by the aphorism in what way does the means of knowledge operate as a cause of discriminative knowledge. 'On the destruction of impurity, &c.' The accessories of Yoga destroy impurity by operating as may be along visible and invisible lines. It should be understood that the five branches of Untrue cognition are spoken of here as indicative of virtue and vice also, because they too are of the nature of impurities, being as they are the causes of life-state, life-experience and life-period. The rest is easy.

A cause is seen operating in more ways than one. In what does the practice of Yoga operate as the cause ? For this reason he says :

'The practice of the accessories of Yoga, &c.' The cause of impurity being removed, means that it separates impurity from the essence of the Will-to-be. He gives an illustration :--'As the axe, &c.' The hatchet separates the tree to be cut from the root.

Further, having separated the essence of the Will-to-be from impurity, it leads it to the attainment of discriminative knowledge, as obedience to law is the means of the attainment of happiness. Similarly is the practice of Yoga accessories the means of the

attainment of discriminative knowledge. There is no other way in which the cause operates. He says this:—‘It is the cause of attainment, &c.’ Inasmuch as it is said that there is no other way in which it operates, he puts the question, How many are the ways of operation altogether? He answers: ‘They are nine only.’ He enumerates them by a verse:—‘Birth, preservation, &c.’ Now he illustrates them: ‘The cause of birth, &c.’ The mind operates to bring knowledge from the state of being unpredictable into the state of present existence; it is, therefore, the cause of the birth of knowledge. The fulfilment of the purpose of the Puruṣa is the cause of the preservation of the mind. Born of the principle of egoism, the mind is preserved as long as it has not fulfilled both the objects of the Puruṣa. When, however, both the objects of the Puruṣa have been fulfilled, it is no longer preserved as such. For this reason the non-achievement of the objects of the Puruṣa is the cause of the preservation of the mind, after it has been born out of its cause. He gives an illustration: ‘As food of the body.’

Manifestation means the placing of an object under certain conditions so that they may help in the act of perception either by means of the senses or by the act of the mind itself; as light is the cause of the manifestation of colour.

The cause of change or modification of the mind is an object other than that which has possession of the mind at the time. So goes the story. Mṛkandu was sitting with his mind entranced. He heard the fifth note of the musical scale emitted by a creeper that was ripening. He at once opened his eyes, and what did he see? The fair and youthful nymph Pramlocha. The sight of her beauty drew away his mind from the object of his then mental application, and his mind became attached to her. He gives an illustration of this:—‘As fire is of the things cooked.’ When raw, the particles of rice, &c., are so close as to make them hard to be separated. By cooking a change is introduced. The particles become loose. Fire operates as the cause of change, that is, of the introduction of softness instead of hardness.

It is only the knowledge of an existing object that is brought about by sequential cognition. The knowledge of smoke is the cause of the knowledge of fire. Knowledge is that which is known. The knowledge of fire here means the knowledge which is the same as fire, the mental idea of fire. This is the meaning. It is by sequential cognition that it operates as the cause of the knowledge of fire existing in the present as the thing to be known. •

It is natural with causes to pass into effects; but for some reason they sometimes do not pass into that state. Take, for example, water. It is the nature of water to flow downwards when poured on a higher level. But an embankment may be made to check its downward flow. The same is the case here. The essence of the Will-to-be is by nature pleasing and luminous. It is natural for it to reach the state of happiness and discriminative knowledge. It, however, does not reach that state somehow by reason of being checked in its operations by vice (adharma) or by inertia (tamas). That check is removed by virtue or by the practice of the accessories of Yoga. Its operations thus become unhampered; it reaches that state, being its natural producer. As will be said:—‘There is no operative cause to set the Prakritis into action; but it pierces through the impediments like the husbandman.’—iv. 3. It is thus that the practice of the accessories of Yoga is said to operate as the cause of the attainment of discriminative knowledge. With reference, however, to another effect lower down, it is described as the cause of separation. Thus he says:—‘The cause of separation is as, ‘&c.’

Now he describes the cause of differentiation: ‘The cause of differentiation is as the goldsmith of the gold.’ Gold is both different and not different from wristlets, earrings and armlets. It is different when it is necessary to point out the difference; not different when it is not desired to point out the difference. Thus is it different from the

ear-rings. The goldsmith, however, who makes wristlets, makes them from gold which is not other than the gold of the ear-rings. He, therefore, becomes the cause of introducing another differentia altogether into the otherwise quite identical gold. He is, therefore, the cause of differentiation.

Similarly, is fire the cause of the differentiation of things that are cooked. It is, however, described above as the cause of modification. What is intended to be said there is that the difference between cooked and raw rice, as the characteristics of the same qualified thing, is not intended to be conveyed; and therefore even though the two characteristics are born and disappear respectively, the thing qualified remains the same in both conditions. It is not possible to say that the thing qualified has become quite another thing. It is for these considerations that fire is only spoken of as the cause of modification. There is no overlapping.

The meaning is not to be understood to be that different arrangement is the cause of differentiation, because in that case the goldsmith in the text will be quite out of place.

Having in the beginning described the cause of differentiation in the outside world, now he describes the operation of the same with reference to the mind:—Similarly as in the case of a single notion about one woman, &c. Nescience consists in the cognition of lovability, &c., in a damsel. When this nescience is coupled with forgetfulness (moha) one becomes stupid, that is full of stupid imaginings. 'Maitra is a very fortunate man to possess such a jewel of a wife. I am unfortunate not to possess her.' In the same way the notion of the same woman in the mind of a co-wife causes aversion and consequent pain. Similarly, the notion of the same woman in the mind of her husband Maitra causes attachment and consequent pleasure. The knowledge of the realities thereof consists in the recognition of the fact that the body of the woman is after all nothing except skin, muscle, fat, bone and mucus; and that it is naturally impure on account of the place of its fecundation and the seed which grows into it. This knowledge in the mind of the wise becomes the cause of the idea that it is neither pleasurable nor painful; and thus it becomes the cause of desirelessness.

The cause of upholding:—The body is the upholder of the power of sensation and action. These powers again are the upholders of the body. The five forces of Prâṇa, &c., are the manifestations of the common energy of these powers. The body dies in their absence. Similarly, muscle and the other portions of the body support each other in life. Similarly, are the elements of Pṛithvī, &c., the supporters of the bodies of men, of Varuṇa, Sun, Vāyu and those that live in the Chandraloka. The elements further support each other in life. The Pṛithvī having the five qualities of odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, all the five elements are present therein supporting and supported by each other; as also four in the Apas, three in the Tejas, two in the Vāyu. The animals, men and gods also exist supporting each other in life. But how can they be the supporters of each other, seeing that they are not related to each other as the containor and the contained. For this reason he says:—'They live for each other, &c.' The body of man is sustained by the materials supplied by the bodies of beasts, bird, deer, snakes and vegetables. Similarly, the bodies of tigers and others of the same class are supported by the bodies of men, beasts, and deer, &c. Similarly, the bodies of beasts and deer, &c., are supported by vegetables, &c. Similarly, the bodies of gods are supported by the sacrifices of goats, deer, clarified butter and Purodāśa, &c., offered by men as also by means of the accessories of sacrifice, branches and stones, &c. Similarly, the gods also support men by giving them the objects of their desires and by causing rain, &c. Therefore do they live for each other. The rest is easy.—28.

Sūtra 29.

यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि

29. Restraint,¹ Observance,² Posture,³ Regulation of breath (Prāṇāyama),⁴ Abstraction,⁵ Concentration,⁶ Meditation⁷ and Trance⁸ are the eight⁹ accessories¹⁰ of Yoga.—80.

तत्र योगाङ्गान्यवधार्यन्ते । यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि । यथाक्रममेवामनुष्ठानं स्वरूपं च वक्ष्यामः ॥ २९ ॥

VYĀSA.

The accessories of Yoga are now determined. "Restraint, &c." We shall now describe their nature and practice in order.—80.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now the author determines the accessories of Yoga with the object of determining their number more or less. 'The accessories of Yoga, &c.'

'Restraint, &c.' Practice, desirelessness, faith, energy, &c., are by their very nature to be understood as falling under these wherever they may properly fall, not as independent means.—20.

Sūtra 30.

तत्राहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमाः ॥ ३० ॥

30. Of these¹ the restraints² are. Abstinence from injury (Ahimsā);³ Veracity;⁴ Abstinence from theft;⁵ Continence;⁶ Abstinence from avariciousness⁷.—81.

तत्राहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमाः । तत्राहिंसा सर्वथा सर्वदा सर्वभूतानामनभिद्रोहः । उत्तरे च यमनियमात्तन्मूलास्तात्सङ्घिपरतयैव तत्प्रतिपादनाय प्रतिपाद्यन्ते । तदवदारूपकरणयैवोपादीयन्ते । तथा चोक्तम् । स खल्वयं ब्राह्मणो यथा यथा व्रतानि बहूनि समादित्सते तथा तथा प्रमादकृतेभ्यो हिंसानिदानेभ्यो निवर्तमानस्तामेवावदातरूपमहिंसां करोति । सत्यं यथार्थं वाङ्मनसे । यथादृष्टं यथानुमितं यथाश्रुतं तथा वाङ्मनश्चेति परत्र स्वबोधसङ्क्रान्तये वागुक्ता । सा यदि न वञ्चिता भ्रान्ता वा प्रतिपत्तिवन्ध्या वा भवेदित्येषा सर्वभूतोपकारार्थं प्रवृत्ता न भूतोपघाताय यदि चैवमप्यभिधीयमानाभूतोपघातपरैव स्यान्नसत्यं भवेत्पापमेव भवेत्तेन पुण्याभासेन पुण्यप्रतिरूपकेण कष्टं तमः प्राप्नुयात्तस्मात्परीक्ष्य सर्वभूतहितं सत्यं ब्रूयात् । स्तेयमशास्त्रपूर्वकं द्रव्याणां परतः स्वीकरणं तत्प्रतिषेधः पुनरस्पृहारूपमस्तेयमिति । ब्रह्मचर्यं गुप्तेन्द्रियस्योपलब्धस्य संयमः । विषयाणामर्जनरक्षणक्षयसङ्गहिंसादोषदर्शनादस्वाकरणमपरिग्रह इत्येते यमाः ॥ ३० ॥

VYĀSA.

Of these, abstinence from injury is the not causing of pain to any living creature in any way at any time. The restraints and observances

that follow have their origin in it. They are meant to achieve it. They are taught with the object of teaching it. They are taken up with the object of rendering the light of its appearance purer. And so it has been said:—As the Brâhmaṇa goes on undertaking many a vow of restraint and observance, he goes on turning away from the sins committed on account of forgetfulness, and having their origin in injury caused to others (Himsâ); and by so doing he goes on rendering the Ahimsâ itself purer and purer.

Veracity consists in word and thought being in accord with facts. Speech and mind corresponds to what has been seen, heard and inferred as such. Speech is uttered for the purpose of transferring one's knowledge to another. It can only be said to have been employed for the good of others and not for their injury, if it is not deceptive, confused or barren in knowledge. If, however, it proves to be injurious to living beings even though uttered as such, it is not truth; it is a sin only. By this outward appearance, this is a facsimile of virtue, and one gets into painful darkness. Therefore, let every one examine well and then utter truth for the benefit of all living beings.

Theft is the making one's own unlawfully of things belonging to others. Abstinence from theft consists in the absence of the desire thereof.

Continence is the restraint of the hidden power, the power of generation.

Absence of avariciousness is the non-appropriation of things not one's own, consequent upon seeing the defects of attachment and of the injury caused by the collection, preservation and destruction of goods. These are the restraints.—81.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having enumerated the accessories of Yoga as the restraints and observances, &c., now he enumerates the restraints by introducing the aphorism: 'Of those abstinence from injury, &c.' The restraints are abstinence from injury, &c. Now describes abstinence from injury as an accessory of Yoga: 'Not causing of pain &c.' Qualifies such Ahimsâ: 'The restraints and observances that follow, &c.'

'Have their origin in it': the other restraints and observances when performed without observing the vow of causing no pain, are as it were, not performed; because in that case they are quite useless. The practice is resorted to only for the purpose of achieving Ahimsâ.

If Ahimsâ is the root of all those that follow, how is it that they are meant for achieving it? For this reason he says:—'They are taught with the object of teaching it.' The meaning is that achievement here refers to knowledge, not to birth.

Let that be. But if the following restraints and observances are for the purpose of giving a knowledge of Ahimsâ, then they are of no use; because that knowledge is

obtained from other sources. For this reason he says :—‘For the purpose of rendering the light of its appearance purer.’ The meaning is that if the following ones are not practised, *Ahiṃsā* would remain impure on account of the existence of untruth, &c.

He mentions the concurrence of the *Āgamis* with this :—‘And so it has been said’.

Now he describes the nature of truth :—‘Word and thought being in accord with facts.’ Next he describes the nature of facts :—‘What has been heard, seen and inferred as such.’

Otherwise it would not be truth. He describes this with reasoning. Speech is uttered with the object of transferring one’s thoughts to another ; that is, for the purpose of creating in the other mind a knowledge similar to the knowledge existing in the mind of the speaker. For this reason, if it is not deceptive, &c. For example, *Yudhiṣṭhira* was questioned by *Droṇāchārya* with reference to the death of his son “My dear, your wealth is truth, is *Aśwatthāmā* dead ?” His answer was, “It is true that *Aśwatthāmā* is dead,” but he thought at the time of the death of *Aśwatthāmā*, the elephant, and not the son of *Droṇa*. This was merely a reply in the terms of the question. It did not transfer to the mind of *Droṇa* what was in the mind of *Yudhiṣṭhira*. The knowledge in *Yudhiṣṭhira*’s mind was that the elephant was dead, and this he had obtained by the sense of his sight. The knowledge, however, that was transferred to the mind of *Droṇa* was that his son was dead. This is deceptive knowledge.

‘Confused speech’ is that which is born from confusion. The confusion may exist at the time of speaking, or, at the time of ascertaining the object of knowledge.

Barren in knowledge is that which carries no information. As, for example, the knowledge of barbarians carries no impression of the objects of knowledge to the mind. It also means the speech which may be objectless. Such speech is not desirable to utter. In this case, even though the knowledge of the speaker is transferred to the mind of the hearer, yet it is not as it were transferred, because it is useless.

Such speech also must be uttered for the good of others. If not so uttered, it is only the semblance of truth, not truth. For this reason he says :—‘It can only be said to be employed, &c.’

‘If, however, it proves injurious to living beings, &c.’ Take for example, the case of a man who has taken the vow of truth, being asked by a gang of robbers if the caravan they be in pursuit of had passed that way. He has seen it passing that way and says so. This utterance of his, even though technically truth, is not so in reality, as it tends to the injury of others. The rest is easy.

He now describes theft, because the abstinence from any act depends upon the understanding of the nature of the act. ‘Theft is the making of things, &c.’ The object is to indicate the general by the particular.

Inasmuch as the functioning of speech and body depends upon the mind, the mental modification is mentioned here as the principal factor :—‘Absence of the desire thereof.’

Next he describes the nature of continence :—‘The restraint of the hidden power.’ The words “hidden power,” are used to signify that the mere non-use of the organ is not continence. The desire of seeing and speaking to women and embracing them as the seats of Cupid is also incontinence. The meaning is that the other sensations tending towards that are also to be checked.

He describes the nature of abstinence from avariciousness :—‘Absence of avariciousness, &c.’ Here the defect of attachment has been described. Attachment increases in consequence of the repetition of enjoyment, as also the deftness of the powers in their functioning.

The defect of injury also has been described. No enjoyment is possible without causing injury to others.

Absence of avariciousness is the not making one's own of objects, inasmuch as their possession originates in undesirable means if they are not sanctioned by the Śāstras and are obtainable without effort even ; and because there is evil done even in the preservation of possessions, that are obtained even in accordance with the Śāstras.— 30.

Sūtra 31.

जातिदेशकालसमयानवच्छिन्नाः सार्वभौमा महाव्रतम् ॥ ३१ ॥

31. They are the Great⁷ Vow,⁸ universal,⁶ and not-limited⁵ by life-state,¹ space,² time,³ and circumstance.⁴ (Samaya).—82.

ते तु । जातिदेशकालसमयानवच्छिन्नाः सार्वभौमा महाव्रतम् । तत्राहिंसाजात्य-
वच्छिन्ना मत्स्यवधकस्य मत्स्येष्वेव नान्यत्र हिंसा सैव देशावच्छिन्ना न तीर्थे हनिष्यामी-
ति सैव कालावच्छिन्ना न चतुर्दश्यां न पुण्येऽहनि हनिष्यामीति । सैव त्रिभिरुपरतस्य
समयावच्छिन्ना देवब्राह्मणार्थं नान्यथा हनिष्यामीति । यथा च क्षत्रियाणां युद्ध एव
हिंसा नान्यत्रेति । एभिर्जातिदेशकालसमयैरनवच्छिन्ना अहिंसादयः सर्वथैव परिपाल-
नीयाः । सर्वभूमिषु सर्वविषयेषु सर्वथैवाविदितव्यमिचाराः सार्वभौमा महाव्रत-
मित्युच्यन्ते ॥ ३१ ॥

VYĀSA.

And these are 'the great vow, universal, not-limited by life-state, space, time and circumstance.'

Of these, abstinence from injury is limited to life-state, as for example, the injury inflicted by a fisherman is limited to fish alone, and to none else. The same is limited to space, as for example, in the case of a man who says to himself, "I shall not injure at a sacred place." The same is limited to time, as for example, in the case of a man who says to himself, "I shall not cause injury on the sacred day of the Chaturdaśī, (the fourteenth) of the lunar fortnight."

The same in the case of a man who has given up the three injuries is limited by circumstance, as for example, when a man says to himself, "I shall cause injury only for the sake of gods and Brāhmins and not in any other way." Or, as for example, injury is caused by soldiers in battle alone and nowhere else. The restraints of Ahimsā and the others are always practised without being limited by life-state, time, space and circumstance. Universal is that which pervades all conditions of life, everywhere, always ; and is nowhere out of place. They are called the Great Vow.—82.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

They have been described in general. Now he introduces the aphorism in order to describe how they are to be observed by the Yogis. 'And these, &c.' They are called

Universal, because they are known in all states, described as life-state, &c.' Inasmuch as it is said that the restraints of Ahimsā and the others are to be practised, the 'same limitations are to be considered as applicable in the case of other restraints also.—81.

Sūtra 32.

शौचसन्तोषतपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि नियमाः ॥ ३२ ॥

32. The observances⁷ are Cleanliness,¹ Contentment,² Purificatory action,³ study⁴ and the making of the Lord⁵ the motive of all action.⁶—83.

शौचसन्तोषतपः स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि नियमाः । तत्र शौचं मृज्जलादिजनितं मेघ्याभ्यवहरणादि च बाह्यम् । आभ्यन्तरं चित्तमलानामाक्षालनम् । संतोषः सन्निहित-साधनादधिकस्यानुपादित्वा । तपो द्वन्द्वसहनम् । द्वन्द्वं च जिघत्सापिपासे शीतोष्णे स्थानासने काष्ठमौनाकारमौने च । व्रतानि चैषां यथायोगं कृच्छ्रचान्द्रायणसान्त्वनादीनि स्वाध्यायो मोक्षशास्त्राणामध्ययनं प्रणवजपो वा । ईश्वरप्रणिधानं तस्मिन्परमगुरो सर्वकर्मोपशान्तम् । शय्यासनस्थोऽथ पथि व्रजन्वा स्वस्थः परिक्षीणवितर्कजालः । संसारबीज-क्षयमीक्षमाणः स्यान्नित्ययुक्तोऽमृतभोगभागी ॥ यत्रेदमुक्तं ततः प्रत्यम्बेतनाधिगमोऽप्यन्तरायाभावश्चेति ॥ ३२ ॥

VYĀSA.

Cleanliness, contentment, Purificatory Action, Study and the making of Īśvara the motive of all actions, are the observances.

Of these, Cleanliness is external when brought about by earths and water, &c., and consists in the eating of pure things, &c. It is internal when it consists in the washing away of impurities of the mind.

Contentment is the absence of desire to secure more of the necessities of life than one already possesses.

Purificatory action consists in the endurance of the pairs of opposites. The pairs of opposites are such as the desire to eat and the desire to drink ; heat and cold ; standing and sitting ; the absence of speech (Kāṣṭha Mauna) and the absence of facial indications (Ākāra Mauna). It also includes such vows as the fasts of Chândrāyana and Śāntapana, &c., so far as necessary.

Study is the reading of the sciences of liberation (Mokṣa), or the repetition of the Pranava, the syllable Aum.

The making of Īśvara the motive of all actions, means the doing of all actions to fulfil the purpose of that Great Teacher. It is with reference to this state that the following has been said:—'Lying down on a bed or seated or wandering along a road, ever given to Yoga, with the network of the sins to be restrained, removed, conscious of the destruction of the seed of repeated births, he shares the joys of immortality.'

Then is the understanding of the individual self and the absence of obstacles. P. I. 29.—83.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

He describes the observances of Cleanliness, &c.

"Cleanliness, Contentment, Purificatory Action, Study and the making of God the motive of all actions are the observances . . ." He explains these :—"Cleanliness is, &c." The first 'et cetera' means such things as cowdung plaster and other similar things. Pure things are such as the urine of the cow, and barley, &c., which purify the body by removing impurities. The words 'et cetera' in connection with the eating of purifying things mean the limitation of mouthfuls in size and number, &c.' Instead of speaking of the purity caused by eating, &c., of purifying things, the words used here are only eating, &c., of things. It is to be understood that the effect is meant by the mention of the cause.

Mental impurities are pride, jealousy, vanity, &c. Mental purity consists in their removal.

Contentment is the absence of desire to possess more than is necessary for the preservation of life. It should be added that this is because the appropriation of things not one's own has already been given up.

The absence of facial indications which let into the secret of one's mind, is the control of one's self, so as not to transfer the thought at random. Absence of speech is the ordinary holding of the tongue.

The sins to be restrained are the causing of injury to others, lying, &c., which will be described later. They also include doubt and Untrue cognition. Next is described the sequence, on becoming purified by this much.

Further these restraints and observances are described in the Viṣṇu Parāṇa :—"Let the Yogī practise continence, harmlessness, truthfulness, abstinence from theft and non-covetousness without desire of fruit; and let him make his mind gradually fit for progress. He should also apply himself to study, cleanliness and purificatory actions and contentment; and let his mind rest upon the Parabrahma. These are the restraints and observances five each. When practised with desire they secure special fruit. To those who have no desire for fruit, they secure liberation."—32.

Sūtra 33.

वितर्कबाधने प्रतिपक्षभावनम् ॥ ३३ ॥

33. Upon thoughts of sin¹ troubling,² habituation¹ to the contrary³.—84.

एतेषां यमनियमानाम् । वितर्कबाधने प्रतिपक्षभावनम् । यदास्य ब्राह्मणस्य हिंसादयो वितर्का जायेरन्हनिष्याम्यहमपकारिणमनृतमपि वक्ष्यामि द्रव्यमप्यस्य स्वीकरिष्यामि दारेषु चास्य व्यवायी भविष्यामि परिग्रहेषु चास्य स्वामी भविष्यामीति । एवमुन्मार्गं प्रवक्ष्य-
तर्कज्वरेणातिदीप्तेन बाध्यमानस्तत्प्रतिपक्षान्भावयेत् । धारेषु संसाराङ्गारेषु पच्यमानेन मया शरणमुपगतः सर्वभूताभयप्रदानेन योगधर्मः । स खल्वहं त्यक्त्वा वितर्कान्पुनस्ताना-
ददानस्तुल्यः श्ववृत्तेर्नातं भावयेत् । यथा श्वा वान्तावलेही तथा त्यक्तस्य पुनराददान इति एवमादि सूत्रान्तरेष्वपि योज्यम् ॥ ३३ ॥

VYĀSA.

When during the practice of the restraints and observances sinful thoughts give trouble, the mind is to be habituated to the contrary ideas. When thoughts of the sins of causing injury to others and other sins appear in the mind of this devotee of wisdom, such as, 'I shall kill the evil-doer,' 'I shall tell lies,' 'I shall appropriate this man's wealth,' 'I shall spoil this man's wife,' 'Why should I not possess the things which this man possesses.' When he is touched-by the high fever of these sins, which tend to push him along the wrong path, he should habituate himself to think upon the contraries of such sins. He should entertain such ideas as these :—Being burnt up as I am in the fires of the world, I have taken refuge in the practice of Yoga, giving as it does protection to all living beings. Were I to take up the sins, having once given them up, I should certainly be a dog in my conduct. As the dog licks up his own vomit, so should I be acting, if I were to take up again what I have once given up.' This should be applied to other aphorisms also.—84.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

There are many obstacles in the way to good things. Thus obstruction being possible, the aphorism teaching the remedy thereof is introduced :—'When these restraints and observances &c.' The aphorism is, 'Upon thoughts of sin troubling, habituation to the contrary.' In the Commentary explaining the sins there is nothing difficult to understand.—33.

Sūtra 34.

वितर्का^१ हिंसादयः^२ कृतकारितानुमोदितालोभक्रोधमोह-
पूर्वका^३ मृदुमध्याधिमात्रा^४ दुःखाज्ञानानन्तफला^५ इतिप्रतिपक्षभा-
वनम्^६ ॥ ३४ ॥

34. The sins¹ are the causing of injury to others² and the rest. They are done,³ caused to be done⁴ and permitted to be done⁵; they are preceded⁶ by desire⁷, anger⁸ and ignorance⁹; they are slight¹⁰, middling¹¹ and intense¹²; their result¹³ is an infinity¹⁴ of pain¹⁵ and un wisdom¹⁶; thus comes the habit-of-thinking¹⁷ to the contrary¹⁸.—85.

वितर्का हिंसादयः कृतकारितानुमोदितालोभक्रोधमोहपूर्वका मृदुमध्याधिमात्रा दुःखाज्ञानानन्तफला इति प्रतिपक्षभावनम् । तत्र हिंसा तावत् । कृतकारितानुमोदितेति त्रिधा । एकैका पुनस्त्रिधा । लोभेन मांसचर्मार्थं क्रोधेनापकृतमनेनेति मोहेन धर्मो

भविष्यतीति । लोभक्रोधमोहाः पुनस्त्रिविधा मृदुमध्याधिमात्रा इत्येवं सप्तविंश-
तिभेदा भवन्ति हिंसायाः । मृदुमध्याधि मात्राः पुनस्त्रिविधाः । मृदुमृदुर्मध्य-
मृदुस्तीव्रमृदुरिति । तथा मृदुमध्ये मध्यमध्यस्तीव्रमध्य इति । तथा मृदुतीव्रो
मध्यतीव्रोऽधिमात्रतीव्र इति । एवमेकाशीतिभेदा हिंसा भवति । सा पुनर्नियम-
विकल्पसमुच्चयभेदादसंख्येया । प्राणभृद्देहस्यापरिसंख्येयत्वादिति एवमनृतादिष्वपि
योज्यम् । ते खल्वमो वितर्का दुःखाज्ञानानन्तफला इति । प्रतिपक्षभावनम् ।
दुःखमज्ञानं चानन्तं फलं येषामिति प्रतिपक्षभावनम् । तथाच हिंसकस्तावत्प्रथमं
वध्यस्य वीर्यमाक्षिपति । ततश्च शस्त्रादिनिपातेन दुःखयति ततो जीवितादपि मोच-
यतीति । ततो वीर्यक्षेपादस्य चेतनाचेतनमुपकरणं क्षीयवीर्यं भवति । दुःखोत्पादान्नर-
कतिर्यक्प्रेतादिषु दुःखमनुभवति जीवितत्रयपरोपणात्प्रतिक्षणं च जीवितात्यये वर्तमानो
मरणमिच्छन्नपि दुःखविपाकस्य नियतविपाकवेदनीयत्वात् । कथंचिदेवोच्छ्वसिति यदि च
कथंचित्पुण्यावापगता हिंसा भवेत्तत्र सुखप्राप्तौ भवेदल्पायुरिति । एवमनृतादिष्वपि योज्यं
यथासंभवम् । एवं वितर्काणां चामुमेवानुगतं विपाकमनिष्टं भावयन्नवितर्केषु मनः प्रणि-
दधीत । प्रतिपक्षभावनाहेतोर्येया वितर्काः । यदास्य स्युरप्रसवधर्मीणस्तदा तत्कृतमैश्वर्यं
योगिनः सिद्धिसूचकं भवति ॥ ३३ ॥

VYĀSA.

Of these the causing of injury to others :—It is of three descriptions, that which is done, that which is caused to be done and that which is permitted to be done. Each again is three-fold. Prompted by desire of gain, as in the case of one who desires to obtain flesh and skin; prompted by anger as in the case of a man who has received some injury; done through ignorance of the real nature of an act, under the impression that the act proposed is a virtue.

Desire, anger and ignorance are again three-fold, slight, middling and intense. Thus there are twenty-seven modifications of injury caused to others.

Mild, middling and intense are again three-fold each; Mild-mild, Middling-mild, and Mild-intense. Also Middling-mild, Middling-middling, and Middling-intense. Also Intense-mild, Intense-middling, and Intense-intense. Thus injury is of eighty-one descriptions.

This again becomes infinite on account of rule (niyama), option (vikalpa) and conjunction (samuchchaya). Similarly should this be applied to untruthfulness, &c.

The contrary tendency consists in the notion that these immoral tendencies cause an infinity of pain and untrue cognition. This means that pain and un wisdom are the unending fruits of these immoralities, and that in this idea lies the power which causes the habit of the contrary trend of thought.

Further—more the injurer first overpowers the strengths of the victim ; then gives him pain by blows from weapons ; then takes his life even.

Now as a consequence of overpowering strength, his intelligent and non-intelligent means of enjoyment lose the power of causing enjoyment. By causing pain he suffers pain among animals, earth-bound disembodied spirits, &c., and in hell. By taking life he lives every moment in a state of waning life. He is so much troubled that he prefers and wishes for death ; and yet, inasmuch as the effects of pain must run their course, he somehow lives on. And if somehow these acts of injury be mixed up with virtue, he is full of enjoyment but short-lived.

These observations may also be applied to untruthfulness, &c., as far as may be. Thus making himself familiar with the undesirable consequences of these sins, he no longer allows his mind to rest over evil acts. The habituation to the contrary tendencies becomes the cause of removing the sins. When these become characterized by non-productivity, then power caused by them becomes, to the Yogî, the indication of his success.—85.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

These sins having different natures, modes, characteristics and fruits, and each of these being an object of habituation to the contrary tendency, he now describes them by the aphorism, with the object of describing the nature of the contrary tendency :—' The sins are the causing of injury to others, &c.' Explains :—' Now as the injury, &c.' Rule (niyama) and untrue cognition and their combinations co-exist with the sins of injury, &c., on account of the infinity of differentiation among living beings. Then, vice causing the intensification of inertia, arises unwisdom also, which is nothing more than the four classes of untrue cognition. For this reason they fructify as unwisdom also. Thus the thought of their fruition as an immensity of pain and unwisdom is also an habituation to the contrary tendency. The author renders the same contrary tendency clearer. 'First overpowers the strength, i.e., his activity, the free motions of the body of the victim, that is the animal, &c., to be killed. By binding to the sacrificial pillar the animal loses the light of his life. The rest is very plain.

The restraints and observances have been described. The removal of their tendencies by means of the habituation to the contrary tendency has also been described. There being thus no obstacles left, now he describes the indications of the success of these practices. By knowing these the Yogî having attained what he has undertaken, turns towards the work which is yet to be done. For this reason he says :—' When these become characterized, &c.'—84.

Sûtra 35.

अहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायां तत्सन्निधौ वैरत्यागः ॥ ३५ ॥

35. (The habit² of) not-causing-injury¹ being confirmed², hostilities³ are given-up⁴ in his³ presence⁴.—86.

तद्यथा । अहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायां तत्सन्निधौ वैरत्यागः । सर्वप्राणिनां भवति ॥ ३५ ॥

VYĀSA.

As for example all living beings give up their hostilities in his presence.—86.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Horse and buffalo, rat and cat, snake and mongoose, and others being natural enemies of each other, give up their animosities, by following the tendencies of the mind of the revered one, whose habit of not causing injury is confirmed. - 85.

Sūtra 36.

सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाफलाश्रयत्वम् ॥ ३६ ॥

36. Veracity¹ being confirmed², action³ and fruition⁴ become dependents⁵. -87.

सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाफलाश्रयत्वम् । धार्मिको भूया इति भवति धार्मिकः स्वर्गं प्राप्नोति । अमोघास्य वाग्भवति ॥ ३६ ॥

VYĀSA.

'Be virtuous.' This being said the object of the benediction becomes virtuous. 'Go to heaven,' he attains the heavenly state. His speech becomes effective.—87.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Action signifies virtue and vice which are the results thereof and their fruition consists in heaven and hell. They become dependents upon him: they come to live in him. They come into existence by the speech of the master. He illustrates the dependence of action: 'Be virtuous.' Illustrates the dependence of fruition: --'Go to heaven.' "Effective" means "unchecked."-- 86.

Sūtra 37.

अस्तेयप्रतिष्ठायां सर्वरत्नोपस्थानम् ॥ ३७ ॥

(The habit of) not-stealing¹ being confirmed², all³, jewels⁴, approach⁵ him.—88.

अस्तेयप्रतिष्ठायां सर्वरत्नोपस्थानम् । सर्वदिक्कान्यस्योपतिष्ठन्ते रत्नानि ॥ ३७ ॥

VYĀSA.

Jewels approach him from all quarters.—88.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

This is easy.—37.

Sūtra 38.

ब्रह्मचर्यप्रतिष्ठायां वीर्यलाभः ॥ ३८ ॥

Continence¹ being confirmed², vigour³ is obtained⁴.—89.

ब्रह्मचर्यप्रतिष्ठायां वीर्यलाभः । यस्य लाभादप्रतिघातुगुणानुत्कर्षयति । सिद्धश्च विद्येयुः ज्ञानमाधातुं समर्थो भवतीति ॥ ३८ ॥

VYĀSA.

By whose attainment, the Yogī perfects his attainments unchecked, and having attained the power becomes capable of imparting knowledge to learners.—89.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Vigour is power by attaining which, being unchecked, *i.e.*, without giving way to obstacles, the Yogī perfects, that is lays by the store of *Apimā*, &c.

Having attained the power: When he is possessed of the eight attainments known as *Tāra*, &c., and having other names as *Uha*, &c.

Learners are the disciples of the Yogī. Knowledge means the Yoga which is an accessory of the Yoga. He becomes capable of teaching Yoga.—88.

Sūtra 39.

अपरिग्रहस्थैर्ये जन्मकथंता संबोधः ॥ ३९ ॥

Non-covetousness¹ being confirmed², the knowledge⁵ of-the-how⁴ of births³.—90.

अपरिग्रहस्थैर्ये जन्मकथंता संबोधः । अस्य भवति कोऽहमासं कथमहमासं किंस्विदिदं कथंस्विदिदं के वा भविष्यामः कथं वा भविष्याम इत्येवमस्य पूर्वान्तापरान्तमव्यवस्थितमावजिज्ञासा स्वरूपेणापावर्तते । एता यमस्थैर्ये सिद्धयो नियमेषु वक्ष्यामः ॥ ३९ ॥

VYĀSA.

Non-covetousness being confirmed, the knowledge of the how-of-births comes to him. Who was I? How was I? What is this? How is this? What shall we be? Or, How shall we be? In this shape comes to him the desire of knowing the nature of his own existence in the past, the present and the future.

These are attainments due to the confirmation of the restraints. We shall now speak of those that are caused by observances.—90.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Non-covetousness being confirmed, the knowledge of the 'how-of-births.' Birth means coming into relationship with the physical body and the powers of sensation, &c., together. The how-of-birth means its modality. Its knowledge means its direct consciousness. It means the perfect knowledge of the past, the present and of all that is beyond ken, together with their modes.

Questions about the past:—'Who was I? Questions about the different modes of the birth and preservation of the same:—'How was I?' Wishes to know the nature of the present birth:—'What is this?' Is the physical body the mere collection of the physical elements or something different therefrom? Here too the words. 'How is this?' are to be understood. In some books they actually appear.

Questions about the future:—‘What shall we be?’ Here too the how must be understood. Thus comes to him the desire to know of his own existence, i.e., the coming into relationship with the body, &c., in the past, the present and the future. From the desire comes the knowledge, the rule being that one does whatever he desires.—39.

Sūtra 40.

शौचात्स्वाङ्गजुगुप्सापरैरसंसर्गः ॥ ४० ॥

40. By cleanliness¹ disinclination³ to one's-body²; and cessation-of-contact⁵ with-others⁴.—91.

शौचात्स्वाङ्गजुगुप्सा परैरसंसर्गः । स्वाङ्गे जुगुप्सायां शौचमारभमाणः कायावद्य-
दर्शो कायानमिष्यङ्को यतिर्भवति । किञ्च परैरसंसर्गः कायस्वभावलोकी स्वमपि कायं
जिहासुर्मृज्जलादिभिराक्षालयन्नपि कायशुद्धिमपश्यन्कथं परकार्यैरत्यन्तमेवाप्रयतैः संसृ-
ज्यत ॥ ४० ॥

VYĀSA.

One begins to clean himself, being disgusted with the dirt of his body. Then he sees the defects of the body. He loses his attachment to the body, and becomes restrained in himself. Furthermore, he ceases to come into contact with others. He sees the nature of the body. He wishes to give up his own body, seeing that it is never pure, even though it is being constantly washed by water, &c. How should he come into contact with the body of others which are all the more impure.—91.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

This shows the external cleanliness to be the indicator of attainments. —40.

Sūtra 41.

सत्त्वशुद्धौ सौमनस्यैकाग्र्येन्द्रियजयात्मदर्शनयोग्यत्वानि च ४१

41. And¹⁰ upon-the-essence¹ becoming-pure², come high-mindedness³, one-pointedness⁴, control⁶ of the senses⁵ and fitness⁹ for the knowledge⁸ of the self⁷. —92.

किं च । सत्त्वशुद्धौ सौमनस्यैकाग्र्येन्द्रियजयात्मदर्शनयोग्यत्वानि च । भवन्तीति-
वाक्यशेषः । शुचेः सत्त्वशुद्धिस्ततः सौमनस्यं तत ऐकाग्र्यं तत इन्द्रियजयस्ततश्चात्म-
दर्शनयोग्यत्वं बुद्धिसत्त्वस्य भवतीत्येतच्छौचस्थैर्यादधिगम्यत इति ॥ ४१ ॥

VYĀSA.

Further, high-mindedness, control of the senses and fitness for self-knowledge come upon the essence becoming pure. By cleanliness comes the purity of the essence. Thence high-mindedness, thence one-pointedness, thence control of the senses and thence fitness for self-knowledge,

of the essence of the mind. 'This it is that comes to the Yogī by cleanliness being confirmed.—92.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now he describes the attainments indicated by internal cleanliness :—' Further ' &c.' By washing off the impurities of the mind the essence of the mind shows itself in its purity. By the removal of dirt comes high-mindedness which is an index of purity. That which is pure becomes one-pointed. The mind having been thus controlled, the senses too are controlled, being dependent as they are upon the mind. Thence the essence of the mind becomes fit for self-knowledge.—41.

Sūtra 42.

संतोषादनुत्तमः सुखलाभः ॥ ४३ ॥

42. By-contentment¹ the acquisition⁴ of extreme² happiness³.—93.

संतोषादनुत्तमः सुखलाभः । तथा चोक्तम् । यच्च कामसुखं लोके यच्च दिव्यं महत्सुखम् । तृष्णाक्षयसुखस्यैते नार्हतः षोडशो कलामिति ॥ ४२ ॥

VYĀSA.

And so it has been said :—' Whatever of pleasure is there in the world of desires, and whatever of larger happiness is there in the world of heaven, they do not come to the sixteenth part of the joy due to the suppression of desires'.—93.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Extreme means that than which there is nothing higher in existence. As was said by Yayāti to Puru when he was begging his youth from him :—' The wise man who gives up desire so difficult to give up by the ignorant and never becoming old with age is full of bliss.' Shows this by ' whatever is there, &c.' - 42.

Sūtra 43.

कायेन्द्रियसिद्धिरशुद्धिक्षयात्तपसः ॥ ४३ ॥

43. By-purificatory-actions⁶, the removal⁵ of impurity⁴ and the attainments³ of the physical-body¹ and the senses²—94.

कायेन्द्रियसिद्धिरशुद्धिक्षयात्तपसः । निर्वर्त्यमानमेव तपो हिनस्यशुद्ध्यावरणमलं तदावरणमलापगमात्कायसिद्धिरणिमाद्या । तथेन्द्रियसिद्धिर्दूराच्छ्रवणमननाद्येति ॥ ४३ ॥

VYĀSA.

Purificatory actions as they are being done, destroy the dirt of the veil of impurity. By the destruction of the dirt of this veil, come the

attainments of the physical body, Animā and others. So also the attainments of the senses, clairaudience and thought-reading from a distance, &c. —94.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Mentions the indications of the attainment of the Purificatory action. By Purificatory action, &c. 'The veil which is described as impurity consists of vice, &c., due to inertia. Animā and others, such as Mahimā, Laghimā and Prāpti. It is all easy.—48.

Sūtra 44.

स्वाध्यायादिष्टदेवतासंप्रयोगः ॥ ४४ ॥

44. By-study¹ comes communion³ with the desired-deity².—95.

स्वध्यायादिष्टदेवतासंप्रयोगः । देवा ऋषयः सिद्धाश्च स्वाध्यायशीऽस्य दर्शनं गच्छन्ति कार्ये चास्य वर्तन्ते इति ॥ ४४ ॥

VYĀSA.

The gods, the R̥is̥is and the Siddhas become visible to him who is given to study, and they do take part in his work.—25.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Mentions the attainments indicated by the perfection of study: 'By study communion with the desired deity.' This is easy. 44.

Sūtra 45.

समाधिसिद्धिरीश्वरप्रणिधानात् ॥ ४५ ॥

45. The attainment² of trance¹ by making 'Īśwara³ the-motive-of-all-actions¹.—96.

समाधिसिद्धिरीश्वरप्रणिधानात् । ईश्वरार्पितसर्वभावस्य समाधिसिद्धिर्यया सर्वमीप्सितमवितथं जानाति देशान्तरे देहान्तरे कालान्तरे च । ततोऽस्य प्रज्ञा यथाभूतं प्रजानातीति ॥ ४५ ॥

VYĀSA.

The faculty of trance (samādhi) becomes perfect in him who dedicates all his powers to Īśwara. By this he knows all that he desires to know, just as it is in reality, in another place, in another body or at another time. Then his intellect knows everything as it is.—96.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'The attainment of trance by making Īśwara the motive of all actions.' It should not be said that inasmuch as the Cognitive trance is attained by making Īśwara the motive of all actions, the remaining seven accessories are useless. These accessories are useful in the attainment of that mental mood which devotes all action to the purposes

of Īśvara, by known and unknown subsidiary methods. They are also useful in the attainment of the Cognitive trance, by a separate combination of accessories. Thus the same curds serve the purpose of a man and are useful for the purposes of a sacrifice.

In this case the accessories of concentration, meditation and trance would not be the internal accessories of the Cognitive trance. The Cognitive trance would thus become a cause equal in degree with them. Its directness (internality) is perceived by the other accessories not being directly turned towards it. The observance of making Īśvara the motive of all action has Īśvara only for its direct object. Its direct object is not the object of Cognitive trance. Therefore this is an external, indirect means. Thus all is plain.

The word Prajanāti = 'knows,' shows the radical meaning of prajñā-intellect. — 45.

Sūtra 46.

स्थिरसुखमासनम् ॥ ४६ ॥

46. Posture³ is steadily¹ easy². — 97.

उक्ताः सहसिद्धिर्भिर्यमनियमाः । आसनादीनि वक्ष्यामस्तत्र । स्थिरसुखमासनम् ।
तद्यथा पद्मासनं वीरासनं भद्रासनं स्वस्तिकं दण्डासनं सोपाश्रयं पङ्क्तं क्रौञ्चनिषदनं
हस्तिनिषदनमुष्ट्रनिषदनं समसंस्थानं स्थिरसुखं यथासुखं चेत्येवमादीनि ॥ ४६ ॥

VYĀSA.

The restraints and observances have been described with attainments. We shall now describe the posture, &c. Of these, posture is steadily easy. Thus, for example, the Padmāsana, the Virāsana, the Bhadrāsana, the Svastika, the Dandāsana, the Sopashraya, the Paryanka, the Krauñchniṣādana, the Hastiniṣādana, the Uṣṭraniṣādana, the Samasamsthāna, the Sthirasukha, the Yathāsukha and such others.—97.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Introduce the next aphorism : — 'The restraints and observances, &c.' 'Of these posture is steadily easy.' Steadiness means absence of motion. The same must be easy. It must not cause trouble. Such should be the posture. This is the meaning of the aphorism. Posture is the way in which one sits. He mentions different postures : — As for example : — The Padmāsana is well-known. The Virāsana is that in which a sitting man has one foot in contact with the ground, and places the other over the partially inclined other knee.

The Bhadrāsana is that in which the sitting man places the soles of both feet joined together below the testicles, and places both hands with the fingers interlaced over that region.

The Svastika is that in which the left foot is placed, a little downward inclined between the right thigh and shank, and the right foot is placed in a similar position between the left thigh and shank.

The Dandāsana is practised by sitting with thighs, shanks and feet stretched straight along the ground with the ankles joined together, but the toes kept apart.

The Paryanka is that in which the knees are extended and the arms are used to lie upon.

The Sopashraya is that in which the tiger's skin or the deer skin or some cloth is used to sit upon.

The Krauñchaniṣādana and others of the same class are to be imitated from the sitting postures of the Krauñcha, the elephant, the camel.

The Samasamsthāna is that in which the feet are so placed that the heels and fore-parts of both are joined together with the feet a little bent.

The Sthirasukha is whatever posture may secure steadiness and ease. This is approved by the writer of the aphorisms. It is also described as Yathāsukha. This means any position that may secure ease.—46.

Sūtra 47.

प्रयत्नशैथिल्यानन्तसमापत्तिभ्याम् ॥ ४७ ॥

47. By-slackening² of effort¹ and by thought-transformation¹ as infinite.³—98.

प्रयत्नशैथिल्यानन्तसमापत्तिभ्याम् । भवतीति वाक्यशेषः । प्रयत्नोपरमात्सिध्य-
त्यासनं येन नाङ्गमेजयो भवति । अनन्ते वा समापन्नं चित्तमासनं निर्वर्तयतीति ॥ ४७ ॥

VYĀSA.

The sentence is completed by adding the word, 'is secured.' Posture becomes perfect when effort to that end ceases, so that there may be no more movement of the body. Or, when the mind is transformed into the infinite, that is, makes the idea of infinity its own, it brings about the perfection of posture.—98.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having described the nature of posture, he describes the means thereof:—'By slackening of effort and by thought-transforming as infinite.' The effort which is directed towards the accomplishment of a certain posture helps to keep the body in a particular position. It is not the cause of the posture which as an accessory of Yoga is meant to be taught here. If that were its cause, the teaching would be useless, inasmuch as in that case the posture would be achieved by its own operation. Therefore this natural effort of the body does not bring about the posture that is meant to be taught. It is in fact its antagonistic. Further this natural effort being the antecedent of the posture that may at any time be desired, does away with the very object of posture. Therefore, he who practices posture as an observance taught here, should employ an effort which consists in suppressing the natural efforts of the body. Otherwise the posture taught here will not be accomplished. It is for this reason that the slackening of the natural efforts of the body is said to be the means of accomplishing posture.

Or, the mind transformed into the idea of the infinite, the Great Serpent, who upholds the sphere of the earth by means of his very steady thousand heads, brings about steadiness.—47.

Sūtra 48.

ततो द्वन्द्वानभिघातः ॥ ४८ ॥

48. Thence¹ cessation-of-disturbance³ from-the-pairs-of-opposites².—99.

ततो द्वन्द्वानभिघातः । शीतोष्णादिभिर्द्वन्द्वरासनजयास्त्राभिभूयते ॥ ४८ ॥

VYĀSA.

When posture has been mastered he is not disturbed by the pairs of opposites such as heat and cold. —99.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Mentions the indications of the achievement of posture.

"Thence the cessation of disturbance from the pairs of opposites."

The Commentary has been explained by what has already been said

Sutra 49.

तस्मिन्सति श्वासप्रश्वासयोगतिविच्छेदः प्राणायामः ॥ ४९ ॥

49. Regulation-of-breath (Prāṇāyāma)¹ is the stoppage⁶ of the inspiratory² and expiratory¹ movements⁵ (of breath) which follows, when that¹ has-been-secured². —100.

तस्मिन्सति श्वासप्रश्वासयोगतिविच्छेदः प्राणायामः । सत्यासनजये बाह्यस्य वायोरान्तरमनं श्वासः । कौष्ठ्यस्य वायेर्निःसारणं प्रश्वासः । तयोर्गतिविच्छेदे उभयाभावः प्राणायामः ॥ ४९ ॥

VYĀSA.

When posture has been achieved the cessation of the movements of both inspiration, the drinking in of external air, and expiration, the throwing out of the internal air, is the regulation of breath (Prāṇāyāma). —100.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Posture also has been described in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa :— 'Having thus practised the Bhadrāsana, &c., and being full of their qualities, &c.' After posture describes the Prāṇāyāma, at the same time showing that posture must precede it :— 'Prāṇāyāma is the cessation of the inspiratory and expiratory movements of breath which follows when that has been secured.' The cessation of the movements of expiration and inspiration exists in the Rechaka, Kumbhaka and Puraka branches of the regulation of breath. This, therefore, is a description of the ordinary Prāṇāyāma. This means that where in the Puraka the external air having been inspired is retained inside, the cessation of the movements of inspiration and expiration takes place. Similarly, where in the Rechaka, the internal air having been expelled is retained outside, the cessation of the movements of inspiration and expiration takes place. Similarly, in the Kumbhaka too. This is what the Commentary says :— 'When posture has been, &c.'—49.

Sutra 50.

बाह्याभ्यन्तरस्तम्भवृत्तिर्देशकालसंख्याभिः परिदृष्टो दीर्घसूक्ष्मः ॥ ५० ॥

50. Manifestation¹ as external,¹ internal² and total restraint³ is regulated⁸ by place⁵, time⁶ and number⁷; and thus it becomes long-in-duration⁹ and subtle¹⁰. —101.

स तु । बाह्याभ्यन्तरस्तम्भवृत्तिर्देशकालसङ्ख्याभिः परिहृतो दीर्घसूक्ष्मः । यत्र प्रश्वासपूर्वको गत्यभावः स बाह्यः । यत्र श्वासपूर्वको गत्यभावः स आभ्यन्तरः । तृतीयस्तम्भवृत्तिर्यत्रोभयाभावः सकृत्प्रयत्नाद्भवति । यथा तप्ते न्यस्तमुपले जलं सर्वतः संकोचमापद्येत तथा द्वयोर्युगपद्व्यभाव इति । त्रयोऽप्येते देशेन परिहृताः । इयानस्य विषयो देश इति । कालेन परिहृताः क्षणानामित्यन्तावधारणेनावच्छिन्ना इत्यर्थः । सङ्ख्याभिः परिहृता एतावद्भिः श्वासप्रश्वासैः प्रथम उद्घातस्तद्वन्नित्युद्घातस्यैतावद्भिर्द्वितीय उद्घात एवं तृतीयः । एवं मृदुरेवं मध्य एवं तीव्र इति सङ्ख्यापरिहृतः स खल्वयमेवमभ्यस्तो दीर्घसूक्ष्मः ॥ ५० ॥

VYĀSA.

And that manifests as external, internal and total restraint, is regulated by time, place and number; is of long duration and subtle. The cessation of the motion of breath which precedes expiration is external. The cessation of the motion of breath which precedes inspiration is internal. The third manifests total restraint where cessation of both these motions takes place by a single effort. As water thrown on a heated stone shrivels up from all sides, so do both cease simultaneously. All these three are regulated by place. So much of space is occupied by it. Also are they regulated by time. The meaning is that they are measured by ascertaining the seconds of their duration. They are also regulated by number. The first cessation is for so many, the second for so many, and similarly the third. Similarly it is thus mild, thus middling and thus intense. Thus is it regulated by number. This verily thus practised becomes long in duration and subtle.—101.

• VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

He introduces the aphorism by describing the three descriptions of Prāṇāyāma :— 'And that manifests as external, internal and total restraint; is regulated by time, place and number; is of long duration and subtle.' The word Vritti 'manifestation' is related to all the three. He describes the Rechaka :— 'That which precedes expiration.' Describes the Puraka :— 'That which precedes inspiration.' Describes the Kumbhaka :— 'The third, &c.' Renders the same plainer : 'Where the cessation of both inspiration and expiration takes place simultaneously by a single effort of restraint, not that it stands in need of restraining effort which is the culmination of the effort of inspiration, nor that it stands in need of the restraining effort which culminates in the effort of expiration. On the other hand, as water thrown on a heated stone shrivels up on all sides as it is being dried up, so also the air running in or out ceases its action by a strong effort of restraint, and stays in the body reduced to a state of greater than ordinary tenuity. It does not fill in and is not, therefore, Puraka. Nor does it go out and is not, therefore, Rechaka.

In the external the limit of space is measured in a place free from wind by the effect upon a straw or a piece of cotton wool, by a yard or foot-rule or by the hand. Similarly; in the internal it is measured by the sensation of touch at the soles of feet or at the forehead, slight like the touch of an ant.

A 'second' (kṣaṇa) is the fourth part of the period of time taken by the act of shutting the eyes. It is measured by ascertaining the seconds of duration.

A 'mātrā' (measure) is the time which is taken up by thrice turning up one's hand over one's knee and then snapping the fingers once.

- Measured by thirty-six such mātrās is the first attempt (udghata) which is mild.
- Twice that is the second, which is middling. Thrice that is the third which is intense. This is the Prāṇāyāma as measured by number. It is described:—Thus is it measured by number, &c.

The time taken by the inspiration and expiration of a healthy man is the same as that which is measured by snapping the fingers, as described, after turning the hand thrice over the knee.

The first attempt when carried to its completion is said to be conquered or mastered. The time is intended to be described by so many inspirations and expirations. They are practically the same.

This Prāṇāyāma becomes of long duration when it takes up greater space and time, being daily practised and being increased in succession of a fortnight, a day, &c. It is subtle, because it is known by very subtle trance (samādhi) not because it becomes weak. —50.

Sūtra 51.

बाह्याभ्यन्तरविषयाक्षेपी चतुर्थः ॥ ५१ ॥

51. The fourth⁵ is that which follows when the spheres³ of the external¹ and internal² have-been-passed.⁴—102:

बाह्याभ्यन्तरविषयाक्षेपी चतुर्थः । देशकालसङ्ख्याभिर्बाह्यविषयपरिदृष्ट आक्षिप्तः तथाभ्यन्तरविषयपरिदृष्ट आक्षिप्तः । उभयथा दीर्घसूक्ष्मः । तत्पूर्वको भूमिजयात्क्रमेणोभयोर्गत्यभावश्चतुर्थः प्राणायामः । तृतीयस्तु विषयानालोचितो गत्यभावः सकृदारब्ध एव देशकालसङ्ख्याभिः परिदृष्टो दीर्घसूक्ष्मः । चतुर्थस्तु श्वासप्रश्वासयोर्विषयानवधारणात्क्रमेण भूमिजयादुभयाक्षेपपूर्वको गत्यभावश्चतुर्थः प्राणायाम इत्ययं विशेष इति ॥ ५१ ॥

VYĀSA.

The sphere of the external, having been mastered by the measurements of time, space and number, is left behind. Similarly is the sphere of the internal thus measured, left behind. In the case of both, it becomes long and subtle. The cessation of the movements of both, in sequence of the attainment of that state, by gradual mastery over the different states, is the fourth. In the third the sphere is not considered; the cessation of motion takes place with one single effort, and is then measured by space, time and number; and thus becomes long and subtle. In the fourth, however, the spheres of inspiration and expiration are ascertained, the different states are mastered by and by, and it follows the perfection of both. Thus comes about the cessation of the movements of both. This is the fourth Prāṇāyāma and is thus distinguished.—102.

VACHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Thus three descriptions of Prāṇāyāma have been described. Now he describes the fourth :—‘The fourth is that, &c.’ Explains :—‘The sphere of the external, &c.’

‘Left behind’ :—dethroned from its position, which has been mastered by practice. That also is protracted and subtle.

‘In sequence of’ :—The external and internal Prāṇāyāmas preceded by a calculation of time, space and number. And this fourth one is not brought about, all at once, by a single effort, like the third one.

On the other hand it reaches different states of perfection, as it is being practised ; and as one state has been mastered it goes on to the higher stage in succession, and it is thus acquired. This is said :—‘By gradual mastery over the different states.’

The question is that the cessation of the motion of both the Prāṇāyāmas takes place in the third Prāṇāyāma also, which is described as the total restraint ; what then is the distinction between the third and the fourth. For this reason he says :—‘In the third, &c.’ The third is brought about by a single effort and is not preceded by the thought of measurements. The fourth, however, is preceded by the knowledge of the measurements, and is brought about by much effort. This is the difference. The meaning is that the spheres of the Puraka and the Rechaka are not considered, but this is measured by time, space and number.—51.

Sūtra 52.

ततः क्षीयते प्रकाशावरणम् ॥ ५२ ॥

52. Thence¹ the cover¹ of light³ is destroyed². —103.

ततः क्षीयते प्रकाशावरणम् । प्राणायामानभ्यस्यतोऽप्य योगिनः क्षीयते विवेक-
ज्ञानावरणीयं कर्म यत्तदाचक्षते । महामोहमयेनेन्द्रियजालेन प्रकाशशीलं सत्त्वमावृत्य
तदेवाकार्यं नियुक्तमिति । तदस्य प्रकाशावरणं कर्म संसारनिबन्धनं प्राणायामाभ्यासाद्
दुर्बलं भवति प्रतिक्षणं च क्षीयते । तथ चोक्तम् । तपो न परं प्राणायामात्ततो विशुद्धि-
र्मलानां दीप्तिश्च ज्ञानस्येति ॥ ५२ ॥

VYĀSA.

The karma of the Yogī which covers up the discriminative knowledge is destroyed as he practises the Prāṇāyāma. This is what they say :—‘By the magic panorama of desire, the Essence, which is luminous by nature, is covered up, and the same is directed towards vice.’ This karma of the Yogī which covers up the light and binds him to repeated births, becomes weak by the practice of Prāṇāyāma every moment, and is then destroyed. And so it has been said :—‘There is no purificatory action higher than Prāṇāyāma ; purity is secured by that, through the destruction of impurity ; and the light of knowledge shines.’—103.

VACHASPATI'S GLOSS.

He describes the object of Prāṇāyāma :—‘Thence the cover of light is destroyed.’ The cover is that which covers up the light of Mental Essence. It means the afflictions and sin. He explains :—‘The karma of the Yogī.....as he practises Prāṇāyāma.’ Knowledge

is that by which anything is known. It is the light of the Mental Essence. Discriminative knowledge is the knowledge of the distinction (between the Objective Essence and consciousness). That which covers up discriminative knowledge is 'the karma which covers up.' Karma means the vice which is brought about by action so called, and the afflictions caused thereby. He says that the Âgamis agree in this matter :—'This is what they say.' Desire is spoken of as the Great Forgetfulness. By the mention of desire is to be understood Nescience also, which is found inseparably joined to it.

Vice is that which should not be done.

The question arises that if Prāṇāyāma alone does away with vice what is the use of purificatory action? (Tapas). For this reason he says :—"Becomes weak" and not altogether destroyed by it. Therefore, purificatory action is necessary for its destruction. In this too the Âgamis agree :—'And so it has been said.'

Manu also says :—'Let the defects be burnt up by Prāṇāyāma.'

The Viṣṇu Purāṇa speaks of the Prāṇāyāma as an accessory of Yoga :—'He who masters the air known as Prāṇa by practice, is said to have secured Prāṇāyāma.' It is either seeded or seedless. When the powers known as Prāṇa and Apāna are mastered one by the other, it is two-fold. The third is that when both are checked.—52.

Sūtra 53.

धारणासु च योग्यता मनसः ॥ ५३ ॥

53. And² the fitness³ of the mind¹ for concentration¹.—104.

किंच । धारणासु च योग्यता मनसः । प्राणायामाभ्यासादेव प्रच्छर्दनविधारणाभ्यां वा प्राणस्येति वचनात् ॥ ५३ ॥

VYĀSA.

Further, the fitness of the mind for concentration. By the practice itself of Prāṇāyāma is this secured. As laid down :—

"By the expulsion and retention of breath optionally."—I. 34.—104.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Prāṇāyāma renders the mind fit for concentration, by making it steady.—53.

Sūtra 54.

स्वविषयासंप्रयोगे चित्तस्य स्वरूपानुकार इवेन्द्रियाणां प्रत्याहारः ५४

54. Abstraction (Pratyāhāra)⁹ is that by which the senses⁸ do not-come-into-contact³ with their¹ objects² and follow⁶ as-it-were⁷ the nature⁵ of the mind¹.—105.

अथ कः प्रत्याहारः स्वविषयासंप्रयोगे चित्तस्य स्वरूपानुकार इवेन्द्रियाणां प्रत्याहारः । स्वविषयसंप्रयोगाभावे चित्तस्वरूपानुकार इवेति । चित्तनिरोधे चित्तवन्निरुद्धानीन्द्रियाणि नेतरेन्द्रियजयवदुपायान्तरमपेक्षन्ते । यथा मधुकरराजानं मक्षिका उत्पतन्तमनुत्पतन्ति निविशमानमनुनिविशन्ते तथेन्द्रियाणि चित्तनिरोधे निरुद्धानीत्येष प्रत्याहारः ॥ ५४ ॥

VYĀSA.

Now what is Pratyāhāra? 'Pratyāhāra is that by which the senses do not come into contact with their objects and, as it were, follow the nature of the mind.' The meaning is that in the absence of contact with their objects, they imitate, as it were, the nature of the mind. The senses are restrained, like the mind, when the mind is restrained. They do not stand in need of other means like the control of the other organs. Just as the bees fly, as the queen flies; and sit as the queen sits down; so the sense becomes restrained, as the mind is restrained. This is Pratyāhāra. —105.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Thus then having been purified by the restraints, &c., begins the practice of Pratyāhāra with a view to secure Samyama. The author puts a question to introduce the aphorism describing it:—'Now what, &c.' Pratyāhāra is that by which the senses do not come into contact with their objects, and as it were follow the nature of the mind.' The meaning is that inasmuch as the mind does not come into contact with objective sounds, &c., as cause of forgetfulness, attachment and aversion, the senses of sight, &c., too do not, on account of the absence of that contact, incline towards their objects. This is the imitation of the mind by the senses. Inasmuch however, as the senses do not imitate the mind in the fact of the taking in of the realities of objects, because their field of operation is the external world alone, it is said that they, *as it were*, imitate the mind. By using the locative case it is shown that the ordinary quality of non-contact with their objects is the operative cause of the senses imitating the mind. 'In the absence of contact with their, &c.' Explains the imitation:—'The senses are restrained like the mind, &c.' The similarity is that the cause of the restraint of both is, and the restraint of both is due to, the same effort. Illustrates the same:—'Just as the bees &c.' Applies the illustration to the object to be illustrated:—'So, &c.'

In this connection also says the Viṣṇu Purāṇa:—'The Yogī who is devoted to the practice of Pratyāhāra should restrain the senses which are attached to the objects of sound, &c., and make them imitate the mind.'

Its object is shown even there. "Those of undisturbed mind have thereby the highest possible control of the senses. If the senses are uncontrolled, the Yogī can not achieve Yoga."—54.

Sūtra 55.

ततः परमावश्यतेन्द्रियाणाम् ॥ ५५ ॥

55. Thence¹ the senses⁴ are under the highest² control³.—106.

ततः परमावश्यतेन्द्रियाणाम् । शब्दादिष्वव्यसनमिन्द्रियजय इति केचित् । सक्तिर्व्यसनं व्यस्यत्येनं श्रेयस इति । अविरुद्धप्रतिपत्तिर्याया । शब्दादिसंप्रयोगः स्वेच्छयेत्यन्ये । रागद्वेषभावे सुखदुःखशून्यं शब्दादिज्ञानमिन्द्रियजय इति केचित् । चित्तैकाग्र्यादप्रतिपत्तिरेवेति जैमिषव्यः । ततश्च परमा त्वयं वश्यता यच्चित्तनिरोधे निरुद्धानीन्द्रियाणि नेतरेन्द्रियजयवत्प्रयत्नकृतमुपायान्तरमपेक्षन्ते योगिन इति ॥ ५५ ॥

इति श्रीपातञ्जले सांख्यप्रवचने योगशास्त्रे साधननि-

र्देशो नाम द्वितीयः पादः समाप्तः ॥ २ ॥

VYĀSA.

Some say that the conquest of the senses is their non-attachment to sound, etc. Attachment is a defect which draws them away from the good. Others say that inasmuch as the enjoyment of unprohibited objects is proper, it should be said that contact with sound, &c., subject to one's wishes, is the conquest of the senses. Others again say that the conquest of the senses is the obtaining of knowledge of sound, &c., without their causing pleasure and pain, in the absence of attachment and aversion. Jaigishavya says that it is only the want of action of the senses, on account of the one-pointedness of the mind. For this reason it is then that this control is the very highest, the restraint, that is to say, of the senses along with the restraint of the mind; and also for the reason that the Yogis, being thus restrained, do not stand in need of employing other means, like those employed in the conquest of other organs.—106.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'Thence the senses come under the highest control.' Are there any controls of the senses which may be said not to be the highest, so that it is said here that the highest control is secured? Shows them: 'Some say that the conquest, &c.' Explains this:—Attachment is desire. The word in the original is *vyasana*, which is described as meaning that which removes away from the good. The absence of this attachment which draws one away from the good, is the control. Describes another control:—The enjoyment of such sound, &c., as is not forbidden by *Śruti*, &c., and the avoidance of those that are forbidden, is proper, that is, in accordance with propriety.

He describes another control:—'Contact with sound, &c.' The contact of the senses with sound, &c., depends upon one's wishes. Man is free to enjoy whatever he likes. He is not dependent upon the enjoyment.

He mentions another control also:—'The knowledge of sound, &c., without pleasure and pain, &c.'

He mentions the control which is preferred by the author of the aphorism, and with which a great *Rṣi* is in accord. Jaigishavya says that it is the non-inclination of the senses towards their objects, the sounds, &c., along with the mind which has become one-pointed. Now he says that this is the highest control:—'For this reason is it then, &c.' The word 'then' (*TU* in the original) differentiates this control from other controls. The other controls do not remove the possibility of contact with the poison of afflictions, because they are of the nature of the conjunction between the serpent and the poison. Even the greatest professor of the science of poisons who has controlled a serpent, sleeps not with the serpent in his arms, without fear. This control, however, which is free from contact with all poisons, leaves no fear, and is, therefore, called the Highest.

'Like the control of the other organs':—In the state of the *Yatātma Yogī*, when one sense has been controlled, the *Yogī* stands in need of further effort for controlling the remaining senses. Not so is there need of other effort to control the external senses, when the mind is restrained. This is the meaning.—55.

Five objects have been treated in this chapter: The *Kriyā Yoga*, the Afflictions, the Fruitage of actions, the consequent Pain, and the four branches of the science of Sorrow.

Here finishes the Gloss of Vāchaspati on the second Chapter of the Commentary of Vyāsa on Patanjali's Yoga Philosophy. The chapter describing 'The means of Yoga,'

CHAPTER THIRD.
ON ATTAINMENTS (VIBHÜTIS OR SIDDHIS).

Sūtra 1.

देशबन्धश्चित्तस्य धारणा ॥ १ ॥

1. Concentration¹ is the stead¹fastness² of the mind³.—107.

उक्तानि पञ्च बहिरङ्गानि साधनानि । धारणा वक्तव्या । देशबन्धश्चित्तस्य धारणा ।
नाभिचक्रे हृदयपुण्डरीके मूर्ध्नि ज्योतिषि नासिकाग्रे जिह्वाग्र इत्येवमादिषु देशेषु बाह्ये
वा विषये चित्तस्य वृत्तिमात्रेण बन्ध इति धारणा ॥ १ ॥

VYĀSA.

The five external means of attainment have been described. Concentration (Dhāraṇā) is now discussed. 'Concentration is the steadfastness of the mind.' Concentration means the mind becoming fast in such places as the sphere of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the light in the brain, the fore-part of the nose, the fore-part of the tongue, and such like parts of the body ; or by means of the modifications only in any other external object only.—107.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Trance (Samādhi) and the means of its attainment have been described in the first and second chapters. In the third chapter are to be described the attainments which follow in their wake and which are the means of generating faith. The attainments are achieved by *Samyama*. *Samyama* consists of concentration, meditation and trance together. As means for the achievement of attainments, these three accessories are more intimate than the five external ones, and thus being internal, they are described here, in order that they may be specifically mastered. Among these too, concentration, meditation and trance are related to one another as cause and effect consecutively, and their order of causation is fixed. The order is respected here in the enumeration. Therefore concentration is described first. Thus the Bhāṣyakāra says:—'The five external means, etc.' 'Concentration is the steadfastness of the mind.' He enumerates the places for concentration in the body:—'The sphere of the navel, etc.' 'Such like parts of the body' indicate the palate, etc. He describes the external objects:—'Or any other external object.' It is not possible for the mind to come into relationship with the external objects bodily ; hence is it said : 'By means of the modifications only.'

On this subject also says the Purāṇa :

"Having mastered the breath by means of controlling the processes of breathing, and having likewise subjected the senses to the mind by the practice of making their activity dependent upon the process of thought, he should let his mind rest upon some auspicious object." The external auspicious objects are the Golden Kestus (Hiranyagarbha), Indra and Prajāpati, etc.

Further the following is said there:—

“The personified appearance of the Lord leaves no room for the desire to possess any other object of concentration. The fact of the mind being held fast there is what is called concentration. And, O king, hear what that personified appearance of the Lord is that should be meditated upon; there can be no concentration without something upon which the mind may rest. The face is cheerful and pleasing to the mind, the eyes are full of freshness and depth like lotus-leaves, the cheeks are beautiful, the forehead is bright and high, the ears are symmetrical and well-adorned by drops, the neck is long like the shell of a conch; the auspicious sign of fortune, the *Śrivatsa*, marks his chest; with a deep navel and deep furrows appearing in the abdomen; with eight or four arms hanging from his body; sitting with thighs and shanks evenly placed, and hands and feet placed in the form of a *Śvastika*. Such is the appearance of Viṣṇu clad in clean yellow garb, adorned with beautiful head-dress, armlet, bracelet, etc.; carrying his bow, the *Śārṅga*, his discus, his club, his sword, his conch-shell and his rosary of *Rudrākṣa*. He has become Brahma. With mind merged in Him, let the Yogī devote himself to meditating upon Him. Let him apply his mind to him so long as his concentration becomes well established. Practising this concentration or doing some other work in accordance with his own wishes, so long as the mind learns not to get away from the object of concentration, the Yogī should in that state consider his concentration achieved.—1.

Sūtra 2.

तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानम् ॥ २ ॥

2. The continuation³ there¹ of the mental-effort² (to understand) is meditation¹ (*dhyāna*).—108.

तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानम् । तस्मिन्देहे ध्येयालम्बनस्य प्रत्ययस्यैकतानता सहशः प्रवाहः प्रत्ययान्तरेणापरामृष्टो ध्यानम् ॥ २ ॥

VYĀSA.

Meditation is the continuance, i.e., the unchanging flow, of the mental effort to understand the object of meditation, untouched by any other effort of the understanding.—108.

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

The author describes the meditation which is brought about by concentration:— ‘Continuance of the mental effort to understand it is meditation.’ Continuance of the mental effort means one-pointedness. The Commentary is easy. Here too says the Purāṇa: ‘Meditation is the continuance of one-pointedness with reference to the effort of understanding directed to any object, there being absence of desire to understand anything else at the time. This is brought about, O King, by the foregoing accessories.’—2.

Sūtra 3.

तदेवार्थमात्रनिर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधिः ॥ ३ ॥

3. The same¹ when shining³ with the light¹ of the

object³ alone², and devoid,⁷ as-it-were,⁸ of itself,⁶ is trance⁹ (or 'contemplation, Samâdhi).—109.

तदेवार्थमात्रनिर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधिः । ध्यानमेव ध्येयाकारनिर्भासं प्रत्ययात्मकेन स्वरूपेण शून्यमिव यदा भवति ध्येयस्वभावावेशात्तदा समाधिरित्युच्यते ॥ ३ ॥

VYĀSA.

When on account of the object of contemplation taking entire possession of the mind, contemplation shows forth only the light of the form of the contemplated object, and is devoid, as it were, of its nature of self-cognition, then is it called trance (or contemplation).—109.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author describes trance which is brought about by meditation :

"The same when it shines by the light of the object alone, and is devoid, as it were of itself, is trance." The Bhāṣyakāra explains :— 'When on account of contemplation, etc. ;' 'Shows forth only the form of the object of contemplation ;' 'Devoid, etc.' Inasmuch as the question arises that if it is devoid of the nature of self-cognition, how can it illuminate the object, he adds :— 'As it were.' He mentions its cause :— 'On account of the object of contemplation taking entire possession of the mind.'

The Purāṇa has on this too : "Trance is that in which the mind takes in the nature of the object of thought free from 'Fancy' (kalpanā). It is brought about by meditation." Fancy (kalpanā) consists in the perception of the act and the object of meditation as distinct from each other. The Trance-Cognition is free from this fancy.

Having described the eight accessories of Yoga to Khandikyā, Kuśīdhvaja thus summarized :— 'The knower of the field is the employer of the means. The means is knowledge, that is not intelligent. Having achieved the work of salvation, it has nothing of its duty left to do, and turns back.'—3.

Sūtra 4.

त्रयमेकत्र संयमः ॥ ४ ॥

4. The three¹ together² are Samyama³.—110.

त्रयमेकत्र संयमः । तदेतद्धारणाध्यानसमाधित्रयमेकत्र संयमः । एकविषयाणि त्रीणि साधनानि संयम इत्युच्यते । तदस्य त्रयस्य तान्त्रिकी परिभाषा संयम इति ॥ ४ ॥

VYĀSA.

These three together, concentration, meditation and 'trance' are Samyama. The practice of all the three accessories with reference to one object of thought is Samyama. This word Samyama is a technical term of the science meant to denote the three.—110.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Inasmuch as the mention of concentration, meditation and trance, all three, each by its own separate name at every place, would be very lengthy, this aphorism is introduced

with the object of laying down a technical term for the sake of brevity :—‘The three together are Samyama.’ The Bhāṣyakāra explains :—‘With reference to one object, etc.’ He removes the possible doubt that the word has the radical meaning of these three :—“The word is a technical term, etc.” (The word Tantra in the original means the science of Yoga. Hence ‘Tāntrika’ means a technical term of the science. The province of Samyama is the ‘Three changes’ and such other places.—1.

Sūtra 5.

तज्यात्प्रज्ञालोकः ॥ ५ ॥

5. By achievement² thereof¹ comes the visibility¹ of the Cognition³.—111.

तज्यात्प्रज्ञालोकः । तस्य संयमस्य जयात्समाधिप्रज्ञाया भवत्यालोको यथा यथा संयमः स्थिरपदो भवति तथा तथा समाधिप्रज्ञा विशारदी भवति ॥ ५ ॥

VYĀSA.

By the achievement of this ‘Samyama’ comes the visibility of the Trance-Cognition. As Samyama becomes firmer and firmer, so does the Trance-Cognition become more and more lucid.—111.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author mentions the fruit of the practice for the achievement of Samyama :—‘By achievement thereof comes the visibility of the Cognition.’ Visibility consists in the maintenance of its flow free from impurity and unimpeded by any other effort of cognition. The Commentary is easy.—5.

Sūtra 6.

तस्य भूमिषु विनियोगः ॥ ६ ॥

6. Its¹ application² is to the planes.²—112.

तस्य भूमिषु विनियोगः । तस्य संयमस्य जितभूमेर्यानन्तराभूमिस्तत्र विनियोगः । नह्यजिताधरभूमिरनन्तरभूमिं विलङ्घ्य प्रान्तभूमिषु संयमं लभते । तदभावाच्च कुतस्तस्य प्रज्ञालोक ईश्वरप्रणिधानाज्जितोत्तरभूमिकस्य च नाधरभूमिषु परचित्तज्ञानादिषु संयमो युक्तः । कस्मात्तदर्थस्यान्यथैवावगतत्वाद्भूमेरस्या इयमनन्तरा भूमिरित्यत्र योग पवोपाध्यायः । कथम् । एवं ह्युक्तम् । योगेन योगो ज्ञातव्यो योगो योगात्प्रवर्तते । योऽप्रमत्तस्तु योगेन स योगे रमते चिरमिति ॥ ६ ॥

VYĀSA.

When one plane has been conquered by Samyama, it is applied to the next immediately following. No one who has not conquered the lower plane, can jump over the plane immediately following, and then achieve Samyama with reference to the plane further off. And if this Samyama cannot be achieved, how can the visibility of the Cognition come? For him, however, who has conquered the higher planes by making Īśvara the motive of all actions it is not proper to perform

Samyama with reference to the lower planes, such as thought-reading, &c.' Why? Because the object thereof has already been achieved by means other than this. As to which is the next immediate plane after a certain plane, it is the practice of Yoga alone that will teach this. How? It has been so said :—'The Yoga is to be known by the Yoga; the Yoga becomes manifest by the Yoga; whoever is not confused, enjoys the Yoga for long by the Yoga.'—112.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

But whereto is this Samyama to be applied in order to achieve this fruit? For this reason the author says :—'Its application is to be to the planes.' The Commentator specifies the planes. 'When one plane, &c.' The application is to the unconquered plane immediately following the plane, that is, the mental state, which has been conquered.

When the Indistinct Trance Cognition, having the gross world for its sphere, has been achieved by Samyama, the application of the Samyama is to be to the yet unconquered Distinct Trance. When that has been conquered, the application is to be to the Meditative Transformation. Similar is the application to the Ultra-meditative.

For this very reason the Purâṇa introduces the trance with reference to the subtle objects, after the thought-transformation into gross objects has been achieved, and all the arms and ornaments have been put off one after the other :—'Then let the wise man meditate upon the form of the Lord as devoid of the couch, the club, the discus and the bow, calm and possessing only the rosary of Rudrâkṣa. When concentration has become well-established hereupon, then let the Yogî meditate upon HIM as devoid of the ornaments of head-dress, armlet, &c. Then should he devote himself to HIM as possessed of the limbs alone; and then should he think of himself as HIS SELF. 'I am HE.' Then should he devote himself to the thought of the 'I am' alone.

But then why is it that one conquers the higher plane only after having conquered the lower one? Why does he not conquer in the reverse order? For this reason the Bhāṣya-kāra says :—'No one who has not conquered the lower plane, &c.' No one who starts to the Ganges from the Śilâhrada, reaches the Ganges without first reaching the Meghavâna.

"For him who has conquered the higher planes by making Īśwara the motive of all actions, &c." Why? Because the object, i.e., the conquest of the higher planes, has been achieved by another very proximate means, that is, devotion to God. When an object has been achieved, then the employment of a means for its achievement which does not introduce something new in the expected result, oversteps the propriety of the rule of practice.

Well, let that be. But the sub-planes are known by authority. Their order, however, is not so known. How is that order to be known? For this reason he says :—'As to which is the next, &c.' When the preceding state of Yoga is conquered it becomes the cause of the knowledge of the nature and activity of the next. This is to be understood by seeing that the state is intended to be spoken of as being identical with the object of which the state is named.—6.

Sûtra 7.

त्रयमन्तरङ्गं पूर्वेभ्यः ॥ ७ ॥

7. The three¹ are more-intimate² than-the-preceding.³—113.

त्रयमन्तरङ्गं पूर्वेभ्यः । तदेतद्धारणाध्यानसमाधिः त्रयमन्तरङ्गं संप्रज्ञातस्य समाधेः
पूर्वेभ्यो यमादिभ्यः पञ्चभ्यः साधनेभ्य इति ॥ ७ ॥

VYĀSA.

The three, concentration, meditation and trance are more intimate means of the Cognitive Trance than the preceding five, the restraints, &c.'—113.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

How is it that Samyama alone is to be employed in all places here and there, and not the other five, although both are the accessories of Yoga equally? For this reason the author says :—'The three are more intimate than the preceding ones.' This three-fold means has the object to be achieved as its direct sphere of operation; it is, therefore, called intimate. The restraints, &c., are not such; they are, therefore, called non-intimate. This is the meaning.—7.

Sūtra 8.

तदपि बहिरङ्गं निर्बीजस्य ॥ ८ ॥

8. Even² that¹ is non-intimate³ to the seedless.⁴—114.

तदपि बहिरङ्गं निर्बीजस्य । तदप्यन्तरङ्गं साधनत्रयं निर्बीजस्य योगस्य बहिरङ्गं भवति कस्मात्तदभावे भावादिति ॥ ८ ॥

VYĀSA.

This intimate triad of means too becomes an external accessory of the seedless trance. Why? Because it comes into existence upon its cessation.—114.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The triad of means is intimate only to the Cognitive Trance, not to the Ultra-Cognitive. The Ultra-Cognitive Trance being seedless, there is no similarity between the spheres of their operation and also because the seedless trance is born when the triad of means has long been under restraint, and the Cognitive Trance has reached its highest culmination, or which is the same thing, when the state of the higher desirelessness consisting as it does of the purity of knowledge, is reached. 'The triad of means, &c.' 'Even that is non-intimate to the seedless.'

'Intimacy' consists in having a common sphere of operation. That, however, does not exist here. There is no immediate sequence here. When it is said that the non-intimate means of devotion to the Lord brings about that state and that therefore there is overlapping, it is meant that although the definition of the intimate overlaps, including as it does the means of devotion to the Lord, it does not possess the characteristic of following in immediate sequence and thus differs from the non-intimate. For this reason, in order to show that in the case of the Ultra-Cognitive the Samyama is rather a remote cause, it is said that it comes into existence upon the cessation thereof.—8.

Sūtra 9.

व्युत्थाननिरोधसंस्कारयोरभिभवप्रादुर्भावौ

निरोधक्षणाच्चित्तान्वयो निरोधपरिणामः ॥ ९ ॥

9. The suppressive¹⁰ modification¹¹ is the conjunction⁹ of the mind⁸ with the moment⁷ of suppression⁶ (nirodha), when the outgoing¹ and suppressive² potencies³ disappear⁴ and appear⁵ respectively.—115.

अथ निरोधचित्तक्षणेषु चलं गुणवृत्तमिति कीदृशस्तदा चित्तपरिणामः । व्युत्थाननिरोधसंस्कारयोरभिभवप्रादुर्भावौ निरोधक्षयचित्तान्वयो निरोधपरिणामः । व्युत्थानसंस्काराश्चित्तधर्मा न ते प्रत्ययात्मका इति प्रत्ययनिरोधेन निरुद्धा निरोधसंस्कारा अपि चित्तधर्मास्तयोरभिभवप्रादुर्भावौ व्युत्थानसंस्काराश्चित्तधर्मा हीयन्ते निरोधसंस्कारा आधीयन्ते निरोधक्षयं चित्तमन्वेति तदेकस्य चित्तस्य प्रतिक्षणमिदं संस्कारान्यथात्वं निरोधपरिणामस्तदा संस्कारशेषं चित्तमिति निरोधसमाधौ व्याख्यातम् ॥ ९ ॥

VYĀSA.

Change is of the very nature of the functioning of 'the qualities.' What sort of change does, therefore, take place at the time of this functioning in the moments of mental suppression ? 'The suppressive modification is the conjunction of the mind with the moment of suppression, when the outgoing and suppressive potencies disappear and appear respectively.'

The outgoing potencies are the characteristics of the mind. It is not that they are suppressed by the restraints of the acts of cognition, being of the nature of the acts of cognition, (as they are not of the nature of the acts of cognition). The potencies of suppression too are characteristics of the mind. The respective suppression and appearance of these two, when the characteristics of the outgoing potencies are destroyed and the potencies of suppression acquired, is the moment of suppression which the mind appears in conjunction with. This acquiring of different potencies by the one mind every moment is the suppressive change. In that state the potencies alone are left in the mind. This has been described as the Suppressive Trance.—115.

VĀCHASPATHI'S GLOSS.

The three changes are to be utilized in 'By Samyama over the three changes, &c.' (P. III, 16).

It is desirable to explain them. Hence the question in connection with the seedless trance mentioned in the last aphorism : 'What sort of a change, &c.' In the states of outgoing mental activity and trance (Cognitive), the heaping up of different evident changes is a matter of direct knowledge. No change is, however, perceived in the Suppressive Trance. It is not, however, that it does not exist because it is not directly perceived, inasmuch as the mind is changeable on account of its being made up of the three qualities, and because it is impossible that the 'qualities' should not change even for a moment. This is the meaning of the question. The aphorism is the answer to the question :-- 'The suppressive change is the conjunction of the mind with the moment of suppression, when the outgoing and suppressive potencies appear and disappear respectively.'

In relation to the Ultra-Cognitive the cognitive too is an outgoing. Suppression is that by which this is suppressed,—the illumination of knowledge, the higher desirelessness. The disappearance and appearance (mentioned here) are of these outgoing and suppressive potencies respectively. This being the case, the disappearance of the outgoing and the appearance of the suppressive potency consists in the conjunction of the mind, the characterized, with the moment of suppression. This conjunction in time with the suppression is the conjunction with both these states. The mind as an individualized phenomenon capable of possessing characteristics, does not, either in the Cognitive or the Ultra-Cognitive states, differ in nature from the states of the suppression and manifestation of potencies.

Well, but the afflictions following Nescience, which have their root in Nescience, are removed on the removal of Nescience, and do not after the removal of Nescience stand in need of any other effort distinct therefrom to remove them. In the same way, seeing that the potencies having their origin in the outgoing acts of the mind are removed by the removal of the outgoing activity itself, the potency of suppression should not be needed further for their removal. For this reason the Bhāṣyakāra says :—‘The potencies of the outgoing, &c.’ It is not necessary that the effect should be removed by the mere removal of the cause. The cloth is not destroyed by the removal of the weaver. The fact is that the effect which is of the nature of the cause itself, is only removed upon the removal of that cause.

The afflictions which have been described as following Nescience have been said to be of the nature of Nescience itself. It is, therefore, very proper that they should be removed on the removal of Nescience. It is not in this way that potencies are of the nature of the acts of Cognition; because it is seen that memory exists even though the acts of Cognition have been suppressed for a very long time. For this reason although the acts of Cognition may have ceased for a long time, it is necessary that the storage of potencies of suppression be attended to for the removal of the potencies originating in the acts. The rest is easy. 9.

Sūtra 10.

तस्य प्रशान्तवाहिता संस्कारात् ॥ १० ॥

10. By potency¹ comes its¹ undisturbed² flow³.—116.

तस्य प्रशान्तवाहिता संस्कारात् । निरोधसंस्काराभ्यासपाटवापेक्षा प्रशान्तवाहिता चित्तस्य भवति तत्संस्कारमान्द्ये व्युत्थानधर्माणां संस्कारेण निरोधधर्मः संस्कारो अभिभूयत इति ॥ १० ॥

VYĀSA.

Undisturbed flow comes to the mind by the deftness of practice in the generating of the mental potencies of suppression. In case the potencies are weak, the potency characterized by suppression is overpowered by the potency characterized by outgoing activity.—116.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Of what sort is the change of the mind brought about by means of the powerful suppressive tendency, when the potencies of outgoing activity have been altogether overpowered? In answer to the question the author says: ‘By potency comes its undisturbed flow.’

"Undisturbed flow" means the flow in uninterrupted succession of the suppressive potencies alone, free from the impurity of the outgoing potencies.

But then why does it stand in need of the deftness in generating potencies? Why not potency alone? For this reason the Bhāṣyakāra says: — 'In case the potencies are weak, &c.' The potencies referred to are those of suppression. Those however who read a 'not' before 'overpowered', explain the potencies to be those of the out-going activities.—10.

Sūtra 11.

सर्वार्थतैकाग्रतयोः क्षयोदयो चित्तस्य समाधिपरिणामः ॥ ११ ॥

11. The trance⁶ modification⁷ of the mind⁵ is the destruction³ and rise¹ of all-pointedness¹ and one-pointedness² respectively.—117.

सर्वार्थतैकाग्रतयोः क्षयोदयो चित्तस्य समाधिपरिणामः । सर्वार्थता चित्तधर्मः । एकाग्रतापि चित्तधर्मः । सर्वार्थतायाः क्षयस्तिरोभाव इत्यर्थः । एकाग्रताया उदय आविर्भाव इत्यर्थः । तयोर्धर्मित्वेनानुगतं चित्तं तदिदं चित्तमपायोपजननयोः स्वात्मभूतयोर्धर्मयोरनुगतं समाधीयते स चित्तस्य समाधिपरिणामः ॥ ११ ॥

VYĀSA.

All-pointedness is a characteristic of the mind. One-pointedness is also a characteristic of the mind. The destruction of all-pointedness is its disappearance. The rise of one-pointedness is its appearance. The mind puts on both these characteristics. This mind then following along both these characteristics of destruction and manifestation which make its very nature, inclines towards contemplation. This is the trance modification of the mind.—117.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now the author shows the state of the mental change towards Cognitive trance. 'The trance modification of the mind is the disappearance and rise of all-pointedness and one-pointedness respectively.'

All-pointedness means distractedness. It cannot be destroyed; hence its destruction is only its disappearance. Nothing which exists is destroyed. Rise is appearance. The disappearance and birth of the characteristics of all-pointedness and one-pointedness which are of the very nature of the mind, means that the disappearance is to be of all-pointedness, and the appearance is to be of one-pointedness. The mind following these two becomes inclined towards trance. The meaning is that it becomes qualified by the trance condition which is achieved gradually by the later condition becoming the former.—11.

Sūtra 12.

ततः पुनः शान्तोदितौ तुल्यप्रत्ययौ चित्तस्यैकाग्रतापरिणामः ॥ १२ ॥

12. Thence¹ again² comes the mental⁷ modification⁹

of one-pointedness,* when the subsiding³ and rising⁴ cognitive acts⁶ are similar".—118.

ततः पुनः शान्तोदितौ तुल्यप्रत्ययौ चित्तस्यैकाग्रतापरिणामः । समाहितचित्तस्य पूर्वप्रत्ययः शान्त उत्तरस्तत्सदृश उदितः समाधिचित्तमुभयोरनुगतं पुनस्तथैवासमाधि-
श्रेयादिति । स खल्वयं धर्मिणश्चित्तस्यैकाग्रतापरिणामः ॥ १२ ॥

VYĀSA.

Of him whose mind is inclined towards the trance modification, the former cognitive act subsides ; and the later that rises is similar thereto. The mind inclined towards trance is common to both. The same happens again and again up to the end of trance.

This of course is the modification of the one-pointedness of the mind which exists as an individualized unit independent of the characteristics.—118.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'Thence again comes the mental modification of one-pointedness, when subsiding and cognitive acts are similar.'

Again, when trance having been achieved, the later state of trance becomes the former, the former subsides and the later cognitive trance modification arises. That is to say, one becomes the past and the other the present. When both these cognitive acts of him who has become inclined towards trance, become similar to each other, it becomes one-pointed. This shows the achievement of trance, and also of one-pointedness itself. The Bhāṣyakāra shows the limit :—'Up to the end of trance.'—12.

Sūtra 13.

एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याताः ॥१३॥

13. By this¹ are described⁸ the changes⁷ of characteristic⁴ (dharma), secondary quality⁵ (lakṣaṇa), and condition⁶ (avasthā) in the objective² and instrumental³ phenomena.—119.

एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याताः । एतेन पूर्वोक्तेन चित्त परिणामेन धर्मलक्षणावस्थारूपेण भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्मपरिणामो लक्षणपरिणामोऽवस्थापरिणामश्चोक्तो वेदितव्यः । तत्र व्युत्थाननिरोधयोर्धर्मयोरभिभवप्रादुर्भावौ धर्मिणि धर्मपरिणामो लक्षणपरिणामश्च । निरोधश्चलक्षणस्त्रिभिरध्वभिर्युक्तः । स खल्वनागतलक्षणमध्वानं प्रथमं हित्वा धर्मत्वमनतिक्रान्तो वर्तमानलक्षणं प्रतिपन्नः । यत्रास्य स्वरूपेणाभिव्यक्तिरेषोऽस्य द्वितीयोऽध्वा । न चातीतानागताभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यां विमुक्तः तथा व्युत्थानं त्रिलक्षणं त्रिभिरध्वभिर्युक्तं वर्तमानलक्षणं हित्वा धर्मत्वमनतिक्रान्तमतीतलक्षणं प्रतिपन्नमेषोऽस्य तृतीयोऽध्वा । न चानागतवर्तमानाभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यां विमुक्तः । एवं पुनर्व्युत्थानमुप संपद्यमानमनागतलक्षणं हित्वा धर्मत्वमनतिक्रान्तं वर्तमानलक्षणं प्रतिपन्नं यत्रास्य

स्वरूपाभिव्यक्तौ सत्यां व्यापार एषोऽस्य द्वितीयोऽध्या । न चातीतानागताभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यां विमुक्तमित्येवं पुनर्निरोध एवं पुनर्व्युत्थानमिति । तथावस्थापरिणामः । निरोधक्षणेऽपि निरोधसंस्कारा बलवन्तो भवन्ति दुर्बला व्युत्थानसंस्कारा इति । एष धर्माणामवस्थापरिणामस्तत्र धर्मिणो धर्मैः परिणामो धर्माणां त्रयध्वनां लक्षणैः परिणामो लक्षणानामप्यवस्थाभिः परिणाम इत्येवं धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामैः शून्यं न क्षणमपि गुणवृत्तमवतिष्ठते । चलं च गुणवृत्तम् । गुणस्वाभाव्यं तु प्रवृत्तिकारणमुक्तं गुणानामिति । एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्मधर्मिभेदात्त्रिविधः परिणामो वेदितव्यः । परमार्थतस्त्वेक एव परिणामो धर्मिस्वरूपमात्रा हि धर्मो धर्मविक्रियैवैषा धर्मद्वारा प्रपञ्चयत इति । तत्र धर्मस्य धर्मिणि वर्तमानस्यैवाध्वस्वतीतानागतवर्तमानेषु भावान्यथात्वं भवति न तु द्रव्यान्यथात्वम् । यथा सुवर्णभाजनस्य भित्त्वान्यथ क्रियमाणस्य भावान्यथात्वं भवति न सुवर्णान्यथात्वमिति । अपर आह । धर्मानभ्यधिको धर्मो पूर्वतत्त्वानतिक्रमात् । पूर्वापरावस्थाभेदमनुपतितः कौटस्थ्येनैव परिवर्तते यद्यन्वयो स्यादिति । अयमदोषः । कस्मात् । एकान्ततानभ्युपगमात्तदेतत्त्रैलोक्यं व्यक्तेरपैति नित्यत्वप्रतिषेधात् । अनेतमप्यस्ति विनाशप्रतिषेधात् । संसर्गाच्चास्य सौक्ष्म्यं सौक्ष्म्याच्चाऽनुपलब्धिरिति । लक्षणपरिणामो धर्मोऽध्वसु वर्तमानोऽतीतलक्षणयुक्तोऽनागतवर्तमानाभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यामविमुक्तः । तथा वर्तमानो वर्तमानलक्षणयुक्तोऽतीतानागताभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यामविमुक्त इति । तथानागतोऽनागतलक्षणयुक्तो वर्तमानातोताभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यामविमुक्त इति । यथा पुरुष एकस्यां स्त्रियां रक्तो न शेषासु विरक्तो भवतीति । अत्र लक्षणपरिणामे सर्वस्य सर्वलक्षणयोगादध्वसङ्करः प्राप्नोतीति परैर्दोषश्चोद्यत इति तस्य परिहारः । धर्माणां धर्मत्वमप्रसाध्यम् । सति च धर्मत्वे लक्षणभेदोऽपि वाच्यो न वर्तमानसमय एवास्य धर्मत्वम् । एवं हि न चित्तं रागधर्मकं स्यात् । क्रोधकाले रागस्यासमुदाचारादिति । किंच त्रयाणां लक्षणानां युगपदेकस्यां व्यक्तौ नास्ति सम्भवः । क्रमेण तु स्वव्यञ्जकाञ्जनस्य भावो भवेदिति । उक्तं च रूपातिशया वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च विरुध्यन्ते । सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते तस्मादसङ्करः । यथा रागस्यैव क्वचित्समुदाचार इति न तदानीमन्यत्राभावः किंतु केवलं सामान्येन समन्यागत इत्यस्ति तदा तत्र तस्य भावः । तथा लक्षणस्येति न धर्मो त्रयध्वा । धर्मास्तु त्रयध्वानस्ते लक्षिता अलक्षितास्तत्र लक्षितास्तां तामवस्थां प्राप्नुवन्तोऽन्यत्वेन प्रतिनिर्दिश्यन्ते । अवस्थान्तरतो न द्रव्यान्तरतः । यथैका रेखा शतस्थाने शतं दशस्थाने दश एका चैकस्थाने । यथा चैकत्वेऽपि स्त्री माता वाच्यते दुहिता च स्वसा चेति । अवस्थापरिणामे कौटस्थ्यप्रसङ्गदोषः कैश्चिदुक्तः । कथम् । अध्वनो व्यापारेण व्यवहितत्वाद्यदा धर्मः स्वव्यापारं न करोति तदानागता यदा करोति तदा वर्तमानो यदा कृत्वा निवृत्तस्तदातीत इत्येवं धर्मधर्मिणोर्लक्षणानामवस्थानां च कौटस्थ्यं प्राप्नोतीति परैर्दोष उच्यते । नासौ दोषः । कस्माद्गुणिनित्यत्वेऽपि गुणानां विमर्दवैचित्र्यात् । यथा संस्थानमादिमद्धर्ममात्रं शब्दादीनां गुणानां विनाश्यविनाशिनामेवं लिङ्गमादिमद्धर्ममात्रं सत्त्वादीनां गुणानां विनाश्यविनाशिनां तस्मिन्विचारसंज्ञेति । तत्रेदमुदाहरणं मृद्धमीं पिण्डाकाराद्भूमौद्धर्मान्तरमुपसम्पद्यमानो धर्मतः परिणामते घटाकारमिति । घटाकारोऽनागतं लक्षणं हित्वा वर्तमानलक्षणं प्रतिपद्यत इति लक्षणतः परिणामते । घटो नवपुराणतो प्रतिक्षणमनुभवन्नवस्थापरिणामं प्रतिपद्यत इति । धर्मिणोऽपि धर्मान्तरमवस्था धर्मस्यापि लक्षणान्तरमवस्थेत्येक एव द्रव्यपरिणामो भेदेनोपदिशित इति । एवं पदा-

थान्तरेष्वपि योज्यमिति । त एते धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा धर्मिस्वरूपमनतिक्रान्ता इत्येक
पथ परिणामः सर्वानमून्विशेषानभिप्लवते । अथ कोऽयं परिणामोऽवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य पूर्व-
धर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः परिणाम इति ॥ १३ ॥

VYĀSA.

It must be understood that by describing as above the changes of characteristic, secondary quality and condition with reference to the mind, the change of characteristic, the change of secondary quality and the change of condition with reference to the objective forms of matter and instruments of action and sensation have also been described.

There, the disappearance and appearance of the characteristics of the outgoing activity and suppression were the modifications of characteristic (primary quality) in the characterized (the object as existing independently of the quality); also the modification of secondary quality. Suppression has three secondary qualities; it is connected with three paths of being (*adhivâ*).

Having given up the first path of being, which consists of the secondary quality not yet manifested, it takes it up as a secondary quality existing in the present, although it has not thereby overstepped its primary quality. It is in this secondary quality which manifests in the present that its true nature is manifested. This is its second path of being. It is not devoid of the past and the yet-unmanifested qualities (*lakṣaṇa*).

Similarly is the outgoing activity possessed of three secondary qualities and is connected with three paths of being. Having given up the present secondary quality, but not having given up its characteristic, it puts it on as the second quality of the past. This is its third path of being, and it is not devoid of the secondary qualities of the future and the present.

Similarly, inclining again to outward activity, it gives up the yet-unmanifested secondary quality; but not having given up its characteristic of existence as such, it gets on to it as the secondary quality of the present, where manifesting its true nature, it acts as such. This is its second path of being. And it is not devoid of the past and the future secondary qualities.

Similarly, suppression again and outgoing activity again.

Similar is the modification of condition. During moments of suppression, the suppressive potencies are being strengthened; and the potencies of the outgoing activities are being weakened. This is the modification of the conditions of the characteristics.

Thus the object changes by means of the characteristics ; the characteristics possessed of three paths of being are changed by means of secondary qualities ; the secondary qualities too are modified into conditions.

Thus is it that the functioning of the " qualities " is never devoid even for a moment of the changes of the characteristics, secondary qualities and conditions ; and the functioning of the ' qualities ' consists in ceaseless activity. It has further been said that the cause of the activity of the ' qualities ' is their very nature.

By this must be understood the three-fold change in the objective and instrumental phenomena, due to the conception of a distinction between the characteristic and the characterized. In reality, however, there is but one change, because the characteristic is the very being itself of the characterized ; and it is the change of the characterized alone that is detailed by means of the characteristic. It is only the characteristic present in the characterized object that changes states in the past, the present and future, the substance is not changed. Thus when a vessel of gold is broken to be made into something else, it is only the condition that changes, not the gold.

Another says :—The characterized is nothing more than the characteristic, inasmuch as the reality of the former does not overstep the latter. If it were something co-existent, it would change as an independent existence only, simply changing into distinct anterior and posterior conditions.

This is no defect. Why ? Because constancy is not found therein. Thus the three worlds give up their individual appearances, because eternity has been denied to them. Yet they exist in the case of disappearance also, because destruction has been denied to them.

Further its subtlety is due to conjunctive existence ; and it is not perceived on account of its subtlety.

The change of secondary qualities is the moving of the characteristic along the paths of being. The past characteristic joined to the past secondary quality, is not devoid of the future and the present secondary quality.

Similarly, the present (characteristic) joined to the present secondary quality is not devoid of the past and the future secondary quality. Similarly, the future joined to the future secondary quality is not devoid of the present and the past secondary qualities. For example, a man who is attached to one woman, does not hate all the others.

Others find a fault in this change of secondary qualities. They say that all the qualities being in simultaneous existence, their paths of

being must be confused, (and thus overlapping one another can not be considered as distinct and different.)

This is thus met with. That the characteristics do exist as such requires no proof. When there is such a thing as a characteristic, the differences of the secondary qualities also must be posited. It is not only in the present time that the characteristic characterizes. If it were so the mind would not possess the characteristic of attachment, seeing that attachment is not in manifestation at the time of anger. Further the three secondary qualities are not possible of existence in one individual simultaneously. They may however appear in succession by virtue of the operation of their several causes. And so it has been said :--' The intensities of nature and those of function are opposed to each other ; but the ordinary manifestations co-exist with the intense ones.' Therefore there is no confusion. For example, attachment being in the height of manifestation with reference to some object, it does not for that reason cease to exist with reference to all other objects. On the contrary it is then ordinarily in existence with reference to them.

Similar is the case with the secondary qualities. It is not the characterized object that is possessed of the three paths of being. It is the characteristics that are possessed of the three paths. They may be visible or latent. Of these the visible ones assume different conditions, and are termed accordingly differently, because the conditions are different and not the substance. This is in the same way, as the figure of 1 means ten in the place of ten, hundred in the place of hundred, and one in the place of unity. Or again a woman, although one, is called a mother, a daughter and a sister.

Some make the theory of change of condition defective as rendering independent existence necessary. How? There being intervals between the operations of the paths of being a characteristic is the future one, when it does not perform its function ; it is the present one when it does ; it has become the past when it has ceased to operate

Now the defect that the opponents find is that in this way, the characteristic and the characterized object, as also the secondary quality and the condition must necessarily be considered as independent existences.

This is no defect. Why? On account of the variety due to the interaction of the 'qualities' even in case of the 'qualified' being permanent. As the coming together of the indestructible qualities of sound, &c., is only a characteristic having a beginning and is destructible, so also is the undifferentiated phenomenal state of matter with a beginning,

and is only a characteristic of the indestructible 'qualities' of Essentiality, &c., and is as such destructible. It is for this reason that it is termed a 'vikâra,' a product. Here is an illustration in this connection. Clay is an object possessed of characteristics. Its existence in the shape of a sod is a characteristic thereof. (Giving up this particular characteristic it takes up another; and thus takes up another characteristic when it takes up the form of a jar. In the form of a jar its secondary quality gives up its futurity and comes to possess the secondary quality as manifested in the present. It thus changes its secondary quality. The jar changes, showing comparative oldness and newness every moment. This is change of condition.

Another characteristic taken up by the characterized substratum is but a change of condition. Of the characteristic too another secondary quality is a change of condition. It is, therefore, the change of one substance only that is thus shown by differentiation. In this way may this be applied to other things also. Thus it is that the changes of characteristic, secondary quality and condition do not overstep the being of the characterized substratum, and it is for this reason that there is but one change which runs through all these specializations thereof.

Well what is this change? Change is the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of a substance which remains constant.—119.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author classifies the changes of the objective and instrumental phenomena of matter, whose use will be described later, but whose occasion has come now :—'By this the changes of characteristic, secondary quality and condition in the objective and instrumental phenomena have been described.'

The Commentator explains :—'It must be understood, &c.' The question is that it is the fact only of mental change that has been mentioned, not its modes in the shape of characteristic, secondary quality and condition. How is it then that they are spoken of here over and above that? For this reason he says :—'There the disappearance and appearance of the characteristics of outgoing and suppression, &c.' The brief meaning is that the words of characteristic, secondary quality and condition have no doubt not been used, but it is not that for that reason the changes themselves of characteristic, secondary quality and condition have not been described. Thus in the aphorism :—'The suppressive modifications, &c.' (III. 9), the change of characteristic is spoken of.

Further he says that by showing this change of characteristic, the change of secondary quality also in the characteristic taken as substratum is indicated :—'So also the change of secondary quality.'

Secondary quality stands for 'Lakṣaṇa.' It means that by which something is indicated. This quality is due to difference in time. It is by time that a thing is given certain qualities, by means of which it is differentiated from certain things standing in a different relationship to time.

Suppression has three different secondary qualities. It is but another mode of saying that it is related to three paths of being. The word 'adhvā', path of being, implies time.

"Having given up the first path of being, which consists of the secondary quality not yet manifested": -

The question arises, 'Does this suppression, while giving up the first path of being, overstep the nature of the characteristic too in the same way as it gives up the path of being? The Commentator says that it does not: - "Although it has not overstepped its primary quality too."

It does not overstep its characteristic, but takes up the secondary quality as existing in the present. The same suppression which had not manifested yet, has now come into present existence, not that suppression has become non-suppression.

The meaning of the nature of a thing existing in the present is now described: - 'It is in this secondary quality which manifests in the present that its true nature is manifested.'

'True nature' is that which performs the function proper to its existence as such.

Manifestation means its essentialization as such.

With reference to the yet unmanifested first path of being this is its second path of being.

Well if it be so that it gives up the yet unmanifested path of being and takes up the present, and that having given up the present state, it will pass on to the past path of being, then, it necessarily follows that paths of being are subject to birth and destruction. This however is not proper, because nothing is born that exists not, nor is anything that exists destroyed. For this reason the Commentator says: - 'And it is not devoid of the past and the yet unmanifested secondary qualities,' which go on existing in their generic unspecialized state.

Having shown the secondary quality of the present existence of the yet unmanifested suppression, the Commentator now shows the third path of being, the passing on to the past of the present outgoing activity: -

"Similar is the outgoing activity, &c."

Well then does suppression alone exist in the yet unmanifested state, not outgoing activity? The Commentator says No: - 'Similarly inclining again to outward activity, &c.'

This repeated manifestation of the outgoing activity is not the manifestation of any individual output thereof. It is a manifestation of the same class only. That which has passed can not come back.

"The manifestation of true nature is the essentialization of the object as possessing the capacity of performing its proper function."

It is this change of secondary quality thus described, which appears with reference to objects of the same class over and over again. For this reason the Commentator says: - 'Similarly, suppression again, &c.'

Now he describes the change of condition which is indicated by the change of characteristic: 'Similar is the modification, &c.'

The strength and weakness of the characteristics in their present path of being, are their conditions. The increase or decrease of weakness and strength every moment is the change of condition.

He summarizes: - 'This is the modification of the conditions of the characteristics.'

Now he determines the different relations of the different changes: - 'Thus the object changes, &c.'

Is then this change of the 'qualities' only occasional? He says No: - 'Thus it is that the functioning of the qualities is never, &c.'

But then why is this change ever-existent? He says:—'The functioning of the qualities consists in ceaseless activity.' The word 'and' in this sentence means a cause.

Functioning means action. But whence this functioning itself? He says:—'It is of their very nature.' 'It has been said' hereinbefore.

This three-fold change of the mind is taught by the author of the Aphorisms to be existing in the objective and instrumental phenomena of matter. He says:—'By this must be understood, &c.'

'This' means the distinction between the characteristic and the characterized. When the distinction between the characteristic and the characterized is kept in sight, the physical elements of *Prithvī*, &c., are the objects characterized, and the bodies of cow, &c., or the jar, &c., are the changes of the characteristic thereof. The forms which the characteristics put on in the past and the yet unmanifested and the present ones constitute the change of their secondary quality. When the cow, &c., have taken up the secondary qualities as existing in the present, their change of condition consists in their taking up the states of the newly born calf, a little advanced in age, youth and old age. In the case of the jar, &c., too, their newness and oldness are their changes of condition.

Similarly are the instrumental phenomena the characterized objects. The taking in of this or that blue, &c., is the change of characteristic of the sense of sight. The change of secondary quality consists in the assumption by the characteristic, of the qualities due to the existence in the present, &c., as such. The present sensation of a jewel, &c., may be distinct or indistinct. This is its change of condition.

The change of the objective and instrumental phenomena is described, looking upon the characteristic, the secondary quality and condition as distinct from the characterized.

Now the Commentator speaks of them when they are looked upon as the same:—'In reality, however, there is but one change, &c.' The word 'however' turns away from the other view according to which the characteristic and the characterized are looked upon as distinct. Its reality is made known here, not that the nature of change is denied to the other. For what reason? 'Because the characteristic is the very being of the characterized.'

The question is that if the characteristic is only a modification of the characterized, how is it that people do not confuse the notions of the changes? For this reason he says:—'And it is the change of the characterized alone that is detailed through the characteristic.' By the word 'characteristic' here are understood all the three things, namely, characteristic, secondary quality and condition. All this is the modification of the characterized alone by means of them. There is, therefore, but one change of the characteristic, &c., one not confused with the others, because there is no real distinction between them, the characterized objects themselves do not overlap one another.

The question arises that inasmuch as the characteristic and the characterized are not different from each other, and because the paths of being of the characterized objects are different, the characteristic also must in this case behave as the characterized object, on account of the characteristic and the characterized object being the same. For this reason he says:—'It is only the characteristic present in the characterized, &c.'

'That changes states':—The word 'state' here means a different arrangement of the thing, a different appearance. Thus when vessels of gold are styled differently as a *Ruchaka* and *Svastika*, they differ only so far; not that the substance gold becomes not-gold. The reason is evident. They do not differ entirely. This will be stated further on.

The Commentator brings forward the example of the *Bauddha*, who holds that the characteristic only is what exists:—'Another says:—It is only the characteristics of the *Ruchaka*, &c., that are being thus born, which are the realities. There is no such

thing as gold which might be looked upon as a substance remaining the same among more changes than one. If there be such a thing as substance which remains constant even though the characteristics are being changed, then that thing would be immutable like the power of consciousness. It would become an independent reality; independent, that is to say, of the change which is of the very nature of the thing appearing to change. As the power of consciousness does not give up its nature even though the 'qualities' are constantly putting on different appearances, and is therefore independently eternal, so also would gold, &c., become independently eternal. This, however, is not desirable. Therefore the characteristic is not different from the characterized; the substance is not different from the qualities.

The Commentator refutes this argument:— 'This is no defect. Why? Because constancy is not found therein.'

We might admit this if we found that as a matter of fact the substance was constant in its so-called eternity like unto the power of consciousness. We, however, do not find this constancy of eternity. On the other hand the whole of this world, to say nothing of one substance only, is seen giving up its individual appearances; the appearances, that is to say, that are meant to perform certain functions.

How is this? On account of eternity being denied to them by the authority of reasoning. If a jar of earth did not give up its individuality of appearance, it would plainly be seen as a jar even when it existed in the condition of a half-jar or in that of powdered clay, &c.; and it would go on performing its function too all the same as before. Hence the three worlds are non-eternal.

Well then let it be non-eternal alone, being practically quite non-existent as it is like the lotus of the sky, on account of its universality and the non-performance of any function. For this reason he says:— 'It exists in the case of non-appearance also, because destruction has been denied to it.'

The meaning is that it is not so very insignificant as to be altogether non-eternal and therefore to be classed as non-existent. Why? Because destruction has been denied to it by reason.

Thus stands the reasoning:—

That which is non-existent is never visible and does not perform any function, as the lotus of the sky.

The three worlds, however, sometimes have some functions and are visible.

So are the following causes proving its existence to be mentioned. A thing is seen being born; characteristic, secondary quality and conditions are ever found appearing therein. For this reason they are out of the category of such non-existent things as the lotus of the sky and the horns of a man.

It is not, therefore, constant in its eternity, so that it may be classed with the independent reality of consciousness. On the contrary it is only in a way eternal. This also proves that it is changeful. It is eternal in its change.

By this it must be understood that in a piece of clay exist its effects, the states of the jar, &c., which have not yet expressed themselves. Well, let that be. But if it exists even if removed, how is it that it is not perceived as before? For this reason the Commentator says:— 'It becomes subtle on account of conjunctive existence, that is, on account of its mergence into the causal state. It becomes unperceivable on account of its subtlety and is not, therefore, perceived.'

Having thus explained the change of characteristic the Commentator now explains the change of secondary qualities also as such secondary qualities.

'The change of secondary qualities, &c.'

The meaning is that each secondary quality is followed by others along with itself,


The question is that inasmuch as at the time of conjunction with one secondary quality, the others are not perceived, how can it be said that the others also are present along with it? For this reason the Commentator says:—‘For example, a man who is attached to one woman, &c.’ The non-existence of perception does not disprove the existence of anything, proved to exist by other means of knowledge. The birth itself of a thing at different places is a reason for its existence. Nothing that exists not, can be born. As for example, the horn of a man.

The Commentator states a defect suggested by another:—‘Others find a fault in this change of secondary quality.’ If the past and the present exist at the time when the present characteristic is in existence in the present, then the three paths of being must overlap one another. If, however, the paths come into being one after the other, then it comes to this that the non-existent comes into existence. This is the meaning.

He refutes the argument:—‘This is thus met with, &c.’ The existence of the characteristics in the present is only proved by perception. It also gives the knowledge of its existence in the past and in the future as related to the present. It is plain that the non-existing does not come into existence and the existing is not destroyed. He says the same:—‘If it were so the mind would not possess, &c.’ The mind is found possessing the characteristic of attachment after the time of anger has passed away. If it be that attachment did not exist at the time of anger as capable of manifestation in the future, how could it be born? and if not born how could it be perceived?

It may be so. Even then, however, how is it proved that paths of being do not overlap? He gives the answer:—‘Further the three secondary qualities, &c.’ The three secondary qualities are impossible of existence simultaneously. Where? In one mental modification. . . . Succession, however, one of the qualities does come into manifestation by virtue of its manifesting cause. The ascertainment of the secondary qualities being dependent upon the thing qualified thereby, it is along with the form of the thing qualified that the mind becomes possessed of the qualities. He quotes Pāñchajīkhā Achārya on this very subject:—‘And so it has been said, &c.’ This has been explained before. He summarizes:—‘Therefore there is, &c.’ On account of the contrary characteristics of manifestation and disappearance remaining merged in the cause, the paths of being do not overlap. He gives an illustration:—‘For example, attachment to, &c.’ The knowledge of the existence of attachment with anger was explained before. Now, however, is explained the existence of relationship existing between attachment with respect to one object and attachment with reference to another. He applies the illustration to the subject to be illustrated:—‘Similar is the case with secondary qualities, &c.’

The question is that inasmuch as identity can exist even though the identical object may not be perceived as such altogether, it follows that characteristic, secondary quality and condition being distinct phenomena, the characterized object which is nothing separate from them, should also be considered to be distinct from itself under each and every one of these varying states. He says that this view is not desirable, because it is contradicted by the perception of the identical substance remaining the same under all varying states. ‘It is not the characterized object that is possessed of the three paths of being,’ because the characteristics which are not distinct from it, are possessed of the three paths of being. The fact of the taking up of the three paths of being by the characteristics is further elucidated:—‘They are either visible, i. e., essential, present, or latent, that is not in esse. These are the past and the future. Of these, visible ones assume different states of strength and weakness, &c., and are termed accordingly differently, because the states are different, not the substance. By the word state are to be understood here all the three things, namely, characteristic, secondary quality and condition. This is the meaning. It is only perception as such that establishes the distinction from, or the identity



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